On July 28th, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin began their respective Indo-Pacific visits with U.S. allies and partners in the region. They began their journey together by meeting their Japanese counterparts for the bilateral Security Consultative Committee (commonly called “2+2”) in Tokyo.
The Joint Statement released following the meeting heralded several significant announcements, including upgrading the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to a Joint Force Command with operational responsibility, and reaffirmation of their commitment to exploring the opportunities for bilateral co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment of their defense equipment, as well as advancing deepening their relationship with other key U.S. allies and security partners including the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the Philippines, and Europe. All in all, these announcements all point to one trendline: the U.S.-Japan alliance is positioning itself to be the hub of the U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific region.
Moving forward, the most formidable implementation challenge is on the U.S. side: upgrading USFJ to a Joint Force Command with expanded and enhanced mission and operational authority.
Secretary Austin explained that this decision is “the most significant change to U.S. Forces Japan since its creation, and one of the strongest, improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years.” Despite being led by a 3-star general who was also the commander of the 5th Air Force, USFJ’s primary responsibility had been historically considered as a high-level political-military coordinator, with no actual operational authority. Since it had not been designated as the “Joint Task Force-capable” command, the Pacific Command’s “command” element had to move forward to USFJ headquarters to command Operation Tomodachi at the time of the 2011 Great Eastern Japan Earthquake to support Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) rescue, recovery and reconstruction operation in the aftermath of the triple disaster.
Upgrading USFJ has been considered in the past when the U.S. reexamined its global forward force presence laydown. But it was really the experience of U.S. forces and JSDF to stand up the Bilateral Coordination Action Team (BCAT)—ultimately headquartered in USFJ, with two additional BCATs Ichigaya (Japan Ministry of Defense headquarters) and Sendai (Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Northeastern Army headquarters)—which reignited discussion within the U.S. about the necessity of reexamining the mission and authority for USFJ.
Now it is up to the U.S. to fully implement the upgrade of this command. With the announced change, US forward-deployed forces will have one four-star command in ROK and three three-star commands in Japan. The command-and-control relations among all these three- and four-star commands, all reporting to INDOPACOM, still remains unclear. In addition, with the U.S. Army also demonstrating greater interests in expanding its relations with its counterparts in Japan, there may be a push from the U.S. Army to upgrade its command in Japan, which is currently a two-star command. It is critical that U.S. addresses any challenges against the announced command upgrade—including budget-related questions—with expediency and transparency. In particular, given that the U.S. enters a volatile political season, and the announced upgrades are said to be driven by a strong resolve shown by Secretary Austin, it is critical that Japan be given the assurance that the USFJ upgrade decision is irreversible and insulated from any potential political changes in the U.S.
On the Japanese side as well, now that the U.S. demonstrated its commitment to x-down on its military-to-military relations with Japan by upgrading USFJ, Japan Joint Operations Command (JJOC) establishment needs to move with the same level of urgency and with sufficient resources—fiscal and otherwise—to ensure that the JJOC will be indeed effective and operational.
In addition, the U.S. and Japan need to demonstrate that some of the initiatives announced during Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Washington earlier this year can begin to generate future-oriented results. For example, it is indeed an encouraging step forward that the two governments announced the establishment of the Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) as a new consultative framework to discuss future government-to-government cooperation in the defense industry. However, the working groups that have been stood up so far remain focused on co-production and Japanese opportunity to repair and maintain U.S. defense equipment—a far cry from “joint” defense industrial cooperation. As encouraging as it is that there are already working groups actively engaged in the consultation to implement this cooperation, it is equally important that the two governments begin to discuss potential program concepts that leverage the advanced technologies that both countries offer.
The SCC Joint Statement demonstrated a strong resolve and commitment by both governments to truly transform the U.S.-Japan alliance for the future. As remarkable and historical as this transformation and these initiatives have been, their implementation is even more critical than ever.
A Transformation in US-Japan Defense Cooperation
By Yuki Tatsumi
Japan
On July 28th, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin began their respective Indo-Pacific visits with U.S. allies and partners in the region. They began their journey together by meeting their Japanese counterparts for the bilateral Security Consultative Committee (commonly called “2+2”) in Tokyo.
The Joint Statement released following the meeting heralded several significant announcements, including upgrading the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to a Joint Force Command with operational responsibility, and reaffirmation of their commitment to exploring the opportunities for bilateral co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment of their defense equipment, as well as advancing deepening their relationship with other key U.S. allies and security partners including the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, the Philippines, and Europe. All in all, these announcements all point to one trendline: the U.S.-Japan alliance is positioning itself to be the hub of the U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific region.
Moving forward, the most formidable implementation challenge is on the U.S. side: upgrading USFJ to a Joint Force Command with expanded and enhanced mission and operational authority.
Secretary Austin explained that this decision is “the most significant change to U.S. Forces Japan since its creation, and one of the strongest, improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years.” Despite being led by a 3-star general who was also the commander of the 5th Air Force, USFJ’s primary responsibility had been historically considered as a high-level political-military coordinator, with no actual operational authority. Since it had not been designated as the “Joint Task Force-capable” command, the Pacific Command’s “command” element had to move forward to USFJ headquarters to command Operation Tomodachi at the time of the 2011 Great Eastern Japan Earthquake to support Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) rescue, recovery and reconstruction operation in the aftermath of the triple disaster.
Upgrading USFJ has been considered in the past when the U.S. reexamined its global forward force presence laydown. But it was really the experience of U.S. forces and JSDF to stand up the Bilateral Coordination Action Team (BCAT)—ultimately headquartered in USFJ, with two additional BCATs Ichigaya (Japan Ministry of Defense headquarters) and Sendai (Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Northeastern Army headquarters)—which reignited discussion within the U.S. about the necessity of reexamining the mission and authority for USFJ.
Now it is up to the U.S. to fully implement the upgrade of this command. With the announced change, US forward-deployed forces will have one four-star command in ROK and three three-star commands in Japan. The command-and-control relations among all these three- and four-star commands, all reporting to INDOPACOM, still remains unclear. In addition, with the U.S. Army also demonstrating greater interests in expanding its relations with its counterparts in Japan, there may be a push from the U.S. Army to upgrade its command in Japan, which is currently a two-star command. It is critical that U.S. addresses any challenges against the announced command upgrade—including budget-related questions—with expediency and transparency. In particular, given that the U.S. enters a volatile political season, and the announced upgrades are said to be driven by a strong resolve shown by Secretary Austin, it is critical that Japan be given the assurance that the USFJ upgrade decision is irreversible and insulated from any potential political changes in the U.S.
On the Japanese side as well, now that the U.S. demonstrated its commitment to x-down on its military-to-military relations with Japan by upgrading USFJ, Japan Joint Operations Command (JJOC) establishment needs to move with the same level of urgency and with sufficient resources—fiscal and otherwise—to ensure that the JJOC will be indeed effective and operational.
In addition, the U.S. and Japan need to demonstrate that some of the initiatives announced during Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Washington earlier this year can begin to generate future-oriented results. For example, it is indeed an encouraging step forward that the two governments announced the establishment of the Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS) as a new consultative framework to discuss future government-to-government cooperation in the defense industry. However, the working groups that have been stood up so far remain focused on co-production and Japanese opportunity to repair and maintain U.S. defense equipment—a far cry from “joint” defense industrial cooperation. As encouraging as it is that there are already working groups actively engaged in the consultation to implement this cooperation, it is equally important that the two governments begin to discuss potential program concepts that leverage the advanced technologies that both countries offer.
The SCC Joint Statement demonstrated a strong resolve and commitment by both governments to truly transform the U.S.-Japan alliance for the future. As remarkable and historical as this transformation and these initiatives have been, their implementation is even more critical than ever.
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