In January 2023, Saudi Arabian Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman announced that, given a recent discovery of indigenous uranium reserves, the Kingdom intends to advance its plans to develop a front-end nuclear fuel-cycle infrastructure, with both a domestic and an international dimension. The Saudi minister specified that this might involve joint ventures with willing partners and that Saudi Arabia would comply with international standards of transparency.
His comments were not particularly surprising. At a meeting in 2022, bin Salman had stated that the Kingdom planned to exploit its vast uranium resources “in the most transparent way.” That did not prevent international concern from growing over Saudi intentions amid a regional context in which Iran is reported to be enriching uranium at ever-higher levels.
Saudi interest in civilian nuclear technology dates to the late 1980s, when the Kingdom established an Atomic Energy Research Institute within the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology. Saudi nuclear ambitions significantly widened, at least publicly, in June 2011, when Abdul Ghani bin Melaibari, coordinator of scientific collaboration at yet another body—the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy—addressed the Gulf Environment Forum. He announced plans to construct 16 nuclear reactors over 20 years, and said they would ultimately meet about 20 percent of national electricity demand. This “city” was established in 2010 with the aim of increasing energy source diversification, utilizing nuclear power for desalination, and exploring the potential of renewable energy in general.
The development of a civilian nuclear energy program was also integral to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030: an ambitious plan to transition Saudi Arabia from an economy dependent on hydrocarbons to a more diversified, sustainable, and productive one. Since Vision 2030 was unveiled in 2016, Saudi policy elites have expressed a strong and seemingly non-negotiable interest in developing the capacity to produce low-enriched uranium as nuclear fuel utilizing domestic resources: In other words, nuclear fuel-cycle independence.
The Kingdom’s nuclear program has generated alarmist predictions and allegations since its inception. Reports of suspected yellowcake factories and uranium-conversion facilities, clandestine uranium milling, and Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation have fueled speculation about the program’s nature and direction. Although these claims often could not be substantiated, their subtext—that Saudi Arabia would inevitably acquire nuclear weapons—obscures a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis.
To some experts, the Saudi determination to have the ability to go from mining to fuel fabrication is an additional reason to doubt the Kingdom’s peaceful intentions, given the uneconomical nature of domestic fuel fabrication as well as the country’s vast oil reserves and solar energy potential. For others, it underlines the inadequacy of Saudi Arabia’s current safeguards. For example, the Kingdom maintains the old version of the so-called Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), which exempts the country from extensive verification and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Saudis have so far been unwilling to adopt the IAEA’s revised SQP or the Model Additional Protocol, which allows intrusive inspections on short notice. For a country embarking on ambitious nuclear energy plans, early verification and full monitoring are essential to confirm the benign nature of the program to the international community.
Saudi policy elites’ long-standing rhetoric in relation to the Iranian nuclear program has caused additional concern. Officials have reiterated in various fora that “all bets are off” if Iran acquires nuclear weapons.
Most analyses tend to conform to a traditional Western-centric view of nuclear politics, disregarding unique domestic, regional, and international dynamics that intertwine and define a country’s attitude toward the nuclear dimension. That Saudi Arabia has yet to implement its supposed “right to enrich” despite years of rhetoric deserves attention. Considered alongside Saudi threats that they will develop bombs if Iran does, the insistence on fiercely claiming such a right contributes to a broad strategy of securitization meant to prepare domestic and international audiences for a dramatic shift in the Saudi program should the government deem it necessary.
As energy reporter Steven Mufson aptly summed up in a 2018 piece for the Washington Post, “For Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, the reactors are a matter of international prestige and power, a step toward matching the nuclear program of Shia rival Iran while quenching some of the Kingdom’s domestic thirst for energy.”
While the civilian nuclear objectives have been transparent—energy diversification, demographic security, and alleviating water scarcity—nuclear fuel cycle independence in the Kingdom must also be seen as a matter of prestige, intended to enhance the regime’s legitimacy internally and project power externally. For Saudi Arabia, prestige is closely tied to the exercise of sovereign choice. As Clive Jones of Durham University writes, “the logic of securitization and its link to stateness, therefore, is not about whether the Saudis can enrich. After all, this remains a technical matter for an episteme that the Saudis can pay for. Rather, the logic of securitization is that Saudi Arabia must enrich.”
A line of reasoning not too far from the Iranian one.
This should bring us to correct the widely held argument, put forward by Western literature, that the acquisition of nuclear weapons automatically enhances the prestige and status of a country. Indeed, the development of civil nuclear power and the adoption of a nuclear hedging strategy can have the same impact in a particular regional and domestic context. The cases of Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, although in different ways, demonstrate how specific regional countries behave vis à vis the multifaceted potential of nuclear power. Observing such dynamics beyond traditional paradigms and recognizing how regional elites conceive the interdependence between nuclear power, regional prestige, and regime legitimacy can help craft a more effective regional security regime.
What remains central is not whether Saudi Arabia should or should not enrich uranium domestically. After all, as a member of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the country has that right so long as it is under safeguards. Rather, it is the status of Saudi Arabia’s safeguards that poses the biggest concern. In this context, any nuclear cooperation agreement—with Russia, China, or South Korea—should precondition the sale of reactors to the Kingdom’s adoption of the Additional Protocol.
Ludovica Castelli is a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Leicester within the ERC-funded project “The Third Nuclear Age.”
Why Does Saudi Arabia Want to Acquire the Nuclear Fuel Cycle?
By Ludovica Castelli
In Middle East & North Africa
In January 2023, Saudi Arabian Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman announced that, given a recent discovery of indigenous uranium reserves, the Kingdom intends to advance its plans to develop a front-end nuclear fuel-cycle infrastructure, with both a domestic and an international dimension. The Saudi minister specified that this might involve joint ventures with willing partners and that Saudi Arabia would comply with international standards of transparency.
His comments were not particularly surprising. At a meeting in 2022, bin Salman had stated that the Kingdom planned to exploit its vast uranium resources “in the most transparent way.” That did not prevent international concern from growing over Saudi intentions amid a regional context in which Iran is reported to be enriching uranium at ever-higher levels.
Saudi interest in civilian nuclear technology dates to the late 1980s, when the Kingdom established an Atomic Energy Research Institute within the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology. Saudi nuclear ambitions significantly widened, at least publicly, in June 2011, when Abdul Ghani bin Melaibari, coordinator of scientific collaboration at yet another body—the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy—addressed the Gulf Environment Forum. He announced plans to construct 16 nuclear reactors over 20 years, and said they would ultimately meet about 20 percent of national electricity demand. This “city” was established in 2010 with the aim of increasing energy source diversification, utilizing nuclear power for desalination, and exploring the potential of renewable energy in general.
The development of a civilian nuclear energy program was also integral to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030: an ambitious plan to transition Saudi Arabia from an economy dependent on hydrocarbons to a more diversified, sustainable, and productive one. Since Vision 2030 was unveiled in 2016, Saudi policy elites have expressed a strong and seemingly non-negotiable interest in developing the capacity to produce low-enriched uranium as nuclear fuel utilizing domestic resources: In other words, nuclear fuel-cycle independence.
The Kingdom’s nuclear program has generated alarmist predictions and allegations since its inception. Reports of suspected yellowcake factories and uranium-conversion facilities, clandestine uranium milling, and Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation have fueled speculation about the program’s nature and direction. Although these claims often could not be substantiated, their subtext—that Saudi Arabia would inevitably acquire nuclear weapons—obscures a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis.
To some experts, the Saudi determination to have the ability to go from mining to fuel fabrication is an additional reason to doubt the Kingdom’s peaceful intentions, given the uneconomical nature of domestic fuel fabrication as well as the country’s vast oil reserves and solar energy potential. For others, it underlines the inadequacy of Saudi Arabia’s current safeguards. For example, the Kingdom maintains the old version of the so-called Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), which exempts the country from extensive verification and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Saudis have so far been unwilling to adopt the IAEA’s revised SQP or the Model Additional Protocol, which allows intrusive inspections on short notice. For a country embarking on ambitious nuclear energy plans, early verification and full monitoring are essential to confirm the benign nature of the program to the international community.
Saudi policy elites’ long-standing rhetoric in relation to the Iranian nuclear program has caused additional concern. Officials have reiterated in various fora that “all bets are off” if Iran acquires nuclear weapons.
Most analyses tend to conform to a traditional Western-centric view of nuclear politics, disregarding unique domestic, regional, and international dynamics that intertwine and define a country’s attitude toward the nuclear dimension. That Saudi Arabia has yet to implement its supposed “right to enrich” despite years of rhetoric deserves attention. Considered alongside Saudi threats that they will develop bombs if Iran does, the insistence on fiercely claiming such a right contributes to a broad strategy of securitization meant to prepare domestic and international audiences for a dramatic shift in the Saudi program should the government deem it necessary.
As energy reporter Steven Mufson aptly summed up in a 2018 piece for the Washington Post, “For Saudi Arabia’s crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, the reactors are a matter of international prestige and power, a step toward matching the nuclear program of Shia rival Iran while quenching some of the Kingdom’s domestic thirst for energy.”
While the civilian nuclear objectives have been transparent—energy diversification, demographic security, and alleviating water scarcity—nuclear fuel cycle independence in the Kingdom must also be seen as a matter of prestige, intended to enhance the regime’s legitimacy internally and project power externally. For Saudi Arabia, prestige is closely tied to the exercise of sovereign choice. As Clive Jones of Durham University writes, “the logic of securitization and its link to stateness, therefore, is not about whether the Saudis can enrich. After all, this remains a technical matter for an episteme that the Saudis can pay for. Rather, the logic of securitization is that Saudi Arabia must enrich.”
A line of reasoning not too far from the Iranian one.
This should bring us to correct the widely held argument, put forward by Western literature, that the acquisition of nuclear weapons automatically enhances the prestige and status of a country. Indeed, the development of civil nuclear power and the adoption of a nuclear hedging strategy can have the same impact in a particular regional and domestic context. The cases of Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, although in different ways, demonstrate how specific regional countries behave vis à vis the multifaceted potential of nuclear power. Observing such dynamics beyond traditional paradigms and recognizing how regional elites conceive the interdependence between nuclear power, regional prestige, and regime legitimacy can help craft a more effective regional security regime.
What remains central is not whether Saudi Arabia should or should not enrich uranium domestically. After all, as a member of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the country has that right so long as it is under safeguards. Rather, it is the status of Saudi Arabia’s safeguards that poses the biggest concern. In this context, any nuclear cooperation agreement—with Russia, China, or South Korea—should precondition the sale of reactors to the Kingdom’s adoption of the Additional Protocol.
Ludovica Castelli is a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Leicester within the ERC-funded project “The Third Nuclear Age.”
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