Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
The geopolitical chessboard of the Middle East has entered a new phase in which Iran’s strategic calculus is increasingly shaped by external threats and internal governance challenges, including a society demanding progress. Tehran faces a multidimensional crisis that is testing its economic resilience, diplomatic agility, and domestic legitimacy.
Among its adversaries are a rising Israel, supported by the U.S. Since the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel nearly two years ago, Israel’s vision of a “Greater Israel” appears to have evolved from a biblical concept into a modern geopolitical strategy aimed at establishing dominance across the Levant. Rooted in historical claims to lands spanning the Jordan River to the Mediterranean, this policy now manifests through superior military force as well as strategic alliances with the U.S. and Europe. By weakening Iran, which had supported Hamas and other non-state enemies of Israel, Israel seeks to redraw the Middle East’s security architecture, positioning itself as the indispensable regional power and gatekeeper for energy corridors, counterterrorism operations, and trade routes.
Israel’s ascendancy has caused unease among other regional powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey fears that Israel’s expansionism threatens Ankara’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and its influence in Syria and Libya. Saudi Arabia worries that a post-Iran power vacuum could destabilize the Arab consensus on the Palestinian issue and embolden domestic dissent over normalization.
The prospect is of a Middle East split between Israeli-aligned and resistance blocs. Turkey’s recent outreach to Iran and Qatar signals an attempt to forge a counterweight, while Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 hedges bets by diversifying partnerships with China and Russia. Smaller Gulf states fear becoming vassals in a hierarchy where their security depends on Washington and Tel Aviv. Crucially, Israel’s insistence on military primacy risks triggering unintended escalations, from Turkey to Yemen, where an Israeli airstrike on August 28 killed the Houthi prime minister and other officials. For Ankara and Riyadh, the challenge lies in balancing pragmatic cooperation with Israel and the U.S. against the existential threat of becoming secondary players in their own region.
Iran’s predicament is even more dire. Still recovering from a 12-day war by Israel joined at the end by the U.S., Iran now confronts the prospect that it will face renewed UN sanctions. On August 28, European powers began the process of snapping back the multilateral penalties against Iran that were imposed starting in 2006 but were lifted by the 2015 nuclear deal. The European announcement led to yet another precipitous drop in the value of Iran’s currency and worsening projections for the economy, even though the sanctions mostly have to do with arms transfers. Government efforts to stem the decline are further complicated by societal demands for peace, development, and transparency from a tech-savvy, globally connected younger generation. This convergence of pressures has left the regime scrambling to maintain control while projecting strength externally.
Iran’s dilemma was illustrated by initial reactions to the threat of snapback. On the day the Europeans began the process, the Iranian parliament voted to implement long-standing threats to quit the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), halt all inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and end any nuclear negotiations with Europe or the U.S. Such momentous decisions ultimately rest with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. At a time when relations between Tehran and the West have already reached their lowest level in many years, the consequences of exiting the NPT would not be limited solely to the nuclear domain but also affect the future of Iran’s overall relations with the global community.
With only 30 days before snapback could occur, Iran must decide whether to increase cooperation with the IAEA and to make major concessions that could revive stalled talks with the Trump administration despite continuing anger over the Israeli and U.S. attacks, which occurred while Iran was still in negotiations with Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff.
Some Iranian officials have sought to project defiance. On the social media platform X, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called the European action “immoral, unjustified, and unlawful.” Former foreign minister and nuclear negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif concurred and accused the Europeans of failing to meet their obligations after the U.S. withdrew unilaterally from the nuclear agreement in 2018. Zarif asserted that the real threat to Israel is an end to war, not Iran’s nuclear program, which was heavily damaged in the Israeli-US strikes.
Another former diplomat, Jalal Sadatian, argued that Europe and the U.S. need to show more flexibility. However, international affairs analyst and former diplomat Ghasem Mohebali criticized Iran’s past nuclear brinkmanship on issues such as indigenous uranium enrichment as counterproductive, arguing that it strengthened the international consensus against Tehran. Mohebali urged more cooperation with the IAEA and innovative proposals to defuse multilateral pressure and make it harder for Israel to justify new military strikes.
Other critics argued against reliance on China or Russia and said the focus should be on broadening society’s support for the government to counter Israeli efforts at regime change.
While the nuclear dossier remains a focal point, it increasingly serves as a proxy for deeper geopolitical rivalries. Even if Tehran were to dismantle its program entirely, many in Iran believe that Western powers would likely pivot to human rights, Iran’s missile program, or regional proxy activities to maintain pressure. Thus, nuclear concessions would not end Iran’s isolation but merely shift the battleground.
Domestically, Iran’s institutional and civil capacities have been underestimated by adversaries. But while Israel’s efforts to promote regime change, including by boosting exiled opposition groups and figures like Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late Shah, have so far not succeeded, military strategists warn of new hybrid threats, including potential foreign-backed coups combining cyberattacks, targeted assassinations, and urban warfare.
Tehran faces a choice. The conservative approach prioritizes centralization: tightening security measures, suppressing dissent, and doubling down on regional proxies. Yet this policy risks exacerbating economic stagnation and social unrest. Alternatively, mobilizing public opinion by making meaningful domestic policy changes, such as releasing political prisoners and ending internet filtering, could begin to renew the system’s waning political legitimacy.
Iran stands at an inflection point where foreign policy cannot be decoupled from domestic change. The regime’s ultimate survival hinges on countering existential external threats while addressing societal demands for modernity and accountability. For Israel, the gamble lies in whether regime change would yield a more pliable neighbor or unleash chaos, empowering even worse adversaries. In this contest, Tehran’s greatest asset may be civil resilience — if harnessed through inclusive governance rather than suppressed by paranoia. The alternative — a cycle of escalation culminating in regional conflagration — will serve neither Iranians nor Israelis, only the hubris of their leaders.
“Snapback” Compounds the Multidimensional Crisis Facing Iran
By Anonymous
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
The geopolitical chessboard of the Middle East has entered a new phase in which Iran’s strategic calculus is increasingly shaped by external threats and internal governance challenges, including a society demanding progress. Tehran faces a multidimensional crisis that is testing its economic resilience, diplomatic agility, and domestic legitimacy.
Among its adversaries are a rising Israel, supported by the U.S. Since the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel nearly two years ago, Israel’s vision of a “Greater Israel” appears to have evolved from a biblical concept into a modern geopolitical strategy aimed at establishing dominance across the Levant. Rooted in historical claims to lands spanning the Jordan River to the Mediterranean, this policy now manifests through superior military force as well as strategic alliances with the U.S. and Europe. By weakening Iran, which had supported Hamas and other non-state enemies of Israel, Israel seeks to redraw the Middle East’s security architecture, positioning itself as the indispensable regional power and gatekeeper for energy corridors, counterterrorism operations, and trade routes.
Israel’s ascendancy has caused unease among other regional powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey fears that Israel’s expansionism threatens Ankara’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and its influence in Syria and Libya. Saudi Arabia worries that a post-Iran power vacuum could destabilize the Arab consensus on the Palestinian issue and embolden domestic dissent over normalization.
The prospect is of a Middle East split between Israeli-aligned and resistance blocs. Turkey’s recent outreach to Iran and Qatar signals an attempt to forge a counterweight, while Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 hedges bets by diversifying partnerships with China and Russia. Smaller Gulf states fear becoming vassals in a hierarchy where their security depends on Washington and Tel Aviv. Crucially, Israel’s insistence on military primacy risks triggering unintended escalations, from Turkey to Yemen, where an Israeli airstrike on August 28 killed the Houthi prime minister and other officials. For Ankara and Riyadh, the challenge lies in balancing pragmatic cooperation with Israel and the U.S. against the existential threat of becoming secondary players in their own region.
Iran’s predicament is even more dire. Still recovering from a 12-day war by Israel joined at the end by the U.S., Iran now confronts the prospect that it will face renewed UN sanctions. On August 28, European powers began the process of snapping back the multilateral penalties against Iran that were imposed starting in 2006 but were lifted by the 2015 nuclear deal. The European announcement led to yet another precipitous drop in the value of Iran’s currency and worsening projections for the economy, even though the sanctions mostly have to do with arms transfers. Government efforts to stem the decline are further complicated by societal demands for peace, development, and transparency from a tech-savvy, globally connected younger generation. This convergence of pressures has left the regime scrambling to maintain control while projecting strength externally.
Iran’s dilemma was illustrated by initial reactions to the threat of snapback. On the day the Europeans began the process, the Iranian parliament voted to implement long-standing threats to quit the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), halt all inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and end any nuclear negotiations with Europe or the U.S. Such momentous decisions ultimately rest with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. At a time when relations between Tehran and the West have already reached their lowest level in many years, the consequences of exiting the NPT would not be limited solely to the nuclear domain but also affect the future of Iran’s overall relations with the global community.
With only 30 days before snapback could occur, Iran must decide whether to increase cooperation with the IAEA and to make major concessions that could revive stalled talks with the Trump administration despite continuing anger over the Israeli and U.S. attacks, which occurred while Iran was still in negotiations with Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff.
Some Iranian officials have sought to project defiance. On the social media platform X, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called the European action “immoral, unjustified, and unlawful.” Former foreign minister and nuclear negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif concurred and accused the Europeans of failing to meet their obligations after the U.S. withdrew unilaterally from the nuclear agreement in 2018. Zarif asserted that the real threat to Israel is an end to war, not Iran’s nuclear program, which was heavily damaged in the Israeli-US strikes.
Another former diplomat, Jalal Sadatian, argued that Europe and the U.S. need to show more flexibility. However, international affairs analyst and former diplomat Ghasem Mohebali criticized Iran’s past nuclear brinkmanship on issues such as indigenous uranium enrichment as counterproductive, arguing that it strengthened the international consensus against Tehran. Mohebali urged more cooperation with the IAEA and innovative proposals to defuse multilateral pressure and make it harder for Israel to justify new military strikes.
Other critics argued against reliance on China or Russia and said the focus should be on broadening society’s support for the government to counter Israeli efforts at regime change.
While the nuclear dossier remains a focal point, it increasingly serves as a proxy for deeper geopolitical rivalries. Even if Tehran were to dismantle its program entirely, many in Iran believe that Western powers would likely pivot to human rights, Iran’s missile program, or regional proxy activities to maintain pressure. Thus, nuclear concessions would not end Iran’s isolation but merely shift the battleground.
Domestically, Iran’s institutional and civil capacities have been underestimated by adversaries. But while Israel’s efforts to promote regime change, including by boosting exiled opposition groups and figures like Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late Shah, have so far not succeeded, military strategists warn of new hybrid threats, including potential foreign-backed coups combining cyberattacks, targeted assassinations, and urban warfare.
Tehran faces a choice. The conservative approach prioritizes centralization: tightening security measures, suppressing dissent, and doubling down on regional proxies. Yet this policy risks exacerbating economic stagnation and social unrest. Alternatively, mobilizing public opinion by making meaningful domestic policy changes, such as releasing political prisoners and ending internet filtering, could begin to renew the system’s waning political legitimacy.
Iran stands at an inflection point where foreign policy cannot be decoupled from domestic change. The regime’s ultimate survival hinges on countering existential external threats while addressing societal demands for modernity and accountability. For Israel, the gamble lies in whether regime change would yield a more pliable neighbor or unleash chaos, empowering even worse adversaries. In this contest, Tehran’s greatest asset may be civil resilience — if harnessed through inclusive governance rather than suppressed by paranoia. The alternative — a cycle of escalation culminating in regional conflagration — will serve neither Iranians nor Israelis, only the hubris of their leaders.
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