Editor’s Note: Burak Can Çelik is a geopolitical analyst and researcher specializing in international relations, Middle Eastern politics, and global strategic affairs. His work focuses on U.S. and Israeli foreign policy, Turkish regional strategy, and the evolving balance of power in the Middle East. A graduate in International Relations from Karabük University, he has published in both Turkish- and English-language media, including The New Arab and Al-Monitor.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Iraq’s Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline resumed oil flows on September 27 for the first time since early 2023.
Under a US-mediated agreement between Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Turkey, and foreign oil companies, 180,000–190,000 barrels per day (bpd)of crude now flows south from Kirkuk to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Turkish officials anticipate an eventual rise to about 230,000 bpd — close to the level before the 2023 shutdown.
The reopening ends a two-year impasse triggered by a March 2023 order by a tribunal of the International Criminal Court, which fined Turkey $1.5 billion for allowing the KRG to export oil independently of authority from Baghdad. Under the new deal, all crude from KRG fields will be delivered to the Iraqi federal State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) for export. About 50,000 bpd will remain for local consumption, with the remainder sent to Ceyhan. The arrangement will effectively restore Iraq’s export capacity to nearly 3.6 million bpd. For Iraq, clearing the bottleneck boosts revenues and economic stability. For the KRG, it revives its long-stalled oil economy under federal oversight.
Turkey is also a major beneficiary. Before March 2023, Turkey earned $200-300 million per year in transit revenue from the pipeline. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has emphasized that the 970-kilometer-long line can carry up to 1.5-1.6 million bpd. With the revival of exports, Turkey not only recovers lost fees but also reinforces its role as an energy hub between East and West. If all goes to plan, Iraqi oil will have a fresh path to world markets, reducing global reliance on potential choke points like the Strait of Hormuz and the congested Persian Gulf.
Some issues remain unresolved. The KRG owes nearly $1 billion to international oil companies for past production, and companies like DNO/Genel have withheld full participation pending debt assurances. To address this, the eight firms that signed the resumption deal agreed to meet within 30 days to negotiate a debt‐settlement mechanism. In the meantime, foreign producers operating in the KRG will be paid a premium of about $16 per barrel to cover production and transit costs.
In addition to the pipeline deal, Turkey has reached out to other Arab states for energy partnerships, deepening ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular. In 2023, on a visit to the Gulf, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed 13 deals worth $50.7 billion, of which $29.7 billion were dedicated to energy projects, including solar and wind power, green hydrogen and ammonia production, natural gas, and nuclear energy cooperation. Around $27 billion of the UAE package targets the clean energy sector, aligning with Turkey’s 2053 net-zero goal.
Deals signed with Saudi Arabia include cooperation on refined petroleum products, petrochemicals, and 4-5 gigawatts of renewable generation capacity in Turkey. Saudi utility developers could fund new wind and solar parks in Anatolia, while Turkey could benefit from the kingdom’s expertise in mega-project execution. Strategic infrastructure is also on the table: Saudi Arabia is moving to connect its electric grid to Iraq’s, a link that could extend to Turkey in the future.
The UAE’s Masdar, a major clean energy company, and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power have both signaled interest in the Turkish renewable venture Fiba. Their potential entry, through equity stakes or joint ventures, could accelerate Turkey’s renewable rollout, helping Ankara meet its target of 65% renewables in installed capacity by 2035. Green hydrogen is another promising arena for cooperation. Turkey aims to produce up to 10.5 million tons of hydrogen annually by 2053 under its climate pledges, and the Gulf nations are also racing to become top hydrogen exporters. Joint hydrogen projects — using Turkish wind power and Gulf solar to produce ammonia fuel for export — could marry each side’s advantages.
The energy projects dovetail with a broader geopolitical warming between Turkey and the Gulf after years of rivalry emanating from Turkish support for Islamist rebellions during the 2011 Arab Spring.
China’s Middle Corridor and Eurasian Connectivity
These developments intersect with other projects promoting Eurasian connectivity, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and, in particular, the Middle Corridor or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route — a network of railways, roads, and ferry links that conveys goods from China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. The Middle Corridor bypasses sanctioned areas, boosting its relevance since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
China has worked with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to improve infrastructure and streamline customs along this path. Turkey, sitting at the corridor’s western end, hopes to integrate the plans with its own logistical investments. As Turkey cements its role as an oil and gas conduit — via pipelines from Azerbaijan, potentially Iraq and the Gulf, and maybe Turkmenistan in the future — China could leverage this for secure energy transport to and from Eurasian markets.
Kazakhstan’s oil is already shipped across the Caspian to Baku and on to Ceyhan, Turkey, for Mediterranean export, and discussions are underway about Turkmenistan sending gas to Turkey’s TANAP pipeline. The planned Development Roadthrough Iraq (supported by Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar) could interface with the Middle Corridor to create a more extensive lattice of trade routes and reduce transit times by 10 days compared to the Suez Canal. Chinese officials have publicly noted that the Iraq-Turkey Development Road “stands to complement the Belt and Road Initiative.” However, China has not been a direct stakeholder in funding or building the Development Road so far, leaving Gulf investors and Turkey to take the lead.
Implications for Regional Influence and Trade Architecture
The confluence of these trends is reshaping the geopolitical map. Europe and global markets are gaining alternative oil and gas supply routes, while the Middle East’s producers have more export options. By hosting key oil pipelines, negotiating gas deals, and sitting astride both the Middle Corridor and the Development Road, Turkey gains influence that can be leveraged in diplomacy with both East and West. The Gulf states, through strategic investments, are extending their economic influence into Turkey and Iraq, tying the region together. All these players are effectively weaving a new East-West trade architecture that is less dependent on traditional nodes like the Suez Canal or Russian railroads.
In conclusion, the reopening of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline, Gulf-Turkey energy partnerships, and the Middle Corridor’s expansion point to an emerging infrastructure network across West and Central Asia that diminishes traditional bottlenecks and empowers regional middle players. Energy flows and trade routes are the sinews of power; as they realign, so, too, does influence. The next few years will test how well these ambitious plans materialize. If they do, the Eurasian continent could see a historic re-routing of commerce, with Ankara, Basra, Dubai, and beyond forming the nodes of a new Silk Road for the 21st century.
New and Revived Energy Partnerships Boost Turkey and East-West Trade Routes
By Burak Can Çelik
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Burak Can Çelik is a geopolitical analyst and researcher specializing in international relations, Middle Eastern politics, and global strategic affairs. His work focuses on U.S. and Israeli foreign policy, Turkish regional strategy, and the evolving balance of power in the Middle East. A graduate in International Relations from Karabük University, he has published in both Turkish- and English-language media, including The New Arab and Al-Monitor.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Iraq’s Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline resumed oil flows on September 27 for the first time since early 2023.
Under a US-mediated agreement between Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Turkey, and foreign oil companies, 180,000–190,000 barrels per day (bpd)of crude now flows south from Kirkuk to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Turkish officials anticipate an eventual rise to about 230,000 bpd — close to the level before the 2023 shutdown.
The reopening ends a two-year impasse triggered by a March 2023 order by a tribunal of the International Criminal Court, which fined Turkey $1.5 billion for allowing the KRG to export oil independently of authority from Baghdad. Under the new deal, all crude from KRG fields will be delivered to the Iraqi federal State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) for export. About 50,000 bpd will remain for local consumption, with the remainder sent to Ceyhan. The arrangement will effectively restore Iraq’s export capacity to nearly 3.6 million bpd. For Iraq, clearing the bottleneck boosts revenues and economic stability. For the KRG, it revives its long-stalled oil economy under federal oversight.
Turkey is also a major beneficiary. Before March 2023, Turkey earned $200-300 million per year in transit revenue from the pipeline. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has emphasized that the 970-kilometer-long line can carry up to 1.5-1.6 million bpd. With the revival of exports, Turkey not only recovers lost fees but also reinforces its role as an energy hub between East and West. If all goes to plan, Iraqi oil will have a fresh path to world markets, reducing global reliance on potential choke points like the Strait of Hormuz and the congested Persian Gulf.
Some issues remain unresolved. The KRG owes nearly $1 billion to international oil companies for past production, and companies like DNO/Genel have withheld full participation pending debt assurances. To address this, the eight firms that signed the resumption deal agreed to meet within 30 days to negotiate a debt‐settlement mechanism. In the meantime, foreign producers operating in the KRG will be paid a premium of about $16 per barrel to cover production and transit costs.
In addition to the pipeline deal, Turkey has reached out to other Arab states for energy partnerships, deepening ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular. In 2023, on a visit to the Gulf, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed 13 deals worth $50.7 billion, of which $29.7 billion were dedicated to energy projects, including solar and wind power, green hydrogen and ammonia production, natural gas, and nuclear energy cooperation. Around $27 billion of the UAE package targets the clean energy sector, aligning with Turkey’s 2053 net-zero goal.
Deals signed with Saudi Arabia include cooperation on refined petroleum products, petrochemicals, and 4-5 gigawatts of renewable generation capacity in Turkey. Saudi utility developers could fund new wind and solar parks in Anatolia, while Turkey could benefit from the kingdom’s expertise in mega-project execution. Strategic infrastructure is also on the table: Saudi Arabia is moving to connect its electric grid to Iraq’s, a link that could extend to Turkey in the future.
The UAE’s Masdar, a major clean energy company, and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power have both signaled interest in the Turkish renewable venture Fiba. Their potential entry, through equity stakes or joint ventures, could accelerate Turkey’s renewable rollout, helping Ankara meet its target of 65% renewables in installed capacity by 2035. Green hydrogen is another promising arena for cooperation. Turkey aims to produce up to 10.5 million tons of hydrogen annually by 2053 under its climate pledges, and the Gulf nations are also racing to become top hydrogen exporters. Joint hydrogen projects — using Turkish wind power and Gulf solar to produce ammonia fuel for export — could marry each side’s advantages.
The energy projects dovetail with a broader geopolitical warming between Turkey and the Gulf after years of rivalry emanating from Turkish support for Islamist rebellions during the 2011 Arab Spring.
China’s Middle Corridor and Eurasian Connectivity
These developments intersect with other projects promoting Eurasian connectivity, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and, in particular, the Middle Corridor or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route — a network of railways, roads, and ferry links that conveys goods from China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey. The Middle Corridor bypasses sanctioned areas, boosting its relevance since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
China has worked with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to improve infrastructure and streamline customs along this path. Turkey, sitting at the corridor’s western end, hopes to integrate the plans with its own logistical investments. As Turkey cements its role as an oil and gas conduit — via pipelines from Azerbaijan, potentially Iraq and the Gulf, and maybe Turkmenistan in the future — China could leverage this for secure energy transport to and from Eurasian markets.
Kazakhstan’s oil is already shipped across the Caspian to Baku and on to Ceyhan, Turkey, for Mediterranean export, and discussions are underway about Turkmenistan sending gas to Turkey’s TANAP pipeline. The planned Development Roadthrough Iraq (supported by Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar) could interface with the Middle Corridor to create a more extensive lattice of trade routes and reduce transit times by 10 days compared to the Suez Canal. Chinese officials have publicly noted that the Iraq-Turkey Development Road “stands to complement the Belt and Road Initiative.” However, China has not been a direct stakeholder in funding or building the Development Road so far, leaving Gulf investors and Turkey to take the lead.
Implications for Regional Influence and Trade Architecture
The confluence of these trends is reshaping the geopolitical map. Europe and global markets are gaining alternative oil and gas supply routes, while the Middle East’s producers have more export options. By hosting key oil pipelines, negotiating gas deals, and sitting astride both the Middle Corridor and the Development Road, Turkey gains influence that can be leveraged in diplomacy with both East and West. The Gulf states, through strategic investments, are extending their economic influence into Turkey and Iraq, tying the region together. All these players are effectively weaving a new East-West trade architecture that is less dependent on traditional nodes like the Suez Canal or Russian railroads.
In conclusion, the reopening of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline, Gulf-Turkey energy partnerships, and the Middle Corridor’s expansion point to an emerging infrastructure network across West and Central Asia that diminishes traditional bottlenecks and empowers regional middle players. Energy flows and trade routes are the sinews of power; as they realign, so, too, does influence. The next few years will test how well these ambitious plans materialize. If they do, the Eurasian continent could see a historic re-routing of commerce, with Ankara, Basra, Dubai, and beyond forming the nodes of a new Silk Road for the 21st century.
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