On July 27, defense leaders from the U.S., Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) met for a trilateral defense ministerial meeting. Even though three defense leaders have met on the sidelines of multinational meetings such as the so-called Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2024, it is the first time they have gotten together for a stand-alone defense ministerial meeting. Consistent with the Spirit of Camp David joint announcement by U.S. President Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, and South Korean President Yoon, the three defense leaders signed the Memorandum of Understanding for the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF) to institutionalize the defense relations among the three countries.
The TSCF, despite non-legally binding, reflects the three leaders’ resolve to support the commitment demonstrated by three leaders to solidify the trilateral relations between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea in national defense. TSCF aims to regularize the interaction among the three countries’ defense establishments, including policy consultation, joint exercises and training (such as the Freedom Edge which took place at the end of June 2024), information-sharing, and defense exchanges.
The U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral defense ministerial meeting came one day before the U.S. and Japan convened the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (‘2 plus 2”) meeting at which they announced a major modernization of the Command and Control (C2) structure between their two militaries including upgrading U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) to a Joint Operation Headquarters (JOHQ) with warfighting authority. Together they reinforce the U.S. intention to institutionalize its alliance relations in the Indo-Pacific region to put these relationships on a sustainable path.
Normalization of Japan-South Korea relations was essential to bring the U.S. and its two key Northeast Asian allies closer. In this sense, the resumption of defense exchanges between Tokyo and Seoul, announced after Japanese Defense Minister Minoru Kihara and South Korean Defense Minister Shin Wok-sik met in Singapore in June 2024, was also a critical enabler for TSCF.
The Joint Statement issued after the defense trilateral is notable in its renewed focus on the threat posed by North Korea. In stark contrast to the statement made following the Camp David Summit a year ago when the three leaders specifically mentioned China and the Taiwan Straits, three defense ministers only spoke to it indirectly when they expressed their opposition against “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the waters of the Indo-Pacific” in the Joint Statement. Rather, the Joint Statement spoke at length about the three countries’ shared concern against the recent rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang, including signing the “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” and strengthening their economic and military ties.
Of course, this renewed focus on the threat from North Korea reflects the three countries’ shared sense of urgency about the implication of closer cooperation between Russia and North Korea. Even though the current trend may turn out to be more like a “marriage of convenience” –Russia needs North Korean weapons to sustain its war against Ukraine while North Korea needs food and other essential items as well as advanced technologies to complete its nuclear weapon program—their closer relations have a considerable impact on the threat posed by these two countries both against and beyond Korean Peninsula. At the same time, the considerably more cautious tone of reference to China and Taiwan reflects a nuanced difference in threat perceptions against China held in three capitals.
Indeed, Seoul has been known for its hesitance to align itself with the threat perception shared between the U.S. and Japan vis-à-vis China. As South Korea heads to the presidential election in 2027 with President Yoon’s conservative People’s Power Party (PPP) significantly weakened following the April 2024 parliamentary election, whether South Korea maintains the policy trajectories set by Yoon remains an open question. By reemphasizing the “counter-North Korean threat,” the purpose of the trilateral security cooperation can safeguard the cooperation should Yoon’s successor come to the office with a very different foreign policy outlook, particularly toward Japan.
In Japan, there is growing pressure against Prime Minister Kishida, who continues to suffer low approval ratings, as he eyes his party’s presidential election in September. While most of Japan’s foreign and national security policy trendlines will likely hold steady regardless of Kishida’s political fate, Tokyo’s approach to Seoul may be more volatile depending on what may happen in the South Korean presidential race. More importantly, these efforts to institutionalize the cooperation will likely help alleviate the concerns emerging among the U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond for uncertainty of U.S. presidential politics.
These factors make the shared commitment and resolve that the three defense leaders demonstrated in Tokyo all the more important. While the deliverables from the meeting that are actionable in the immediate term were modest, the meeting nonetheless was significant in demonstrating their shared commitment to protecting the trilateral cooperative framework against domestic political volatility in each capital.
U.S.-Japan-ROK Defense Trilateral—Establishing a Safeguard for the Future
By Yuki Tatsumi
Japan
On July 27, defense leaders from the U.S., Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) met for a trilateral defense ministerial meeting. Even though three defense leaders have met on the sidelines of multinational meetings such as the so-called Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2024, it is the first time they have gotten together for a stand-alone defense ministerial meeting. Consistent with the Spirit of Camp David joint announcement by U.S. President Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, and South Korean President Yoon, the three defense leaders signed the Memorandum of Understanding for the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF) to institutionalize the defense relations among the three countries.
The TSCF, despite non-legally binding, reflects the three leaders’ resolve to support the commitment demonstrated by three leaders to solidify the trilateral relations between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea in national defense. TSCF aims to regularize the interaction among the three countries’ defense establishments, including policy consultation, joint exercises and training (such as the Freedom Edge which took place at the end of June 2024), information-sharing, and defense exchanges.
The U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral defense ministerial meeting came one day before the U.S. and Japan convened the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (‘2 plus 2”) meeting at which they announced a major modernization of the Command and Control (C2) structure between their two militaries including upgrading U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) to a Joint Operation Headquarters (JOHQ) with warfighting authority. Together they reinforce the U.S. intention to institutionalize its alliance relations in the Indo-Pacific region to put these relationships on a sustainable path.
Normalization of Japan-South Korea relations was essential to bring the U.S. and its two key Northeast Asian allies closer. In this sense, the resumption of defense exchanges between Tokyo and Seoul, announced after Japanese Defense Minister Minoru Kihara and South Korean Defense Minister Shin Wok-sik met in Singapore in June 2024, was also a critical enabler for TSCF.
The Joint Statement issued after the defense trilateral is notable in its renewed focus on the threat posed by North Korea. In stark contrast to the statement made following the Camp David Summit a year ago when the three leaders specifically mentioned China and the Taiwan Straits, three defense ministers only spoke to it indirectly when they expressed their opposition against “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the waters of the Indo-Pacific” in the Joint Statement. Rather, the Joint Statement spoke at length about the three countries’ shared concern against the recent rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang, including signing the “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” and strengthening their economic and military ties.
Of course, this renewed focus on the threat from North Korea reflects the three countries’ shared sense of urgency about the implication of closer cooperation between Russia and North Korea. Even though the current trend may turn out to be more like a “marriage of convenience” –Russia needs North Korean weapons to sustain its war against Ukraine while North Korea needs food and other essential items as well as advanced technologies to complete its nuclear weapon program—their closer relations have a considerable impact on the threat posed by these two countries both against and beyond Korean Peninsula. At the same time, the considerably more cautious tone of reference to China and Taiwan reflects a nuanced difference in threat perceptions against China held in three capitals.
Indeed, Seoul has been known for its hesitance to align itself with the threat perception shared between the U.S. and Japan vis-à-vis China. As South Korea heads to the presidential election in 2027 with President Yoon’s conservative People’s Power Party (PPP) significantly weakened following the April 2024 parliamentary election, whether South Korea maintains the policy trajectories set by Yoon remains an open question. By reemphasizing the “counter-North Korean threat,” the purpose of the trilateral security cooperation can safeguard the cooperation should Yoon’s successor come to the office with a very different foreign policy outlook, particularly toward Japan.
In Japan, there is growing pressure against Prime Minister Kishida, who continues to suffer low approval ratings, as he eyes his party’s presidential election in September. While most of Japan’s foreign and national security policy trendlines will likely hold steady regardless of Kishida’s political fate, Tokyo’s approach to Seoul may be more volatile depending on what may happen in the South Korean presidential race. More importantly, these efforts to institutionalize the cooperation will likely help alleviate the concerns emerging among the U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond for uncertainty of U.S. presidential politics.
These factors make the shared commitment and resolve that the three defense leaders demonstrated in Tokyo all the more important. While the deliverables from the meeting that are actionable in the immediate term were modest, the meeting nonetheless was significant in demonstrating their shared commitment to protecting the trilateral cooperative framework against domestic political volatility in each capital.
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