Biden and the United Nations Security Council reform: true commitment or tokenism?

The US government will have to show concrete forms of commitment for its call for UNSC expansion to be credible.

During his speech before the 2022 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on September 21, US President Joseph R. Biden affirmed the United States’ support for increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent representatives on the UN Security Council (UNSC). The president mentioned, in particular, the inclusion of countries from Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, in addition to “those nations [the United States has] long supported”―including Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan, who have formed the G4 and support each other’s bid to become permanent members.

UNSC reform has been a long-standing demand from countries from across the globe, and in particular from developing states, which are underrepresented in that UN body. The structure of the UNSC does not reflect the current world order, and the paralysis induced by the permanent member’s overuse of their veto power impedes the UNSC’s core objective of preserving international peace and security. In that regard, President Biden’s speech might create some expectations among smaller and emerging powers that he will take concrete actions to lead reform efforts. But in light of past US inertia, and the challenges to actually implanting such an agenda, caution is warranted.

Even if Biden’s speech was not convincing, it is consistent with other attempts to rally support from smaller and emerging powers for US policy, particularly with respect to Russia and its war in Ukraine. Since the beginning of the war, several developing countries reaffirmed their calls for expanding the UNSC, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called for the UNSC to either remove Russia from the body or “dissolve [itself] altogether.”

But as I argued elsewhere about African responses to this crisis, the Biden administration’s challenge in drawing global support against Russia is demonstrative of the United States’ unconvincing engagement policy towards the continent, and more generally towards the Global South. South African leaders, for example, are vocal about their desire to remain neutral vis-à-vis the war. During Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to the country in August 2022, South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor denounced a “sense of patronizing bullying toward ‘you choose this or else,’” and called for a diplomatic end of the conflict in Ukraine. The most recent example of the United States’ failure to secure global support against Russia is the neutral position adopted by Brazil and India. Both aspire to gain a UNSC permanent seat, but in the September 30 UNSC vote to condemn Russia’s attempted annexation of four Ukrainian regions, they (along with China and Gabon) abstained.

Developing countries have built strategic ties with US adversaries in various ways, from economic development to climate security, too often because the United States failed to step up. The US government will have to show concrete forms of commitment for its call for UNSC expansion to be credible.

Contrary to Biden’s proclamation that “the United States is committed to this vital work,” the US government has expressed only moderate support for expansion. During a 2020 UNGA plenary meeting, for example, a US official representing the Trump administration said the United States was “open” to a “modest” expansion of the UNSC, “as long as it does not diminish the Council’s effectiveness or impact veto power.” A year later, Tom Carnahan reiterated this position on behalf of the Biden administration, underlining that the expansion should not alter or expand the veto. This position underlies certain hypocrisy and will to retain a higher level of power and decision-making than potential new permanent members. For now, Biden’s stronger tone in favor of reform is at odds with US behavior, and the lack of concrete actions to expand UNSC membership.

To be sure, the expansion of the UNSC faces acute challenges. The lack of consensus―including among the Global South―on the need for such a reform, on what countries should accede to the new permanent and non-permanent seats, on the potential new structure of the body, and on the reform of the veto, are all thorny topics.

Unless the new move by the Biden administration is backed up by specific policies, it could reinforce the sentiment that the United States commits to partnering with countries from the Global South only when it suits US efforts to counter Russia (or China). But engaging with developing countries primarily through the lens of great power competition means adopting a reactive posture, seeking to scale up relations with the Global South in response to adversaries’ policies. It is a shortsighted and hypocritical strategy that is unlikely to produce the desired effects of weakening relations between US competitors and their developing country partners. Countries from the Global South are not naïve or easily duped. As a recent Foreign Policy article stressed, “African leaders view the renewed engagement with some degree of cynicism, knowing that both U.S. and Russian interest in the continent is more about great-power rivalry than equal friendship.”

Whether or not the Biden administration is committed to making UNSC expansion work is yet to be seen. Reforming the UNSC will require political will and long-term efforts from all parties, which seems unrealistic in the current context. The Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on September 8, 2022, on the modalities for the Summit of the Future, “has an important role to play in reaffirming the Charter of the United Nations, reinvigorating multilateralism [and] agreeing on concrete solutions to challenges and restoring trust among Member States” should be an opportunity for UN member states to further advance the efforts that the Intergovernmental Negotiations framework, which advocates for reforming the UNSC, has undertaken during the past 14 years. Change needs to happen, but President Biden should not merely engage in lip service about UN reform. Instead of making bold statements that are unlikely to translate into action, in the hope of strengthening its ties with smaller nations and bolstering its leadership in a time of crisis, the United States should adopt concrete policies of investment, exchange, and other win-win partnerships with developing countries. It should not do so merely to counter adversaries, but because Global South countries are relevant diplomatic, economic, and security partners in their own right. If the US government realizes that only in times of crisis, it’s likely already too late.

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