The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, introduced by the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was passed by the Senate on September 14. The most profound impact of the bill is in the areas of diplomacy and arms sales, covering broad security and military assistance to support Taiwan against potential threats from Beijing. Although some provisions have been revised after several rounds of discussions, U.S.-Taiwan relations are about to reach a new milestone, helping Taiwan again grab international attention.
In terms of strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan defense partnership, supporters of the 2022 Taiwan Policy Act mention that in order to effectively deter future wars of aggression that China may launch against Taiwan, it is necessary to enhance Taiwan’s asymmetric combat capabilities. The “Taiwan Security Assistance Initiative” in the bill proposes to provide around US$4.5 billion over four years to accelerate the modernization of Taiwan’s military. In the fifth year, an additional US$2 billion in military loans to Taiwan was added with non-repayable military assistance in terms of supply and stockpiling of ammunitions. The efforts of U.S. military support will positively help Taiwan improve its resilience capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
While most people believe the non-repayable loans have more positive effects on Taiwan’s military preparations against China’s threats, some have mentioned that there are still concerns on the newly passed bill. The military aid from the U.S. to Taiwan refer to the fact that the military assistance will be mostly in the format of equipment and not in cash, indicating that Taiwanese government can only invest the money with arms dealers, rather than applying the military loans to other independent research and development in terms of national defense. Furthermore, the military assistance written in the Taiwan Policy Act reflects the fact that the U.S. has the authority to enforce rules on what can be owned and transferred to Taiwan. There is no doubt that Taiwan’s future military buildup and preparations for war will be further subject to the US command system with less autonomy.
This hierarchical relationship further reflects the relationship between Washington and Taipei as similar to a “bandwagon” structure. In the theory of international relations, scholars of this field have proposed that in a system of steep hierarchy, band-wagoning replaces the balance of power as the main strategy of secondary states. The use of band-wagoning predominates in hierarchically ordered political realms where functional differentiation is low and influential resources are tightly concentrated in the hands of the dominant power. The expectations from the following or secondary states that the central power will wield substantial power generally increase the incentives for potential actors to quickly join any winning coalition. Besides, a central power at the top of the hierarchy could maintain the order and minimize conflicts between the lesser powers, and a hierarchical order is regarded as a stable political structure. Therefore, a trustworthy and valuable commitment from the central power and tight concentration of power in positions of leadership encourages the strategy of band-wagoning.
Apparently, the Taiwan Policy Act will move Taiwan closer to the U.S., urging the island to become more dependent on the U.S. for political and military order, and hereafter receive a measure of protection for the military assistance, property, and promise from Washington. The political phenomenon fits David Lake’s observations on how small states prefer submitting and accepting the military assistance and command from the dominant country in the steep hierarchical structure. The relationship between subordination and systemic leadership is emphasized, while the subordination is the main thread connecting the small and dominant state. The small state will legitimize the dominant state’s authority by engaging in different formats of coordination that publicly acknowledge their subordination.
In addition to the military assistantship, the bipartisan group of lawmakers focuses on the Taiwan Policy Act from the diplomatic level. The Senate tried to rename the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” to “Taiwan Representative Office,” which attempted to boost engagement with Taiwan from all angles and push back against Beijing’s growing diplomatic and economic coercions. As far as we know, the rename of TECRO is not a new initiative but was proposed before in the 2021 “Ensuring America’s Global Leadership and Engagement Act” (EAGLE Act). However, the Biden administration expressed its concern over this provocative behavior and pressed the Senate Committee to change “symbolic language” in the bill to avoid antagonizing Chinese leadership in Beijing. The final version of bill was adjusted to remove the renaming gesture, reflecting the Biden administration’s efforts to prevent giving the ammunition to Beijing’s assertion that the U.S. is moving away from its One China policy.
As we look closely at the changes in the bill passed on the Senate floor, it is easy to identify the check and balance between the executive and legislative branches of the United States. The Biden administration has pressured the Senate Committee to alter some language in the bill to avoid an overall antagonization of relations against Beijing prior to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. If the White House goes too far from current U.S.-China-Taiwan relations and overthrows its “common-sense guardrails,” the “status quo” among the three parties across the Taiwan Strait may face unprecedented challenges. Facing the situation in East Asia, the Biden administration must think about how to manage the crisis with Beijing more closely.
As Xi Jinping has faced much stronger hawkish voices domestically about setting the timeline for the unification, the eagerness of Xi’s policy of “the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” relentlessly squeezes the leaders in Taiwan to resume the track of reunification. The increasing verbal and physical threats posed by Beijing consistently remind that the traditional strategic deterrence adopted by Washington may need to be adjusted with a stronger security commitment to the potential militarized activities initiated by China. Therefore, Washington has taken a less ambiguous position on cross-Strait relations during the Biden administration.
Taiwan has traditionally relied upon U.S. security support in its defense against Communist China. Even though the U.S. decided to shift its formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, Washington still maintains close military ties with Taiwan. Thereafter, the security commitment from the U.S. became one of the significant impacts on Taiwanese security. This is the reason why Biden has spoken not only once about his commitment to defending Taiwan. The continuous verbal deterrence and the security commitment have been carefully handled by well-organized strategic plans under Biden’s administration and his diplomatic teams. That being said, Biden and the foreign policy community have become more aware of the possibility of experiencing the devastating impact of potential armed conflict with China if the administration fails to handle the Taiwan issue with more care. In other words, how to manage stable bilateral relations without escalating conflict with Beijing has become the top mission during the Biden administration.
However, the security commitment from Washington has become a double-edged sword. If the security commitment is strong enough for the Taiwanese people, it may embolden the supporters of de jure independence, pushing the Taiwan to cross the redline. Nonetheless, if the commitment is too weak, Beijing may not be deterred from adopting unilateral military movement against the Taiwan issue. Biden himself should understand that the impact of any strengthened message, especially the guaranteed U.S. military support to cross-Strait conflict, might embolden the political elites in Taiwan to push for de jure independence. He reiterated again that such strategic commitment would not be operative if Taiwan provokes a unilateral crisis by making its own decision on independence. Clearly, the premeditated announcement also belongs to the function of dual deterrence embedded in the idea of strategic ambiguity.
Facing imminent threats from Beijing, Taipei has expected more security assistance from Washington. However, neither pure balancing nor pure band-wagoning against Beijing would benefit Taiwan’s current security situation. As Sino-U.S. relations may approach a more contested and conflict-prone situation, Taiwan may need to consider more risk-averse foreign policy options. Hedging is a distinct strategic approach, alongside balancing and band-wagoning, and it deserves considerably more comprehensive study. Hedging does not mean choosing sides between Washington and Beijing, but one of the applicable concepts of hedging includes risk management, guiding the secondary country to do the best and prepare for the worst. The most distinct and applicable hedging strategy for Taiwan is to split its hedging bets, managing balancing and band-wagoning closely between two great powers. As U.S.-China relations characterized by deeper hostility and competition, it has become more urgent for Taiwan not to fan the flames, minimizing the risk of an intensifying cross-Strait security dilemma. The political elites and decision-makers in Taiwan may still seriously consider how to help this island stay away from unprecedented and conflictual Sino-U.S. confrontations by hedging its bets.
The Taiwan Policy Act and the Future of U.S.-Taiwan Relations
By Dr. Charles Chong-Han Wu
In China
The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, introduced by the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was passed by the Senate on September 14. The most profound impact of the bill is in the areas of diplomacy and arms sales, covering broad security and military assistance to support Taiwan against potential threats from Beijing. Although some provisions have been revised after several rounds of discussions, U.S.-Taiwan relations are about to reach a new milestone, helping Taiwan again grab international attention.
In terms of strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan defense partnership, supporters of the 2022 Taiwan Policy Act mention that in order to effectively deter future wars of aggression that China may launch against Taiwan, it is necessary to enhance Taiwan’s asymmetric combat capabilities. The “Taiwan Security Assistance Initiative” in the bill proposes to provide around US$4.5 billion over four years to accelerate the modernization of Taiwan’s military. In the fifth year, an additional US$2 billion in military loans to Taiwan was added with non-repayable military assistance in terms of supply and stockpiling of ammunitions. The efforts of U.S. military support will positively help Taiwan improve its resilience capabilities for asymmetric warfare.
While most people believe the non-repayable loans have more positive effects on Taiwan’s military preparations against China’s threats, some have mentioned that there are still concerns on the newly passed bill. The military aid from the U.S. to Taiwan refer to the fact that the military assistance will be mostly in the format of equipment and not in cash, indicating that Taiwanese government can only invest the money with arms dealers, rather than applying the military loans to other independent research and development in terms of national defense. Furthermore, the military assistance written in the Taiwan Policy Act reflects the fact that the U.S. has the authority to enforce rules on what can be owned and transferred to Taiwan. There is no doubt that Taiwan’s future military buildup and preparations for war will be further subject to the US command system with less autonomy.
This hierarchical relationship further reflects the relationship between Washington and Taipei as similar to a “bandwagon” structure. In the theory of international relations, scholars of this field have proposed that in a system of steep hierarchy, band-wagoning replaces the balance of power as the main strategy of secondary states. The use of band-wagoning predominates in hierarchically ordered political realms where functional differentiation is low and influential resources are tightly concentrated in the hands of the dominant power. The expectations from the following or secondary states that the central power will wield substantial power generally increase the incentives for potential actors to quickly join any winning coalition. Besides, a central power at the top of the hierarchy could maintain the order and minimize conflicts between the lesser powers, and a hierarchical order is regarded as a stable political structure. Therefore, a trustworthy and valuable commitment from the central power and tight concentration of power in positions of leadership encourages the strategy of band-wagoning.
Apparently, the Taiwan Policy Act will move Taiwan closer to the U.S., urging the island to become more dependent on the U.S. for political and military order, and hereafter receive a measure of protection for the military assistance, property, and promise from Washington. The political phenomenon fits David Lake’s observations on how small states prefer submitting and accepting the military assistance and command from the dominant country in the steep hierarchical structure. The relationship between subordination and systemic leadership is emphasized, while the subordination is the main thread connecting the small and dominant state. The small state will legitimize the dominant state’s authority by engaging in different formats of coordination that publicly acknowledge their subordination.
In addition to the military assistantship, the bipartisan group of lawmakers focuses on the Taiwan Policy Act from the diplomatic level. The Senate tried to rename the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” to “Taiwan Representative Office,” which attempted to boost engagement with Taiwan from all angles and push back against Beijing’s growing diplomatic and economic coercions. As far as we know, the rename of TECRO is not a new initiative but was proposed before in the 2021 “Ensuring America’s Global Leadership and Engagement Act” (EAGLE Act). However, the Biden administration expressed its concern over this provocative behavior and pressed the Senate Committee to change “symbolic language” in the bill to avoid antagonizing Chinese leadership in Beijing. The final version of bill was adjusted to remove the renaming gesture, reflecting the Biden administration’s efforts to prevent giving the ammunition to Beijing’s assertion that the U.S. is moving away from its One China policy.
As we look closely at the changes in the bill passed on the Senate floor, it is easy to identify the check and balance between the executive and legislative branches of the United States. The Biden administration has pressured the Senate Committee to alter some language in the bill to avoid an overall antagonization of relations against Beijing prior to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. If the White House goes too far from current U.S.-China-Taiwan relations and overthrows its “common-sense guardrails,” the “status quo” among the three parties across the Taiwan Strait may face unprecedented challenges. Facing the situation in East Asia, the Biden administration must think about how to manage the crisis with Beijing more closely.
As Xi Jinping has faced much stronger hawkish voices domestically about setting the timeline for the unification, the eagerness of Xi’s policy of “the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” relentlessly squeezes the leaders in Taiwan to resume the track of reunification. The increasing verbal and physical threats posed by Beijing consistently remind that the traditional strategic deterrence adopted by Washington may need to be adjusted with a stronger security commitment to the potential militarized activities initiated by China. Therefore, Washington has taken a less ambiguous position on cross-Strait relations during the Biden administration.
Taiwan has traditionally relied upon U.S. security support in its defense against Communist China. Even though the U.S. decided to shift its formal diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, Washington still maintains close military ties with Taiwan. Thereafter, the security commitment from the U.S. became one of the significant impacts on Taiwanese security. This is the reason why Biden has spoken not only once about his commitment to defending Taiwan. The continuous verbal deterrence and the security commitment have been carefully handled by well-organized strategic plans under Biden’s administration and his diplomatic teams. That being said, Biden and the foreign policy community have become more aware of the possibility of experiencing the devastating impact of potential armed conflict with China if the administration fails to handle the Taiwan issue with more care. In other words, how to manage stable bilateral relations without escalating conflict with Beijing has become the top mission during the Biden administration.
However, the security commitment from Washington has become a double-edged sword. If the security commitment is strong enough for the Taiwanese people, it may embolden the supporters of de jure independence, pushing the Taiwan to cross the redline. Nonetheless, if the commitment is too weak, Beijing may not be deterred from adopting unilateral military movement against the Taiwan issue. Biden himself should understand that the impact of any strengthened message, especially the guaranteed U.S. military support to cross-Strait conflict, might embolden the political elites in Taiwan to push for de jure independence. He reiterated again that such strategic commitment would not be operative if Taiwan provokes a unilateral crisis by making its own decision on independence. Clearly, the premeditated announcement also belongs to the function of dual deterrence embedded in the idea of strategic ambiguity.
Facing imminent threats from Beijing, Taipei has expected more security assistance from Washington. However, neither pure balancing nor pure band-wagoning against Beijing would benefit Taiwan’s current security situation. As Sino-U.S. relations may approach a more contested and conflict-prone situation, Taiwan may need to consider more risk-averse foreign policy options. Hedging is a distinct strategic approach, alongside balancing and band-wagoning, and it deserves considerably more comprehensive study. Hedging does not mean choosing sides between Washington and Beijing, but one of the applicable concepts of hedging includes risk management, guiding the secondary country to do the best and prepare for the worst. The most distinct and applicable hedging strategy for Taiwan is to split its hedging bets, managing balancing and band-wagoning closely between two great powers. As U.S.-China relations characterized by deeper hostility and competition, it has become more urgent for Taiwan not to fan the flames, minimizing the risk of an intensifying cross-Strait security dilemma. The political elites and decision-makers in Taiwan may still seriously consider how to help this island stay away from unprecedented and conflictual Sino-U.S. confrontations by hedging its bets.
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