Hamas’ recent retribution killings have exposed a complex landscape of Palestinian militias, clan networks, and criminal groups that challenge Hamas’ authority in Gaza.

While none of these actors rivals Hamas in power or organization, their presence adds further layers of instability to Gaza’s highly volatile environment while the ceasefire with Israel that took effect on October 10 remains extremely fragile.

Mapping Gaza’s ecosystem of armed factions is difficult, conceptually and empirically. A core challenge lies in defining what constitutes a “militia” in Gaza. Fluid affiliations, overlapping identities, and informal hierarchies blur the boundaries between organized armed factions, clan-based networks, and criminal syndicates. Many of these actors are highly adaptive and operate in the shadows of Hamas and another decades-old militant faction, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Some groups have only emerged or reasserted themselves recently. Many are supported by Israeli authorities who see Palestinian fragmentation as a way to contain Hamas and to perpetuate Israel’s occupation.

At least a dozen distinct Palestinian armed groups besides Hamas and PIJ are identifiable. They differ widely in ideological orientation, degrees of organization, and external affiliations with state and non-state actors including Israel, the Islamic State (ISIS), and Palestinian factions in the West Bank.

Popular Forces

Led by Rafah native Yasser Abu Shabab, the Popular Forces is an anti-Hamas militia supported by Israel’s military and the US-created Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. Within the organization, figures such as Issam Nabahin have also had ISIS links.

Emerging in early 2025, the Popular Forces have cooperated with Israel in targeting Hamas positions during recent airstrikes. The group is estimated to comprise between 500 and 700 fighters, with an additional 800 to 1,000 civilians residing within its main base in southern Gaza. According to Sky News’ Data and Forensics Unit, the Popular Forces and aligned factions collectively command roughly 3,000 fighters across the enclave. Strategically positioned along a humanitarian aid corridor near the Kerem Shalom crossing, where the borders of Israel, Gaza, and Egypt converge, the group has leveraged its location to intercept and loot incoming aid shipments.

Abu Shabab’s criminal background long predates his emergence as a militia leader. Before heading the Popular Forces, he led a looting network and was detained by Hamas authorities in 2015 for theft and drug-related crimes before escaping from prison amid the chaos of war that followed the Hamas attacks on Israel in October 2023. Under Abu Shabab’s command, the Popular Forces gained notoriety for seizing aid convoys operating near areas under Israeli control. Although the militia’s limited size limits its ability to challenge Hamas’ dominance directly, it has become a visible irritant to Hamas. Since October 10, Hamas’ newly formed Radea security force has intensified operations against the group, confronting its fighters and confiscating weapons and other “tools used in their subversive activities.”

Popular Army – Northern Forces

Operating under the Popular Forces’ auspices, the Popular Army – Northern Forces is led by Ashraf al-Mansi and based in the abandoned Ezbet Beit Hanoun Elementary School in northern Gaza. The faction has engaged in intermittent clashes with Hamas units in Jabalia and Beit Lahiya. In a video message on October 4, Mansi thanked U.S. President Donald Trump for his efforts to bring about a Gaza ceasefire. Composed largely of former narcotics traffickers, the group maintains ties with the Israeli military.

Counter-Terrorism Strike Force

Established in August 2025, the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force is an anti-Hamas militia led by Hossam al-Astal. Operating primarily in southeastern Khan Younis, with a presence in Qizan al-Najjar, Jorat al-Lout, and al-Manara, the group has emerged as one of several local factions challenging Hamas’ authority. Astal, who previously worked in Israel before joining the Palestinian Authority’s security services, later served with the Popular Forces before forming his own organization. He stands accused of involvement in the Mossad’s 2018 assassination of Fadi al-Batsh, one of Hamas’ engineers, in Malaysia. Astal has expressed his willingness to work with former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair in a post-Hamas Gaza.

The Counter-Terrorism Strike Force has only about 40 fighters and has yet to conduct significant operations against Hamas. Its leadership appears to consist largely of figures affiliated with Fatah, Hamas’ main Palestinian rival, from Astal’s extended family. The group, which portrays itself as a protective force for civilians in areas of Gaza outside Hamas’ control, is positioned only meters from Israeli-controlled zones of the enclave and receives direct support from the Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic counterterrorism and intelligence force. Astal does interviews in Israeli media and has been explicit about his “full” cooperation with Israeli forces in Gaza. He justifies this relationship as “the only way to survive.”

Shujaiya Popular Defense Forces

Rami Helles, who comes from Gaza’s third largest family, leads the Shujaiya Popular Defense Forces, an Israel-backed group based out of eastern Gaza City. Tensions between the Helles family and Hamas date back to the 2007 battle for control over Gaza when Hamas put down a US-backed coup attempt by Fatah against the Islamist group after it won 2006 parliamentary elections. The Shujaiya Popular Defense Forces is a small, irregular militia composed of dozens of fighters, primarily drawn from the Helles clan. However, the family has publicly disavowed the group’s activities and reaffirmed its support for the Palestinian resistance to occupation.

Al-Majayda and Doghmosh Clans

The al-Majayda and Doghmosh clans, which are mainly based in Khan Younis and northern Gaza’s Tel al-Hawa and al-Sabra neighborhoods, respectively, are two of Gaza’s most powerful clans. Al-Majayda clan members have engaged in several armed clashes with Hamas forces in recent months. In October, Hamas security units raided the clan’s stronghold, seeking to arrest individuals accused of involvement in killing its members. The operation sparked a firefight that left multiple casualties on both sides. Sources close to the al-Majayda clan reject Hamas’ allegations of collaboration with Yasser Abu Shabab’s network, asserting that the raid was a pretext for targeted killings and citing a document purportedly recovered from the bodies of Hamas fighters as evidence. Yet, in a statement issued on October 13, the clan’s leader publicly voiced support for Hamas’ broader security campaign to preserve law and order in Gaza, urging clan members to cooperate with the authorities. The al-Majayda clan encompasses members with varied political loyalties, including both Fatah and Hamas affiliations.

Historically heavily armed, the Doghmosh clan has long regarded the possession of weapons as a cultural imperative tied to the defense of its land. Its members maintain affiliations across the Palestinian political spectrum, including both Fatah and Hamas. A prominent figure within the clan, Mumtaz Doghmosh, is a US-designated terrorist who previously commanded the armed wing of the Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza City before establishing the Army of Islam, a Salafist-jihadist group which pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2017. His whereabouts have remained unknown since before the outbreak of war in 2023. The Doghmosh clan has had long-standing tensions with Hamas, and the clan and Hamas clashed shortly after the October 10 ceasefire took effect.

The activities of these anti-Hamas militias, clans, and criminal organizations in Gaza threaten the Trump administration’s ambitious 20-point peace initiative. Hamas will be even more reluctant to disarm, while internecine violence undermines the prospects for creating a regional stabilization force and beginning reconstruction of the devastated enclave.

Israeli support for these militias, clans, and gangs reflects a long-standing “divide and conquer” strategy aimed at undermining Palestinian resistance to the occupation. This decades-old approach entailed Israel initially supporting Hamas — established in the 1980s as an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood — as a counterbalance to the secular Fatah. The objective is to deepen fractures among Palestinians, who already hold diverse ideological and political affiliations, thereby complicating efforts to mount a unified opposition that could work for and achieve an independent Palestinian state. By fostering internal divisions, Israel seeks to prevent Palestinians in Gaza from attaining cohesion, effectively maintaining the enclave as a fragmented landscape dominated by competing warlords rather than a unified front against occupation.