Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
The return to Iran’s government of veteran diplomats who negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal has led to some cautious optimism that Iran’s nuclear program can be dealt with through new talks. However, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is unlikely to be revived and the most likely configuration for discussions will be bilateral – between the U.S. and Iran – rather than multistate.
On August 27, 2024, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave the go-ahead to President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet to “interact with the enemy [the United States] in certain situations.” He cautioned “not to place your hopes” in talks while suggesting, in a clear reference to the nuclear program that “a tactical retreat might sometimes be necessary.”
Earlier, new Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, a former deputy foreign minister and key negotiator of the JCPOA, said in an interview with a German news outlet that revival of the original deal “is not possible.” He highlighted shifts in the international landscape due to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, which have altered the security perspectives of the European Union, Russia, China and the U.S.
Araghchi also noted that due to sunset provisions in the JCPOA, “certain text provisions need to change, which is a challenging process.”
During his campaign and after his election, Pezeshkian, who is due in New York next week for the annual summit of the UN General Assembly, promised to resume interactions with the West in hopes of relieving crushing economic sanctions reimposed by the U.S. after the Trump administration quit the JCPOA unilaterally in 2018. Talks on restoring the agreement took place after Joe Biden replaced Donald Trump, but faltered after Iran elected a hardline president, Ebrahim Raisi, in 2021. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 further complicated the process as did rising tensions between the U.S. and China. This suggests that the original framework for negotiations – involving Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Germany – is no longer useful to achieve a resolution of the issue within a reasonable amount of time.
Back-channel talks between the U.S. and Iran in Oman preceded the JCPOA’s success. Khamenei’s and Araghchi’s recent comments indicate a willingness to take part in direct talks with the U.S. again in a regional venue. However, new negotiations will probably have to wait until after the U.S. presidential elections. Currently, resolving the Gaza conflict and preventing a regional escalation rank as the most pressing issue for Washington. Concerns regarding Iran’s regional policies, its proxies, and its drone and missile capabilities also might overshadow the nuclear dispute. New sanctions imposed on Iran’s national airline over Tehran’s reported delivery of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia have further soured the atmosphere for talks.
At the same time, Iran has made such significant advancements in its nuclear program that it is seen as capable of quickly developing nuclear weapons if it decides to do so. As of mid-August, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran possessed 164.7 kilograms (363.1 pounds) of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, more than enough to make several bombs if further enriched to 90 percent, or weapons-grade. It is unlikely that Iran would return to the levels stipulated by the JCPOA – no more than 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to less than 5 percent purity. Framing new negotiations about weaponization, rather than enrichment, might facilitate a more successful dialogue.
Another key issue for new talks is IAEA oversight. In addition to enriching far beyond the limits set by the JCPOA, Iran has also significantly reduced its cooperation with the agency in terms of inspections and electronic monitoring. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has called for “more transparency from Iran” as well as “significant reforms and updates” in Iran’s dealings with the IAEA. Grossi has added that he hopes to visit Iran soon to discuss these matters with the new president.
Under Araghchi, the Iranian foreign ministry is likely to have a fair amount of flexibility for conducting talks, perhaps even more leeway than under the administration of Hassan Rouhani, a pragmatist who often clashed with Iranian hardliners.
The fact that Araghchi is already discussing amending the JCPOA and initiating new negotiations likely indicates approval from higher-level officials, including the Supreme Council of National Security. It is also likely that new negotiations would address issues beyond the JCPOA’s purview, including Iran’s regional and missile policies. Iran’s pressing need to alleviate sanctions reshapes the negotiation landscape.
In outlining his approach as foreign minister, Araghchi has put a priority on Iran’s tilt to the East and closer ties with Russia and China. However, the two countries have been benefiting from Iran’s sanctioned status and are unlikely to be enthusiastic about a new deal that relieves Iran’s isolation. Europe, too, has become more hawkish on Iran because of Ukraine and Iran’s human rights abuses. Thus, the most viable option might be direct talks with the U.S.
Complicating the prospects for such talks are the U.S. elections and Israel. The region has been in turmoil since the Hamas attacks on Israel of last Oct. 7, which have pushed the shadow war between Iran and Israel into the open as well as activating a variety of Iranian partners against Israel and the U.S. The Israeli killing of seven Iranian military officers in an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus in April led Iran to respond with a barrage of missiles and drones against Israel, an unprecedented direct response.
On July 31, in a further provocation, Israel assassinated the political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran where he had just attended Pezeshkian’s inauguration. Should Iran carry out threats to retaliate against Israel for the killing, Israel is likely to respond harshly. Such an escalation could jeopardize the chances of reviving the nuclear deal and further empower anti-deal factions within the U.S., the European Union, and the Middle East. Indeed, the focus of negotiations would likely shift to Iran’s drone and missile capabilities and regional alliances.
Another factor is Israeli influence over U.S. policy toward Iran. Whoever is elected U.S. president in November, Israel is likely to insist on a voice in U.S. talks with Tehran. Israeli opposition to the JCPOA in 2015 almost sunk the deal then and was a major factor in the U.S. withdrawal in 2018. Given the rise of tensions between Israel and Iran and Iran-backed groups, Tel Aviv will demand that its interests be recognized.
Many Iranian political analysts believe that one reason Israel killed Haniyeh in Tehran was to undermine the Pezeshkian government’s chances for improving relations with the West. Political analyst Ahmad Zeidabadi said the assassination was intended to push Iran onto an even more radical trajectory. New attacks by Israel against Hezbollah by activating booby-tracked wireless communications devices also could cast a pall over potential U.S.-Iran talks.
At the same time, rising clamor for an end to the Gaza war among Israelis since the recent death of six young Israeli hostages could increase U.S. leverage over the unpopular government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Rising poll numbers for Democrat Kamala Harris could encourage the White House to revive nuclear and other talks with Iran. If Harris wins, the lame duck Biden administration would have three months to work on such hard issues with the confidence that any progress would not be reversed by the incoming president. Either Qatar or Oman would be likely venues for such talks.
The Outlook for Iran Nuclear Negotiations
By Anonymous
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: While the Stimson Center rarely publishes anonymous work, the author of this commentary is a Tehran-based analyst who has requested anonymity out of legitimate concern for their personal safety. The writer is known to appropriate staff, has a track record of reliable analysis, and is in a position to provide an otherwise unavailable perspective.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
The return to Iran’s government of veteran diplomats who negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal has led to some cautious optimism that Iran’s nuclear program can be dealt with through new talks. However, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is unlikely to be revived and the most likely configuration for discussions will be bilateral – between the U.S. and Iran – rather than multistate.
On August 27, 2024, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave the go-ahead to President Masoud Pezeshkian and his cabinet to “interact with the enemy [the United States] in certain situations.” He cautioned “not to place your hopes” in talks while suggesting, in a clear reference to the nuclear program that “a tactical retreat might sometimes be necessary.”
Earlier, new Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, a former deputy foreign minister and key negotiator of the JCPOA, said in an interview with a German news outlet that revival of the original deal “is not possible.” He highlighted shifts in the international landscape due to the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, which have altered the security perspectives of the European Union, Russia, China and the U.S.
Araghchi also noted that due to sunset provisions in the JCPOA, “certain text provisions need to change, which is a challenging process.”
During his campaign and after his election, Pezeshkian, who is due in New York next week for the annual summit of the UN General Assembly, promised to resume interactions with the West in hopes of relieving crushing economic sanctions reimposed by the U.S. after the Trump administration quit the JCPOA unilaterally in 2018. Talks on restoring the agreement took place after Joe Biden replaced Donald Trump, but faltered after Iran elected a hardline president, Ebrahim Raisi, in 2021. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 further complicated the process as did rising tensions between the U.S. and China. This suggests that the original framework for negotiations – involving Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and Germany – is no longer useful to achieve a resolution of the issue within a reasonable amount of time.
Back-channel talks between the U.S. and Iran in Oman preceded the JCPOA’s success. Khamenei’s and Araghchi’s recent comments indicate a willingness to take part in direct talks with the U.S. again in a regional venue. However, new negotiations will probably have to wait until after the U.S. presidential elections. Currently, resolving the Gaza conflict and preventing a regional escalation rank as the most pressing issue for Washington. Concerns regarding Iran’s regional policies, its proxies, and its drone and missile capabilities also might overshadow the nuclear dispute. New sanctions imposed on Iran’s national airline over Tehran’s reported delivery of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia have further soured the atmosphere for talks.
At the same time, Iran has made such significant advancements in its nuclear program that it is seen as capable of quickly developing nuclear weapons if it decides to do so. As of mid-August, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran possessed 164.7 kilograms (363.1 pounds) of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, more than enough to make several bombs if further enriched to 90 percent, or weapons-grade. It is unlikely that Iran would return to the levels stipulated by the JCPOA – no more than 300 kilograms of uranium enriched to less than 5 percent purity. Framing new negotiations about weaponization, rather than enrichment, might facilitate a more successful dialogue.
Another key issue for new talks is IAEA oversight. In addition to enriching far beyond the limits set by the JCPOA, Iran has also significantly reduced its cooperation with the agency in terms of inspections and electronic monitoring. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has called for “more transparency from Iran” as well as “significant reforms and updates” in Iran’s dealings with the IAEA. Grossi has added that he hopes to visit Iran soon to discuss these matters with the new president.
Under Araghchi, the Iranian foreign ministry is likely to have a fair amount of flexibility for conducting talks, perhaps even more leeway than under the administration of Hassan Rouhani, a pragmatist who often clashed with Iranian hardliners.
The fact that Araghchi is already discussing amending the JCPOA and initiating new negotiations likely indicates approval from higher-level officials, including the Supreme Council of National Security. It is also likely that new negotiations would address issues beyond the JCPOA’s purview, including Iran’s regional and missile policies. Iran’s pressing need to alleviate sanctions reshapes the negotiation landscape.
In outlining his approach as foreign minister, Araghchi has put a priority on Iran’s tilt to the East and closer ties with Russia and China. However, the two countries have been benefiting from Iran’s sanctioned status and are unlikely to be enthusiastic about a new deal that relieves Iran’s isolation. Europe, too, has become more hawkish on Iran because of Ukraine and Iran’s human rights abuses. Thus, the most viable option might be direct talks with the U.S.
Complicating the prospects for such talks are the U.S. elections and Israel. The region has been in turmoil since the Hamas attacks on Israel of last Oct. 7, which have pushed the shadow war between Iran and Israel into the open as well as activating a variety of Iranian partners against Israel and the U.S. The Israeli killing of seven Iranian military officers in an Iranian diplomatic compound in Damascus in April led Iran to respond with a barrage of missiles and drones against Israel, an unprecedented direct response.
On July 31, in a further provocation, Israel assassinated the political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran where he had just attended Pezeshkian’s inauguration. Should Iran carry out threats to retaliate against Israel for the killing, Israel is likely to respond harshly. Such an escalation could jeopardize the chances of reviving the nuclear deal and further empower anti-deal factions within the U.S., the European Union, and the Middle East. Indeed, the focus of negotiations would likely shift to Iran’s drone and missile capabilities and regional alliances.
Another factor is Israeli influence over U.S. policy toward Iran. Whoever is elected U.S. president in November, Israel is likely to insist on a voice in U.S. talks with Tehran. Israeli opposition to the JCPOA in 2015 almost sunk the deal then and was a major factor in the U.S. withdrawal in 2018. Given the rise of tensions between Israel and Iran and Iran-backed groups, Tel Aviv will demand that its interests be recognized.
Many Iranian political analysts believe that one reason Israel killed Haniyeh in Tehran was to undermine the Pezeshkian government’s chances for improving relations with the West. Political analyst Ahmad Zeidabadi said the assassination was intended to push Iran onto an even more radical trajectory. New attacks by Israel against Hezbollah by activating booby-tracked wireless communications devices also could cast a pall over potential U.S.-Iran talks.
At the same time, rising clamor for an end to the Gaza war among Israelis since the recent death of six young Israeli hostages could increase U.S. leverage over the unpopular government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Rising poll numbers for Democrat Kamala Harris could encourage the White House to revive nuclear and other talks with Iran. If Harris wins, the lame duck Biden administration would have three months to work on such hard issues with the confidence that any progress would not be reversed by the incoming president. Either Qatar or Oman would be likely venues for such talks.
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