Policy Paper

South Asia Program

Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Project

China’s Evolving Strategic Discourse on India

From Doklam to Galwan and Beyond

India has significant influence over Chinese strategy, which New Delhi should better leverage against Beijing.

By Antara Ghosal Singh

In South Asia

May 4, 2022

Executive Summary

The China-India border standoff that began in May 2020 continues to date at various friction points in the mountainous terrain of Ladakh in the Himalayas. A deadly clash between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley in June 2020, which was the worst fighting in over four decades and resulted in casualties on both sides, has come to define the crisis. Almost two years into the standoff, there is still little clarity on its fundamental cause. Much of the existing discourse is unable to provide a complete picture of or explanation for the development. However, a closer look at China’s domestic debates and discussions on India in the years preceding the Galwan clash and thereafter provides a clear and comprehensive understanding of the circumstances that might have led to the border crisis and also offers clues on the way forward. While situating the ongoing border crisis within the overarching framework of Chinese foreign policy and global strategy, this paper makes two key arguments: first, the border standoff in Ladakh is likely the outcome of an intensifying conflict between two Chinese strategies towards India— its Major Power Diplomacy (of wooing India to hedge against the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and making it a key partner in the Belt and Road Initiative) and its Neighborhood Strategy (of securing a China-centered regional order with Beijing as the sole leader or rule-maker in the region). Second, the standoff reveals China’s policy dilemma over India — on the one hand, Beijing wants to effectively check a rising New Delhi by asserting its strength and psychological advantage in bilateral ties. But on the other hand, China is anxious about the impact of the current crisis on the realization of its various regional and global objectives in the Indian Ocean Region that necessitates cordial ties with India. In the end, the lesson for India is to look beyond the lens of the power differential between the two Asian giants when dealing with China. New Delhi should come to terms with the fact that it has leverage with China due to its increasing strategic value to Beijing, whether in the realm of China’s foreign policy or its development strategies, and utilize it to shape Beijing’s behavior and extract benefits from it.

Introduction

The China-India border standoff, which began in spring of 2020, continues to date at various friction points in Eastern Ladakh, notwithstanding the important breakthroughs in February and August 2021, when troops from both sides mutually withdrew from the north and south banks of the Pangong Tso and, possibly, also at the Gogra Post.¹

Almost two years into the standoff, there is still little clarity about the fundamental cause of the ongoing crisis at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de-facto border between India and China. Was it a Chinese reaction to India revoking the special semi-autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir² or was it a response to Indian construction of strategic border infrastructure, particularly the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) Road?³ Was it a Chinese ploy to divert attention from the loss (economic or reputational) inflicted by the coronavirus pandemic?⁴ Or was it Beijing’s effort to unilaterally define the border between China and India along the controversial 1959 claim line, mirroring recent episodes of Chinese power projection in the entire Indo-Pacific region under the intensified US-China competition?⁵ While analysts all over the world, including in India, have been vigorously debating the merits of each of these arguments, some Chinese strategists have sought to craft a propaganda counter-narrative, de-emphasizing and de-linking Chinese actions from the situation on the border with India and thereby providing academic support to the Chinese government’s official stance on the issue.⁶ They put the blame squarely on New Delhi, citing the impact of internal political dynamics like rising Hindu nationalism, a sinking economy, and worsening conditions due to the coronavirus epidemic as reasons for India’s “aggressive” behavior at the border, which they argue is in line with deterioration in India’s relations with its other neighbors in the region, including Pakistan and Nepal.⁷

As insightful as these arguments are, a major shortcoming in the present discourse on the ongoing China-India standoff at the LAC is that it is based on isolated facets of China-India relations, i.e., either the endogenous China-India bilateral differences or the exogenous regional rivalry or impact of each country’s ties with the United States. Thus, much of the existing discourse cannot provide a complete picture of or explanation for the present crisis. However, a closer look at China’s internal debates and deliberations on India in the years preceding the Galwan clash and thereafter provides a clearer and more comprehensive understanding of the circumstances that might have led to the ongoing border crisis and offer important clues on the way forward.

India is a country that features concurrently in all three focus areas of China’s strategic outlay (considered the foundational framework of Chinese diplomacy), i.e., Major Power Diplomacy,⁸ Neighborhood Diplomacy, and Developing Country Diplomacy.⁹ Chinese strategists, working closely with the Chinese government, often analyze relations with India through multiple lenses at the same time, namely China-India dynamics, South Asian geopolitics, China-U.S. strategic competition, and ultimately through the paradigm of China’s rise. This has produced a large body of rich literature on China-India relations, mostly in the Chinese language, which remains somewhat under-explored in the mainstream analysis of dynamics between the two countries. This paper reviews both English and Chinese language journal publications, news reports, op-eds, interviews, and commentaries by Chinese strategists and experts on India and South Asia as well as generalists associated with important Chinese governmental and semi-governmental institutions that influence Chinese policymaking, to put the present border crisis and its impact into proper perspective.¹⁰

While situating the ongoing border standoff within the overarching framework of Chinese foreign policy and global strategy, this paper makes two key arguments. First, the ongoing border crisis in Ladakh is likely the outcome of an intensifying conflict between China’s Major Power Diplomacy (of wooing India to hedge against the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and making New Delhi a key partner in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its Neighborhood Strategy (that of securing a China-centered regional order with Beijing as the sole leader or rule-maker in the region) vis-à-vis India. Second, the standoff lays bare China’s policy dilemma over India — on the one hand, Beijing wants to effectively check a rising India by asserting its strength and psychological advantage over New Delhi. But on the other hand, China is anxious about the impact of the current crisis on the realization of its various regional and global objectives in the Indian Ocean Region that necessitates cordial ties with India.

China’s pre-Galwan Strategic Discourse on India

Improving ties with all its neighbor’s, particularly India, was officially determined as one of China’s topmost foreign policy agendas during the 18^th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. However, there has always been a difference in opinion within the Chinese strategic community on how to cooperate with India – one section of the community argues that China needs to induce India into cooperating, preferably by offering non-core economic incentives and concessions, while others advocate the Maoist philosophy of cooperation through struggle (以斗争求团结，则团结者存。以妥协求团结，则团结者亡). This philosophy essentially means that cooperation achieved through the use of force is long-lasting while that through compromise is fragile and short-term.¹¹ For this group of analysts, the 1962 border war between China and India is the ideal, which brought decades of peace for China and thus, they recommend forcing New Delhi to cooperate as a superior option.

Even as China-India interactions have become more high-profile and significant, clashes at the border became more severe and long-lasting, indicating that two distinct but contradictory schools of thought dominate China’s India policy.

This lack of consensus within Chinese strategic circles ensured that China’s outreach to India remained episodic at best, marked by alternate periods of camaraderie and conflict and of hope and despair. For instance, in a symbolic move, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang chose India as the destination for his maiden foreign visit in 2013, but the potentially historic trip was overshadowed by an over three-week confrontation between Chinese and Indian forces on the western part of the border. In the following years, even as China-India interactions became more high-profile and significant, clashes at the border became more severe and long-lasting, indicating that two distinct but contradictory schools of thought dominate China’s India policy.¹²

The section below explores how both strong optimism and an equally staunch pessimism towards India coexisted in post-Doklam China, with the pessimistic school of thought eventually gaining greater ground, particularly in the months leading up to the Galwan clash.

China Sought Cooperation with India as Competition Grew between FOIP and BRI

After former U.S. President Donald Trump officially introduced the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy at an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting during his first trip to Asia in November 2017, the Indo-Pacific became a popular strategic concept globally, though the idea was originally conceived of by Japanese leader Shinzo Abe. Since then, various countries such as France, India, and Indonesia have developed their own Indo-Pacific strategies, with the latest examples being from Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

However, China, which has much at stake in the geopolitical churn within the Indo-Pacific, had, for all these years, maintained a relatively muted stance on the concept officially, with very few open assessments by high-ranking Chinese officials. Before the October 2020 Wang Yi statement, asserting that the Indo-Pacific strategy is a “huge underlying security risk” to the region,¹³ it was last in 2018 when the Chinese foreign minister spoke on the issue, dismissing the concept outright by likening it to “sea foam” in the Pacific or the Indian Ocean that would quickly disappear.¹⁴ In the following years, China’s state media stuck to this official stance and often strove to shrug off the Indo-Pacific or the Quad as a “paper tiger”(纸老虎),¹⁵ a “stillborn,”¹⁶ a hollow strategy (虚招多实招少),¹⁷ calling it “bubbles in the sun”( 阳光下的泡沫)¹⁸ and predicting that it is “doomed to fail.” (注定会失败).¹⁹

However, downplaying the Indo-Pacific at the official level belied the alarm and attention China accorded to the concept internally. In China’s domestic circles, the idea pushed a panic button and in popular Chinese-language discourse, the Indo-Pacific came to be seen as “a big pit dug for China” ( 美国用印太战略给中国挖了个大坑),²⁰ “the most dangerous geopolitical framework facing China” ( 中国面临的最危险的地缘框架),²¹ “a concept more vicious than the island chain containment theory”²² that poses “an all-round challenge” (全方位挑战)²³ to China and neutralizes its every bid to achieve an overwhelming power advantage in Asia.

At the military level, the Indo-Pacific strategy was seen as potentially targeting the “going out” strategy of the Chinese Navy and a ploy to block China’s access to the seas by creating a second island chain.²⁴ In the political and economic realms, Chinese analysts saw FOIP as a way to challenge China’s BRI, deter Chinese industrial upgradation, attack its development model, and threaten its energy lifeline. Many in China came to believe that if implemented in its entirety, the Indo-Pacific strategy could force China into a state of isolation in the affairs of the region and the only way to break through the isolation would be to make major concessions in regional affairs.²⁵ Some Chinese strategists even questioned the Chinese government’s evasive or passive attitude towards the Indo-Pacific and advocated for greater acceptance of the idea, better preparation, active participation, and a bigger say in the grouping to dilute its adverse effects for China.²⁶

In the Chinese strategic thinking, the Indo-Pacific concept was not just about the containment of China or maintenance of “U.S. hegemony” in the Asia-Pacific in a cost-effective way.²⁷ It was also about acknowledging the rise of India as a counterweight to China. It is argued that if the Asia-Pacific was centered on China, the Indo-Pacific is centered on India. If the United States is the leading force of the Indo-Pacific strategy and China the main target country, then India (located at the junction of Asia, Middle East, and Africa, and sharing a boundary with China), is the main country the United States depends on to balance Beijing, observed Wu Shichun, President of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS).²⁸ Ambassador Yuan Nansheng, who once served as Chinese Consul General in Mumbai, agreed. “Among all the big powers, India does have the capability to balance China. Given its geographic location and its military strength (particularly having more than one aircraft carrier), it does have the ability to block the Strait of Malacca,”²⁹ he argued. Therefore, in the Chinese assessment, the United States, Japan, and Australia are all seen as relying on India to a certain extent to build pressure on China in the Indian Ocean, causing a disadvantageous two-front conflict situation for Beijing.³⁰

In the Chinese conception, India has been the “key variable” (关键变量) which would determine the success or failure of the Indo-Pacific strategy as “without India, there is no Indo-Pacific.”

But despite many convergences in interest, a U.S.-India alliance was not seen as inevitable by Chinese strategists. They believed that India remained the weakest link of the Indo-Pacific grouping or the Quad (which many Chinese strategists refer to as a three-plus one³¹ and not a quadrilateral) because of New Delhi’s own “great power complex(大国情结),”³² its unwillingness to be subservient to the United States, and the complicated history of U.S.-India relations. Therefore, in the Chinese conception, India has been the “key variable” ( 关键变量)³³ which would determine the success or failure of the Indo-Pacific strategy³⁴ as “without India, there is no Indo-Pacific.”³⁵

A section of the Chinese strategic community also valued India as the only “fulcrum country”³⁶ that did not originally exclude China from its Indo-Pacific conception. In this context, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, where he stated that “India does not regard the Indo-Pacific region as an exclusive club with limited members targeting any one country”³⁷ was appreciated in China. Some Chinese strategists even advocated that China should first enhance its relationship with India under the framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy and then gradually seek to expand cooperation with other member countries. They argued that the focus should be on integrating and connecting China’s existing strategies and policies, particularly the BRI, with the Indo-Pacific strategy, ensuring that China has a greater say or role in shaping the strategy and thereby eliminating its adverse impact on China.³⁸

Apart from its relevance in China’s hedging strategy against the FOIP, India, one of the largest markets in the world, with the greatest development potential, located right next to China, figured prominently in Beijing’s Belt and Road in South Asia, its Western Development Strategy, its “Liang Yang Chu Hai ( 两洋出海)” or Two Oceans Strategy. All these strategies comprised China’s own version of Indo-Pacific, meant to connect the Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions and open up an economically viable, major Indian Ocean exit for China, to overcome its Malacca dilemma and bypass what it calls the U.S. island chain strategy in the South and East China Seas. It is important to note that all of China’s mega connectivity initiatives in South Asia under the BRI like the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM), the China-Nepal-India Trans-Himalayan Corridor, and the 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road, either in their present form or as per plans in the future, include India.³⁹ In the Chinese conception, even the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which India publicly opposes, would in the long-term become a China-Pakistan-India-Iran-Afghanistan-Kazakhstan Corridor, which along with other Chinese connectivity initiatives in the region would open up South Asia and form a new trans-Himalayan economic growth zone for China.⁴⁰

Chinese strategists well understood that to pursue China’s strategic objectives in South Asia, India’s cooperation is crucial, due to several factors: 1) the geography of the subcontinent (the fact that most South Asian countries are not directly connected to China or to each other, and most of the connectivity options in the region would need to pass through India),⁴¹ 2) the India-centered⁴² asymmetric power structure (以印度为中心的非对称性安全格局)⁴³ in the region, 3) the various levels of dependency on India among South Asian nations,⁴⁴ and 4) India’s advantageous position in terms of closer ties with other great powers operating in the region like the United States, Japan, and Russia.⁴⁵ Thus, cooperation with New Delhi under various frameworks, such as ‘China, India+1,’⁴⁶ ‘China + SAARC,’ or SCO was seen as the most viable option for a hassle-free and cost-effective implementation of Beijing’s BRI or Two Oceans Strategy.⁴⁷

The year 2018 saw Chinese optimism regarding India reach a crescendo. There were even some discussions in the Chinese press on whether a compromise could be reached such that China would support India’s key aspirations like joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group in return for India hopping onboard BRI.

Overall, many Chinese strategists saw (and continue to see still) India as the “most critical node”⁴⁸ in the competition between the U.S. FOIP and Chinese BRI. As a result, they advocated that China should strive to: 1) improve ties with India by looking for more common ground, reducing the destabilizing factors in the relationship and ensuring smooth ties;⁴⁹ 2) drive a wedge between India and the other three Quad members and reduce or restrict the strategic interaction⁵⁰ between New Delhi and these Indo-Pacific democracies; and 3) play a role in shaping the Modi government’s strategy towards the Indo-Pacific, encouraging India to practice non-alignment and strategic autonomy.

The year 2018 saw Chinese optimism regarding India reach a crescendo. The dominant narrative in policy circles was that China needed to moderate hostility towards India and that “China’s India policy should not lack warmth and goodwill” because “China-India relations can still be improved” (对印度不要过于“敌意”，中印关系可以搞好).⁵¹ There were even some discussions in the Chinese press on whether a compromise could be reached such that China would support India’s key aspirations like joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group in return for India hopping onboard BRI.⁵² These efforts were part of China’s pursuit for a “new path and new thinking for strategic coexistence between China and India” (中印战略共处的新路径、新思维). The idea, aptly put by veteran Chinese historian and Indologist Tan Chung, was: “If China invests in peaches, India will surely return with plums.” (中国投之以桃，印度必会报之以李).⁵³

Conflict in China’s Major Power and Neighborhood Diplomacy vis-à-vis India

However, even as there was much interest in China to extend an olive branch to India and secure a “China-India Datong” or a dragon-elephant dance in the face of growing competition between FOIP and BRI, some sections of the Chinese strategic community remained deeply disgruntled. India’s actions, they argued, were running counter to Chinese expectations.

These expectations are best articulated by Ye Hailin, director of the Center of South Asia Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, one of China’s most influential think-tanks, in a piece written shortly before the Galwan clash in June 2020. He argued that an “optimal state of China-India relations” would mean that the bilateral structural issues between Beijing and New Delhi can be resolved to China’s satisfaction, that India accepts China’s presence in South Asia (including within India) under the banner of the BRI, and that India and China join hands to oppose “U.S. bullying” and build a community with a shared future for mankind.⁵⁴

However, if this optimal state cannot be achieved due to the changing international landscape and the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, Ye Hailin argued that a ‘sub-optimal’ state of relations would mean that the structural contradictions in China-India relations are effectively managed and an outbreak of fierce conflict between the two sides can be avoided when China does not want it. At the same time, India has adopted an attitude of tacit acceptance towards China’s South Asia strategy and the construction of the Belt and Road, at least not publicly obstructing it. In addition, India can oppose U.S. actions against China on certain occasions, or at least remain neutral.”⁵⁵

In other words, what the Chinese side had hoped for was an association with India that facilitated or guaranteed the rise of a China-led economic and political regional order in Asia and that eliminated U.S. interference from the region surrounding China, oft-considered the first crucial step towards China attaining global dominance.⁵⁶ However, in actuality, they were displeased to see that at the global level, India and the United States were getting closer under the Indo-Pacific framework, particularly in the realm of defense cooperation, and the Quad was making steady progress. Regionally, India had consistently and publicly rejected the BRI, and in areas of bilateral strategic contradiction between China and India such as trade imbalance, the territorial dispute, Pakistan, and Kashmir, India had adopted what they called an “aggressive, high-risk, adventurist” stance through its problematic “issue-based diplomacy” (问题外交).⁵⁷ Chinese strategists further complained that Beijing’s various goodwill gestures like agreeing to list Jaish-e-Muhammad chief Masood Azhar as a global terrorist in May 2019 (after blocking the move thrice since 2009) or initiating a manufacturing partnership with India during Xi’s India visit in October 2019 were little appreciated in India and were, in fact, “misinterpreted” as outcomes of India’s growing clout. On the other hand, much to Chinese resentment, the Modi government had been unwilling to “shelve the disputed border” and consistently stressed that China-India strategic cooperation must be based on the proper settlement of bilateral differences, especially the border dispute.⁵⁸

The conclusion drawn by this disgruntled group was: 1) U.S. rejection of China at the global level had offset China’s power advantage and diluted its psychological advantage over India, so much so that India was no longer restrained by the gap in its absolute strength vis-à-vis China; and 2) that China-India cooperation potential was hard to realize and that Beijing may have overestimated the possible benefits of wooing India or prioritizing peace and stability at the LAC, which was only giving undue advantage to New Delhi.

A 2019 report, jointly released by some of China’s top think tanks, argued that even as India “undoubtedly” occupied a very important position in China’s strategy for responding to the Indo-Pacific concept and beyond, Beijing needed to ensure that India did not become an “excessive diplomatic liability” that would extract high costs for disproportionate benefits.

It was becoming clear that China’s Major Power Strategy was increasingly in tension with its Neighborhood Strategy. A blue book on the Indian Ocean, jointly released in late 2019 by some of China’s top think tanks,⁵⁹ further deliberated on how the progression of the Indo-Pacific from an ambiguous concept to a concrete mechanism had put China’s Neighborhood Diplomacy and Major Power Diplomacy strategies vis-à-vis India to a major test.⁶⁰ Any Chinese overreaction, they asserted, would accelerate the actual realization of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad and underreaction would further embolden India and others. The report argued that even as India “undoubtedly” occupied a very important position in China’s strategy for responding to the Indo-Pacific concept and beyond, Beijing needed to ensure that India did not become an “excessive diplomatic liability” that would extract high costs for disproportionate benefits. If that happened, the authors asserted, China’s rise would be impacted, and its regional and global ambitions jeopardized even before the Indo-Pacific posed any real threat to China.

Meanwhile, an argument that simultaneously began gaining currency within Chinese strategic circles was that the Indo-Pacific strategy had so far remained restricted to the realm of posturing and had not been able to cause an immediate deterioration of the participant countries’ bilateral relations with China, largely due to China’s deterrent actions and its muscular stance and tough positioning on issues involving territoriality, territorial waters, and sovereignty. By making it clear that any country that tried to follow the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy against China would face corresponding costs and risks, Beijing had ensured “rational” behavior from respective countries.⁶¹

A flavor of this argument in the China-India context came from Ye Hailin, as he assessed China’s options while dealing with an allegedly overindulged India, enjoying a greater room for maneuver, in a new favorable international environment. The South Asia research head at one of China’s premier think-tanks, considered the closest to the Chinese government, clearly pointed out in the October 2019 issue of the Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review journal published by the Yunnan University of Finance and Economics that it is no longer possible for China to repel “a pompous and vain” opponent like India and its provocative actions by solely relying on bloodless frontier confrontations similar to that in Dongzhang Waterfall (Chumi Gyatse Falls in Arunachal) or Doklam.⁶²

It is in the backdrop of this churn in China’s strategic thinking vis-à-vis India that the 2020 Ladakh standoff broke out.

China’s post-Galwan Strategic Discourse on India

On June 15, 2020, a deadly skirmish broke out between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley, causing casualties on both sides for the first time in nearly 45 years, marking a new unpleasant turn in China-India relations. The gruesome clash caused public outrage in India, and anti-China sentiment reached its peak. Meanwhile, in China, a sense of shock over the rapid deterioration in China-India ties was palpable.

The section below examines a wide spectrum of Chinese narratives on India post this violent clash, with two opposing schools of thought emerging once again. A portion of the strategic community defended Beijing’s actions on the border with India, while another offered strong criticism of Chinese behavior. However, both groups agreed that it was in China’s interest not to publicly project India as an “enemy.”

Exhibit Strength and Strategic Resolve, Forcing India to Cooperate

In the months following the Galwan clash, analysis by eminent Chinese South Asia strategists, like Hu Shisheng and Lou Chunhao (Director and Deputy Director respectively of the Institute for South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations)⁶³ , as well as Lin Minwang, (Deputy Director of Fudan University’s Centre for South Asian Studies), suggested that the coronavirus pandemic and the pandemic-induced intensification of competition between China and the United States were an immediate trigger for the sudden downturn in China-India ties.⁶⁴ These strategists noted with concern that even as the pandemic had put China under unprecedented international pressure and competition, it had produced more opportunities than challenges for India and opened up significant diplomatic space for the country.⁶⁵

Lou Chunhao noted in the November 2020 issue of Contemporary International Relations that turning the COVID crisis into an opportunity, India had strengthened its participation in the realm of global governance and had been vigorously promoting the concept of reformed multilateralism, aimed at positioning itself as a leading power on the global stage. India, he added, was strengthening its strategic investment in the Indo-Pacific region and was carrying out “industrial chain diplomacy” in the hopes of reducing its dependence on China and improving its position in the global value chains.⁶⁶

The key allegations leveled against India by these strategists were that India had been taking advantage of intensified Sino-U.S. competition to fuel its own rise, taking opportunistic and pragmatic diplomatic actions to overtake China, and continuously sending strong confrontational signals on issues involving Beijing’s core interests.

Meanwhile, they argued, China’s restraint at the LAC, out of its concern over an imminent India-United States rapprochement, was proving counterproductive. It has further emboldened India, which has now become more confident to pressure China on various issues in a cost-effective way and simultaneously bargain with the United States on advanced weapons, technology, security guarantees, and whatever else required to enhance its own strength vis-a-vis China.⁶⁷ The greater India’s national strength and international status became, they warned, the more its self-esteem and self-confidence would grow, and that much louder its demands for more concessions from China would be. Therefore, they asserted, it was no longer possible for China to maintain stability in its relations with India by simply continuing its “cooperative strategy” of the past or merely releasing deterrent signals. China needed to reassert its strength advantage and force India to accept Chinese superiority through committed actions.⁶⁸

Do Not Push India towards the United States

The sheer magnitude of the Galwan incident, the high number of casualities, an unprecedented level of perceived escalation by India, and the global attention around the development caused much unease within Chinese strategic circles. In one of the first major interviews after the incident, renowned Chinese scholar Zheng Yongnian, Founding Director of the Advanced Institute of Global and Contemporary China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in Shenzhen and a well-known Chinese government advisor, lamented how Beijing lacks understanding of a rising India and its importance to China.⁶⁹ He lamented the lack of recognition in China that the Beijing-New Delhi relationship would get as the most important relationship after the Beijing-Washington relationship. He was also critical of Beijing’s India policy still being managed at a comparatively lower level in terms of policy/military planning, thereby exhibiting a tactical, reactive, tit-for-tat nature, without a substantial strategic intent. This, he warned, was counterproductive for China as it stoke nationalism in India and might eventually draw China into an untimely military conflict.⁷⁰

The sheer magnitude of the Galwan incident, the high number of casualities, an unprecedented level of perceived escalation by India, and the global attention around the development caused much unease within Chinese strategic circles.

His key argument was that India’s rise is not necessarily detrimental to China’s interest as this would prevent further polarization of the world and ease the pressure on China. If China managed its relationship with India well, New Delhi would never fully invest in the United States, just like it never fully invested in the Soviet Union⁷¹ and the security situation on China’s western frontier, both land and maritime, would improve significantly. But if China-India ties are impaired beyond repair, India alone or in association with other countries could cause endless trouble for China in the future. For instance, an openly hostile India, in his assessment, could make active efforts to prevent China from reaching the Indian Ocean, be it through Pakistan or Myanmar.⁷² On the other hand, any decoupling of China-India relations would only strengthen the anti-China alliance between the United States, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and other countries, whose key objective was to reshape global industrial chains, use the Indo-Pacific strategy to check China’s military and economic power, and expand international organizations such as the G-7 to weaken China’s influence in international affairs⁷³

Other Chinese strategists of repute like Ling Shengli, Director of the International Security Research Center of the China Foreign Affairs University,⁷⁴ and Sun Xingjie,⁷⁵ Deputy Dean of the School of Public Diplomacy of Jilin University and Deputy Director of the Institute of International Relations, concurred with this analysis. This group posited that the least China could do was not further push India into the U.S. camp. They warned that at a time when the Chinese and U.S. economies are apparently decoupling, if New Delhi and Washington were to establish closer economic ties, it could result in China losing its position in many industrial supply chains. The combination of Japanese capital, American technology, and Indian labor force through the Indo-Pacific economic cooperation model, they stressed, could spell “big trouble (大麻烦)” even if China’s economic aggregate becomes the largest in the next few years.⁷⁶

Pressure to repair the relationship with India also came from the public in some ways. Due to worsening relations with the United States, tensions soaring at the border with India, relations with Australia nose diving, and the controversy over Beijing’s role in the coronavirus pandemic, public sentiment in China was considerably dampened over the country’s deteriorating external environment. So much so that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng had to reassure the Chinese people that China still had friends all over the world, with its friend circle growing and not shrinking.⁷⁷

Some observers worried that China itself was creating the conditions for severe competition with India, which may lead to a repetition of history. Just like in 1979, when the China-Vietnam war marked the complete breakdown of ties between China and the former Soviet Union to accelerate China’s reform and opening up, if there is a military conflict between China and India in the current international environment, regardless of which side wins, it would lead to the actual realization of the Indo-Pacific strategy. A widely-shared article on the Chinese internet warned that India would usher in a new wave of reform and opening up once the pandemic is over, with assistance from the international community, and there will be a real decoupling between China and the world.⁷⁸ Certain political commentators and social media influencers with millions of followers such as Du Jianguo directly called out the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership for mishandling China-India relations over the last 60 years (现在的冲突都是在为六十年前的处置不当埋单). He argued that by falsely playing the victim card in domestic circles (when in reality China has never suffered any loss at the hand of India),⁷⁹ unnecessarily being tough, exaggerating differences, and by amplifying conflict with India, the Chinese leadership had put the country into an unfavorable two-front situation, even though China and India have never shared any historical grudge or hatred towards each other. This, he argued, was the greatest disservice to China’s primary agenda of reunification with Taiwan.⁸⁰ China might have grown stronger than ever before, but it is self-destructive to be an enemy of half the world (中国国力是强大了很多，但是和半个世界为敌是自毁。), read one of his widely commented upon tweets.

At Least, Do Not Turn India into an Enemy

While there may not be an agreement as yet in China on whether to compel or induce India to consider Chinese interests, there does seem to be overall consensus within Chinese strategic circles about the need to prevent a complete rupture in China-India relations and not turn India into an “enemy.” Even the staunchest critics of India in China, would agree that an openly hostile India, regardless of whether it allies with the United States or not, can drastically deteriorate China’s overall security environment and prevent China from putting its full concentration towards the Pacific to deal with the overall pressure of the United States and its alliance system.⁸¹ As Feng Chuanlu, Associate Professor at the Research Institute for Indian Ocean Economies at the Yunnan University of Finance and Economics observed, India’s tough actions on the China-India border send a clear signal to Beijing’s various adversaries, including the United States, that its southwestern border is destabilized, which might prompt them to take more radical actions against China in different domains.⁸²

Therefore, rather than openly projecting India as a key threat to China, analysts argue that it may be wiser to treat India as an occasional partner on specific issues.⁸³ Correspondingly, there has been a concerted effort at all levels, from Chinese diplomats to think-tank scholars to the Chinese media, to deliberately play down the Galwan incident and divorce⁸⁴ the ongoing border stalemate from the overall functioning of the China-India relationship.⁸⁵ In fact, in the post Galwan era, China’s leading South Asia strategists like Ye Hailin, Zhang Jiadong,⁸⁶ Hu Shisheng, and Lou Chunhao have all advocated for a new model of China-India relations, one which prioritizes a “normal state-to state relationship”⁸⁷ where India is neither a friend nor a foe of China. Under this framework:

China accepts greater U.S.-India cooperation under the Indo-Pacific framework because India has already rejected China’s presence in the Indian Ocean and is unlikely to change its posture of treating China as a strategic opponent;
Border confrontation or even conflict with India becomes the new normal and there is likely to be a continuous struggle, a long-term see-saw between forces, for actual control of disputed territories till a redline for both sides is “hammered out” and this red line eventually becomes the LAC in the absence of a mutually-acceptable international boundary;
China intensifies its engagements in South Asia, in a way, seeking to isolate India in the region and thereby building up pressure on India; and
Despite the volatile border and steep competition in South Asia, India and China strive to maintain “normal ties” and even explore opportunities to maintain or expand cooperation when the need arises,⁸⁸ though India does not try to overtake China in its pursuit of development.”⁸⁹

Interestingly, some Chinese observers themselves doubt if such a framework would appeal to India. They rightly believe that New Delhi might find such a model more favorable to China, with nothing substantial on offer for India. They also argue that the Indian side might presume that having a stable relationship with New Delhi is currently a greater need for China than the other way around and that India’s non-cooperation strategy could hurt China more.⁹⁰ However, they warn that this is only a temporary window of strategic opportunity for India. In the long- term, given the common identity of both China and India as developing and neighboring countries, neither can completely bypass each other nor rule out the possibility of common interests in the future.

Conclusion

As evidenced above, the ongoing China-India border standoff is not an ordinary, sporadic confrontation but the manifestation of an intensifying conflict between China’s Major Power Diplomacy (of wooing India to hedge against the U.S. FOIP strategy and making New Delhi a key partner in the BRI) and its Neighborhood Strategy (that of securing a China-centered regional order with Beijing as the sole leader or rule-maker in the region) vis-à-vis India.

By taking a leaf out of China’s own playbook and consistently emphasizing India’s fundamental and growing importance in determining Chinese strategic outcomes – no matter which foreign and defense policy India adopts toward China – Indian policymakers can potentially influence their Chinese counterparts toward greater concessions and conciliation.

China seeks India’s cooperation to weaken the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy, because, in the Chinese assessment, India is the “key variable” ( 关键变量) determining the success or failure of the strategy. On the other hand, Beijing’s Western Development Strategy, its BRI or Two Oceans Strategy, that is, China’s own version of Indo-Pacific, aimed at connecting the Pacific and Indian Ocean economies under Chinese leadership and opening up a dedicated Indian Ocean exit for China, rests heavily on India. Not to mention, good relations with India give China peace and stability on its western frontier and allows Beijing to keep its entire strategic focus and concentrate its resources on the intensifying rivalry with the United States and its allies. Overall, it is well understood within Chinese strategic circles that India’s cooperation can secure Chinese gains of vital geopolitical and economic consequences, and its non-cooperation can pose the biggest hurdle to China’s South Asia strategy and advancement of its Indian Ocean footprints.

But to solicit this Indian cooperation, China is unwilling to pay a strategic cost or make any real tradeoff, such as accommodating India’s concerns or aspirations on the disputed border or South Asia or concerning its membership of international organizations. That is likely because deep down, China recognizes India as a key threat that can intercept its energy lifelines, has the potential to replace it in global supply chains, and can compete with China in various international bodies, thereby challenging China’s ability to achieve an “overwhelming power advantage in Asia.” One of China’s key concerns is: “what if India manages to get these concessions from China, but still chooses to cooperate with the United States?”⁹¹

To break the deadlock, China seems to be exploring a new India strategy that rests on exhibiting its strength advantage (by normalizing border conflicts like the Galwan Valley clash) alongside tactical cooperation (by ensuring that there isn’t a complete breakdown in bilateral ties and keeping the door open for working together when it is in Chinese interest). The key idea is to strike a new balance or equilibrium: where through “controlled conflicts” at the disputed border, a “rising and confident” India is brought under check, and China’s strength and psychological advantage in bilateral ties are restored. But at the same time, escalation of tensions or a full-scale conflict is carefully averted so that the United States, whom China considers its principal adversary, does not get to reap a “fisherman’s benefit”⁹² from the situation.⁹³

However, not all in China are convinced by this approach and there is widespread anxiety about the impact of such policy on; a) the actual realization of the U.S. FOIP strategy and the Quad with whatever political, military, and economic implications it will have for China, including the issue of reorganization of global supply chains; b) the fate of BRI connectivity projects in South Asia and China’s long-term plan for a major Indian Ocean exit; c) the future of China-India economic ties with the Indian technology sector likely being off-limits and Indian market access more challenging for Chinese companies; and d) its effect on China’s overall security situation as an active LAC publicly puts Beijing in an inconvenient multi-front strategic challenge, which it had successfully averted for a long time and which makes it vulnerable in various directions and may even jeopardize China’s plans regarding the reunification of Taiwan.

For India, the lesson should be to no longer fall for China’s long-standing and highly successful propaganda strategy of outwardly trivializing India’s capability and role, while creating an impression globally that “India does not feature prominently in Chinese strategic calculations”⁹⁴ , that it views India primarily “through the American lens”⁹⁵. This has convinced many scholars, from India and beyond, that, unlike India, Beijing has little to gain from cooperation with India,⁹⁶ and thus it has little obligation to be sensitive to India’s concerns or concede anything to India.⁹⁷ That, there is an “asymmetric threat perception in China-India ties,”⁹⁸ so much so that China can easily afford to teach India a lesson and come out largely “unscathed.”⁹⁹ Indian policymakers ought to realize that as long as New Delhi approaches the relationship with Beijing solely through the lens of the power differential between the two countries, it will continue to find itself in a disadvantageous position with limited options to deter China. India would do well to come to terms with and perhaps leverage its increasing strategic value to China, whether in the realm of China’s foreign policy or its future development strategies (the BRI/the Western Development Strategy/the Two Oceans Strategy etc.), allowing it to shape Beijing’s behavior and extract adequate benefits from it. By taking a leaf out of China’s own playbook and consistently emphasizing India’s fundamental and growing importance in determining Chinese strategic outcomes – no matter which foreign and defense policy India adopts toward China – Indian policymakers can potentially influence their Chinese counterparts toward greater concessions and conciliation.

Notes

1
Note: The word “possibly” is used because China has not yet officially announced the news of disengagement at the Gogra Post. See: Antara Ghosal Singh, “Decoding the Latest China-India Military Talks on the Border”, The Diplomat, August 19, 2021, accessed September 14, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/decoding-the-latest-china-india-military-talks-on-the-border/. ‘Joint Press Release of the 12th Round of China-India Corps Commander Level Meeting’, Ministry of National Defence, The People’s Republic of China, August 2, 2021, https://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2021-08/02/content_4890979.htm
2
Note: Ananth Krishnan, “Beijing think-tank links scrapping of Article 370 to LAC tensions,” The Hindu, June 12, 2020, accessed September 1, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/beijing-think-tank-links-scrapping-of-article-370-to-lac-tensions/article31815266.ece.
3
Note: Indrani Bagchi, “LAC stand-off: Not just a border conflict, there’s much more to it,” The Times of India, June 28, 2020, accessed September 6, 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/76635131.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.
4
Note: Derek Grossman, “Chinese Border Aggression Against India Likely Unrelated to Pandemic”, The Diplomat, July 6, 2020, accessed September 6, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/chinese-border-aggression-against-india-likely-unrelated-to-pandemic/.
5
Note: Nayanima Basu, “Beijing is probably aiming for its LAC claim of 1959, China expert Yun Sun says”, The Print, September 21, 2020, accessed September 28, 2020, https://theprint.in/theprint-interview/beijing-is-probably-aiming-for-its-lac-claim-of-1959-china-expert-yun-sun-says/507207/.
6
Note: Mao Keji, “Yindu weihe dui hua shi qiang? Modi zhizheng de liang da “fabao” dou bu lingle” 印度为何对华示强？莫迪执政的两大”法宝”都不灵了 [Why does India show strength against China? The Modi administration’s two magic weapons have been failing], Guancha.com, October 15, 2020, https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2020-10-15/doc-iiznezxr6067946.shtml; “China, India in close communication over border conflicts: FM”, Global Times, June 17, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202006/1191900.shtml
7
Note: Hu Shisheng and Wang Jue, “Yindu dui hua shi qiang waijiao de xingwei luoji” 印度对华示强外交的行为逻辑 [The Behavioural Logic of India’s Diplomacy towards China], Fujian Library, September 9, 2020, https://fjlib.net/zt/fjstsgjcxx/hwsc/202009/t20200909_439430.htm; Lou Chunhao, “Maoxian zhuyi waijaio jiang zhi yindu zhanlüe touzhi” 冒险主义外交将致印度战略透支 [Adventurous diplomacy will cause India’s strategic overdraft], Cfisnet.com, July 6, 2020, https://comment.cfisnet.com/2020/0706/1320071.html.
8
Note: Although China believes that India is not yet a major power in terms of strength or global influence, it nevertheless considers India’s prospects bright and believes that India’s importance in Chinese policymaking is “unquestionable.” See: Antara Ghosal Singh, “Starting high, ending low,” India Seminar, July 28, 2020, accessed September 28, 2020, https://india-seminar.com/2020/728/728_antara_ghosal_singh.htm.
9
Note: After the reform and opening up of China, Chinese foreign policy strove to move away from its ideological foundations and by the beginning of the 21st century, came up with a relatively stable diplomatic outlay of “big power is the key, neighbors are the first, developing countries are the foundation, and multilateral diplomacy is an important stage.” From the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China to the report of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Chinese diplomacy was carried out in the order of major powers, neighboring countries, developing countries, and multilaterals. However, after President Xi Jinping came to power, a new strategic concept of “Major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” was introduced. The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China did not continue the practice of the reports of previous national congresses since the new century. In the new strategic layout, multilateral diplomacy is closely followed by major countries, neighboring countries, and developing countries, which together constitute China’s overall diplomatic layout. (See: https://www.rwtext.com/text.asp?id=55583)
10
Note: Analysis on China-India relations by Ye Hailin, Director of the Center of South Asia Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Hu Shisheng and Lou Chunhao, Director and Deputy Director respectively of the Institute for South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Zhang Jiadong and Lin Minwang, Director and Deputy Director respectively of Fudan University’s Centre for South Asian Studies), Zheng Yongnian, Head of Global and Contemporary China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in Shenzhen, Zhu Cuiping, Deputy Director and Professor of the Indian Ocean Regional Research Center at Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, has been instrumental in writing this paper.
11
Note: Pan Xing and Zou Xianxiang, “Xin tianxa guan shi yu zhong de zhongguo xizang nanya tongdao jianshe he xingbian fumin” 新天下观视域中的中国西藏南亚通道建设和兴边富民战略 [The Construction of China Tibet South Asia Corridor and the Strategy of Prospering Border Areas and Enriching the People in the New World View], Tibet Development Forum 西藏发展论坛, vol.3, June 15, 2021, https://oversea.cnki.net/KXReader/Detail?dbcode=CJFD&filename=XZFZ202103004&uid=#3, Original sentence in Chinese: 以斗争求团结则团结存，以退让求团结则团结亡。只有正确处理好团结和斗争的辩证关系，才能切实推进中国—南亚的和谐稳定。
12
Note: Yun Sun, “China’s strategic assessment of India,” March 25, 2020, War on the Rocks, accessed October 1, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-india/.
13
Note: “Wang Yi: U.S. ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ Undermines Peace and Development Prospects in East Asia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, October 13, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1824140.shtml.
14
Note: “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 9, 2018, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1540928.shtml.
15
Note: “Meiguo yin tai zhanlüe shi zhilaohu ma” 美国印太战略是纸老虎吗 [Is the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy a paper tiger?], Beijing Daily, November 8, 2019, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1649613434653998680&wfr=spider&for=pc.
16
Note: Long Xingchun, “US-Japan-India-Australia alliance stillborn,” Global Times, March 18, 2019, accessed October 1, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1142495.shtml.
17
Note: Zhang Jiadong, “Meiguo tui yin tai zhanlüe xuzhao duo shizhao shao” 美国推“印太战略”虚招多实招少[The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is more rhetoric than real], Global Times, June 2, 2018, https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnK8XZ1.
18
Note: Jin Canrong, “Yin tai yangguang xia de paomo” 印太-阳光下的泡沫 (“Indo-Pacific”- Bubble in the Sun), youwuqiong, https://youwuqiong.top/106422.html.
19
Note: “Guofang bu: Renhe zhanlue dou be ying ni shier dong” 国防部：任何战略都不应逆时而动 [Ministry of National Defence: No strategy should go against time], Xinhuanet.com, June 27, 2019, https://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2019-06/27/c_1210172035.htm.
20
Note: “Meiguo yong yintai zhanlue gei zhongguo wale ge da keng, zenme ban” 美国用印太战略给中国挖了个大坑，怎么办? [The U.S. has used the Indo-Pacific strategy to dig a pit for China, what should China do?],xilu.com, June 8, 2018, https://www.xilu.com/20180608/1000010001045418_1.html.
21
Note: “Yi yin tai zhi ming: Zhongguo mianlin de zui weixian de diyuan kuangjia” 以印太之名：中国面临的最危险的地缘框架 [Indo-Pacific- the most dangerous geopolitical framework facing China], Xueqiu.com, September 5, 2020, https://xueqiu.com/5421020604/158577167.
22
Note: “Weihe shuo “yin tai zhanlüe” bi “daolian” geng edu, jiang haijun xianzhi zai baoweiquan nei” 为何说“印太战略”比“岛链”更恶毒，将海军限制在包围圈内 [Why is the “Indo-Pacific strategy” said to be more vicious than the “island chain”, confining the PLA Navy through a strategic encirclement?], Sohu.com, May 22, 2020, https://www.sohu.com/a/396857475_120097684.
23
Note: Zeng Xiaoyu, “Meiguo jiang Taiwan naru “yin tai zhanlüe” zuowei zhong mei jueli xin zhanchang” 美国将台湾纳入“印太战略”作为中美角力新战场” [The U.S. wants to include Taiwan in “Indo-Pacific”, creating a new battlefield for China-US relations] , Unification Forum 统一论坛, vol.4, August 22, 2019, https://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201904/201908/t20190822_12195370.html.
24
Note: Yi yin tai zhi ming: Zhongguo mianlin dezui weixian di diyuan khuangjia” 以印太之名：中国面临的最危险的地缘框架 [Indo-Pacific- the most dangerous geopolitical framework facing China], Xueqiu.com, September 5, 2020, https://xueqiu.com/5421020604/158577167.
25
Note: Zeng Xiaoyu, “Meiguo jiang Taiwan naru “yin tai zhanlue” zuowei zhong mei jueli xin zhanchan” 美国将台湾纳入“印太战略”作为中美角力新战场” [The U.S. wants to include Taiwan in “Indo-Pacific”, creating a new battlefield for China-US relations], Unification Forum 统一论坛, vol.4, August 22, 2019, https://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201904/201908/t20190822_12195370.html.
26
Note: Pang Jingran and Cui Li, “ ‘Yintai zhanlüe’ shiyu xia de zhongyin guanxi” “印太战略”视域下的中印关系[Sino-India Relationship under the Indo-Pacific Strategy], South and Southeast Asian Studies, vol.6, 2019, 56-66, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2020&filename=DNYA201906005&v=MftRHg1HFuKSiXd2FQ7BWQZgGk7P3qeUGxCRa%25mmd2Ba3r%25mmd2FHYxhP94cLeGX%25mmd2Blta0bUmth.
27
Note: Sun Xingjie, “Meiguo yintai zhanlüe xianru beilun” 美国印太战略陷入悖论” [The U.S.’s Indo-Pacific Strategy falls into a paradox], Youth.cn, December 6, 2019, https://d.youth.cn/elitereference/201912/t20191206_12136169.htm.
28
Note: Wu Shicun and Jayanath Colombage, “Zhongguo ruhe pojie meiguo de ‘yin tai zhanlüe’?” 中国如何破解美国的“印太战略” [How does China crack the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy?], National Institute for South China Sea Studies, December 13, 2019, https://www.nanhai.org.cn/review_c/402.html.
29
Note: “Guanyu yindu de zui shenke jiedu: Qian zhuyin zonglingshi tan yindu de bukesiyi” 关于印度的最深刻解读：前驻印总领事谈印度的不可思议 [The most profound analysis on India, Former Consul General in India talks about Incredible India], ifeng.com, August 11, 2020, https://ishare.ifeng.com/c/s/7yrEGyvYYB7, Original sentence in Chinese: “在所有大国里面，印度是比较有影响的，为什么?它有能力把马六甲海峡给堵了，因为它不止一艘航母…”
30
Note: Ye Hailin, “Zhongguo yingdui meiguo zaiban ‘yintai’ gainian de celüexing sikao” 中国应对美国再版“印太”概念的策略性思考 [Strategic Thoughts on China’s Addressing of the US’s New Version of the “Indo-Pacific” Concept”], Indian Ocean Economic Review, vol. 5, 2019, 1-14, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2020&filename=YDYY201905002&v=X%25mmd2B7pTZ6DNgB2uXQNZLyMx6sHuAS51o%25mmd2FUAvZEUbBlw0%25mmd2BaPZ%25mmd2BwNadT%25mmd2BSqy1iBMmXwv.
31
Note: “Yindu yao duoguo canjia junyan,xiang ‘xia’ zhongguo? Mei xiangdao zao jiu zhongle meiguo de quantao” 印度邀多国参加军演，想“吓”中国？没想到早就中了美国的圈套 [India invites many countries to participate in military exercises and wants to “intimidate” China? Didn’t expect it will fall into the U.S. trap], Yitan, August 4, 2020, https://read01.com/zh-my/J83L478.amp.
32
Note: Zhang Weiwei, “Zhe jiushi zhongguo, di 45 qi: Yindu fazhan mianlin de tiaozhan” 这就是中国, 第45期：印度发展面临的挑战 [This is China, Issue 45:Challenges facing Indian development], Guancha.com, September 10, 2019, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1677404118660528483&wfr=spider&for=pc.
33
Note: Zhang Hualong, “Yindu hui peihe meiguo,ezhi zhongguoma?” 印度会配合美国，遏制中国吗？[Will India cooperate with the United States to contain China?], Cfisnet.com, October 21, 2019, https://comment.cfisnet.com/2019/1021/1317682.html.
34
Note: Zeng Xiaoyu, “Meiguo jiang Taiwan naru “yin tai zhanlue” zuowei zhong mei jueli xin zhanchan”美国将台湾纳入“印太战略”作为中美角力新战场 [The U.S. wants to include Taiwan in “Indo-Pacific”, creating a new battlefield for China-US relations], Unification Forum 统一论坛, vol.4, August 22, 2019, https://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/tylt/201904/201908/t20190822_12195370.html.
35
Note: Zhang Weiwei, “Zhe jiushi zhongguo, di 45 qi: Yindu fazhan mianlin de tiaozhan” 这就是中国, 第45期：印度发展面临的挑战[This is China, Issue 45: Challenges facing Indian development], Guancha.com, September 10, 2019, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1677404118660528483&wfr=spider&for=pc. (Original sentence in Chinese: 印太战略如果没有印度的话就做不成)
36
Note: Pang Jingran and Cui Li, “ ‘Yintai zhanlüe’ shiyu xia de zhongyin guanxi” “印太战略”视域下的中印关系[Sino-India Relationship under the Indo-Pacific Strategy] , South and Southeast Asian Studies. vol.6, 2019, 56-66, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2020&filename=DNYA201906005&v=MftRHg1HFuKSiXd2FQ7BWQZgGk7P3qeUGxCRa%25mmd2Ba3r%25mmd2FHYxhP94cLeGX%25mmd2Blta0bUmth, Original sentence in Chinese: “在“印太战略”中，印度是重要的支点国家. . . . 印度并不排斥中国加入“印太战略”，而是认为“符合各方利益的做法是将中国纳入印太战略体系。”
37
Note: Zhang Hualong, “Yindu hui peihe meiguo,ezhi zhongguoma?” 印度会配合美国，遏制中国吗？[Will India cooperate with the United States to contain China?], Cfisnet.com, October 21, 2019, https://comment.cfisnet.com/2019/1021/1317682.html.
38
Note: Pang Jingran and Cui Li, “’Yintai zhanlüe’ shiyu xia de zhongyin guanxi” “印太战略”视域下的中印关系[Sino-India Relationship under the Indo-Pacific Strategy] , South and Southeast Asian Studies vol.6, 2019, 56-66 , https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2020&filename=DNYA201906005&v=MftRHg1HFuKSiXd2FQ7BWQZgGk7P3qeUGxCRa%25mmd2Ba3r%25mmd2FHYxhP94cLeGX%25mmd2Blta0bUmth.
39
Note: Lan Jianxue, “’Yidai yilu’ changyi zai nanya: Jinzhan, tiaozhan ji weilai”“一带一路”倡议在南亚:进展、挑战及未来 [Belt and Road Initiative in South Asia, Progress, Challenges, Future Prospects], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review, vol.4, 2017, 39-53, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2017&filename=YDYY201704003&v=vK%25mmd2BO1WTSTGWh%25mmd2Bd3kFz5PKq1GaEKNzkyIOkEbenjakF9lgKqhxay2IXh%25mmd2FhLX9wI5o. Antara Ghosal Singh, ‘China’s Approach to South Asia’, East Asian Policy, Vol. 13, No. 04, pp. 46-59 (2021), Special Feature, https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793930521000283
40
Note: Antara Ghosal Singh, “China’s Vision for the Belt and Road in South Asia,” The Diplomat, March 02, 2019, accessed January 10, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-vision-for-the-belt-and-road-in-south-asia/. Antara Ghosal Singh, ‘China’s Approach to South Asia’, East Asian Policy, Vol. 13, No. 04, pp. 46-59 (2021), Special Feature, https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793930521000283
41
Note: Wei Ling, “Cong zhanlüe jiaodu renshi zhongyin jingmao guanxi” 从战略角度认识中印经贸关系[Understanding China-India economic and trade relations from a strategic perspective], Teaching and Research, vol. 9, 2005, 61-66, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFD2005&filename=JWDP200509010&v=V1PaRZIK7We145PqoZpuNehQpuCxkw0crnsnhUiISjh69GartxftM5AtK%25mmd2BgWjjBQ.
42
Note: Feng Chuanlu, “ ‘Yidai yilu’ shiye xia nanya diyuan zhengzhi geju ji diqu xingshi fazhan guancha”, “一带一路”视野下南亚地缘政治格局及地区形势发展观察[Observations of the Geo-Political Context and Regional Order in South Asia: Perspectives from the Belt and Road Initiative], South Asian Studies, vol.3, 2017, 1-32, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2017&filename=LAYA201703002&v=Wh8FzsdHVT1wVVdQzs%25mmd2F6oP2WcfHf6sNSXOE%25mmd2FTYssDKHstho1vjPDpudCNhZMkPwl.
43
Note: Zhu Cuiping, “2017 Yinduyang diqu lanpishu guandian zongshu” 2017印度洋地区蓝皮书观点综述 [Summary of the 2017 Blue Book of Indian Ocean], Think Tank: Theory & Practice, vol.3, 2017, 86-89, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2017&filename=ZKSL201703013&v=TDfkhANB%25mmd2B9fQNlTp5zxs5hT0RMx27%25mmd2B6y3x4Wb2%25mmd2Bvxa6WKIn7ePIlrpS%25mmd2BeAyfGw8s.
44
Note: Yang Siling,“ Yidai yilu: Nanya diqu guojia jian guanxi fenxi shijiao” 一带一路”:南亚地区国家间关系分析视角 [One Belt One Road: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Countries in South Asia], Indian Ocean Economy Studies, vol.5, 2015, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2015&filename=YDYY201505002&v=5IBO739PsUTOjDr7sbVYvLVTnE0%25mmd2FXy5DzJH8Qjr1orIKKN3%25mmd2Fz5f6N9oNT9zCjcG3.
45
Note: Dai Yonghong, “Zhong yin mei e zai nanya de “yihe lian ti” zhanlüe geju” 中印美俄在南亚的“一核两体”战略格局”, [The “One Core, Two Models” Strategic Pattern Involving China, India, US and Russia in South Asia ], Frontiers, vol.1, 2018, 48-55, https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2018&filename=RMXS201801006&v=YAMwaL%25mmd2B6%25mmd2Flqwb6iRLHz%25mmd2FhSvECOaaWAETQFjox7dfB2vIHDkyr46RReiAUVBAluKY.
46
Note: Yang Xiaoping, “Shuangchong hudong yu nanya anquan zhixu goujian” 双重互动与南亚安全秩序构建[Twofold Interactions and the Construction of a South Asian Security Order], Global Review, vol.3, August 2016, 126-141, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2016&filename=GJZW201603008&v=zpuK13UOjybHyK1Ia3blvI0nyRZIyehaa8y5NSUPhnAZoeqzPmBN%25mmd2FSzJYh2%25mmd2FCmJV.
47
Note: Yang Siling, “ ‘yidai yilu’: zhongguo yu nanya guojia hezuo zhong de zhengdang zhengzhi yinsu”“一带一路”：中国与南亚国家合作中的政党政治因素” [ Belt and Road Initiative: Party Politics in the Cooperation between China and South Asian countries ], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review, vol.1, 2020, 1-14, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2020&filename=YDYY202001002&v=87PX1%25mmd2BHzIFSGNlANVZJo3rXaVUa0ReYLUgOUdgzGl%25mmd2Biq41%25mmd2Futt4XmnDb%25mmd2Fk4x4SrE. Later, as India stayed away from China’s Belt and Road Initiative and even publicly objected to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the Chinese strategic community strove to divorce BRI’s success from India’s participation. Many argued (See: Antara Ghosal Singh, ‘China’s Approach to South Asia’, East Asian Policy, Vol. 13, No. 04, pp. 46-59 (2021), Special Feature, https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793930521000283) that China should play down India’s special strategic value to China’s South Asia or Indian Ocean policy, else it will add to India’s rising self-confidence and arrogance and make it even more difficult for China to gain any support from India in the future without adequate compensation. Therefore, the strategy changed to publicizing Chinese cooperation projects in the rest of South Asia, often known as demonstration projects, to build up pressure on India and compel it to cooperate.
48
Note: Sun Xingjie, “Chuxian qiang sheng zhihou, zhong yin bianjing wenti xingzhi yijing fasheng bianhua” 出现枪声之后，中印边境问题性质已经发生变化 [After the gunshots, the nature of the Sino-Indian border issue has changed), Souhu.com, September 27, 2020, https://www.sohu.com/a/421241023_114988.
49
Note: Pang Jingran and Cui Li, “ ‘Yintai zhanüle’ shi yu xia de zhong yin guanxi” “印太战略”视域下的中印关系[Sino-India Relationship under the Indo-Pacific Strategy] , South and Southeast Asian Studies, vol.6, 2019, 56-66, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2020&filename=DNYA201906005&v=MftRHg1HFuKSiXd2FQ7BWQZgGk7P3qeUGxCRa%25mmd2Ba3r%25mmd2FHYxhP94cLeGX%25mmd2Blta0bUmth.
50
Note: Ibid.
51
Note: Lin Minwang, “Buneng zhi ba yanjing ding zai Zhongzyin fenqi shang” 不能只把眼睛盯在中印分歧上 [Can’t just keep your eyes on the differences between China and India], cfisnet.com, April 19, 2018, https://comment.cfisnet.com/2018/0419/1312110.html.
52
Note: Hu Shisheng, “Te lang pu “yin tai zhanlüe” gouxiang yu zhong yin hudong qianjing” 特朗普“印太战略”构想与中印互动前景”[Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and prospect for India-China expectation), The Paper, March 2, 2018, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2014796.
53
Note: Tan Zhong, “Zhong yin ying bao you biyi shuangfei de”中印应抱有比翼双飞的[China-India should have the vision of flying together), Global Times, May 17, 2018, accessed June 21, 2021, https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnK8wQN
54
Note: Ye Hailin, “Shenfen renzhi piancha dui zhong yin guanxi qianjing de yingxiang” 身份认知偏差对中印关系前景的影响”, [Impact of identity cognition on prospects of China-India relations], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review, vol.3, 2020, 1-12, June 15, 2020, https://ex.cssn.cn/gjgxx/gj_ytqy/202007/t20200730_5163496.html. Original sentence in Chinese “”对中国而言，中印关系最优状态是中印双边结构性问题得到令中方满意的解决、印度接纳中国在南亚以及其他印度的利益攸关地区推动“一带一路”建设以提高中国影响力、印度和中国携手反对美国的霸凌并共建人类命运共同体”.
55
Note: Ibid. Original sentence in Chinese “中国所能期待的，应该是符合成本-收益均衡的次优状态。这一状态意味着中国能够有效管控中印关系的矛盾，避免双方在中国所不希望的时候爆发激烈冲突。同时，印度对中国的南亚周边战略和“一带一路”建设采取默认接受的态度，至少不公开阻挠。此外，印度在某些特定场合下能够对美国不利于中国的行动表示反对，至少保持中立。”
56
Note: Ye Hailin, “Zhongguo jueqi yu ciyao zhanlüe fangxiang tiaozhan de yingdui-yi donglang shijian hou de zhong yin guanxi wei li” 中国崛起与次要战略方向挑战的应对-以洞朗事件后的中印关系为例 [China’s rise and response to challenges in the secondary strategic direction- taking China-India relations after the Donglang incident as an example] , Sohu.com, April 6, 2018, https://www.sohu.com/a/234028626_618422, Ye Hailin, “Zhongguo yindui meiguo zaiban “yin tai” gainian de celue xing sikao” 中国应对美国再版“印太”概念的策略性思考”, [Chinese response to America’s relaunch of the Indo-Pacific strategic concept], Indian Ocean Economy Research 2019, (05), 1-14, https://oversea.cnki.net/KXReader/Detail?dbcode=CJFD&filename=YDYY201905002&uid=WEEvREcwSlJHSldSdmVqM1BLVW9SQWJEQ1J6V1B2QkJwb0RVZEo2MVVacz0=$9A4hF_YAuvQ5obgVAqNKPCYcEjKensW4IQMovwHtwkF4VYPoHbKxJw!!
57
Note: Ye Hailin, ” Mo di zhengfu dui hua “wenti waijiao”celue yanjiu—jian lun gai shijiao xia yindu dui “yidai yilu” changyi de taidu” 莫迪政府对华”问题外交”策略研究——兼论该视角下印度对”一带一路”倡议的态度 [The Modi Administration’s “Issue by Issue Diplomacy” Strategy towards China, and Related Attitudes towards the Belt and Road Initiative], Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, vol.6, 2017, 24-47, December 20, 2017, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2018&filename=DDYT201706003&v=IFCvG%25mmd2ByIyCx2Sf9htMYOMqhBdorjt2faEGzNEpKPNmCvNdoP4Zj1jrzVg6zAD5zv; Wang Shida, “Yindu yijing bei “shuangchong zixin”chong hunle tounao” 印度已经被“双重自信”冲昏了头脑”, [India bedazzled by double (two) confidence], June 04, 2020, Baijiahao, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1668525717010931673&wfr=spider&for=pc; Lin Minwang, “Zhong yin guanxi de xin qushi yu xin tiaozhan”, 中印关系的新趋势与新挑战” [New Trends and New Challenges in Sino-Indian Relations], August 02, 2017, Sina.com https://cj.sina.com.cn/article/detail/3860416827/344222?column=china&ch=9.
58
Note: Ye Hailin, ” Modi zhengfu dui hua “wenti waijiao”celüe yanjiu—jian lun gai shijiao xia yindu dui “yidai yilu” changyi de taidu” 莫迪政府对华”问题外交”策略研究——兼论该视角下印度对”一带一路”倡议的态度 [The Modi Administration’s “Issue by Issue Diplomacy” Strategy towards China, and Related Attitudes towards the Belt and Road Initiative], Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, vol.6, 2017, 24-47, December 20, 2017, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2018&filename=DDYT201706003&v=IFCvG%25mmd2ByIyCx2Sf9htMYOMqhBdorjt2faEGzNEpKPNmCvNdoP4Zj1jrzVg6zAD5zv, Original sentence in Chinese: 对于印度来说, 发展和中国的战略合作伙伴关系, 首先意味着双边关系中的重大问题需要得到处理。如果说这一思路在莫迪当选之初仅仅是印度新政府对华政策的粗糙构想的话, 那么在次年 (2015年) 莫迪对中国的访问期间, 印度以问题的解决作为衡量外交成绩和确定双边关系的策略就已经体现得非常明显了。印度的这一策略和中国的外交习惯不同, 印度并不特别看重对双边关系整体状况的概括, 而是更关注两国关系中的具体问题。China is reluctant (See: Antara Ghosal Singh, “India, China, and the Stalemate beyond Ladakh’, South Asian Voices, May 25, 2021, https://southasianvoices.org/india-china-and-the-stalemate-beyond-ladakh/) to address the border row because it believes that “the differences between China and India at the bilateral, regional, and international levels are not caused by just the border dispute, but essentially because both China and India consider themselves to be emerging powers at different stages of rising. Even if China facilitates the settling of the border row, China- India competition will continue unabated at various levels, only China will have one less card in hand, a crucial one, against India.” In words of Liu Zongyi, Secretary-General of the Centre for China and South Asia Studies of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, “if the LAC is determined and the border is delineated, India will next turn the gun towards Pakistan, establish its dominance over South Asia, and subsequently concentrate its entire strategic focus and main resources on the Indian Ocean, intercepting China from the Indian Ocean, and controlling China’s lifeline”.( “而莫迪也希望解决与中国的边界问题，然后调转枪头，集中精力收拾巴基斯坦，实现南亚独尊的地位，进而将其战略重心向印度洋方向转移。”…“实际上实控线确定了，基本就划定了边界，然后他就可以集中精力对付巴基斯坦，把它的战略重心、主要资源集中到印度洋，从印度洋上截住中国，控制中国的生命线。”) In fact, there seems to be consensus (See: Ye Hailin, “Zhongguo jueqi yu ciyao zhanlüe fangxiang tiaozhan de yingdui-yi donglang shijian hou de zhong yin guanxi wei li” 中国崛起与次要战略方向挑战的应对-以洞朗事件后的中印关系为例 [China’s rise and response to challenges in the secondary strategic direction- taking China-India relations after the Donglang incident as an example] , Sohu.com, April 6, 2018, https://www.sohu.com/a/234028626_618422,) among Chinese strategists that the disputed border is a point of leverage for China, restricting India’s ability to challenge China in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, from the political, economic, and strategic perspectives, China seems to be in no rush to resolve the border issue.
59
Note: Like the Indian Ocean Region Research Center of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, the South Asian Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Indo-Pacific Research Institute (generally referred to as the Two-Ocean Strategic Research Institute) jointly established by Fudan University and Yunnan University of Finance and Economics.
60
Note: “‘Yintai’ gainian ji mei ri yin ao sibian hudong yijing chengwei zhongguo quanqiu zhanlüe he zhoubian zhanlüe suo mianlin de guanjian tiaozhan- “yinduyang diqu fazhan baogao 2019 renwei” “印太”概念及美日印澳四边互动已经成为中国全球战略和周边战略所面临的关键挑战—《印度洋地区发展报告（2019）》认为 [The Indo-Pacific and Quad have become key challenges facing China’s Major Power Strategy and Neighborhood Strategy – The Indian Ocean Regional Development report believes), Indian Ocean Region Blue Book, Indian Ocean Region development Report, February 3, 2020, https://www.pishu.cn/psgd/545673.shtml.
61
Note: Wang Peng, “Meiguo “yin tai” zhanlüe beijing xia de zhong yin guanxi” 美国“印太”战略背景下的中印关系”, The Statecraft Institution, September 4, 2018, [China-India Relations in the Context of US “Indo-Pacific” Strategy], https://www.daguoce.org/article/12/328.html.
62
Note: Ye Hailin, “Zhongguo yingdui meiguo zaiban “yin tai”gainian de celüe xing sikao” 中国应对美国再版“印太”概念的策略性思考 [Strategic Thoughts on China’s Addressing of the US’s New Version of the “Indo-Pacific” Concept], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review, vol.5, 2019, 1-14, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2020&filename=YDYY201905002&v=X%25mmd2B7pTZ6DNgB2uXQNZLyMx6sHuAS51o%25mmd2FUAvZEUbBlw0%25mmd2FmgoJ4LDzZwLdZWFrRudys, Original Sentence in Chinese: “对于这样一个虚荣心和自我麻醉能力强到可以无视基本事实的对手，靠类似于在东章瀑布和洞朗地区发生的不流血前沿对峙就击退印度的冒险主义挑衅行径，显然是不可能的.”
63
Note: CICIR (See: Jayadeva Ranade, ‘India-China tensions unlikely to ease’, The Tribune, January 23, 2021, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/india-china-tensions-unlikely-to-ease-202267) is one of China’s most influential foreign policy think tanks and is directly under the Ministry of State Security (MoSS), China’s external intelligence establishment.
64
Note: Hu Shisheng and Wang Jue, “Yindu dui hua shi qiang waijiao de xingwei luoji” 印度对华示强外交的行为逻辑 [The Behavioural Logic of India’s Diplomacy towards China], Fujian Library, September 9, 2020, https://fjlib.net/zt/fjstsgjcxx/hwsc/202009/t20200909_439430.htm; Lou Chunhao, “Yindu duihua de zhengce zhuanbian yu zhongguo de zhengce fansi” 印度对华政策的转变与中国的政策反思[The Changes of India’s China Policy and China’s Response], Contemporary International Relations, vol.11, 2020, 26-34, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDAUTO&filename=XDGG202011004&v=QKEP6J0ECDNxJn3IBiQBFNJEF7qE%25mmd2BDFU0Ea1LG4Fov2rc0N4k0T7Nb0T8XRTrI6J; Lin Minwang, “Xinguan feiyan yiqing xia yindu de daguo waijiao zhanlüe” 新冠肺炎疫情下印度的大国外交战略 [India’s Great Power Diplomacy Strategy under the Novel Corona Virus epidemic], Fudan Development Institute, September 22, 2020, https://fddi.fudan.edu.cn/c6/c8/c21257a247496/page.htm.
65
Note: Ibid.
66
Note: Lou Chunhao, “Yindu duihua de zhengce zhuanbian yu zhongguo de zhengce fansi” 印度对华政策的转变与中国的政策反思[The Changes of India’s China Policy and China’s Response], Contemporary International Reflations, vol.11, 2020, 26-34, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDAUTO&filename=XDGG202011004&v=QKEP6J0ECDNxJn3IBiQBFNJEF7qE%25mmd2BDFU0Ea1LG4Fov2rc0N4k0T7Nb0T8XRTrI6J.
67
Note: Ye Hailin, “Zhongguo xiwang yu yindu jianli zhengchang de guojia guanxi, yin tai zhanlüe buzu wei ju” 中国希望与印度建立正常的国家关系, 印太战略不足为惧[ China hopes to establish normal state relations with India, No need to worry about Indo-Pacific strategy], China Net, July 14, 2020, https://fangtan.china.com.cn/2020-07/14/content_76270833.htm.
68
Note: Ye Hailin, “Ziwo ren zhi, guanxi re zhi yu celüe hudong-dui hong yin bianjie zhengduan di boyi fenxi”自我认知、关系认知与策略互动——对中印边界争端的博弈分析 [Self Recognition, Relationship Cognition and Strategic Interactions: An Analysis on the Escalation of the China-India Border Dispute from the Perspective of Game Theory], World Economics and Politics, November 14, 2020, 4-23, https://oversea.cnki.net/KXReader/Detail?dbcode=CJFD&filename=SJJZ202011002&UID=WEEvREcwSlJHSldSdmVqM1BLVW9RNjZmL0p1U0pyUTUxNUMrTVR2Q0IvOD0%3d%249A4hF_YAuvQ5obgVAqNKPCYcEjKensW4IQMovwHtwkF4VYPoHbKxJw!!&autoLogin=0, Original Sentence in Chinese : 中国可以拒绝认可印度关于两国实力对比关系的主张,以承诺行动迫使印度接受中国和印度之间的差序状态; 也可以接受印度的主张,竭尽所能地调集资源满足印度和中国同为平等强国的愿望。…更何况从重复博弈的逻辑出发,一味以满足对手意愿为目标的博弈策略根本就无法被称为一种策略。
69
Note: Zheng Yongnian, “Zhong yin bianjie shiduan zaiqi. Zhong yin guanxi zenme kan?Zenme ban?” 中印边界事端再起。中印关系怎么看？怎么办？[China-India border row has become prominent again- how to see it? What to do?], Baijiahao, June 22, 2020, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1670175313686802158&wfr=spider&for=pc.
70
Note: Original Sentences in Chinese:”对中国来说，从长远来看，中印关系是仅次于中美关系的一对最重要的关系。这表明，中国要把印度提高到中国国际关系的战略水平” “印度对中国本身带有很强烈的民族主义，因为1962年中印战争印度失败。印度对中国的民族主义就像中国对日本的民族主义。”, “在政策操作层面，中国的对印政策的主体是低层官僚（包括军方）所为。很多对印政策都停留在战术领域，和印度的互动主要表现为反应性的特点，也就是以牙还牙式的。这个特点非常清楚地表现在近年来最具有争议的边界问题上”
71
Note: Zheng Yongnian, “Yindu jueqi bing bujian de dui zhongguo buli”, 印度崛起并不见得对中国不利 [India’s rise is not necessarily detrimental to China], FX361.com, October 09, 2020, https://www.fx361.com/page/2020/1009/7078716.shtml, Original Sentence in Chinese: “印度是从文明基础上建立起来的国家，也坚持不结盟，它以后不会完全投向某个国家。只要中国处理得当，印度不会完全投向美国，它之前也没有完全投向苏联。印度的追求，至少是一个区域大国。它的野心，并不是就对中国不利。把世界“两极化”，才是对中国最不利的。”
72
Note: Zheng Yongnian, “Zhong yin bianjie shiduan zaiqi. Zhong yin guanxi zenmekan?Zenme ban?” 中印边界事端再起。中印关系怎么看？怎么办？”[China-India border row has become prominent again- how to see it? What to do?], Baijiahao, June 22, 2020, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1670175313686802158&wfr=spider&for=pc, Original Sentences in Chinese: “在最低程度上，中国必须千方百计不把印度推向美国和日本。但如果和印度搞不好关系，印度本身或者印度联合其他国家，可以为中国制造无穷的麻烦。”,“中国在西边没有直接的出海口，离中国最近的就是印度洋了。中国通往印度洋必须通过邻国巴基斯坦或者缅甸，但这样做的时候面临着几乎不可超越的困难。顾名思义，印度洋对印度极为重要，是印度地缘政治的核心。印度会通过任何可能的办法来阻止中国通向印度洋。如果中国要通过巴基斯坦进入印度洋，那么就会使得印度和巴基斯坦的关系复杂化。中国如果通过缅甸通往印度洋，同样会遇到缅甸的问题。
73
. Note: Sui Xuemeng ,” Mian dui zhong yin bianjing chongtu,zhongguo ruhe zuo hao weiji guanli” 面对中印边境冲突，中国如何做好危机管理 [Facing the border conflict between China and India, how does China manage the crisis well? ], The Paper, June 18, 2020, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_7896509_1, Original Sentence in Chinese:” 直接或间接支持国际反华势力，甚至与美、日、澳、越、印尼等国组建“反华联盟”。这一联盟的目标可能将是重塑全球产业链，利用印太战略制衡中国的军事和经济力量，扩大G7等国际组织削弱中国的国际事务影响力等。”
74
Note: Ling Shengli, “Zai zhong yin bianjing wenti shnag , women de zhanlue yizhi xuyao jianding liang chulai” 在中印边境问题上，我们的战略意志需要坚定亮出来 [On China-India border issue our strategic will need to be strongly revealed], Beijing News, September 28, 2020, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1679069080829928953&wfr=spider&for=pc.
75
Note: Sun Xingjie, “Chuxian qiang sheng zhihou, zhong yin bianjing wenti xingzhi yijing fasheng bianhua” 出现枪声之后，中印边境问题性质已经发生变化 [After the gunshots, the nature of the Sino-Indian border issue has changed), Souhu.com, September 27, 2020, https://www.sohu.com/a/421241023_114988.
76
Note: Ling Shengli, ““Zai zhong yin bianjing wenti shang , women de zhanlue yizhi xuyao jianding liang chulai” 在中印边境问题上，我们的战略意志需要坚定亮出来 [On China-India border issue our strategic will need to be strongly revealed], Beijing News, September 28, 2020, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1679069080829928953&wfr=spider&for=pc. Sentence in Chinese: “通过印太的经济合作，将日本的资金、美国的技术和印度的劳动力相互结合，这可能是对付中国比较有力的组合拳…当然，如果印度和美国的经济联系越来越紧密，在很大程度上就将取代中国在很多产业链上的地位，再加上美国、日本的扶植，它未来对中国来说就是个越来越大的麻烦。
77
Note: Le Yucheng, “Waijiao bu fubuzhang tan ‘zhan lang waijiao’ ‘simian shudi’ ‘weiquan zhuyi’” 外交部副部长谈“战狼外交”“四面树敌”“威权主义 [Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs on “Wolf Warrier Diplomacy”, “Making Enemies on All Sides” and “Authoritarianism” ] , Guancha.cn, December 6, 2020, https://www.guancha.cn/politics/2020_12_05_573594.shtml.
78
Note: “Yi Yin tai zhi ming : Zhongguo mialin de zui weixian di diyuan kuangjia” 以印太之名：中国面临的最危险的地缘框架” [Indo-Pacific- the most dangerous geopolitical framework facing China], Xueqiu.com, September 5, 2020, https://xueqiu.com/5421020604/158577167, Original Sentence in Chinese: “随着主要国家在印太区域上都基本达成战略性一致，如果印度的国内政策再给予相应的支持和配合，在疫情结束后，印度迎来“改革开放的春天“就是大概率事件。1979年，中越自卫反击战标志着中国与前苏联集团的彻底决裂，也加速了中国的改革开放。在当下的国际环境下，如果中印发生军事冲突，不管输赢结果怎样，可能会加速印太战略的实现”
79
Note: Du Jianguo Weibo, October 12, 2020, Original sentence in Chinese : “中印冲突上，中国不要再持被侵略（中国一直就没吃过亏）心态了。”
80
Note: Du Jianguo Weibo, October 2, 2020, https://weibo.com/1250748474/JnkbhpZq1?type=comment, Original Sentence in Chinese: “网上这些喜欢鼓吹教训印度“阿三”的，几乎全是畏美的怂货。美国我不敢惹，你印度阿三我还不敢揍吗？——他们大致是这种心理。六十年来，基本如此。
一个很现实的问题，真要想跟美国干，真要想解决台湾问题，那自然要求你集中全部力量对付美国，而西线印度方向进行收缩，是必然的要求。中国国力，目前还没有强大到可以一面在东线击败美国，一面在西线击败印度的程度。两线作战不可取，这是常识。
中印之间本来没有深仇大恨，矛盾激化主要是六十年前没能妥善处理的原因。尽快换干戈为玉帛，对两国都是最佳选择。结束两线作战的不利态势，全力对美，是完全可以做到的。”“对美强硬是正确的，因为美国侵犯了中国核心利益。対印强硬就是不智了，因为印度没有侵犯中国的核心利益，中国更没有吃亏。不能混同两者。”
81
Note: Ye Hailin, “Shenfen renzhi piancha dui zhongyinguanxi de yingxiang” 身份认知偏差对中印关系前景的影响 [Impact of identity cognition on prospects of China-India relations], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review, vol.3, 2020, 1-12, June 15, 2020, https://ex.cssn.cn/gjgxx/gj_ytqy/202007/t20200730_5163496.html.[1] Ibid.
82
Note: Feng Chuanlu, “Shixi jinqi yindu dui zhongyin bianjing wenti de lichang” 试析近期印度对中印边境问题的立场 [India’s Recent Positions on Sino-Indian Border Disputes], Contemporary International Relations, vol.11, 2020, 35-42, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2021&filename=XDGG202011005&v=QKEP6J0ECDNXuhGtLR%25mmd2FI6evT%25mmd2FFVdXk0udYMwQlc5ILbLlU2LVb1vS0cAH%25mmd2FT1tzEf, Original Sentence in Chinese: 印度在中印边境的对华强硬行动，对那些一直想着打压中国的国家而言，已经传递出了清晰的战略信号。在大国博弈层面，印度边境对抗行为制造出一种中国地理“西线”已经陷入紧张的假象，而这有可能推动美国对华采取激进行动。
83
Note: Ye Hailin, “Shenfen ren zhi piancha dui zhong yin guanxi qianjing de yingxiang” 身份认知偏差对中印关系前景的影响”, [Impact of identity cognition on prospects of China-India relations], Indian Ocean Economic and Political Review, vol.3, 2020, 1-12, June 15, 2020, https://ex.cssn.cn/gjgxx/gj_ytqy/202007/t20200730_5163496.html , Original Sentence in Chinese: “不以印度为主要威胁，条件许可的情况下，将印度作为特定具体议题的合作伙伴，这应该构成中国对印政策的客体认知基础。”
84
Note: “Wang yi huijian yindu waizhang sujiesheng”, 王毅会见印度外长苏杰生 [Wang Yi meets Indian FM Jaishankar], Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 11, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1813999.shtml
85
Note: It is important to note that on September 7, 2020, a day before his meeting with Wang Yi in Moscow, the Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar clearly stated that: “India, China border cannot be delinked from rest of the relationship.” However, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement released on September 11 mentioned that: “The Indian side has always believed that the development of bilateral relations between India and China does not necessarily presuppose the settlement of the border issue, nor does it hope to go back in the past.”
86
Note: Zhang Jiadong, “Mei yin yi shi zhun junshi tongmengle ma” 美印已是准军事同盟了吗 [Are the US and India already a paramilitary alliance?], cfisnet, October 30, 2020, https://comment.cfisnet.com/2020/1030/1321220.html (中国与印度之间固然有分歧，有些还是难以调和的，但也有广阔的合作空间和共同利益，这也是两国难以回避的。敌人和朋友，都不是可以用来描述中印关系的概念。对中印两国来说，都无法用冷战逻辑来组织自己的对印/对华政策和相应的准同盟体系。)
87
Note: Ye Hailin, “Zhongguo xiwang yu yindu jianli zhengchang de guojia guanxi, yin tai zhanlue buzu wei ju” 中国希望与印度建立正常的国家关系, 印太战略不足为惧[ China hopes to establish normal state relations with India, No need to worry about Indo-Pacific strategy], China Net, July 14, 2020, https://fangtan.china.com.cn/2020-07/14/content_76270833.htm, Original Sentence in Chinese: “我觉得是这样，我们希望有一个正常的中印关系，这本身就是一个很良好的期待。在国际格局发生巨大变化的时候，双边关系维持稳定，就已经是一个不容易的事情了。所以对于中国和印度，情况也是一样的，我们更多地是希望双边关系正常。所谓正常，它不是盟国，也不是敌国。对于中国来说，我们并没有指望印度能成为我们的盟友，当然我们也不希望印度成为我们的敌人。”
88
Note: Hu Shisheng and Wang Jue, “Yindu dui hua shiqiang waijiao de xingwei luoji” 印度对华示强外交的行为逻辑, [The Behavioural Logic of India’s Diplomacy towards China], Fujian Library, September 9, 2020, https://fjlib.net/zt/fjstsgjcxx/hwsc/202009/t20200909_439430.htm.
89
Note: The proposed new model of relationship needs to be seen in the backdrop of the overall Chinese public sentiment vis-a-vis India, which in words of Lin Minwang, remains particularly polarised (See: https://www.sohu.com/a/421817724_433398) between “印黑”(Denigration of Indian potential) and “印吹 (exaggeration of Indian potential) camps. On one hand, India is projected as a country not in the same league with China, rather a weak country on whom China can afford to force its will. It is rather common to see reputed strategists, popular publications, social media discussions, often referring to India not a country or civilization but as a geographical region, a British imperialist construct whose disintegration and reshaping of South Asia favouring Chinese interest as Communist China’s “historic mission”. On the contrary, there is widespread insecurity within Chinese society over questions like “Will India surpass China in the future?” “Can Indian economy overtake Chinese economy in the future? Can it supplant China in global supply chain?” “Will India lobby with the world powers to displace China from the UNSC and other global bodies?” among others. However, in a positive trend, some efforts are being made at individual levels by the likes of Amb.Yuan Nansheng, Prof. Zheng Yongnian etc. to understand India more objectively and in a balanced manner as China-India relations becomes more and more important even in Chinese strategic imagination (See: https://csep.org/event/india-versus-china-why-they-are-not-friends/)
90
Note: Zhang Li, “Goujian zhong yin xinxing daguo guanxi de zhanlüe sikao” 构建中印新型大国关系的战略思考[Strategic Thoughts on Building a New Type of China-India Relations between Great Powers], cssn.cn, August 31, 2020, https://ex.cssn.cn/gjgxx/gj_ytqy/202008/zhant20200831_5176456.html.
91
Note: Ye Hailin, “Bu duichen xuqiu dui zhong yin guanxi de yingxiang” 不对称需求对中印关系的影响”[ The Influence on Asymmetric Needs toward Sino- Indian Relations], World Economics and Politics, vol.1, February 20, 2014, 6-15, https://oversea.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFD2014&filename=YDYY201401003&v=3pV7A%25mmd2F8pgn5U%25mmd2B1eNOhvbUS18XF5QXgoauzTAImzbgNKTdQLp3iGaTMBERcAH6Xf2.
92
Note: There is a Chinese proverb “鹬蚌相争，渔翁得利”, meaning when the snipe bird and the mussel fight, only the fisherman makes profit.
93
Note: Shen Yi, “Zhengque jiedu zhong yin di jiu lun junzhang ji tanpan chengguo” 正确解读中印第九轮军长级谈判成果 [Correctly interpret the results of the Ninth Round of China-India military-level talks], Guancha.com, January 26, 2021, https://www.guancha.cn/ShenYi/2021_01_26_579305_2.shtml.
94
Note: Christopher K. Colley, “Is China Responding to India?”, May 26, 2021 – June 09, 2021 https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publications/details/china-india-brief-183.
95
Note: Indrani Bagchi, “China shouldn’t view us through US lens. That would be a great disservice, says S Jaishankar”, The Times of India, August 2, 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-shouldnt-view-us-through-us-lens-that-would-be-a-great-disservice-says-s-jaishankar/articleshow/77307398.cms
96
Note: Yun Sun, “China’s strategic assessment of the Ladakh clash”, June 19, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-the-ladakh-clash/.
97
Note: Kanti Bajpai, “India versus China, Why They are Not Friends”, 2021, 3.
98
Note: John Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese threat perceptions”, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.25, no.4, 2002, 109-134.
99
Note: Arzan Tarapore, “The crisis after the crisis: how Ladakh will shape India’s competition with China”, Lowy Institute, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/crisis-after-crisis-how-ladakh-will-shape-india-s-competition-china.

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China’s Evolving Strategic Discourse on India

From Doklam to Galwan and Beyond

By Antara Ghosal Singh

In South Asia

Executive Summary

Introduction

China’s pre-Galwan Strategic Discourse on India

China Sought Cooperation with India as Competition Grew between FOIP and BRI

Conflict in China’s Major Power and Neighborhood Diplomacy vis-à-vis India

China’s post-Galwan Strategic Discourse on India

Exhibit Strength and Strategic Resolve, Forcing India to Cooperate

Do Not Push India towards the United States

At Least, Do Not Turn India into an Enemy

Conclusion

Notes

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China’s Evolving Strategic Discourse on India

From Doklam to Galwan and Beyond

By Antara Ghosal Singh

In South Asia

Executive Summary

Introduction

China’s pre-Galwan Strategic Discourse on India

China Sought Cooperation with India as Competition Grew between FOIP and BRI

Conflict in China’s Major Power and Neighborhood Diplomacy vis-à-vis India

China’s post-Galwan Strategic Discourse on India

Exhibit Strength and Strategic Resolve, Forcing India to Cooperate

Do Not Push India towards the United States

At Least, Do Not Turn India into an Enemy

Conclusion

Notes

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