Editor’s Note: Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is a specialist on maritime operations in the Persian Gulf and nearby waters who closely follows other issues of GCC security.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
On October 6, the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) concluded their 29th Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting in Kuwait. The forum, bringing together senior officials from both blocs, convened at a critical moment, two years after the last JC meeting, two years after the Hamas attack on Israel, and amid the final stages of negotiations over U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war on Gaza.
A €1.6 billion EU financial aid package for the Palestinians, a Saudi-French diplomatic push for a two-state solution, and the growing number of EU member states recognizing Palestinian statehood are all significant recent political signals that contributed to the current ceasefire. However, Brussels has yet to fully wield its political and economic weight, which risks eroding its credibility as a strategic partner for the GCC in managing regional tensions.
Since the launch of the EU-GCC “Strategic Partnership” in 2022, the two organizations have deepened cooperation across a wide range of policy areas, including trade and investment, climate change and energy, and security. Yet, unresolved regional geopolitical tensions, heightened threat perceptions among Gulf states following Israel’s military campaigns in the Middle East, and the EU’s ambivalence over the war in Gaza risk undermining these otherwise promising developments.
The bedrock of EU-GCC relations dates to a 1989 Cooperation Agreement, but ties have only recently gained renewed momentum. For much of their history, relations have been marked by minimal, intermittent progress at institutional and technical levels, followed by prolonged periods of inertia.
The EU’s growing recognition of its strategic interdependence with the Gulf region, coupled with the GCC states’ ambitions to play a more assertive role in the international system, has fostered a shared resolve to revitalize their partnership. A breakthrough came with the adoption of Joint Action Program 2022-2027, outlining objectives for multi-sectoral cooperation.
While the JC remains the main engine driving relations, the two organizations have created new frameworks to deepen engagement, including a heads-of-state-level summit, first held in October 2024.
Defense and security cooperation has also assumed new importance with the launch of an EU-GCC Regional Security Dialogue and a High-Level Forum on Regional Security and Cooperation. The former brings together senior officials from both blocs and fosters cooperation through the establishment of working groups on maritime security, cybersecurity, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, disaster preparedness, and emergency management, as well as drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. The latter, spearheaded by the EU Special Representative for the Gulf, Luigi Di Maio, serves as a venue for frank exchanges between top European and Gulf diplomats.
Since 2024, both platforms have convened regularly and pursued concrete initiatives, as demonstrated by the inaugural meeting of the GCC-European General Directors of Criminal Investigations and Intelligence in February 2025, the first 1.5 Track Dialogue on Cyber Diplomacy in October 2025, and the forthcoming launch of the counter-terrorism working group.
The EU Council’s decision in July 2025 authorizing the Commission to launch negotiations with individual GCC countries to conclude Strategic Partnership Agreements also represents a pragmatic step forward. However, the Joint Council final statement this year acknowledged the need to accelerate efforts on energy and climate, and in the digital, logistics, and higher education sectors.
Two major obstacles to cooperation remain a long-stalled free trade agreement and a Schengen visa-free travel arrangement for GCC nationals. An EU-GCC Business Forum, held in Kuwait in early November, succeeded in fostering dialogue among senior policymakers, business leaders, and entrepreneurs, but resolving these structural issues remains vital to unlocking the full potential of interregional cooperation.
Israel Policy: A Work in Progress
Addressing the European Parliament on September 10, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed suspending trade concessions with Tel Aviv, sanctioning extremist ministers and violent settlers, and temporarily halting bilateral support to Israel, the most significant policy shift in the EU’s approach to Israel since the beginning of the Gaza war.
The Commission initiative stemmed from a compliance review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, led by the Netherlands and supported by 16 EU member states, which identified possible violations of Article 2 covering respect for human rights and democratic principles.
Breaches of these clauses entitle Brussels to suspend the Agreement, provided that the EU Council adopts the decision by a qualified majority voting in favor – at least 55% of member states, representing at least 65% of the EU population.
Suspension of selected trade-related provisions would cause Israeli exports to lose preferential access to the EU market. This would constitute a significant blow to Israel’s war-battered economy, given that the EU is Tel Aviv’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly one-third of Israel’s total trade in goods in 2024.
Spain and Ireland, two early proponents of a tougher stance toward Israel, had already sought to advance this agenda in 2024. Mounting public pressure across Europe in response to the worsening humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza prompted several other EU governments to recalibrate their policies. Staunch supporters of Israel – including Germany and Italy – have also adopted a somewhat more critical tone toward Tel Aviv. But a core group of countries retains the capacity to block the initiative, undermining the EU’s credibility as a geopolitical actor and reinforcing a perception of double standards among GCC partners.
The pro-Israeli stance adopted by key power centers within Brussels and influential EU member states has consolidated the belief in the Arab world that Europe invokes international humanitarian law selectively. This perception is sharpened by the stark contrast between the EU’s cautious positions on Israel and its unequivocal support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.
With the Gaza peace plan still in its early implementation stages, the EU Council, meeting on October 23, refrained from formally endorsing the Commission’s proposed anti-Israel measures to grant the plan more time to produce tangible outcomes.
The Council reaffirmed support for a lasting peace and a two-state solution and signaled a small but growing political consensus around a more active EU role in post-war stabilization in Gaza. This includes recognition of the need to strengthen the mandates of existing border assistance (EUBAM Rafah) and police (EUPOL COPPS) missions, so they can effectively contribute to future governance and security.
In June 2025, the Council renewed the mandates of both missions for another year. Formally relaunched in January 2025, EUBAM Rafah was put on hold in March when Israel broke a brief ceasefire. The mission resumed operations at the Egypt-Gaza border crossing in mid-October. While the Trump peace plan foresees an International Stabilization Force (ISF), it currently envisages no formal role for the two EU missions, raising questions about how they will interface with the ISF.
Although full integration of these missions may not be strictly necessary, Brussels should press for stronger operational coordination between them, particularly as several EU member states have signaled willingness to contribute troops. European governments should mobilize greater diplomatic support to influence negotiations at the UN Security Council, aiming to achieve a broad and legitimate UN mandate for the ISF. Achieving these objectives is pivotal to the peace plan’s second phase, which seeks the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from civilian areas, thereby reducing the risk of renewed hostilities.
Likewise, the EU appears for now to be excluded from President Trump’s so-called “Board of Peace,” a glaring omission given that Brussels is the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority (PA), having committed up to €1.36 billion for 2021-2024 and €1.6 billion for 2025-2027. Given the centrality of internal Palestinian politics for long-term stabilization, Brussels must leverage its financial standing to ensure progress on PA-Hamas talks, enabling the establishment of a Palestinian-led governing authority in Gaza, and advancing the reunification of the Gaza Strip with the West Bank. To this end, the EU should put more diplomatic pressure on PA President Mahmoud Abbas to accelerate reform efforts and prepare for national elections.
GCC engagement with the Trump plan remains cautious, particularly regarding the ISF. The lack of a clearly defined mandate, command structure, and rules of engagement for the stabilization forces has exposed hesitation among Gulf capitals, which are willing to bankroll peace and facilitate diplomacy, but not to bear the security risks of Gaza’s volatile ground without a robust UN mandate and explicit international burden-sharing.
The spillover effects of Israel’s war on Gaza have generated serious instability across the region, with the Houthis weaponizing maritime shipping routes for two years, repeated tit-for-tat missile exchanges between Israel and Iran, and violations of Qatari airspace through air strikes by both Israel and Iran. This military escalation jeopardizes the GCC’s long-term security by undermining the economic growth and diversification agenda that lies at the core of their strategic economic visions.
Although the suspension of trade concessions to Israel remains on hold, EU member states should keep this policy option open to signal to GCC partners that the European bloc is a credible strategic actor capable of shaping regional dynamics, rather than merely reacting to them.
Europe, the Gulf, and Gaza: A Quest for More Geopolitical Relevance
By Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco is a specialist on maritime operations in the Persian Gulf and nearby waters who closely follows other issues of GCC security.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
On October 6, the European Union (EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) concluded their 29th Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting in Kuwait. The forum, bringing together senior officials from both blocs, convened at a critical moment, two years after the last JC meeting, two years after the Hamas attack on Israel, and amid the final stages of negotiations over U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war on Gaza.
A €1.6 billion EU financial aid package for the Palestinians, a Saudi-French diplomatic push for a two-state solution, and the growing number of EU member states recognizing Palestinian statehood are all significant recent political signals that contributed to the current ceasefire. However, Brussels has yet to fully wield its political and economic weight, which risks eroding its credibility as a strategic partner for the GCC in managing regional tensions.
Since the launch of the EU-GCC “Strategic Partnership” in 2022, the two organizations have deepened cooperation across a wide range of policy areas, including trade and investment, climate change and energy, and security. Yet, unresolved regional geopolitical tensions, heightened threat perceptions among Gulf states following Israel’s military campaigns in the Middle East, and the EU’s ambivalence over the war in Gaza risk undermining these otherwise promising developments.
The bedrock of EU-GCC relations dates to a 1989 Cooperation Agreement, but ties have only recently gained renewed momentum. For much of their history, relations have been marked by minimal, intermittent progress at institutional and technical levels, followed by prolonged periods of inertia.
The EU’s growing recognition of its strategic interdependence with the Gulf region, coupled with the GCC states’ ambitions to play a more assertive role in the international system, has fostered a shared resolve to revitalize their partnership. A breakthrough came with the adoption of Joint Action Program 2022-2027, outlining objectives for multi-sectoral cooperation.
While the JC remains the main engine driving relations, the two organizations have created new frameworks to deepen engagement, including a heads-of-state-level summit, first held in October 2024.
Defense and security cooperation has also assumed new importance with the launch of an EU-GCC Regional Security Dialogue and a High-Level Forum on Regional Security and Cooperation. The former brings together senior officials from both blocs and fosters cooperation through the establishment of working groups on maritime security, cybersecurity, non-proliferation, counterterrorism, disaster preparedness, and emergency management, as well as drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. The latter, spearheaded by the EU Special Representative for the Gulf, Luigi Di Maio, serves as a venue for frank exchanges between top European and Gulf diplomats.
Since 2024, both platforms have convened regularly and pursued concrete initiatives, as demonstrated by the inaugural meeting of the GCC-European General Directors of Criminal Investigations and Intelligence in February 2025, the first 1.5 Track Dialogue on Cyber Diplomacy in October 2025, and the forthcoming launch of the counter-terrorism working group.
The EU Council’s decision in July 2025 authorizing the Commission to launch negotiations with individual GCC countries to conclude Strategic Partnership Agreements also represents a pragmatic step forward. However, the Joint Council final statement this year acknowledged the need to accelerate efforts on energy and climate, and in the digital, logistics, and higher education sectors.
Two major obstacles to cooperation remain a long-stalled free trade agreement and a Schengen visa-free travel arrangement for GCC nationals. An EU-GCC Business Forum, held in Kuwait in early November, succeeded in fostering dialogue among senior policymakers, business leaders, and entrepreneurs, but resolving these structural issues remains vital to unlocking the full potential of interregional cooperation.
Israel Policy: A Work in Progress
Addressing the European Parliament on September 10, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed suspending trade concessions with Tel Aviv, sanctioning extremist ministers and violent settlers, and temporarily halting bilateral support to Israel, the most significant policy shift in the EU’s approach to Israel since the beginning of the Gaza war.
The Commission initiative stemmed from a compliance review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, led by the Netherlands and supported by 16 EU member states, which identified possible violations of Article 2 covering respect for human rights and democratic principles.
Breaches of these clauses entitle Brussels to suspend the Agreement, provided that the EU Council adopts the decision by a qualified majority voting in favor – at least 55% of member states, representing at least 65% of the EU population.
Suspension of selected trade-related provisions would cause Israeli exports to lose preferential access to the EU market. This would constitute a significant blow to Israel’s war-battered economy, given that the EU is Tel Aviv’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly one-third of Israel’s total trade in goods in 2024.
Spain and Ireland, two early proponents of a tougher stance toward Israel, had already sought to advance this agenda in 2024. Mounting public pressure across Europe in response to the worsening humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza prompted several other EU governments to recalibrate their policies. Staunch supporters of Israel – including Germany and Italy – have also adopted a somewhat more critical tone toward Tel Aviv. But a core group of countries retains the capacity to block the initiative, undermining the EU’s credibility as a geopolitical actor and reinforcing a perception of double standards among GCC partners.
The pro-Israeli stance adopted by key power centers within Brussels and influential EU member states has consolidated the belief in the Arab world that Europe invokes international humanitarian law selectively. This perception is sharpened by the stark contrast between the EU’s cautious positions on Israel and its unequivocal support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.
With the Gaza peace plan still in its early implementation stages, the EU Council, meeting on October 23, refrained from formally endorsing the Commission’s proposed anti-Israel measures to grant the plan more time to produce tangible outcomes.
The Council reaffirmed support for a lasting peace and a two-state solution and signaled a small but growing political consensus around a more active EU role in post-war stabilization in Gaza. This includes recognition of the need to strengthen the mandates of existing border assistance (EUBAM Rafah) and police (EUPOL COPPS) missions, so they can effectively contribute to future governance and security.
In June 2025, the Council renewed the mandates of both missions for another year. Formally relaunched in January 2025, EUBAM Rafah was put on hold in March when Israel broke a brief ceasefire. The mission resumed operations at the Egypt-Gaza border crossing in mid-October. While the Trump peace plan foresees an International Stabilization Force (ISF), it currently envisages no formal role for the two EU missions, raising questions about how they will interface with the ISF.
Although full integration of these missions may not be strictly necessary, Brussels should press for stronger operational coordination between them, particularly as several EU member states have signaled willingness to contribute troops. European governments should mobilize greater diplomatic support to influence negotiations at the UN Security Council, aiming to achieve a broad and legitimate UN mandate for the ISF. Achieving these objectives is pivotal to the peace plan’s second phase, which seeks the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from civilian areas, thereby reducing the risk of renewed hostilities.
Likewise, the EU appears for now to be excluded from President Trump’s so-called “Board of Peace,” a glaring omission given that Brussels is the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority (PA), having committed up to €1.36 billion for 2021-2024 and €1.6 billion for 2025-2027. Given the centrality of internal Palestinian politics for long-term stabilization, Brussels must leverage its financial standing to ensure progress on PA-Hamas talks, enabling the establishment of a Palestinian-led governing authority in Gaza, and advancing the reunification of the Gaza Strip with the West Bank. To this end, the EU should put more diplomatic pressure on PA President Mahmoud Abbas to accelerate reform efforts and prepare for national elections.
GCC engagement with the Trump plan remains cautious, particularly regarding the ISF. The lack of a clearly defined mandate, command structure, and rules of engagement for the stabilization forces has exposed hesitation among Gulf capitals, which are willing to bankroll peace and facilitate diplomacy, but not to bear the security risks of Gaza’s volatile ground without a robust UN mandate and explicit international burden-sharing.
The spillover effects of Israel’s war on Gaza have generated serious instability across the region, with the Houthis weaponizing maritime shipping routes for two years, repeated tit-for-tat missile exchanges between Israel and Iran, and violations of Qatari airspace through air strikes by both Israel and Iran. This military escalation jeopardizes the GCC’s long-term security by undermining the economic growth and diversification agenda that lies at the core of their strategic economic visions.
Although the suspension of trade concessions to Israel remains on hold, EU member states should keep this policy option open to signal to GCC partners that the European bloc is a credible strategic actor capable of shaping regional dynamics, rather than merely reacting to them.
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