The Problem
The United States has observed a moratorium on underground nuclear testing since September 1992. President Donald Trump’s October 30 announcement that the United States will resume nuclear testing marks a major reversal of decades of nuclear policy that relies on comprehensive science-based stockpile stewardship undertaken by the U.S. Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to assess the reliability and effectiveness of the US nuclear arsenal.
A return to underground nuclear testing signals an intent to counter recent technical advancements by the Russian Federation and China to their nuclear forces. Yet, both nations have refrained from nuclear testing under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which, while not entered into force, has served as the de facto international norm against these trials. Russia, then as part of the Soviet Union, conducted its last nuclear test in 1990. Pakistan, China, and France carried out their final tests between 1996 and 1998, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the only country to continue nuclear testing, conducting six tests between 2006 and 2017.
The implications of the United States’ return to testing are profound. Nuclear weapons states will take their cues from Washington, and many may follow suit in the name of strategic parity. Once resumed, testing is notoriously difficult to halt. The previous series of nuclear tests by the United States ran without interruption for almost 50 years, from 1945 to 1992, with only a brief three-year pause in the late 1950s. A renewed course would shatter confidence in the global nonproliferation regime and undermine the practical conclusion of Reagan and Gorbachev that a “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
In a world of over 8 billion people, with unrelenting demands for fresh water and arable land, the residual radiological contamination from underground testing poses risks far beyond the boundaries of any test site.
On an Equal Basis: Remaining Questions
At this early stage, questions remain concerning the meaning of the president’s message.
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, as of 2023, the United States has a nuclear stockpile of 3,748 active and inactive warheads. President Trump’s Truth Social post about the policy change notes that Russia’s arsenal ranks second and China’s third. However, there is no official accounting from the Russian Federation in the open source on the size of its stockpile, and Russia has suspended data exchanges required under the New START Treaty. Tactical nuclear weapons, designed for battlefield deployments, are also excluded from these tallies.
The U.S. Department of Defense notes that China has more than 600 operational nuclear weapons in mid-2024 and will surpass 1000 warheads by 2030. Work by non-governmental organizations suggests that the size of the Russian stockpile may exceed that of the United States.
The Truth Social post continues that because of “other countries testing programs,” testing by the United States will resume “on an equal basis.” Clarity is required on both points as to what constitutes “testing” and what is meant by “testing on an equal basis.” If testing implies underground detonations involving the criticality of special nuclear materials (enriched uranium or plutonium) with the release of neutrons, this represents a significant departure from the current United States’ science-based stockpile stewardship program, which conducts experiments using nuclear materials but without attaining criticality and without the release of neutrons.
As for “testing on an equal basis,” Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan have not conducted a nuclear test in over 25 years, and the DPRK has not tested in eight years. Furthermore, the nuclear stockpiles of the United States, the Russian Federation, and China differ in size.
The president’s statement concludes that the testing process will begin “immediately.”. Although the Department of Defense has been tasked with this renewed mission, the Department of Energy and its NNSA maintain the authority and expertise to conduct nuclear tests. Between 1957 and 1992, 828 underground nuclear tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site (now the Nevada National Security Site), located approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. Fielding these tests required the expert drilling of large diameter boreholes 5 feet in diameter to depths of more than 1000 feet. Upon emplacement of the nuclear device underground, the hole was sealed to contain the immense release of heat, shock, and radiation at the time of the explosion.
Over the 33 years since the last underground test by the United States, much of this expertise has been lost due to retirements and the career reassignments of former testing personnel. Infrastructure has deteriorated, and the technical focus has shifted from field testing to simulation and sub-critical experimentation. Reconstituting the testing program would therefore likely take considerable time and not begin immediately, a challenge compounded by the ongoing federal fiscal shutdown.
The Most Powerful Demonstration
Today’s call for renewed nuclear testing is particularly surprising given the administration’s diplomatic efforts to negotiate with its nuclear adversaries to end conflict and reduce regional tensions. Resuming tests would only heighten anxiety over the potential use of these weapons and encourage unbridled proliferation.
Existing nuclear weapon states could be tempted to test again, while technologically capable states in the Asia Pacific, the Arabian Gulf, and Europe, facing geopolitical vulnerabilities might view this as an invitation to pursue their own nuclear ambitions.
The United States has already invested over $30 billion this year in an expanded science-based stockpile stewardship that has successfully maintained confidence in the safety and reliability of the arsenal without testing since 1992. The environmental legacy of past nuclear testing is well documented; even contained underground tests produce tritium and soluble fission products that are mobile as gases or liquids.
Resumption of nuclear tests by the United States will send a destabilizing political signal that undermines deterrence and intensifies nuclear competition. Rather, the United States should strengthen monitoring programs and forensics capabilities to unambiguously detect and attribute any future test.
The most powerful demonstration of a nuclear test is not to conduct one.
A Nuclear Test We Cannot Afford to Fail
By David Kenneth Smith • Kathryn Rauhut
Defense Policy & Posture
For more than thirty years, the United States has maintained confidence in its nuclear deterrent without a single explosive test, a noteworthy achievement of science, restraint, and international leadership. Reversing that record would be a grave mistake. Doing so would shatter the global norm against such trials, undermine the nonproliferation regime, and invite other powers to follow suit. In today’s volatile world, the most power demonstration of U.S. strength is not to resume testing, but to show that it doesn’t need to.
The Problem
The United States has observed a moratorium on underground nuclear testing since September 1992. President Donald Trump’s October 30 announcement that the United States will resume nuclear testing marks a major reversal of decades of nuclear policy that relies on comprehensive science-based stockpile stewardship undertaken by the U.S. Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to assess the reliability and effectiveness of the US nuclear arsenal.
A return to underground nuclear testing signals an intent to counter recent technical advancements by the Russian Federation and China to their nuclear forces. Yet, both nations have refrained from nuclear testing under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which, while not entered into force, has served as the de facto international norm against these trials. Russia, then as part of the Soviet Union, conducted its last nuclear test in 1990. Pakistan, China, and France carried out their final tests between 1996 and 1998, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is the only country to continue nuclear testing, conducting six tests between 2006 and 2017.
The implications of the United States’ return to testing are profound. Nuclear weapons states will take their cues from Washington, and many may follow suit in the name of strategic parity. Once resumed, testing is notoriously difficult to halt. The previous series of nuclear tests by the United States ran without interruption for almost 50 years, from 1945 to 1992, with only a brief three-year pause in the late 1950s. A renewed course would shatter confidence in the global nonproliferation regime and undermine the practical conclusion of Reagan and Gorbachev that a “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
In a world of over 8 billion people, with unrelenting demands for fresh water and arable land, the residual radiological contamination from underground testing poses risks far beyond the boundaries of any test site.
On an Equal Basis: Remaining Questions
At this early stage, questions remain concerning the meaning of the president’s message.
According to the U.S. Department of Energy, as of 2023, the United States has a nuclear stockpile of 3,748 active and inactive warheads. President Trump’s Truth Social post about the policy change notes that Russia’s arsenal ranks second and China’s third. However, there is no official accounting from the Russian Federation in the open source on the size of its stockpile, and Russia has suspended data exchanges required under the New START Treaty. Tactical nuclear weapons, designed for battlefield deployments, are also excluded from these tallies.
The U.S. Department of Defense notes that China has more than 600 operational nuclear weapons in mid-2024 and will surpass 1000 warheads by 2030. Work by non-governmental organizations suggests that the size of the Russian stockpile may exceed that of the United States.
The Truth Social post continues that because of “other countries testing programs,” testing by the United States will resume “on an equal basis.” Clarity is required on both points as to what constitutes “testing” and what is meant by “testing on an equal basis.” If testing implies underground detonations involving the criticality of special nuclear materials (enriched uranium or plutonium) with the release of neutrons, this represents a significant departure from the current United States’ science-based stockpile stewardship program, which conducts experiments using nuclear materials but without attaining criticality and without the release of neutrons.
As for “testing on an equal basis,” Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan have not conducted a nuclear test in over 25 years, and the DPRK has not tested in eight years. Furthermore, the nuclear stockpiles of the United States, the Russian Federation, and China differ in size.
The president’s statement concludes that the testing process will begin “immediately.”. Although the Department of Defense has been tasked with this renewed mission, the Department of Energy and its NNSA maintain the authority and expertise to conduct nuclear tests. Between 1957 and 1992, 828 underground nuclear tests were conducted at the Nevada Test Site (now the Nevada National Security Site), located approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. Fielding these tests required the expert drilling of large diameter boreholes 5 feet in diameter to depths of more than 1000 feet. Upon emplacement of the nuclear device underground, the hole was sealed to contain the immense release of heat, shock, and radiation at the time of the explosion.
Over the 33 years since the last underground test by the United States, much of this expertise has been lost due to retirements and the career reassignments of former testing personnel. Infrastructure has deteriorated, and the technical focus has shifted from field testing to simulation and sub-critical experimentation. Reconstituting the testing program would therefore likely take considerable time and not begin immediately, a challenge compounded by the ongoing federal fiscal shutdown.
The Most Powerful Demonstration
Today’s call for renewed nuclear testing is particularly surprising given the administration’s diplomatic efforts to negotiate with its nuclear adversaries to end conflict and reduce regional tensions. Resuming tests would only heighten anxiety over the potential use of these weapons and encourage unbridled proliferation.
Existing nuclear weapon states could be tempted to test again, while technologically capable states in the Asia Pacific, the Arabian Gulf, and Europe, facing geopolitical vulnerabilities might view this as an invitation to pursue their own nuclear ambitions.
The United States has already invested over $30 billion this year in an expanded science-based stockpile stewardship that has successfully maintained confidence in the safety and reliability of the arsenal without testing since 1992. The environmental legacy of past nuclear testing is well documented; even contained underground tests produce tritium and soluble fission products that are mobile as gases or liquids.
Resumption of nuclear tests by the United States will send a destabilizing political signal that undermines deterrence and intensifies nuclear competition. Rather, the United States should strengthen monitoring programs and forensics capabilities to unambiguously detect and attribute any future test.
The most powerful demonstration of a nuclear test is not to conduct one.
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