After returning from Tehran over the weekend, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi announced that he had reached an agreement with Iran on “concrete measures” to advance the agency’s stalled investigation into past activities that Iran should have declared to the agency.
A joint statement from the IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) stated that Iran “expressed its readiness to continue its cooperation and provide further information and access to address the outstanding safeguards issues.”
Unfortunately, the statement does not appear likely to herald a breakthrough in the years-long investigation. Within hours of Grossi’s March 4 press conference, the deputy head of the AEOI, Behrouz Kamalvandi, contradicted Grossi’s characterization of the discussions.
Iran’s stonewalling is concerning. Without credible cooperation, the IAEA cannot provide assurances that the country’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful. The implications of the investigation dragging out, however, extend beyond Iran’s safeguards obligations.
As the United States and Iran closed in on an agreement last August to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Tehran’s demands to close the IAEA’s safeguards investigation scuttled the deal. If the IAEA cannot close the probe, the issue will likely remain a roadblock in any future negotiations and a flash point for escalation.
For these reasons, it is critical to explore solutions to bring the IAEA probe to a conclusion. First and foremost, any solution must ensure the IAEA receives the technically credible information it needs to account for Iran’s nuclear materials. Creative and flexible diplomacy can ensure that information is provided while giving Iran a face-saving path to cooperation.
Evidence presented by the IAEA to date suggests that Tehran conducted nuclear activities and/or stored nuclear materials at three locations which should have been declared under the country’s comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA). All non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are legally required to implement a safeguards agreement. For more than two years, however, Iran has failed to provide credible explanations for the presence of processed uranium at these sites. The IAEA also investigated a fourth location and concluded in a May 2022 report that Iran conducted activities relevant to uranium metal there that should have been declared.
While these activities took place over two decades ago, it is critically important that the agency can account for the materials involved. As Grossi reiterated in a Nov. 10, 2022 report, the investigation must be resolved “for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.”
Allowing Iran to get away with less than technically credible answers for the presence of processed uranium at three undeclared locations would undermine the agency and its safeguard’s role. It would also send the wrong message to future would-be proliferators. The IAEA’s independence is also critical.
At the same time, it should not be surprising that Iran is reluctant to own up to its past undeclared nuclear activities. Tehran has never admitted to pursuing nuclear weapons, despite conclusions from the IAEA and the U.S. intelligence community that Iran had an organized nuclear weapons program through 2003 and continued some activities until 2009.
Admitting to illicit nuclear activities now would challenge Iran’s narrative that the weaponization program is Western propaganda. Unlike the IAEA’s past investigation into Iran’s weaponization related activities, referred to as possible military dimensions (PMD), Tehran cannot provide partial cooperation with the agency and then dispute the IAEA’s conclusions. Iran, for instance, argued that certain dual-use activities relevant to weaponization that the agency investigated were for conventional military or civil purposes. There is no similar argument for undeclared uranium activities.
What is important is that the IAEA’s questions are answered, not how Iran frames the answers. While it may not be satisfying to allow Iran to lie yet again about its past nuclear intentions, Tehran was punished by the UN Security Council for its actions. As Grossi noted in his March 4 press conference, it is not the IAEA’s role to “judge intentions.”
The South Korean Precedent
To thread the needle on supporting the IAEA and providing Iran with a politically viable path to cooperation, the IAEA Board of Governors could consider a similar approach to that of South Korea. South Korea pursued a nuclear weapons program but abandoned it under U.S. pressure and joined the NPT in 1975. After becoming a party to the treaty, however, South Korean scientists conducted experiments on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing through 2000 that were not declared to the IAEA. Seoul admitted to having conducted the activities, partly because it could not hide them after 2004 when it ratified the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement, which expands IAEA access to nuclear sites and information.
The IAEA investigated and circulated a report to the Board of Governors in November 2004 detailing South Korea’s uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities from 1979-2000. In that report, the IAEA concluded that South Korea “conducted activities involving uranium conversion, uranium enrichment and plutonium separation,” which it “failed to report to the Agency in accordance with its obligations under its safeguards Agreement.” The report also said that the activities constituted a “serious concern” even though the quantities of nuclear materials were not significant. It also noted that South Korea “has taken corrective action” and that there is no evidence that the undeclared nuclear activities were ongoing.
Despite South Korea’s clear failure to comply with its obligations, the IAEA Board did not pass a resolution censuring South Korea or referring it to the Security Council. The chair of the IAEA Board of Governors issued a conclusion saying that South Korea’s failure to report its activities “is of serious concern” but noted that there is “no indication that the undeclared experiments have continued” and welcomed South Korea’s “corrective actions.” That report and statement closed the file on South Korea.
There are, of course, significant differences between the Iranian and South Korean cases. After attempting to conceal its illicit activities, South Korea proactively cooperated with the agency. Evidence also suggests that South Korea’s activities, while a safeguards violation, were not part of an organized weapons effort. Indeed, detailed assessments of South Korea’s illicit activities suggest they were nuclear experiments conducted without political or military oversight. But similar to Iran, South Korea did have past weapons intentions and it initially tried to cover up its undeclared activities. In both cases, what is most important is that the IAEA receives the necessary information and access to account for the country’s nuclear materials.
The United States and its partners, Britain, France, and Germany (the E3) have already stated that when the IAEA is satisfied with Iran’s explanations, they will support closing the investigation. U.S. Ambassador Laura Holgate reiterated this point during the November 2022 IAEA Board meeting. Holgate said the United States has been clear that once the IAEA reports “that the issues are clarified and resolved… the Board could then close its consideration of this matter.” Holgate also suggested that the United States would support referring Iran to the Security Council, an option available to the Board if the investigation is not resolved. While another censure or Security Council referral would certainly result in Iran retaliating by advancing its nuclear program, the Board cannot consider Iran in a vacuum. The Board must escalate or risk undermining nonproliferation norms.
While Iranian officials offered incredulous explanations for the presence of the processed uranium at the undeclared sites—including blaming a third party for planting the materials—they have also expressed concern that the investigation is a pretext for referring Iran to the Security Council and that once this investigation is closed, the agency will raise questions about additional sites to keep open the option of referring Iran back to the Security Council.
To address that concern—or test its legitimacy—the United States and its European partners could convey to Iran that they would view a referral to the Security Council as unnecessary, provided Iran provides credible cooperation and the IAEA is satisfied. They could further extend that assurance to cover future investigations into past undeclared nuclear activities, provided they are no longer ongoing and Tehran addresses any IAEA inquiries.
While Grossi has made clear that this investigation is about material accountancy, Iranian officials have conflated it with the agency’s past probe into the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. That years-long investigation was closed in December 2015 after the IAEA issued a final report as part of the JCPOA’s implementation process. Iran argues that closing the weaponization investigation closed the option on investigating Iran’s nuclear past. The JCPOA made no such deal, nor could it. The IAEA has an obligation to follow up on evidence of undeclared nuclear materials regardless of the time frame. The IAEA does not, however, have to attribute intent to the noncompliance. Nor does the agency’s Board of Governors, as the South Korea case demonstrates.
In cooperating with the IAEA, Iran could publicly claim that failing to declare the activities was an oversight or that the activities were not sanctioned by the government. The United States and the E3 could refrain from contradicting Iran’s characterization and oppose any push to put the undeclared nuclear activities into the context of the past weaponization report. This might alleviate concerns in Tehran that the investigation is a pretext for reopening the weaponization investigation.
Another option would be for Iran to proactively seek to end the investigation on its own terms. If Tehran sees the investigation as a stigma that is designed to keep open punitive options, it could proactively submit a corrected declaration for its safeguards agreement that includes information about the materials and sites under investigation. Iran could frame an explanation in whatever manner is politically viable, such as error, sloppiness, or unsanctioned experiments. Furthermore, if Tehran was concerned about future investigations, it could include any locations where nuclear activity was present, but not declared as required.
The IAEA could then evaluate the declaration, as it does for all other states, and follow up with questions. If and when the IAEA is satisfied with the corrected declaration, the investigation would be moot.
From a nonproliferation standpoint, the lack of uniformity in the Board’s responses to safeguards noncompliance is not ideal. Nor is allowing Iran to continue lying about its past work. But the current Iranian government is not going to confess to having pursued nuclear weapons. Allowing the investigation to drag on is also detrimental to the IAEA’s safeguards mandate and the broader nonproliferation regime.
Given Iran’s nuclear past, it is most critical to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful going forward. Resolving the IAEA’s safeguards investigation does not ensure that the United States and its partners will be able to reach a nuclear agreement now or in the future, but it does remove a potential barrier and would help signal Iran’s interest in a deal.
Now is the time to make progress before this issue leads to further escalation.
Kelsey Davenport is the Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, where she focuses on the nuclear and missile programs in Iran, North Korea, India, and Pakistan and on international efforts to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Pictured: Rafael Mariano Grossi, IAEA Director General.
South Korean Precedent Could Help Resolve IAEA Iran Safeguards Probe
By Kelsey Davenport
In Middle East & North Africa
After returning from Tehran over the weekend, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi announced that he had reached an agreement with Iran on “concrete measures” to advance the agency’s stalled investigation into past activities that Iran should have declared to the agency.
A joint statement from the IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) stated that Iran “expressed its readiness to continue its cooperation and provide further information and access to address the outstanding safeguards issues.”
Unfortunately, the statement does not appear likely to herald a breakthrough in the years-long investigation. Within hours of Grossi’s March 4 press conference, the deputy head of the AEOI, Behrouz Kamalvandi, contradicted Grossi’s characterization of the discussions.
Iran’s stonewalling is concerning. Without credible cooperation, the IAEA cannot provide assurances that the country’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful. The implications of the investigation dragging out, however, extend beyond Iran’s safeguards obligations.
As the United States and Iran closed in on an agreement last August to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Tehran’s demands to close the IAEA’s safeguards investigation scuttled the deal. If the IAEA cannot close the probe, the issue will likely remain a roadblock in any future negotiations and a flash point for escalation.
For these reasons, it is critical to explore solutions to bring the IAEA probe to a conclusion. First and foremost, any solution must ensure the IAEA receives the technically credible information it needs to account for Iran’s nuclear materials. Creative and flexible diplomacy can ensure that information is provided while giving Iran a face-saving path to cooperation.
Evidence presented by the IAEA to date suggests that Tehran conducted nuclear activities and/or stored nuclear materials at three locations which should have been declared under the country’s comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA). All non-nuclear weapon states party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are legally required to implement a safeguards agreement. For more than two years, however, Iran has failed to provide credible explanations for the presence of processed uranium at these sites. The IAEA also investigated a fourth location and concluded in a May 2022 report that Iran conducted activities relevant to uranium metal there that should have been declared.
While these activities took place over two decades ago, it is critically important that the agency can account for the materials involved. As Grossi reiterated in a Nov. 10, 2022 report, the investigation must be resolved “for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.”
Allowing Iran to get away with less than technically credible answers for the presence of processed uranium at three undeclared locations would undermine the agency and its safeguard’s role. It would also send the wrong message to future would-be proliferators. The IAEA’s independence is also critical.
At the same time, it should not be surprising that Iran is reluctant to own up to its past undeclared nuclear activities. Tehran has never admitted to pursuing nuclear weapons, despite conclusions from the IAEA and the U.S. intelligence community that Iran had an organized nuclear weapons program through 2003 and continued some activities until 2009.
Admitting to illicit nuclear activities now would challenge Iran’s narrative that the weaponization program is Western propaganda. Unlike the IAEA’s past investigation into Iran’s weaponization related activities, referred to as possible military dimensions (PMD), Tehran cannot provide partial cooperation with the agency and then dispute the IAEA’s conclusions. Iran, for instance, argued that certain dual-use activities relevant to weaponization that the agency investigated were for conventional military or civil purposes. There is no similar argument for undeclared uranium activities.
What is important is that the IAEA’s questions are answered, not how Iran frames the answers. While it may not be satisfying to allow Iran to lie yet again about its past nuclear intentions, Tehran was punished by the UN Security Council for its actions. As Grossi noted in his March 4 press conference, it is not the IAEA’s role to “judge intentions.”
The South Korean Precedent
To thread the needle on supporting the IAEA and providing Iran with a politically viable path to cooperation, the IAEA Board of Governors could consider a similar approach to that of South Korea. South Korea pursued a nuclear weapons program but abandoned it under U.S. pressure and joined the NPT in 1975. After becoming a party to the treaty, however, South Korean scientists conducted experiments on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing through 2000 that were not declared to the IAEA. Seoul admitted to having conducted the activities, partly because it could not hide them after 2004 when it ratified the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement, which expands IAEA access to nuclear sites and information.
The IAEA investigated and circulated a report to the Board of Governors in November 2004 detailing South Korea’s uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities from 1979-2000. In that report, the IAEA concluded that South Korea “conducted activities involving uranium conversion, uranium enrichment and plutonium separation,” which it “failed to report to the Agency in accordance with its obligations under its safeguards Agreement.” The report also said that the activities constituted a “serious concern” even though the quantities of nuclear materials were not significant. It also noted that South Korea “has taken corrective action” and that there is no evidence that the undeclared nuclear activities were ongoing.
Despite South Korea’s clear failure to comply with its obligations, the IAEA Board did not pass a resolution censuring South Korea or referring it to the Security Council. The chair of the IAEA Board of Governors issued a conclusion saying that South Korea’s failure to report its activities “is of serious concern” but noted that there is “no indication that the undeclared experiments have continued” and welcomed South Korea’s “corrective actions.” That report and statement closed the file on South Korea.
There are, of course, significant differences between the Iranian and South Korean cases. After attempting to conceal its illicit activities, South Korea proactively cooperated with the agency. Evidence also suggests that South Korea’s activities, while a safeguards violation, were not part of an organized weapons effort. Indeed, detailed assessments of South Korea’s illicit activities suggest they were nuclear experiments conducted without political or military oversight. But similar to Iran, South Korea did have past weapons intentions and it initially tried to cover up its undeclared activities. In both cases, what is most important is that the IAEA receives the necessary information and access to account for the country’s nuclear materials.
The United States and its partners, Britain, France, and Germany (the E3) have already stated that when the IAEA is satisfied with Iran’s explanations, they will support closing the investigation. U.S. Ambassador Laura Holgate reiterated this point during the November 2022 IAEA Board meeting. Holgate said the United States has been clear that once the IAEA reports “that the issues are clarified and resolved… the Board could then close its consideration of this matter.” Holgate also suggested that the United States would support referring Iran to the Security Council, an option available to the Board if the investigation is not resolved. While another censure or Security Council referral would certainly result in Iran retaliating by advancing its nuclear program, the Board cannot consider Iran in a vacuum. The Board must escalate or risk undermining nonproliferation norms.
While Iranian officials offered incredulous explanations for the presence of the processed uranium at the undeclared sites—including blaming a third party for planting the materials—they have also expressed concern that the investigation is a pretext for referring Iran to the Security Council and that once this investigation is closed, the agency will raise questions about additional sites to keep open the option of referring Iran back to the Security Council.
To address that concern—or test its legitimacy—the United States and its European partners could convey to Iran that they would view a referral to the Security Council as unnecessary, provided Iran provides credible cooperation and the IAEA is satisfied. They could further extend that assurance to cover future investigations into past undeclared nuclear activities, provided they are no longer ongoing and Tehran addresses any IAEA inquiries.
While Grossi has made clear that this investigation is about material accountancy, Iranian officials have conflated it with the agency’s past probe into the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. That years-long investigation was closed in December 2015 after the IAEA issued a final report as part of the JCPOA’s implementation process. Iran argues that closing the weaponization investigation closed the option on investigating Iran’s nuclear past. The JCPOA made no such deal, nor could it. The IAEA has an obligation to follow up on evidence of undeclared nuclear materials regardless of the time frame. The IAEA does not, however, have to attribute intent to the noncompliance. Nor does the agency’s Board of Governors, as the South Korea case demonstrates.
In cooperating with the IAEA, Iran could publicly claim that failing to declare the activities was an oversight or that the activities were not sanctioned by the government. The United States and the E3 could refrain from contradicting Iran’s characterization and oppose any push to put the undeclared nuclear activities into the context of the past weaponization report. This might alleviate concerns in Tehran that the investigation is a pretext for reopening the weaponization investigation.
Another option would be for Iran to proactively seek to end the investigation on its own terms. If Tehran sees the investigation as a stigma that is designed to keep open punitive options, it could proactively submit a corrected declaration for its safeguards agreement that includes information about the materials and sites under investigation. Iran could frame an explanation in whatever manner is politically viable, such as error, sloppiness, or unsanctioned experiments. Furthermore, if Tehran was concerned about future investigations, it could include any locations where nuclear activity was present, but not declared as required.
The IAEA could then evaluate the declaration, as it does for all other states, and follow up with questions. If and when the IAEA is satisfied with the corrected declaration, the investigation would be moot.
From a nonproliferation standpoint, the lack of uniformity in the Board’s responses to safeguards noncompliance is not ideal. Nor is allowing Iran to continue lying about its past work. But the current Iranian government is not going to confess to having pursued nuclear weapons. Allowing the investigation to drag on is also detrimental to the IAEA’s safeguards mandate and the broader nonproliferation regime.
Given Iran’s nuclear past, it is most critical to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful going forward. Resolving the IAEA’s safeguards investigation does not ensure that the United States and its partners will be able to reach a nuclear agreement now or in the future, but it does remove a potential barrier and would help signal Iran’s interest in a deal.
Now is the time to make progress before this issue leads to further escalation.
Kelsey Davenport is the Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, where she focuses on the nuclear and missile programs in Iran, North Korea, India, and Pakistan and on international efforts to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Pictured: Rafael Mariano Grossi, IAEA Director General.
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