Editor’s Note: A former journalist in Iran who is also fluent in Arabic, Mohammad Mazhari brings a deep understanding of Iran’s regional and security policies and is a regular contributor to Stimson on these issues.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
In the aftermath of the death of Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut, suspense has risen over how the group and its Iranian patron would respond.
Could the killing on Sept. 27 lead to a full-scale regional conflict, or will there be a largely pro-forma response akin to Iran’s non-kinetic reaction to the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July or the well-telegraphed missile barrage against Israel that followed the Israeli killing of seven Iranian military officers in Damascus in April?
Compounding the losses for Iran was confirmation that Gen. Abbas Nilforoushan, deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in charge of Lebanon and Syria, had also been killed in the massive strike on Nasrallah’s Beirut bunker.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned Israelis a decade ago “that if they are attack us, we will turn Tel Aviv and Haifa into wastelands.” However, in the aftermath of these catastrophic blows to the lead member of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance,” Khamenei delivered only generalities about continuing the fight.
So far, there is no sign that Iran will initiate an all-out conflict. There could be reactions akin to previous ones because Tehran knows that in an extended war, it may lose more.
Past experiences suggest that Iran’s response will be cautious unless it has confidence that it can catch Israel off guard. That certainly occurred last Oct. 7, when Hamas stormed out of Gaza into southern Israel, killed 1200 Israelis, and took several hundred as hostages. But more recently, the intelligence advantage has been on Israel’s side, as evidenced by the methodical takedown of Hezbollah communications and personnel.
To fully grasp the scene, it’s essential to dissect the nature of Hezbollah’s power and Iran’s strategic conduct, addressing previous incidents of confrontation.
The first occurred following the U.S. assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the Iranian Quds Force, in a drone strike near Baghdad airport on Jan. 3, 2020. Iran responded with a missile attack on the Ayn al-Asad airbase. Despite intense Iranian rhetoric promising “severe revenge,” the attack resulted in no American fatalities, transforming it into more of a symbolic, theatrical display.
The second significant moment was Iran’s response to the April 1 assassination of Iranian officers in an Iranian diplomatic building in Syria. On the evening of April 13, 2024, Iran launched a retaliatory strike against Israel, deploying over 300 drones and missiles aimed at various targets.
However, again there were no fatalities and almost all the missiles and drones were shot down by Israel, the U.S. and allied nations. Thus, the retaliation did not restore deterrence for Iran. What has become increasingly clear is that Israel’s intelligence capabilities and surveillance in the region have reached a level of sophistication that the “Axis of Resistance” did not anticipate and so far, cannot match.
The assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran further exposed vulnerabilities within Iran’s intelligence apparatus. The explosion of pagers and the assassination of top Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Aqil along with eight senior commanders of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Unit, dealt a significant blow to the intelligence credibility of both Hezbollah and its primary backer, Iran, even before the killing of Nasrallah. This series of setbacks has not only undermined their operational security but has also cast doubt on their ability to respond effectively to Israeli actions.
In terms of military retaliation, Hezbollah and Iran are hardly powerless. Their missile capabilities are real but insufficient to effectively respond to Israel’s operations or to establish credible deterrence. Missiles launched from farther afield in Iraq and Yemen have also failed to change the game.
Altogether, Iran and its allied militias in the region lack the technological capacity to confront U.S. and Israeli missiles, fighters and military machinery. Should Iran seek to expand the war, there is no doubt that Israel would have the support of its Western allies.
The genuine strength of the Iranian-backed militias in the region has always been more one of endurance, employing guerrilla warfare tactics over generations. Precisely this form of combat led to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and, later, from Gaza in 2005. One might also add the experience of American troops in wars ranging from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan.
For Iran, the policy of “strategic patience” is not an option, but a must. Hezbollah and Iran are conserving military resources and waiting for Israeli ground forces to enter a trap inside Lebanon territory.
A second element of Iran’s and the “Axis of Resistance’s” power is rooted in propaganda. However, after the carnage of the past year, even the Axis’s social base no longer finds the propaganda credible. Today, these cards are burned and useless.
Reacting to statements made by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in New York — where he asserted that “the Zionist regime will not achieve its goals to escalate tensions, but it will pay for its crimes” — many critics of the administration of new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian interpreted the policy of “avoiding the trap of tension” as a reflection of the Iranian government’s weakness.
One social media activist who advocates for Israel’s destruction posted on Twitter/X: “The term #StrategicPatience is nothing but a lie. The reality is that we are weaker than our enemy (Israel), and instead of addressing our deficiency and striving to become stronger, we boasted and bluffed. Now that it’s time to put those words and bravado to the test, but we have nothing to show and have fallen silent.”
Within Iranian circles, there is ongoing discussion about a recent Israeli attack on an IRGC facility and the theft of classified documents, which Iranian media attempted to downplay by claiming the explosion was caused by a gas leak.
Iranian political analyst Mehdi Kharratian acknowledged that Hezbollah now finds itself in a complicated situation, where either escalation or restraint pose significant challenges. Meanwhile, Israel is attempting to impose its own terms on Hezbollah by combining political and military pressure.
Today, Israel is setting new rules of engagement, while Iran and Hezbollah appear stuck in the mindset of the 2006 war, unable to adapt to the evolving landscape.
Mohammad Mazhari is a political scientist who served as editor-in-chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency from 2013-2020 and as a journalist at the Tehran Times from 2020-2021.
Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ Outmatched By Israeli Intelligence And Weapons
By Mohammad Mazhari
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: A former journalist in Iran who is also fluent in Arabic, Mohammad Mazhari brings a deep understanding of Iran’s regional and security policies and is a regular contributor to Stimson on these issues.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
In the aftermath of the death of Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut, suspense has risen over how the group and its Iranian patron would respond.
Could the killing on Sept. 27 lead to a full-scale regional conflict, or will there be a largely pro-forma response akin to Iran’s non-kinetic reaction to the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July or the well-telegraphed missile barrage against Israel that followed the Israeli killing of seven Iranian military officers in Damascus in April?
Compounding the losses for Iran was confirmation that Gen. Abbas Nilforoushan, deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in charge of Lebanon and Syria, had also been killed in the massive strike on Nasrallah’s Beirut bunker.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned Israelis a decade ago “that if they are attack us, we will turn Tel Aviv and Haifa into wastelands.” However, in the aftermath of these catastrophic blows to the lead member of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance,” Khamenei delivered only generalities about continuing the fight.
So far, there is no sign that Iran will initiate an all-out conflict. There could be reactions akin to previous ones because Tehran knows that in an extended war, it may lose more.
Past experiences suggest that Iran’s response will be cautious unless it has confidence that it can catch Israel off guard. That certainly occurred last Oct. 7, when Hamas stormed out of Gaza into southern Israel, killed 1200 Israelis, and took several hundred as hostages. But more recently, the intelligence advantage has been on Israel’s side, as evidenced by the methodical takedown of Hezbollah communications and personnel.
To fully grasp the scene, it’s essential to dissect the nature of Hezbollah’s power and Iran’s strategic conduct, addressing previous incidents of confrontation.
The first occurred following the U.S. assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the Iranian Quds Force, in a drone strike near Baghdad airport on Jan. 3, 2020. Iran responded with a missile attack on the Ayn al-Asad airbase. Despite intense Iranian rhetoric promising “severe revenge,” the attack resulted in no American fatalities, transforming it into more of a symbolic, theatrical display.
The second significant moment was Iran’s response to the April 1 assassination of Iranian officers in an Iranian diplomatic building in Syria. On the evening of April 13, 2024, Iran launched a retaliatory strike against Israel, deploying over 300 drones and missiles aimed at various targets.
However, again there were no fatalities and almost all the missiles and drones were shot down by Israel, the U.S. and allied nations. Thus, the retaliation did not restore deterrence for Iran. What has become increasingly clear is that Israel’s intelligence capabilities and surveillance in the region have reached a level of sophistication that the “Axis of Resistance” did not anticipate and so far, cannot match.
The assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran further exposed vulnerabilities within Iran’s intelligence apparatus. The explosion of pagers and the assassination of top Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Aqil along with eight senior commanders of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Unit, dealt a significant blow to the intelligence credibility of both Hezbollah and its primary backer, Iran, even before the killing of Nasrallah. This series of setbacks has not only undermined their operational security but has also cast doubt on their ability to respond effectively to Israeli actions.
In terms of military retaliation, Hezbollah and Iran are hardly powerless. Their missile capabilities are real but insufficient to effectively respond to Israel’s operations or to establish credible deterrence. Missiles launched from farther afield in Iraq and Yemen have also failed to change the game.
Altogether, Iran and its allied militias in the region lack the technological capacity to confront U.S. and Israeli missiles, fighters and military machinery. Should Iran seek to expand the war, there is no doubt that Israel would have the support of its Western allies.
The genuine strength of the Iranian-backed militias in the region has always been more one of endurance, employing guerrilla warfare tactics over generations. Precisely this form of combat led to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and, later, from Gaza in 2005. One might also add the experience of American troops in wars ranging from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan.
For Iran, the policy of “strategic patience” is not an option, but a must. Hezbollah and Iran are conserving military resources and waiting for Israeli ground forces to enter a trap inside Lebanon territory.
A second element of Iran’s and the “Axis of Resistance’s” power is rooted in propaganda. However, after the carnage of the past year, even the Axis’s social base no longer finds the propaganda credible. Today, these cards are burned and useless.
Reacting to statements made by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in New York — where he asserted that “the Zionist regime will not achieve its goals to escalate tensions, but it will pay for its crimes” — many critics of the administration of new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian interpreted the policy of “avoiding the trap of tension” as a reflection of the Iranian government’s weakness.
One social media activist who advocates for Israel’s destruction posted on Twitter/X: “The term #StrategicPatience is nothing but a lie. The reality is that we are weaker than our enemy (Israel), and instead of addressing our deficiency and striving to become stronger, we boasted and bluffed. Now that it’s time to put those words and bravado to the test, but we have nothing to show and have fallen silent.”
Within Iranian circles, there is ongoing discussion about a recent Israeli attack on an IRGC facility and the theft of classified documents, which Iranian media attempted to downplay by claiming the explosion was caused by a gas leak.
Iranian political analyst Mehdi Kharratian acknowledged that Hezbollah now finds itself in a complicated situation, where either escalation or restraint pose significant challenges. Meanwhile, Israel is attempting to impose its own terms on Hezbollah by combining political and military pressure.
Today, Israel is setting new rules of engagement, while Iran and Hezbollah appear stuck in the mindset of the 2006 war, unable to adapt to the evolving landscape.
Mohammad Mazhari is a political scientist who served as editor-in-chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency from 2013-2020 and as a journalist at the Tehran Times from 2020-2021.
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