Editor’s Note: Fuad Shahbazov is an Azerbaijan-based policy analyst and specializes in regional security issues in South Caucasus and the wider Middle East. He has previously contributed to Stimson’s Middle East Perspective about these topics and also has expertise on Turkey’s strategic affairs and the resurgence of ISIS.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
On August 31, U.S. Central Command’s annual Bright Star drills commenced in Egypt, with the participation of the Saudi Arabian Royal Armed Forces.
The biennial exercises focused on strengthening interoperability and readiness across land, air, and maritime domains, featuring command-post training, field maneuvers with mechanized and armored units, counter-terrorism/irregular warfare scenarios, reconnaissance missions, and live-fire events.
The drills took place in an environment of escalating regional instability two years after the Hamas attacks on Israel and prior to the signing of a fragile ceasefire in Gaza. Israel had retaliated harshly against Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran after the October 7, 2023 attacks and continues military action in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.
Concern over the reliability of U.S. security guarantees facilitated the current strategic rapprochement between Cairo and Riyadh and predate the Israeli attempt on September 9 to assassinate Hamas negotiators in Qatar – host of the biggest U.S. airbase in the region. After the attack in Doha, the Saudis also signed a new defense pact with Pakistan, guaranteeing Islamabad’s direct military support, possibly including nuclear warheads, in case of external aggression against the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia has improved relations with Egypt that had frayed during a brief period of Muslim Brotherhood rule following the overthrow of long-time Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Since 2013, when the Egyptian military ousted the Brotherhood government and General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi became president, Saudi Arabia has backed Egypt economically and diplomatically.
Saudi deepening of defense ties with Egypt could evolve into a new geopolitical axis reflecting a broader imperative for both to secure regional interests. Egypt, as one of the few Arab countries with a large and well-equipped military, has proposed to set up a NATO-style force in the Middle East. However, the idea, which revives a 2015 proposal for a joint force based in Cairo, got a cool reception at a recent Arab League summit in Doha. Egypt hopes to augment the informal security partnership between the U.S. and the wealthy Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which did not prevent Israel from targeting Hamas in Qatar. The Trump administration has since promised to come to Qatar’s aid against any future attack, but that commitment has yet to be tested. Saudi Arabia is reportedly seeking a similar agreement with Washington, but that may be contingent on normalizing relations with Israel, something Riyadh has been reluctant to do absent progress toward a Palestinian state.
The Gulf states’ interest in diversifying security partnerships also reflects concerns about threats in the Red Sea in light of Israel’s intensified air raids and missile strikes on Yemen and the Houthis’ retaliatory attacks on Israeli ports and urban areas. Naval cooperation and military drills are intended to serve as a deterrent to Houthi aggression in the Red Sea, a vital choke point that handles about 12% of world trade and 30% of global container traffic and connects the Suez Canal to the Gulf of Aden via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Egypt, whose economy relies heavily on canal transit fees, and Saudi Arabia, which exports oil via the Red Sea, have been impacted by the Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels in support of the Palestinians in Gaza. The attacks have negatively affected Egypt’s economy by deterring commercial ships from using the Suez Canal, fueling domestic discontent while boosting efforts to tackle the source of the threat. Even if the Gaza cease-fire holds, hostilities between Israel and the Houthis are likely to continue and impact commercial activity in the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia has a long Red Sea coastline, which, in addition to oil depots, is home to mega projects that are being constructed in line with Riyadh’s ambitious Vision-2030 program. The program’s success highly depends on stability in the Red Sea basin and provides further justification for a strengthened Saudi-Egyptian military alliance.
Beyond the Saudi-Egyptian commitment, both states have boosted their partnership with Turkey, the strongest regional actor next to Israel in terms of military power. Shortly after exercises with Riyadh, on September 22, Egypt held joint naval drills with Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea for the first time in 13 years, deepening a diplomatic thaw amid rising threats. The Saudis have also held joint naval exercises with China
Egypt, the most populous Arab state, has long held a particular importance for Saudi Arabia. In addition to providing the kingdom with strategic depth along the Red Sea, Egypt offers a crucial land bridge to North Africa. Partnership with Riyadh offers Cairo financial support and energy partnerships, as well as a foothold in Gulf security architecture. Therefore, Riyadh and Cairo are likely to boost their bilateral partnership in the defense field to contain spillover from the Gaza War, including potential mass relocation of Palestinians, despite a new U.S. peace plan that purports to foreclose that possibility.
Grand Strategy, Human Rights & IHL, Human Rights & IHL, Middle East, North Africa
Share:
Editor’s Note: Fuad Shahbazov is an Azerbaijan-based policy analyst and specializes in regional security issues in South Caucasus and the wider Middle East. He has previously contributed to Stimson’s Middle East Perspective about these topics and also has expertise on Turkey’s strategic affairs and the resurgence of ISIS.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
On August 31, U.S. Central Command’s annual Bright Star drills commenced in Egypt, with the participation of the Saudi Arabian Royal Armed Forces.
The biennial exercises focused on strengthening interoperability and readiness across land, air, and maritime domains, featuring command-post training, field maneuvers with mechanized and armored units, counter-terrorism/irregular warfare scenarios, reconnaissance missions, and live-fire events.
The drills took place in an environment of escalating regional instability two years after the Hamas attacks on Israel and prior to the signing of a fragile ceasefire in Gaza. Israel had retaliated harshly against Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran after the October 7, 2023 attacks and continues military action in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.
Concern over the reliability of U.S. security guarantees facilitated the current strategic rapprochement between Cairo and Riyadh and predate the Israeli attempt on September 9 to assassinate Hamas negotiators in Qatar – host of the biggest U.S. airbase in the region. After the attack in Doha, the Saudis also signed a new defense pact with Pakistan, guaranteeing Islamabad’s direct military support, possibly including nuclear warheads, in case of external aggression against the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia has improved relations with Egypt that had frayed during a brief period of Muslim Brotherhood rule following the overthrow of long-time Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Since 2013, when the Egyptian military ousted the Brotherhood government and General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi became president, Saudi Arabia has backed Egypt economically and diplomatically.
Saudi deepening of defense ties with Egypt could evolve into a new geopolitical axis reflecting a broader imperative for both to secure regional interests. Egypt, as one of the few Arab countries with a large and well-equipped military, has proposed to set up a NATO-style force in the Middle East. However, the idea, which revives a 2015 proposal for a joint force based in Cairo, got a cool reception at a recent Arab League summit in Doha. Egypt hopes to augment the informal security partnership between the U.S. and the wealthy Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which did not prevent Israel from targeting Hamas in Qatar. The Trump administration has since promised to come to Qatar’s aid against any future attack, but that commitment has yet to be tested. Saudi Arabia is reportedly seeking a similar agreement with Washington, but that may be contingent on normalizing relations with Israel, something Riyadh has been reluctant to do absent progress toward a Palestinian state.
The Gulf states’ interest in diversifying security partnerships also reflects concerns about threats in the Red Sea in light of Israel’s intensified air raids and missile strikes on Yemen and the Houthis’ retaliatory attacks on Israeli ports and urban areas. Naval cooperation and military drills are intended to serve as a deterrent to Houthi aggression in the Red Sea, a vital choke point that handles about 12% of world trade and 30% of global container traffic and connects the Suez Canal to the Gulf of Aden via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Egypt, whose economy relies heavily on canal transit fees, and Saudi Arabia, which exports oil via the Red Sea, have been impacted by the Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels in support of the Palestinians in Gaza. The attacks have negatively affected Egypt’s economy by deterring commercial ships from using the Suez Canal, fueling domestic discontent while boosting efforts to tackle the source of the threat. Even if the Gaza cease-fire holds, hostilities between Israel and the Houthis are likely to continue and impact commercial activity in the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia has a long Red Sea coastline, which, in addition to oil depots, is home to mega projects that are being constructed in line with Riyadh’s ambitious Vision-2030 program. The program’s success highly depends on stability in the Red Sea basin and provides further justification for a strengthened Saudi-Egyptian military alliance.
Beyond the Saudi-Egyptian commitment, both states have boosted their partnership with Turkey, the strongest regional actor next to Israel in terms of military power. Shortly after exercises with Riyadh, on September 22, Egypt held joint naval drills with Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea for the first time in 13 years, deepening a diplomatic thaw amid rising threats. The Saudis have also held joint naval exercises with China
Egypt, the most populous Arab state, has long held a particular importance for Saudi Arabia. In addition to providing the kingdom with strategic depth along the Red Sea, Egypt offers a crucial land bridge to North Africa. Partnership with Riyadh offers Cairo financial support and energy partnerships, as well as a foothold in Gulf security architecture. Therefore, Riyadh and Cairo are likely to boost their bilateral partnership in the defense field to contain spillover from the Gaza War, including potential mass relocation of Palestinians, despite a new U.S. peace plan that purports to foreclose that possibility.
Recent & Related
Southward Creep: The Sahel Insurgency Reaches Coastal West Africa
Balancing Export-Led Growth and Labor Protections in Morocco
Mali Attacks: Aggravating the Sahel Security Crisis
Iran Applies Different Postwar Approaches to the Persian Gulf Arab States
The EU’s Technocratic Trap in Libya: How Brussels Is Ceding the Mediterranean
The Sovereignty Paradox: Why GCC Security Integration Remains Elusive
Japan’s Tentative Entry Into a Shifting Global Arms Market
The Time is Ripe for Next Steps on US-Japan Military Shipbuilding Cooperation
Israel Cannot Achieve Normalization with Lebanon by Bombing It
Sudan: How One of the Most Severe Humanitarian Crises Became Marginalized in the Global System
Beneath the Strait: Iran Could Threaten Gulf Data Centers, Undersea Cables
Mali’s Post-Alignment Strategy: Sovereignty, Partnerships, and the Limits of Stabilization
การทำเหมืองแร่โดยไม่ได้รับการควบคุมตามแนวแม่น้ำในแผ่นดินใหญ่ของเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้
ການຂຸດຄົ້ນ-ປຸງແຕ່ງແຮ່ທີ່ບໍ່ຖືກຕ້ອງ ຢູ່ຕາມແມ່ນໍ້າສາຍຕ່າງໆ ຢູ່ແຜ່ນດິນໃຫຍ່ອາຊີຕາເວັນອອກສຽງໃຕ້ Unregulated Mining Along Rivers in Mainland Southeast Asia (Lao Language)
Current Geopolitics Shift Deep-Sea Mining Debates
Navigating Seabed Mining in the Cook Islands: A Conversation with John Parianos
การทำเหมืองแร่โดยไม่ได้รับการควบคุมตามแนวแม่น้ำในแผ่นดินใหญ่ของเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้
Mining in Mainland Southeast Asia – River Basins Dashboard
Unregulated Mining Along Rivers in Mainland Southeast Asia
Trump’s Critical Minerals Search in Africa Won’t Tip the Scales Against China
North Korea’s Integration of AI Across Cyber, Economic, and Military Domains
AI in the Age of Fake (Imagined) Content
Find an Expert
Home to more than 100 scholars and global affiliates, the Stimson Center is proud to be a magnet for the world’s leading experts on the most pressing foreign policy and national security issues of our time. Explore our experts and their work.