Introduction: A Nuclear Acceleration
The current administration has launched an ambitious push to revitalize the U.S. nuclear power industry domestically with the goal of increasing nuclear baseload and reclaiming leadership in nuclear exports. Recent executive orders accelerate the deployment of nuclear power plants and streamline the regulatory processes, all with the aim of promoting energy independence at home. These directives call for the rapid construction and start-up of next-generation nuclear power plants that incorporate a fleet of micro or small modular reactors (SMRs) with outputs of approximately 20 to 150 MWe to be sited at U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Energy owned installations. The directives propose a revamping of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to include fast-tracking reactor licensing decisions and hastening accompanying environmental assessments. The orders collectively represent a sharp acceleration of civilian nuclear deployment timelines, which in the past have taken decades, with the stated aims of providing reliable baseload, strengthening domestic energy supply chains, and maintaining American technological leadership, all to strengthen U.S. national security. To achieve this goal, a new generation of nuclear experts will be needed, particularly as specialists whose careers began during the Cold War and the years following September 11, 2001 retire.
Expediency comes with a premium. Accelerating distribution of nuclear energy without thorough oversight or adherence to established security best practice isn’t just cutting corners. It also risks undermining confidence in the technology, its development, and the broader market for advanced reactors.
This acceleration comes simultaneously with other disruptive technologies in the nuclear sector, including artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, and quantum technologies. Taken together, these undercurrents necessitate a renewed emphasis on nuclear security and verification.
Why Nuclear Security Cannot Be Optional
Nuclear security encompasses measures to prevent, detect, and respond to intentional acts involving the use, production, or storage of nuclear or other radioactive materials. Security measures that protect the population, the environment, and nuclear infrastructure itself are a country’s responsibility. The governance framework that currently supports existing technical, legal, and regulatory protections is dependent upon high-confidence security measures that reduce nuclear theft, terrorism, and proliferation. Nuclear security lapses have implications for nuclear proliferation by introducing potential paths for material to be siphoned off for purposes outside of a country’s legitimate civilian nuclear power program.
Nuclear security is not an afterthought. To understand why, it is useful to revisit the history and science behind current nuclear security measures and the international efforts to keep nuclear technology safe. From the beginning of the atomic age in 1945 to today’s micro and SMR revolution, nuclear innovation has always required parallel investments in safety, transparency, and technical cooperation. Weakening those norms now, solely in the pursuit of expediency or cost savings, increases the potential risk from novel and decentralized technologies to include SMRs.
From an Arms Race to Arms Control
Eighty years ago, a blinding flash in the New Mexico desert marked the dawn of the nuclear age. The July 1945 Trinity test proved the science behind nuclear weapons and ushered in a new era of warfare. Weeks later, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended World War II at the cost of an estimated 200,000 lives, revealing the terrifying consequences of nuclear arms and introducing an existential threat that remains to this day.
A 1949 Soviet atomic test ended the American nuclear monopoly and launched a superpower arms race. From 1945 to 1965, the U.S. nuclear arsenal grew to over 30,000 warheads. A doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) between the Soviet Union, the United States, and the other countries that had developed nuclear arms in the ensuing decades kept these weapons from being detonated, but they were ever-present.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, fears shifted to unsecured nuclear materials. Reported incidents in the Black Sea region and Europe highlighted the threat of nuclear theft and smuggling. The September 11 attacks only heightened the urgency. In response, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ramped up nuclear security efforts, including its Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), which now documents 4,390 confirmed incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, including 353 involving malicious intent or illicit trafficking.
Furthermore, the discovery of the extent of the A.Q. Khan smuggling network that operated in the 1980s and 1990s revealed the vulnerability of nuclear weapons supply chains, associated enrichment technologies, and information related to the development of nuclear weapons to diversion outside of the international nonproliferation regime.
The same scientific breakthroughs that produced nuclear arms also contributed to the fundamental science of nuclear security. Radiochemistry, materials science, and analytical methodologies were adapted to prevent misuse of nuclear or other radioactive materials by states or terrorist groups. Nuclear technology, while enabling devastating weapons, also laid the groundwork for safeguards supporting peaceful uses in energy, medicine, and commerce.
Building the Nuclear Security Architecture
Subsequent international efforts were stood up, including the 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism led by the Russian Federation and the United States. This effort was strengthened at the IAEA with the creation of dedicated institutional components focused on promoting nuclear security practices for Member States with accompanying guidance, training, and international conferences. Four head-of-state Nuclear Security Summits were convened from 2010 to 2016 followed by IAEA ministerial level international conferences. The international community further recognized the implications of nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control with the entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 1987 and its Amendment in 2016. These efforts required credible and sustained technical measures to prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.
Scientific and technological advancements in radiation detection, forensic analysis, and cybersecurity have played a pivotal role in the prevention, detection, and response to nuclear threats. These capabilities have strengthened and operationalized the implementation of nuclear security frameworks. Instruments including high-resolution gamma-ray detectors as well as highly accurate and precise mass spectrometers enabled scientists to accurately trace the origins of intercepted nuclear materials and identify those responsible for illicit trafficking. Isotopic age-dating of nuclear materials allowed insights into production history. The promotion of coordinated research and the publication of consensus guidelines have enhanced global capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear threats. These resources have been utilized by stakeholders worldwide.
New Threats in a New Century
The lessons from the Cold War were adapted to the needs of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security as the threat from the nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the United States was replaced by the specter of nuclear terrorism. Scientists working with policy makers expanded their focus from avoiding a nuclear war to confronting the rise in terrorist threats from subnational groups, starting with Al-Qaeda. Obtaining nuclear or other radioactive material to weaponize was the challenge for subnational terrorists. The lessons of the World Trade Center attacks in 1993 and 2001, as well as subsequent mass casualty attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, pointed to high consequence tactics from a well-coordinated, dedicated, and sophisticated adversary. Radiological dispersal devices or improvised nuclear devices became plausible weapons of mass destruction.
Innovation and New Challenges: The SMR Revolution
Today, the world is witnessing a nuclear renaissance. The 440 nuclear power reactors now operating globally produce approximately 390 GWe of energy. Global electricity demand is projected to reach 630 GWe within the next decade, driven by rapid urbanization and population growth in developing regions, the rising energy needs of digital data centers and artificial intelligence, the decarbonization of power grids, and the continued expansion of commercial electrification.
SMRs represent a new generation of nuclear energy. These compact reactors promise distributed nuclear power with enhanced passive safety features, standardized designs at a lower cost, and lower proliferation risks associated with fuel production. But they also present new security challenges including:
- Remote deployment comes with distributed security and operators as well as responders that may not always be physically on-site.
- SMR fuels may be enriched up to 20% in uranium-235, beyond the 2%-3% enrichments used in conventional, large light water reactors. These new fuel types require enhanced longer-term protection and transport security to and from decentralized reactor facilities.
- Digitalization of industrial systems makes SMRs attractive targets for cyberattack.
Capacity at Risk
The nuclear landscape is changing faster than the pipeline for qualified experts. Current public skepticism toward science and a shift to smaller, venture-funded reactor start-ups challenge the traditional infrastructure that previously incubated nuclear expertise. Unlike in the past, where large utilities dominated, today’s nuclear projects depend on agile, smaller teams, which often do not possess the depth of institutional knowledge that was common in the past.
The pipeline to provide fully qualified experts for nonproliferation and nuclear security assessments often takes years between academic training and subsequent entrance into the civilian or military nuclear enterprise. For the latter, vetting for security clearances takes additional time. Scientific education and technical training will remain essential to an understanding of nuclear technology policy, as well as adherence to related international obligations.
The past several months alone have also seen instability in U.S. nuclear policy affecting staffing at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Initial proposed reductions in the civilian work force were revisited and expertise was subsequently retained in the safety, security, and nonproliferation offices. Nuclear security requires the blending and retention of knowledge in nuclear and computational science, national policy, law, and international relations, among others. The stability of longer-term career paths in nuclear security may not be as attractive as lucrative fields in AI, quantum technologies, or biotechnology. Holes in the staffing pipeline may compromise global efforts to protect and control nuclear materials.
A Reservoir of Nuclear Expertise: The US National Laboratories
The technical role of U.S. national laboratories in addressing security challenges is indispensable. Originating in the urgency of World War II, these laboratories transformed theoretical nuclear physics into the capability to produce nuclear weapons.
The national laboratory network also played an outsized role in the subsequent Cold War-era development, design, and testing of nuclear weapons. To this day, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia national laboratories remain charged with the responsibility of supporting the United States’ efforts to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing.
Technologies used for stockpile stewardship help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and improve nuclear security. Radiation and neutron detection, measurements of trace elements, analyses of environmental particles, and high sensitivity mass spectrometry provide expert capabilities to verify a state’s declaration concerning its inventory of civilian nuclear materials. These techniques would later become essential tools for nuclear forensics, helping to identify and track illicit nuclear materials. To do this, the administration seeks to increase the NNSA budget to $30 billion in FY2026.
The national laboratories and their international partners are uniquely suited to furthering missions in nuclear security and international safeguards. Their work integrates physics, materials science, chemistry, engineering, and computational science supported by unique experimental facilities for the handling and analysis of nuclear materials.
The Need for a Renewed Commitment to Nuclear Security
The story of nuclear security is one of constant adaptation, from the Cold War’s arms race to today’s fight to safeguard and secure new civilian nuclear energy technologies. That struggle is far from over. The world’s nuclear security agenda remains precarious with ever-increasing demands for a diverse energy supply around the world strained by geopolitical conflict, the emergence of artificial intelligence, and climate change. Among these competing national priorities, progress in nuclear security must be sustained. The United States remains committed to nuclear security capacity building globally. In particular, NNSA partnered with more than 66 countries in 2024 as part of its mission to detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. Activities included promoting screening efforts in port security, deployment of radiation detectors at entry points, and increased preparedness in nuclear forensics response.
Conclusions
As the SMR revolution accelerates with technological advances and streamlined regulations, nuclear security must remain an essential part of its utilization. The existing security architecture provides a foundation for the new nuclear age. Awareness must be heightened and informed by high-confidence risk assessments to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. New players in the nuclear sector, including start-ups and data industries, must become versed in nuclear security culture, physical protection measures, radiation detection, and response to recover and secure nuclear and radioactive materials.
Career paths in nuclear security should be well supported to highlight awareness and understanding of policy and supporting technologies to inform a nuclear security architecture. Junior staff must be recruited and mentored to gain necessary experience. Basic scientific research can be a magnet for young investigators who will then later apply that science to optimize tools for nuclear security and safeguards.
In this regard, the U.S. national laboratories and international partners like the Joint Research Center – European Commission are hubs for technology development and training relevant to nuclear security. These laboratories and institutes provide assurance in measurements and interpretation across all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle relevant to nuclear security and safeguards. The institutions are also instrumental in supporting the IAEA’s global leadership efforts in the same domain. Many of the IAEA’s efforts benefit from the provision of seasoned cost-free experts, who staff peer reviews and advisories, host applied trainings, and publish nuclear security technical guidance.
The past 80 years have demonstrated that nuclear energy continues to profoundly shape our world. Ensuring that nuclear security reduces risks is fundamental to delivering on the promise of an abundant and reliable energy future.
80 Years and Counting: Now Is Not the Time for Complacency in Nuclear Security
By David Kenneth Smith • Kathryn Rauhut
Nonproliferation
The push for advanced nuclear power, including small modular reactors, promises energy security and opportunities for domestic technological leadership but also introduces new risks that demand adherence to nuclear security best practice. From the Cold War’s arms race to today’s era of disruptive technologies and decentralized reactors, history shows that innovation in nuclear energy must be matched by equally robust safeguards to prevent theft, terrorism, and proliferation. International cooperation, technical expertise, and the unparalleled capacities of the U.S. national laboratories have long been central to building this security architecture, but looming retirements, workforce gaps, and shifting global priorities threaten capacity. As nuclear power expands rapidly under streamlined regulations, sustained investment in security measures, expert training, and international partnerships remains essential to ensure that nuclear energy fulfills its promise without undermining global safety and stability.
Introduction: A Nuclear Acceleration
The current administration has launched an ambitious push to revitalize the U.S. nuclear power industry domestically with the goal of increasing nuclear baseload and reclaiming leadership in nuclear exports. Recent executive orders accelerate the deployment of nuclear power plants and streamline the regulatory processes, all with the aim of promoting energy independence at home.1“9 Key Takeaways from President Trump’s Executive Orders on Nuclear Energy,” U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, June 10, 2025, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/9-key-takeaways-president-trumps-executive-orders-nuclear-energy. These directives call for the rapid construction and start-up of next-generation nuclear power plants that incorporate a fleet of micro or small modular reactors (SMRs) with outputs of approximately 20 to 150 MWe to be sited at U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Energy owned installations. The directives propose a revamping of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to include fast-tracking reactor licensing decisions and hastening accompanying environmental assessments. The orders collectively represent a sharp acceleration of civilian nuclear deployment timelines, which in the past have taken decades, with the stated aims of providing reliable baseload, strengthening domestic energy supply chains, and maintaining American technological leadership, all to strengthen U.S. national security. To achieve this goal, a new generation of nuclear experts will be needed, particularly as specialists whose careers began during the Cold War and the years following September 11, 2001 retire.
Expediency comes with a premium. Accelerating distribution of nuclear energy without thorough oversight or adherence to established security best practice isn’t just cutting corners. It also risks undermining confidence in the technology, its development, and the broader market for advanced reactors.
This acceleration comes simultaneously with other disruptive technologies in the nuclear sector, including artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, and quantum technologies. Taken together, these undercurrents necessitate a renewed emphasis on nuclear security and verification.2“Verify, Verify, Verify: How Technological Disruption Evolution is Redefining Nuclear Risk,” Stimson Center, August 5, 2025, https://www.stimson.org/2025/verify-verify-verify-how-technological-disruption-is-redefining-nuclear-risk/.
Why Nuclear Security Cannot Be Optional
Nuclear security encompasses measures to prevent, detect, and respond to intentional acts involving the use, production, or storage of nuclear or other radioactive materials. Security measures that protect the population, the environment, and nuclear infrastructure itself are a country’s responsibility. The governance framework that currently supports existing technical, legal, and regulatory protections is dependent upon high-confidence security measures that reduce nuclear theft, terrorism, and proliferation. Nuclear security lapses have implications for nuclear proliferation by introducing potential paths for material to be siphoned off for purposes outside of a country’s legitimate civilian nuclear power program.
Nuclear security is not an afterthought. To understand why, it is useful to revisit the history and science behind current nuclear security measures and the international efforts to keep nuclear technology safe. From the beginning of the atomic age in 1945 to today’s micro and SMR revolution, nuclear innovation has always required parallel investments in safety, transparency, and technical cooperation. Weakening those norms now, solely in the pursuit of expediency or cost savings, increases the potential risk from novel and decentralized technologies to include SMRs.
From an Arms Race to Arms Control
Eighty years ago, a blinding flash in the New Mexico desert marked the dawn of the nuclear age. The July 1945 Trinity test proved the science behind nuclear weapons and ushered in a new era of warfare. Weeks later, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended World War II at the cost of an estimated 200,000 lives, revealing the terrifying consequences of nuclear arms and introducing an existential threat that remains to this day.
A 1949 Soviet atomic test ended the American nuclear monopoly and launched a superpower arms race. From 1945 to 1965, the U.S. nuclear arsenal grew to over 30,000 warheads.3“Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/transparency-us-nuclear-weapons-stockpile. A doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) between the Soviet Union, the United States, and the other countries that had developed nuclear arms in the ensuing decades kept these weapons from being detonated, but they were ever-present.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, fears shifted to unsecured nuclear materials. Reported incidents in the Black Sea region and Europe highlighted the threat of nuclear theft and smuggling. The September 11 attacks only heightened the urgency. In response, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ramped up nuclear security efforts, including its Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), which now documents 4,390 confirmed incidents of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, including 353 involving malicious intent or illicit trafficking.4“IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, 2025 Factsheet,” International Atomic Energy Agency, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/03/itdb-factsheet.pdf.
Furthermore, the discovery of the extent of the A.Q. Khan smuggling network that operated in the 1980s and 1990s revealed the vulnerability of nuclear weapons supply chains, associated enrichment technologies, and information related to the development of nuclear weapons to diversion outside of the international nonproliferation regime.5Christopher O. Clary, “The A.Q. Khan Network: Causes and Implications” (M.A. Thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 105p), https://irp.fas.org/eprint/clary.pdf.
The same scientific breakthroughs that produced nuclear arms also contributed to the fundamental science of nuclear security. Radiochemistry, materials science, and analytical methodologies were adapted to prevent misuse of nuclear or other radioactive materials by states or terrorist groups. Nuclear technology, while enabling devastating weapons, also laid the groundwork for safeguards supporting peaceful uses in energy, medicine, and commerce.
Building the Nuclear Security Architecture
Subsequent international efforts were stood up, including the 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism led by the Russian Federation and the United States. This effort was strengthened at the IAEA with the creation of dedicated institutional components focused on promoting nuclear security practices for Member States with accompanying guidance, training, and international conferences. Four head-of-state Nuclear Security Summits were convened from 2010 to 2016 followed by IAEA ministerial level international conferences. The international community further recognized the implications of nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control with the entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 1987 and its Amendment in 2016. These efforts required credible and sustained technical measures to prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.
Scientific and technological advancements in radiation detection, forensic analysis, and cybersecurity have played a pivotal role in the prevention, detection, and response to nuclear threats. These capabilities have strengthened and operationalized the implementation of nuclear security frameworks. Instruments including high-resolution gamma-ray detectors as well as highly accurate and precise mass spectrometers enabled scientists to accurately trace the origins of intercepted nuclear materials and identify those responsible for illicit trafficking. Isotopic age-dating of nuclear materials allowed insights into production history.6International Atomic Energy Agency, “Establishing a Nuclear Forensic Capability: Application of Analytical Techniques,” IAEA-TECDOC-2019, 2023, https://www.iaea.org/publications/15286/establishing-a-nuclear-forensic-capability-application-of-analytical-techniques. The promotion of coordinated research and the publication of consensus guidelines have enhanced global capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear threats. These resources have been utilized by stakeholders worldwide.
New Threats in a New Century
The lessons from the Cold War were adapted to the needs of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security as the threat from the nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the United States was replaced by the specter of nuclear terrorism. Scientists working with policy makers expanded their focus from avoiding a nuclear war to confronting the rise in terrorist threats from subnational groups, starting with Al-Qaeda. Obtaining nuclear or other radioactive material to weaponize was the challenge for subnational terrorists. The lessons of the World Trade Center attacks in 1993 and 2001, as well as subsequent mass casualty attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, pointed to high consequence tactics from a well-coordinated, dedicated, and sophisticated adversary. Radiological dispersal devices or improvised nuclear devices became plausible weapons of mass destruction.
Innovation and New Challenges: The SMR Revolution
Today, the world is witnessing a nuclear renaissance. The 440 nuclear power reactors now operating globally produce approximately 390 GWe of energy. Global electricity demand is projected to reach 630 GWe within the next decade, driven by rapid urbanization and population growth in developing regions, the rising energy needs of digital data centers and artificial intelligence, the decarbonization of power grids, and the continued expansion of commercial electrification.7“World Energy Needs and Nuclear Power,” World Nuclear Association, updated January 6, 2025, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/world-energy-needs-and-nuclear-power?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
SMRs represent a new generation of nuclear energy. These compact reactors promise distributed nuclear power with enhanced passive safety features, standardized designs at a lower cost, and lower proliferation risks associated with fuel production. But they also present new security challenges including:
Capacity at Risk
The nuclear landscape is changing faster than the pipeline for qualified experts. Current public skepticism toward science and a shift to smaller, venture-funded reactor start-ups challenge the traditional infrastructure that previously incubated nuclear expertise. Unlike in the past, where large utilities dominated, today’s nuclear projects depend on agile, smaller teams, which often do not possess the depth of institutional knowledge that was common in the past.
The pipeline to provide fully qualified experts for nonproliferation and nuclear security assessments often takes years between academic training and subsequent entrance into the civilian or military nuclear enterprise. For the latter, vetting for security clearances takes additional time. Scientific education and technical training will remain essential to an understanding of nuclear technology policy, as well as adherence to related international obligations.
The past several months alone have also seen instability in U.S. nuclear policy affecting staffing at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).8Davis Winkie, “Top Nuke Officials Admit Staffing Challenges After DOGE Layoffs, Hiring Freeze,” USA Today, May 21, 2025, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2025/05/21/nuclear-weapons-leaders-describe-workforce-woes-doge/83770727007/. Initial proposed reductions in the civilian work force were revisited and expertise was subsequently retained in the safety, security, and nonproliferation offices. Nuclear security requires the blending and retention of knowledge in nuclear and computational science, national policy, law, and international relations, among others. The stability of longer-term career paths in nuclear security may not be as attractive as lucrative fields in AI, quantum technologies, or biotechnology. Holes in the staffing pipeline may compromise global efforts to protect and control nuclear materials.
A Reservoir of Nuclear Expertise: The US National Laboratories
The technical role of U.S. national laboratories in addressing security challenges is indispensable. Originating in the urgency of World War II, these laboratories transformed theoretical nuclear physics into the capability to produce nuclear weapons.
The national laboratory network also played an outsized role in the subsequent Cold War-era development, design, and testing of nuclear weapons. To this day, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia national laboratories remain charged with the responsibility of supporting the United States’ efforts to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing.
Technologies used for stockpile stewardship help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and improve nuclear security. Radiation and neutron detection, measurements of trace elements, analyses of environmental particles, and high sensitivity mass spectrometry provide expert capabilities to verify a state’s declaration concerning its inventory of civilian nuclear materials. These techniques would later become essential tools for nuclear forensics, helping to identify and track illicit nuclear materials. To do this, the administration seeks to increase the NNSA budget to $30 billion in FY2026.9U.S. Department of Energy, “FY 2026 Congressional Certification Budget in Brief,” DOE/CF-0218, May 2025, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/doe-fy-2026-bib-v6.pdf.
The national laboratories and their international partners are uniquely suited to furthering missions in nuclear security and international safeguards. Their work integrates physics, materials science, chemistry, engineering, and computational science supported by unique experimental facilities for the handling and analysis of nuclear materials.
The Need for a Renewed Commitment to Nuclear Security
The story of nuclear security is one of constant adaptation, from the Cold War’s arms race to today’s fight to safeguard and secure new civilian nuclear energy technologies. That struggle is far from over. The world’s nuclear security agenda remains precarious with ever-increasing demands for a diverse energy supply around the world strained by geopolitical conflict, the emergence of artificial intelligence, and climate change. Among these competing national priorities, progress in nuclear security must be sustained. The United States remains committed to nuclear security capacity building globally. In particular, NNSA partnered with more than 66 countries in 2024 as part of its mission to detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. Activities included promoting screening efforts in port security, deployment of radiation detectors at entry points, and increased preparedness in nuclear forensics response.10Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), “NSDD International Capacity Building for Nuclear Forensics,” ITWG Update No. 33, December 2024, https://www.nf-itwg.org/newsletters/ITWG_Update_no_33.pdf.
Conclusions
As the SMR revolution accelerates with technological advances and streamlined regulations, nuclear security must remain an essential part of its utilization. The existing security architecture provides a foundation for the new nuclear age. Awareness must be heightened and informed by high-confidence risk assessments to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. New players in the nuclear sector, including start-ups and data industries, must become versed in nuclear security culture, physical protection measures, radiation detection, and response to recover and secure nuclear and radioactive materials.
Career paths in nuclear security should be well supported to highlight awareness and understanding of policy and supporting technologies to inform a nuclear security architecture. Junior staff must be recruited and mentored to gain necessary experience. Basic scientific research can be a magnet for young investigators who will then later apply that science to optimize tools for nuclear security and safeguards.
In this regard, the U.S. national laboratories and international partners like the Joint Research Center – European Commission are hubs for technology development and training relevant to nuclear security. These laboratories and institutes provide assurance in measurements and interpretation across all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle relevant to nuclear security and safeguards. The institutions are also instrumental in supporting the IAEA’s global leadership efforts in the same domain. Many of the IAEA’s efforts benefit from the provision of seasoned cost-free experts, who staff peer reviews and advisories, host applied trainings, and publish nuclear security technical guidance.
The past 80 years have demonstrated that nuclear energy continues to profoundly shape our world. Ensuring that nuclear security reduces risks is fundamental to delivering on the promise of an abundant and reliable energy future.
Notes
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