Iran and Israel have much in common –– cultural traits, minority status as non-Arab states, and experience with hostility from their Arab neighbors. However, the two countries remain actively at odds with each other.
In the past, the two countries enjoyed long periods of peaceful and close relations under the Iranian monarchy and even to some extent after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The two countries have even advocated for each other politically. For example, only three days after Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, according to scholar Trita Parsi, then-Israeli foreign minister Moshe Dayan interrupted a private visit to Vienna to “urge the U.S. to forget the past and help Iran keep up its defenses” even though Iran was still holding U.S. diplomats hostage.
While the radical and religious ideology of the Iranian regime and the Zionist mission of the Israeli government are important factors in the division between these two nations, competition for regional predominance appears to be an even bigger reason for the deterioration in relations after the 1979 revolution – and particularly in the last two decades.
Tensions between the two countries rose after 1979 when the new Iranian government embraced a revolutionary ideology that promoted religious government, Muslim unity, and Iranian hegemony. Iran also repositioned itself on historic tensions in the region, becoming a strident supporter of the Palestinian cause. Still, both Israel and Iran saw Iraq as an enemy during the Iran-Iraq War, which is why Israel provided Iran with arms and military training. Israel saw Iran as a counterweight to Iraq, which Israel viewed as a greater threat at the time. Collaboration between Israel and Iran included Project Flower, under which Iran purchased missile technology from the Israelis after the Iraqis bought Scud ballistic missiles. With Israeli prodding and informed by the impression that there were “moderates” in Iran prepared to change policy toward Washington, the U.S. –which had sided with Iraq in the war – muddied the waters by providing weapons to Iran during the Iran-Contra scandal.
Israel shifted policy after Iraq was defeated in the 1991 Gulf War. A spike in attacks on Israelis by Iran-backed militants threatened Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy and motivated Israel to pressure Washington to embrace a policy of “dual containment” toward both Iraq and Iran, despite the differences between the two countries. This policy was echoed a decade later following September 11, 2001, when the George W. Bush administration branded Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an “axis of evil” – although none of these countries were responsible for the strikes by al-Qaeda.
Tehran also sought to sabotage Israeli-Palestinian peace through increased support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which carried out numerous suicide bombings in Israel in the mid-1990s. The two countries also clashed in Lebanon, where Iran had been instrumental in the formation of Hezbollah after the Israeli invasion of 1982. A decade later, Israel assassinated the then-leader of Hezbollah, Abbas al-Musawi, his family, and four others. Hezbollah retaliated with attacks that killed more than a hundred Jews in Argentina.
Iran and Israel thus fell into a self-perpetuating spiral of hostility. The cycle had a brief respite during the two terms of reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami from 1997-2005 who went so far as to say that, in the interest of “fair and equal peace in the region…whatever conditions [the Palestinians] accept must also be accepted by others in the region.”
Tensions rose again in 2002 when it was revealed that Iran’s nuclear program had progressed farther than many had previously thought. Since then, the nuclear issue has become one of the greatest sources of contention between Israel and Iran. Mossad Director David Barnea expressed fear that Iran would use a nuclear weapon against Israel, while others contend that Israel is more concerned about losing its status as the sole nuclear-armed state in the region.
In turn, Israel has used cyberattacks and assassinations to try to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program, winning short-term gains but often spurring further Iranian advancement. For example, the killing of a top Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, in late 2020 led the Iranian parliament to pass legislation mandating increased levels of enrichment, now at 60 percent.
In 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu helped persuade President Donald Trump to unilaterally quit the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a 2015 agreement between Iran and the international community led by the U.S. that restricted Iran’s nuclear program for 15 years in exchange for sanctions relief. U.S. withdrawal, however, motivated Iran to amass sufficient material for several nuclear bombs and compromised perhaps the greatest opportunity for U.S.-Iran rapprochement since the 1979 revolution.
Despite the current state of relations, history has shown glimmers of hope for the future in easing tensions between the two nations. Even Netanyahu once offered to repay Israel’s old debts to Iran for oil, shut down an Iranian opposition movement that was using an Israeli satellite, and provide aid after an earthquake in 2016.
Track II discussions between former officials have occurred in the past and may be used in the future as well as Arab intermediaries. Such dialogues might take on chronic challenges including the nuclear issue as well as Iran’s continued support for militant groups in Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
In charting a new way forward, Israel would have to accept Iran as a major regional player and recognize the security threat the U.S. and Israel pose to Iran. Likewise, Iran would have to recognize the State of Israel and its right to defend itself. While hard to envision now, this sort of détente could emerge if more moderate voices come to power in both countries, according to Iran expert Ali Vaez.
As for intermediaries, the United Arab Emirates or Oman could prove good candidates since the Emiratis have diplomatic relations with both Israel and Iran, and Oman has official ties with Iran and long-standing unofficial links with Israel.
In the overarching pursuit of a more peaceful and prosperous Middle East, effective strategies that ease tensions between Iran and Israel will be critical in mitigating conflict, the source of instability, and friction between the U.S. and Iran. Without a cooling between the two nations, citizens in both Israel and Iran, as well as the wider region, will continue to suffer from violence and an arms race that could end in a nuclear exchange.
Leila Pifko is an intern at the Stimson Center and fourth-year student at The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University where she studies international affairs with a concentration in conflict resolution. @Lpifko1819
After Decades of Hostility, is an Iran-Israel Rapprochement Even Possible?
By Leila Pifko
Middle East & North Africa
Iran and Israel have much in common –– cultural traits, minority status as non-Arab states, and experience with hostility from their Arab neighbors. However, the two countries remain actively at odds with each other.
In the past, the two countries enjoyed long periods of peaceful and close relations under the Iranian monarchy and even to some extent after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The two countries have even advocated for each other politically. For example, only three days after Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, according to scholar Trita Parsi, then-Israeli foreign minister Moshe Dayan interrupted a private visit to Vienna to “urge the U.S. to forget the past and help Iran keep up its defenses” even though Iran was still holding U.S. diplomats hostage.
While the radical and religious ideology of the Iranian regime and the Zionist mission of the Israeli government are important factors in the division between these two nations, competition for regional predominance appears to be an even bigger reason for the deterioration in relations after the 1979 revolution – and particularly in the last two decades.
Tensions between the two countries rose after 1979 when the new Iranian government embraced a revolutionary ideology that promoted religious government, Muslim unity, and Iranian hegemony. Iran also repositioned itself on historic tensions in the region, becoming a strident supporter of the Palestinian cause. Still, both Israel and Iran saw Iraq as an enemy during the Iran-Iraq War, which is why Israel provided Iran with arms and military training. Israel saw Iran as a counterweight to Iraq, which Israel viewed as a greater threat at the time. Collaboration between Israel and Iran included Project Flower, under which Iran purchased missile technology from the Israelis after the Iraqis bought Scud ballistic missiles. With Israeli prodding and informed by the impression that there were “moderates” in Iran prepared to change policy toward Washington, the U.S. –which had sided with Iraq in the war – muddied the waters by providing weapons to Iran during the Iran-Contra scandal.
Israel shifted policy after Iraq was defeated in the 1991 Gulf War. A spike in attacks on Israelis by Iran-backed militants threatened Israeli-Palestinian peace diplomacy and motivated Israel to pressure Washington to embrace a policy of “dual containment” toward both Iraq and Iran, despite the differences between the two countries. This policy was echoed a decade later following September 11, 2001, when the George W. Bush administration branded Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an “axis of evil” – although none of these countries were responsible for the strikes by al-Qaeda.
Tehran also sought to sabotage Israeli-Palestinian peace through increased support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which carried out numerous suicide bombings in Israel in the mid-1990s. The two countries also clashed in Lebanon, where Iran had been instrumental in the formation of Hezbollah after the Israeli invasion of 1982. A decade later, Israel assassinated the then-leader of Hezbollah, Abbas al-Musawi, his family, and four others. Hezbollah retaliated with attacks that killed more than a hundred Jews in Argentina.
Iran and Israel thus fell into a self-perpetuating spiral of hostility. The cycle had a brief respite during the two terms of reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami from 1997-2005 who went so far as to say that, in the interest of “fair and equal peace in the region…whatever conditions [the Palestinians] accept must also be accepted by others in the region.”
Tensions rose again in 2002 when it was revealed that Iran’s nuclear program had progressed farther than many had previously thought. Since then, the nuclear issue has become one of the greatest sources of contention between Israel and Iran. Mossad Director David Barnea expressed fear that Iran would use a nuclear weapon against Israel, while others contend that Israel is more concerned about losing its status as the sole nuclear-armed state in the region.
In turn, Israel has used cyberattacks and assassinations to try to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program, winning short-term gains but often spurring further Iranian advancement. For example, the killing of a top Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, in late 2020 led the Iranian parliament to pass legislation mandating increased levels of enrichment, now at 60 percent.
In 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu helped persuade President Donald Trump to unilaterally quit the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a 2015 agreement between Iran and the international community led by the U.S. that restricted Iran’s nuclear program for 15 years in exchange for sanctions relief. U.S. withdrawal, however, motivated Iran to amass sufficient material for several nuclear bombs and compromised perhaps the greatest opportunity for U.S.-Iran rapprochement since the 1979 revolution.
Despite the current state of relations, history has shown glimmers of hope for the future in easing tensions between the two nations. Even Netanyahu once offered to repay Israel’s old debts to Iran for oil, shut down an Iranian opposition movement that was using an Israeli satellite, and provide aid after an earthquake in 2016.
Track II discussions between former officials have occurred in the past and may be used in the future as well as Arab intermediaries. Such dialogues might take on chronic challenges including the nuclear issue as well as Iran’s continued support for militant groups in Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
In charting a new way forward, Israel would have to accept Iran as a major regional player and recognize the security threat the U.S. and Israel pose to Iran. Likewise, Iran would have to recognize the State of Israel and its right to defend itself. While hard to envision now, this sort of détente could emerge if more moderate voices come to power in both countries, according to Iran expert Ali Vaez.
As for intermediaries, the United Arab Emirates or Oman could prove good candidates since the Emiratis have diplomatic relations with both Israel and Iran, and Oman has official ties with Iran and long-standing unofficial links with Israel.
In the overarching pursuit of a more peaceful and prosperous Middle East, effective strategies that ease tensions between Iran and Israel will be critical in mitigating conflict, the source of instability, and friction between the U.S. and Iran. Without a cooling between the two nations, citizens in both Israel and Iran, as well as the wider region, will continue to suffer from violence and an arms race that could end in a nuclear exchange.
Leila Pifko is an intern at the Stimson Center and fourth-year student at The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University where she studies international affairs with a concentration in conflict resolution. @Lpifko1819
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