Policy Memo

Between “Cyber Insecurity” and Modern Warfare: The Precarious Tightrope of Deterrence Stability in South Asia

If both India and Pakistan continue to modernize their warfighting capabilities without restraint, they will end up critically impeding their nuclear signaling capabilities

Deterrence stability in South Asia is hinged on India and Pakistan’s mutual understanding and appreciation of modern warfare. Yet, cycles of crises have created a trust deficit between the two, resulting in their wanting to modernize their warfighting capabilities. Both states are investing in a mix of cyber and electronic warfare strategies but these improvements in warfighting may lead to more instability than stability. Cyberwarfare and electronic warfare have subtle differences and similarities, which makes it difficult to distinguish between wartime and peacetime operations. India and Pakistan must invest in bilateral risk reduction mechanisms to prevent miscommunication – and nuclear war – in the region.

Introduction

Nuclear risk reduction is a difficult conversation to have between Pakistan and India because of the protracted history of crises and ongoing conflicts. Since their overt nuclearization in 1998, both states have done little to add confidence between themselves and the international community with respect to how they maintain deterrence.¹ Finding space for limited war or nonconventional means of targeting critical infrastructure are sensitive matters between states maintaining nuclear deterrence. If Pakistan and India continue to follow their unrestrained induction of new technologies, they will end up critically impeding their nuclear signaling capabilities, putting the region at a higher risk for nuclear war.

Cycles of crises have created a trust deficit between India and Pakistan, resulting in both eventually developing volatile military doctrines. However, what’s even more problematic is that with each crisis and confrontation, both states have increased their interest in modernizing their warfighting capabilities,² as seen after the Balakot-Pulwama crisis in 2019. The crisis itself was a series of escalatory actions by the air forces of both states, even violating agreed-upon border parameters, which not only posed serious threats to bilateral security but also raised concerns about their nuclear deterrence.³ Each state wants to induct new weapon systems and technologies into their armed forces to provide a more robust atmosphere of warfighting and situational awareness⁴ during crisis escalation.

Pakistan and India have both started investing significant interest and resources in developing nontraditional means of warfighting. This transforms their contemporary battlefield-oriented military dynamics to one based on battlespace preparedness.⁵ This means not only improving command and control capabilities but also adding electronic warfighting⁶ to the current arsenals.

The complication in adding a mix of cyber and electronic warfare strategies is that it is a slippery slope. The cyber strategy targets systems and networks of communication within and beyond a battlefield, whereas the electronic strategy targets battlefield equipment used for communications and weapon systems. However, such improvements in an environment mired by a trust deficit raise serious concerns about nuclear deterrence as it encourages cross-domain adventurism⁷ between India and Pakistan. Based on how electronic warfare and cyberwarfare have severe yet subtle differences and similarities in a warfighting scenario, their points of convergence blur the lines between wartime and peacetime operations. The fragility of this strategy is in miscommunication during crises leading to escalation or, in a worst-case scenario, questions about the other side’s commitment to nuclear deterrence itself.

The Netcentric Warfare Approach

The concept of network-centric warfare or “netcentric warfare” was applied by the United States in the 1990s,⁸ because technological advancement made warfighting a complex undertaking. The major focus was on understanding the application of sophisticated technologies to decision-making⁹ and strategic dispositions before or during conflict. High performance computing was used to design a command and control structure capable of addressing core issues and mitigating human error to reduce collateral damage. Targeted and precision strikes supplemented by a sophisticated command and control system became the focus of both countries, as they could be used to cause disruption without causing mass casualties during the conflict. The concept behind netcentric warfare¹⁰ was aimed at neutralizing inefficient decision-making and distorting an adversary’s capability to gain a similar advantage. Acquiring sophisticated computer systems with high-speed processing made decision-making significantly more effective.¹¹ Information superiority not only reduces the fog of war, but allows for more control on the battlefield and enables shared alertness between decision-makers and their operators.

Based on how electronic warfare and cyberwarfare have severe yet subtle differences and similarities in a warfighting scenario, their points of convergence blur the lines between wartime and peacetime operations.

The United States employed two dimensions of netcentric warfare during the Gulf War.¹² The military response called Operation Desert Shield was aimed at defensive application, whereas Operation Desert Storm was the offensive application of modern warfighting. In Desert Shield, the aim was to deny the adversary any advantage over critical targets. In contrast, Desert Storm was aimed at offensively and aggressively neutralizing the enemy’s capacity to gain any advantage and eventually aimed at decapitating its warfighting capability.¹³ Command and control thus played a very technical role in the war; it was both a desired target and the best means to neutralize the enemy. On one end, this dual role made warfighting sophisticated, but it added more complications on the other end to an already complex warfighting scenario by increasing technological dependency.

Both operations (Desert Storm and Desert Shield) provided a trifecta of battlespace supremacy aimed at successfully protecting all critical infrastructure within Kuwait while simultaneously eliminating the enemy’s warfighting capacity¹⁴ The essential components of this trifecta¹⁵ are situational awareness, effective targeting, and cross-domain application of weapon systems. Situational awareness is crucial to this form of warfare as it allows armed forces to create a series of communications networks (satellites, radios, internet, infrared, or radars), allowing for an advantage in mapping strategies as information comes in.¹⁶ Effective targeting is achieved by providing accurate and reliable information to weapon systems (manned and unmanned) and their operators to neutralize threats and/or deny the enemy an advantage during a conflict.

Imagining Netcentric Warfare in South Asia: Prospects and Challenges

Netcentric warfare in South Asia is an emerging concept due to the lack of technological advancement in the militaries of Pakistan and India.¹⁷ Combining electronic warfare and disruption strategies by employing cyber warfare tools and strategies is a baseline on which both Pakistan and India intend to operate, meaning that there are sufficient margins to modernize their armed forces.¹⁸

This situation implies that their focus would not only be on the sophistication of military platforms but also on new strategies built around emerging technologies. Current modernization projects inducted by Pakistan and India have seen some progress in cyberspace. Pakistan and India have both updated their cybersecurity policies and are well on their way to developing doctrines to facilitate their transition in this new domain of war.

The modernization goal of both Pakistan and India remains a gray area in South Asian strategic stability for two reasons. First, compared to how global development in cyberwarfare and electronic warfare is progressing, Pakistan and India lack access to technologies and learning that are prerequisites to such sophisticated warfighting.¹⁹ Second, their contemporary setup is structured around learning about the application in war before they embark on practical demonstrations.²⁰ To establish a netcentric warfare environment, sophistication is required to combine High-Performance Analytics and Computing (HPAC), inducted through supercomputers, quantum computing, and fast-tracked decision-making during combat. Unmanned combat or surveillance platforms will provide additional support in situational awareness. Both states must invest heavily in their command and control capabilities to achieve this level of technological sophistication.²¹

The technology race in South Asia is in its embryonic phase, where both Pakistan and India are panning out prerequisites for a prospective technology arms race. The issue with a cyber-related vulnerability is that the detection of an attack or breach is not considered a total failure of the system installed. Without a breach, intentional or unintentional, identifying weaknesses is rather difficult in the cyberspace domain. While it is true that such intrusions account for some shortcomings or problems with the system, both states see the unreliable detection capability as an opportunity to upgrade. In other words, consistent security breaches²² and firewall failures at sensitive installations²³ insulate both India and Pakistan from intrusive cyberspace vulnerabilities.

The scenario can be termed a cyber insecurity situation within a more pronounced security dilemma environment. This environment would demand both states to acquire, develop, and induct a complex array of new weapon systems and surveillance capabilities for all branches of armed forces, which come with many challenges. For example, this environment of adding more weapon systems and associated technologies, coupled with new crises identifying limitations to their warfighting capabilities, would also require both states to upgrade existing command, control, and communications frameworks to suit this need and induct integration across platforms²⁴ for better situational awareness. This effort would complicate their battlespace experiences and add new risks, as both states have not been used to complex forms of warfighting in the past.

A trust deficit continues to play a dominant role in how Pakistan and India understand crises and their potential escalation. Cyberspace operations will add more to the problem as identifying the right source of an attack would negatively affect the outcome of any prospective crisis between both states.

India and Pakistan have a long history of conflict, where a significant challenge for both states during each crisis episode has been their ability to coordinate and plan battles efficiently. India has been working consistently to address its military mobilization challenge,²⁵ while Pakistan seeks strategies and means to address its conventional asymmetry with India.²⁶

A major portion of warfighting in South Asia was focused on neutralizing legacy platforms, which makes warfighting difficult and rather volatile as it encourages a consistent stream of possible future escalations. Supremacy can be achieved by opting to neutralize decision-making capability or by counterbalancing the ability of an adversary to predict actions during war. That very lack of predictability raises serious questions about the potential for inadvertent escalation in the context of a crisis between two nuclear-armed states. Attribution for cyberattacks is challenging under normal circumstances and doubly so during conflict. The potential for miscommunication and misunderstandings is high, especially as both sides seek to introduce and deploy new, cyber-enabled tools into their arsenals.

Pakistan and India have the impetus to focus on netcentric warfare due to their need for more advantages in joint integrated operations during crises. Instead of opting into conventional and traditional means of decision-making and strategy determination, netcentric warfare allows for a more robust and quicker-paced disposition. Cyberspace operability allows for more room to maneuver due to its attributability challenge. Not identifying the attacker and its origins makes taking appropriate defensive measures highly challenging. Cyberspace adds more to the fog of war²⁷ than anywhere else in the warfighting matrix. In South Asia, being unable to identify the attacker within a persisting trust deficit situation is not only a risky scenario but a volatility-favoring crisis escalation. A trust deficit continues to play a dominant role in how Pakistan and India understand crises and their potential escalation. Cyberspace operations will add more to the problem as identifying the right source of an attack would negatively affect the outcome of any prospective crisis between both states.

How Modern Warfare Is Developing in the Region

The debate about whether cyberspace can be classified as a new domain of war²⁸ is ongoing within the international community, but it seems to be an accepted and investment-worthy domain of war where states like the U.S., China, and Russia are significantly investing militarily, financially, and strategically. To India, a strategic partnership between Pakistan and China, including memorandums of understanding signed on joint cybersecurity, indicates a growing concern about possible cooperation in offensive cyber capabilities. This vulnerability for New Delhi would push it to develop its own strategic technology exchange in the field.²⁹ The argument that cybercentric technologies can fracture or completely neutralize command and control systems of states is one dimension that has gained significant momentum. Coupled with unmanned combat vehicles and/or lethal autonomous weapons, the concept of netcentric warfare takes on a new meaning.

For South Asia, the advent of cyber insecurity has expanded the debate on how national security is perceived. Pakistan and India have experienced their fair share of cyber-related threats and hacking incidents targeting government infrastructure like the Kudankulam Nuclear Reactor in India in 2019 and Pakistan’s Federal Bureau of Revenue database in 2021,³⁰ and even though attacks were identified, the source, scale of damage, and concerns of such breaches are still being debated. From hacking incidents on government installations to data breaches and malware incidents on sensitive installations, cyberspace aggression has received significant attention³¹ in Pakistan and India, both from civilian law enforcement and military strategists. This situation implies that cyberspace vulnerabilities would have to be independently identified within the broader national security framework. Given the technologies, systems, and upgrades required for the armed forces of both states, switching to this new kind of warfighting will have a significant economic and technological impact.

India and Pakistan both have made significant progress in their cybersecurity infrastructure.³² India has relative advantages in cybersecurity over Pakistan. As India and Pakistan continue to invest more in the cyberspace domain, a clear distinguishable pattern becomes visible: Indian public-private partnerships and cybersecurity startups have widened the technological learning gap with Pakistan, even as Pakistan picked up the pace after its Cybersecurity Policy 2021. By inducting quantum learning into a diverse mix of decision supremacy and unmanned combat platforms, India can use such an integrated strategy to neutralize adversaries’ command and control systems by employing it in netcentric warfare. Indian military modernization, indigenization, and cooperation with international partners also contribute to the country’s hopes of achieving this target.³³

As India and Pakistan continue to invest more in the cyberspace domain, a clear distinguishable pattern becomes visible: Indian public-private partnerships and cybersecurity startups have widened the technological learning gap with Pakistan, even as Pakistan picked up the pace after its Cybersecurity Policy 2021.

Computing technology, specifically quantum computing in network-centric warfare, has initiated a strong debate on the second quantum revolution.³⁴ The essential idea that such technologies have immense utility in warfighting is the one factor that attracts strategic decision-making advantage to be more than just conventional canons of warfare. Pakistan established its first National Center for Cybersecurity (NCCS) in 2018, and India operationalized its Defense Cyber Agency (DCA), preparing for its introduction to netcentric warfare. India is also upgrading its Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) to focus on quantum computing, a dual-use technology that can be significantly disruptive for both military and civilian installations. Such a wide spectrum application of quantum technologies or quantum warfare capabilities magnifies existing sophisticated platforms in their military application within netcentric warfare. This would not only have an impact on how both Pakistan and India understand warfare and warfighting but also on how their nuclear deterrence would also require an overhaul. Even though these institutions and organizations are being set up with similar initiatives on the way, understanding cyber warfare is more defensive than offensive. Conversely, adding joint integrated doctrines, upgrading electronic warfare systems, and improving communications indicates a more offensive approach. This combination points out that both states are slowly but surely moving toward a battlespace environment and, consequently, toward a netcentric warfare scenario.

There exists a strong causal link between technological development and its dual-use military utility³⁵ with reference to cyberspace warfighting. This link also indicates a growing trajectory of induction and learning in Pakistan and India regarding emerging technologies and their utilization in warfighting strategies. The impact of HPAC; the institution of Unmanned and Automated Combat Platforms (UACP) like combat and surveillance drones operating in air, land, and sea domains; and the quantum revolution in information technologies in South Asia would be significant.³⁶ The question that remains unanswered for Pakistan and India is what will be the cascading impact of such emerging technologies on conventional domains of warfare and command and control, from battlefield to strategic decision-making.

Modern Warfare and Battlespace Transformation Amid Nuclear Deterrence

Poor communication during the Pulwama-Balakot incident and continued noncommunication after the BrahMos accident raise serious questions³⁷ on how these new technologies will impact an already fragile deterrence equilibrium. Strategic stability between Pakistan and India hinges on their battlefield-centric approach, which has been defined by limited subconventional and conventional conflict under the nuclear threshold. Given how netcentric warfighting and situational awareness directly target communicability, a critical component of nuclear deterrence, both states risk accelerating their climb on the ladder of escalation. Though military modernization and upgrading command and control are prerequisites for armed forces to keep pace with new developments, they can negatively impact nuclear deterrence if deterring parties limit their risk reduction to insufficient bilateral risk reduction.

The current environment is built on nonengagement and noncommunication, with each state pursuing military modernization without communicating the consequences to the other. India has inducted a host of institutions and organizations focusing exclusively on more robust command and control capabilities as well as new weapon systems aiming for cross-domain operations. Pakistan not only has a defensive position owing to its asymmetry with Indian military modernization but also to its financial constraints and limited indigenous defense capabilities. For Pakistan, the situation is to balance its quid pro quo³⁸ and full-spectrum deterrence with India; whereas for New Delhi, maintaining escalation dominance through conventional modernization is a serious impediment to its credible minimum deterrence commitments. This asymmetry between both Pakistan and India have brought Beijing and Islamabad closer together in terms of technology sharing under a strategic partnership. For India, this partnership upsets its own deterrent variable against Beijing, which in turn not only accelerates its military modernization but makes it reach out to international stakeholders for assistance. For South Asia, this outreach to superpowers and prospective technology transfers further erodes bilateral risk reduction and paves the way for possible future confrontation.

For both states, nuclear deterrence becomes a question of serious consideration toward their ambition to create all-domain, interoperable conventional forces capable of synergizing all factors of netcentric warfare without jeopardizing nuclear deterrence.

Even though India still must maintain a dual deterrence vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, New Delhi’s focus on the latter would still be a consistent cause for concern to policymakers in Pakistan. Pakistan and India already have their fair share of near misses and escalation-intensive moments, with the latest being an accidental launch of a BrahMos missile from India inside Pakistan in 2022. After the BrahMos accident,³⁹

both states continue not to engage on the vulnerabilities they have with new technologies. This noninteractive atmosphere adds more impetus to their netcentric challenges. Unlike the Gulf War, if Pakistan and India ever decide to engage in a battlespace environment, their limited infrastructure and understanding of the concept of modern warfare would have a devastating impact on their nuclear deterrent.

After the Kargil conflict, a significant number of their escalatory engagements were averted by third-party intervention, and crisis termination was never converted to positive bilateralism. Pakistan and India do not have the tools necessary for a complicated battlespace environment, and their modernization campaigns have had little impact on how much they understand the concept of modern warfare. For both states, nuclear deterrence becomes a question of serious consideration toward their ambition to create all-domain, interoperable conventional forces capable of synergizing all factors of netcentric warfare without jeopardizing nuclear deterrence.

Policy Recommendations and Impact Assessment

Without immediately moving to implement arms reduction arrangements, Pakistan and India can initiate bilateral discussions on setting limitations on conventional military modernization campaigns, especially toward delivery systems. Risk reduction and crisis mitigation require states to opt for rapprochement, and both aforementioned incidents provide sufficient incentives for both states. The object would be to initiate Track I and Track II dialogues between both states regarding their military modernization campaigns in light of their international commitments and their fallout on regional strategic equilibrium.

A constructive framework can be designed to preempt the “blame loop” during crises, which allows imminent conflicts to have unwarranted connectivity to past incidents and is a principal trigger of trust deficit. A suggested arms limitation agreement not only creates liminal space for unaided bilateralism but also provides an autonomous mechanism for future risk reduction, taking a step away from the post-2019 environment of escalation termination. Both states have adequate motivation to pursue such dialogue owing to the causal link between their military modernization ambitions and a rational plausibility toward a mutually assured destruction (MAD) environment on multifarious flash points.

India and Pakistan have significantly progressed in deterrence equilibrium and strategic stability despite engaging in volatile doctrinal and technological competition. Pakistan avoided escalation by opting to choose for crisis termination during the Pulwama-Balakot crisis. India showed similar meaningful gestures by addressing the accidental launch of BrahMos with zero tolerance for those involved. This restraint hints toward transforming strategic thought in both states, which is an excellent gauge for possible bilateral engagement. Beyond their conventional risk reduction mechanisms, this environment can be used as a suggestive framework for more comprehensive dialogue in the future.

For both Pakistan and India, developing strategic partnerships may be a useful avenue to enhance their warfighting capabilities to modern standards, but the pursuit of such enterprises can run greater risks if left unabated. India may not be incentivized to bilateral confidence building as it sees China’s role more pronounced, considering its vulnerabilities. Although Pakistan may not be interested in keeping China out of the region, both India and Pakistan can develop a regional cybersecurity forum to outline limitations to acquisition of offensive and defensive cyber technology. South Asia has yet to experience its own arms limitation agreements and, with cyberspace technologies, this bilateral collaboration can be attempted as a precursor.

Pakistan and India are both progressing toward military modernization campaigns and are also in the process of inducting new weapon systems and delivery platforms. Owing to the strategic makeup of the region and the role of international stakeholders, Pakistan and India should engage in setting some standards for future military ambitions, notwithstanding their tumultuous past experiences. Crisis dynamics in South Asia have evolved, and both states have shown substantial improvement in how they preserve strategic stability, indicating that constructive discourse and bilateral agreements are possible.

Keeping their current risk reduction mechanisms in mind (hotlines and nonattack agreements on nuclear installations), both states can further this argument to include intrusive offensive cyberattacks and breach of cybersecurity systems. This information sharing, like the decades-old and regularly practiced Nuclear Information Exchange, can be put to practice between both states to add another layer of confidence building. The structure of this agreement can include the monitoring of cybersecurity breaches and intrusive activities to better track and trace their origins and intent. This approach will also allow both states to avoid third-party unattributable cyberattacks that can impact confidence building by triggering the blame loop.

Pakistan and India have come a long way in defining the nature of conflict and bilateral trust deficit with each other. Even though they understand how serious any future military adventure may become, their military might is growing and modernizing fairly consistently. The more modern their armies become, the more serious the onus of responsibility and restraint is mandated. Given this aspect of risk and reward, deterrence stability in South Asia is hinged on their mutual understanding and appreciation of modern warfare. The margins of such a style of war, as identified during Operation Desert Storm, are vivid and should especially be heeded by nuclear-armed competitors. Until that realization is acknowledged and some risk reduction is initiated, South Asia will continue to be apprehensive about a cybersecurity atmosphere. Both states have added bilateral risk reduction mechanisms in the past regarding missile tests and the establishment of hotlines, and it is no novelty that such an approach may be repeated toward this new aspect of warfighting.

Notes

1
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2
Aamna Rafiq, “Militarisation of Artificial Intelligence and Future of Arms Control in South Asia,” Strategic Studies, vol. 41, no. 2 (Summer 2021): 49-63, https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/4_SS_Aamna_Rafiq_No-3_2021.pdf.pdf.
3
C. Raja Mohan, “Explained: How Balakot Changed the Familiar Script of India-Pakistan Military Crises,” Indian Express, March 4, 2019, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/pulwama-attack-pakistan-narendra-modi-balakot-air-strike-iaf-5609325/.
4
Nasreen Akhtar and Arshad Abbasi, “Nuclearization, Development, and Deterrence in South Asia: An Analysis of Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture, ” Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) 41, no. 2 (2021), https://openurl.ebsco.com/EPDB%3Agcd%3A9%3A1048857/detailv2?sid=ebsco%3Aplink%3Ascholar&id=ebsco%3Agcd%3A151849267&crl=f.
5
Noreen Naseer, Muhammad Fahim Khan, and Aamer Raza, “A Comparative View of India and Pakistan’s Defence Capabilities: Historical Evolution and Future Trends, ” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 8, no. 1 (2023), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/20578911221124384. Battlespace preparedness implies using all forms and strategies for warfighting, including but not limited to air, land, sea, cyber, space, and information assets, which complicates the matter considering their trust deficit. Such a militarized atmosphere is leading both Pakistan and India to invest more aggressively in cyberspace capabilities and design a modern warfare environment to dictate future confrontations.⁵Umaima Ali, “Comparing the AI-Military Integration by India and Pakistan,” Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research, Sept. 7, 2023, https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/comparing-the-ai-military-integration-by-india-and-pakistan/.
6
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7
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8
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9
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10
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11
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12
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13
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14
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15
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16
Mehmet Cem Demici, “What is Network-Centric Warfare,” Naval Post, Jun. 21, 2023, https://navalpost.com/what-is-network-centric-warfare/#:~:text=Definition%20of%20Network%20Centric%20Operations%20NCO%20is%20a,both%20the%20efficiency%20and%20effectiveness%20of%20military%20operations.
17
Marie Baezner, “Regional Rivalry between India-Pakistan: Tit-for-Tat in Cyberspace, ” Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, August 2018, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2018-04.pdf.
18
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19
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20
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21
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22
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23
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24
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25
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26
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27
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28
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29
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30
Syed Talat Hussain, “What Caused Pakistan’s Largest Data Centre Attack?,” Gulf News, Aug. 24, 2021, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/what-caused-pakistans-largest-data-centre-attack-1.81758508.
31
Saba Kiran, “A Comprehensive Study of India and Pakistan’s Cyber Strengths and Weaknesses,” Modern Diplomacy, May 15, 2023, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/05/15/a-comprehensive-study-of-india-and-pakistans-cyber-strengths-and-weaknesses/.
32
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33
Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Military Modernization: Plans and Strategic Underpinnings,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, Sept. 24, 2012, https://www.nbr.org/publication/indias-military-modernization-plans-and-strategic-underpinnings/.
34
James S. Johnson, “China’s Vision of the Future Network-Centric Battlefield: Cyber, Space and Electromagnetic Asymmetric Challenges to the United States, ” Comparative Strategy 37, no. 5 (2018).
35
Thea Riebe and Christian Reuter, “Assessing Dual-Use in IT Development,” Science and Technology for Peace and Security (PEASEC), Technische Universitat Darmstadt, Mar. 13, 2019, https://peasec.de/paper/2019/2019_RiebeReuter_AccessingDualUse_ProcSciencePeaceSecurity-TUprints.pdf
36
Manoj Joshi and Pushan Das, eds., “The Future of War in South Asia: Innovation, Technology and Organisation,” Observer Research Foundation, Mar. 18, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-future-of-war-in-south-asia-innovation-technology-and-organisation.
37
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