Yemen CSPA Country Profile • Stimson Center

CSPA Implementation Tracker

Yemen

Years Listed

Each shaded box corresponds to a year the country appeared on the CSPA list and what types of waivers it received, if any.

Yemen has appeared on the CSPA list for fifteen consecutive years beginning in 2010. The U.S. president waived, either in part or in full, CSPA prohibitions against the provision of U.S. arms sales and military assistance to Yemen for twelve of these fifteen years, resulting in the provision of more than $286.8 million in arms sales and military assistance. Specifically, the president has waived nearly $50 million in Direct Commercial Sales, more than $78.9 million in Foreign Military Financing, more than $5.8 million in International Military Education and Training, and more than $152.9 million in Section 1206 or Section 333 assistance. The president denied Yemen $22,338 in Excess Defense Articles in FY2017 and $225,000 in Direct Commercial Sales in FY2019 due to CSPA prohibitions.

According to the U.S. State Department, the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and government-aligned forces (particularly the Security Belt Forces, a Yemeni government-aligned paramilitary group) have recruited and used child soldiers since 2009. Child soldier recruitment accelerated following the Houthi takeover of the Yemeni government in 2014 and the ensuing armed conflict.¹ In 2019, the UN Group of Experts on Yemen reported that all parties to the war had recruited and used more than 3,000 children in their operations. Government forces have allegedly used child soldiers to guard checkpoints and military facilities, and there are reports – though unverified – that government forces used children as uniformed soldiers in combat. According to an international organization, at least 54 children between the ages of 9 and 17 were recruited and used by armed groups in Yemen between April and December 2021. Between 2023 and 2024, the U.S. State Department cited a continuance of the recruitment and use of child soldiers by government and government-affiliated armed forces despite the reduction of military operations after the six-month truce in 2022.² Children have been used by government and government-affiliated forces and other armed groups (including the Houthis) in combatant roles, to guard checkpoints, to lay land mines, to drive military vehicles, and within other support roles such as supply delivery.³

The Yemeni government has taken some steps to address the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The government signed a UN Action Plan in 2014 to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, which included the establishment of specific steps for the release of children serving in its armed forces.⁴ However, since the Plan’s signing, officials have not reported demobilizing any child soldiers and have made limited attempts to do so. Efforts to prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers have for years been encumbered by nascent but hampered political will, overlapping security, political, and economic crises, cultural acceptance of child soldiers, and weak law enforcement mechanisms. That said, the government has made efforts to raise awareness of child soldier issues, including by hosting trainings for defense and security officials on child soldier issues in 2019 and making public statements expressing its commitment to addressing the issue and discouraging recruitment and use of children by armed groups. In a positive sign of progress, the government of Yemen entered into an agreement with the UN in January 2020 that created a roadmap for the implementation of the 2014 Action Plan.⁵ While such efforts have been somewhat limited, actions conducted by the ROYG in the past year included establishing child protection units in all military regions and conducting field visits to both disseminate directives banning child recruitment and to verify the absence of children in military ranks.⁶ Additionally, since at least April 2020, the government has reportedly operated an interim care center, funded by Saudi Arabia, to assist former child soldiers, through has not relayed any cases of child soldier demobilization in the past several years.⁷

Since 2021, U.S. presidents have been required to include justifications for CSPA waivers that were issued during the previous year in the annual Trafficking in Persons Report. Yemen’s 2020 and 2021 waiver justifications maintained that “[i]t is in the U.S. national interest to support efforts to bring about a negotiated political settlement led by the United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen,” and that “[t]his waiver will allow assistance that directly contributes to efforts to advance the UN-led political process.” The justifications also maintain that “a critical element of ending the conflict in Yemen is our counterterrorism campaign and efforts to counter Iranian arms smuggling to the Houthis,” and that “[b]uilding the capacity of the Republic of Yemen Government to meet these goals furthers important U.S. government security interests to include enhancing homeland security, while simultaneously moving toward the goal of ending the war in Yemen.”⁸ Similar language was included in the 2022 and 2023 waiver justifications for Yemen.⁹

For more information, see the U.S. State Department’s 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report and 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. More information on the situation in Yemen can also be found in the UN Secretary-General’s 2024 annual report on Children and Armed Conflict and country-specific reports on Yemen.

Total Waived and Prohibited

Since the CSPA took effect.

Explore the Data

Country- and program-level data on the number and type of national interest waivers granted, as well as the amount of arms sales and military assistance waived.

Amounts

Waivers

Amounts

Waivers