Editor’s Note: Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University. A frequent contributor to Stimson on Middle East conflicts and diplomacy, Cafiero has a particular expertise about the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
The US-Israel-Iran conflict, now in its fourth week, has unfolded into a nightmarish and escalating war that no Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member sought.
Gulf diplomats, especially Oman’s, worked hard to prevent this scenario, aware that any American or Israeli strike on Iran could provoke Tehran into retaliating on Gulf countries’ soil. Such foresight has been tragically validated since February 28 with thousands of Iranian missile and drone attacks inflicting severe human, economic, and security costs on the GCC states.
By March 1, all six GCC states had come under attack. Tehran framed its assaults as retaliation against alleged Gulf complicity in allowing the U.S. military to wage Operation Epic Fury from bases on the Arabian Peninsula. Yet the Gulf states denied such involvement and Tehran has offered no evidence to demonstrate otherwise. While Iran has sought to justify these attacks on the grounds that it is targeting military installations, the strikes have also hit civilian infrastructure such as airports, hotels, apartment complexes, energy facilities, and maritime ports.
The past few weeks have revealed the vulnerabilities of GCC members’ high-value targets despite the hundreds of billions of dollars the Gulf states have invested in their defense. Nevertheless, aided primarily by U.S. military support, Gulf states have intercepted the bulk of Iranian projectiles, while local security forces have to the best of their abilities sought to maintain daily life for citizens and expatriates under fire.
GCC members have responded cautiously, relying on defensive measures and diplomatic gestures to put more pressure on Tehran. The UAE shut down its embassy in Tehran and withdrew its ambassador while Qatar and Saudi Arabia have expelled some military/diplomatic officials from their capitals.
Concerns that retaliatory strikes on Iran could provoke further escalation, including attacks on desalination plants (beyond a Bahraini one hit on March 8) that would render Gulf cities uninhabitable, have largely restrained offensive action. Other factors include risks of President Donald Trump unilaterally declaring “victory,” leaving the GCC states fighting Iran alone with Israel, and any real or perceived alignment between Tel Aviv and the Gulf monarchies against Tehran fueling backlash from segments of Gulf and wider Muslim societies still infuriated by Israeli actions in Gaza following October 7, 2023.
These risks notwithstanding, GCC states are moving toward a more confrontational posture with long-term negative ramifications for relations with Iran.
“Our thinking does not stop at a ceasefire, but rather turns toward solutions that ensure lasting security in the Arabian Gulf, curbing the nuclear threat, missiles, drones, and the bullying of the straits,” wrote Anwar Gargash, a senior adviser to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed. “It is inconceivable that this aggression should turn into a permanent state of threat,” he wrote, adding that Gulf states might respond to Iran’s attacks by deepening their ties with Washington.
Saudi Arabia is now permitting U.S. forces to operate from its territory, signaling a potential shift from restraint toward strategies designed to force Tehran to bear a greater cost for making Gulf states collateral damage in a war initiated by Washington and Tel Aviv.
In short, as much as the Gulf countries did not want this war, there is a growing sense among at least some of them that they are being forced into regarding the conflict as their own. Following are the latest factors affecting the calculations of the GCC states:
United Arab Emirates
Despite its large Iranian expatriate population and important trade ties with Tehran, the UAE has been the Islamic Republic’s primary GCC target, with Iran launching hundreds of ballistic missiles and at least 1,700 drones at Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and other parts of the country. Struck locations include Dubai International Airport, the Shah gas field, Abu Dhabi’s Ruwais Industrial Complex, Fujairah’s oil trading hub, and two Amazon data centers, disrupting consumer apps and banking. Debris from intercepted weapons caused fires at Jebel Ali Port, Burj Al Arab, and the Dubai International Financial Centre Innovation Hub. Military sites hit include Al-Dhafra Air Base and Camp de la Paix, housing French forces.
Abu Dhabi’s ties with Israel — spanning cybersecurity, defense, and intelligence — have heightened Iran’s threat perception, despite the restoration of full diplomatic ties with Iran in 2022 following Emirati diplomatic outreach beginning in 2019. Beyond this, the UAE’s centrality in regional supply chains, logistics, aviation, finance, and energy makes it a prime target as Tehran seeks to harm the U.S. by jolting the global economy.
Kuwait
Having hit Ali Al Salem Air Base and Camp Buehring, Iran’s attacks on Kuwait seem heavily focused on the U.S. military presence in the oil-rich country. Kuwait International Airport and Mina Al-Ahmadi refinery have also been struck. On March 24, Kuwaiti authorities announced that seven overhead power lines were damaged by falling shrapnel from air defense interceptions, causing partial outages in several areas. Kuwaiti-Iranian relations had been relatively stable since the 2015–16 “Abdali Cell” case – in which 25 Kuwaiti Shi’ites were charged with amassing weapons and explosives for terror attacks. Like their counterparts in the UAE, Kuwaiti authorities have arrested individuals accused of running Hezbollah-linked cells since the war against Iran started.
Bahrain
Bahrain’s small size, Shi’ite majority, and proximity to Iran make it highly vulnerable. Attacks have targeted the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters, the Financial Harbour Towers housing the Israeli embassy, and BAPCO’s oil processing facility on Sitra. Sectarian tensions amplify instability, as seen after the 2016 Saudi execution of Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, a prominent Saudi Shi’ite cleric, with some Bahrainis cheering Iranian strikes on a U.S. base. Iran’s targeting reflects opposition to Bahrain’s U.S. alliance and role in the Abraham Accords. An Iranian parliamentarian’s open call on March 11 for annexing Bahrain speaks to Persian revisionist ambitions that to no small degree inform Manama’s threat perceptions of the Islamic Republic.
Qatar
Despite historically pragmatic ties with Iran, especially since the start of the 2017-21 Saudi- and Emirati-led blockade of Doha, Qatar has suffered strikes on Al Udeid Air Base, which hosts U.S. Central Command, and Tehran targeted Doha’s Hamad International Airport. Iran views Qatar, an extremely close U.S. ally, as complicit in American-Israeli aggression. Iranian attacks, in response to the Israeli bombing of its South Pars gas field shared with Qatar’s North Dome, have severely harmed Qatar’s LNG sector, particularly at Ras Laffan Industrial City, following Tehran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, requiring Doha to suspend LNG production. Iranian strikes so far have taken out 17% of the country’s LNG capacity, which is estimated to take three to five years to recover, causing a severe impact on the global economy as well as Qatari income. This war has prompted Qatar to declare force majeure on major LNG supply contracts with Belgium, China, Italy, and South Korea. Realistic about such dangers, Doha spent many years trying to avert this conflict. As a regional mediator, Qatar’s political leadership long advocated for the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the CEO of QatarEnergy warned Washington about the dangers of attacks on Iran’s gas fields, emphasizing the threat to Qatar’s North Dome.
Saudi Arabia
Hundreds of Iranian missiles and drones have targeted Saudi Arabia’s key military, oil, and civilian sites, including Prince Sultan Air Base, King Khalid Airport, Ras Tanura refinery, Shaybah oilfield, the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, the Red Sea port of Yanbu, and a residential building in Kharj. These attacks shattered the Riyadh-Tehran détente established with a March 2023 agreement brokered by China. According to the New York Times, which cited “people briefed by American officials,” Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been urging Trump to continue the war, arguing that the US-Israeli military campaign presents a “historic opportunity” to remake the Middle East. However, some skepticism of this reporting is warranted. With Washington and Tel Aviv failing so far to achieve a decisive victory, a disinformation campaign appears to be underway, aimed at shifting blame onto GCC states, including Saudi Arabia. Given the strategic importance of Vision 2030 and regional stability for Saudi Arabia, one must question whether the Saudi leader would truly want this war to be prolonged and intensified. Nonetheless, Riyadh is being forced to strike a delicate balance between efforts to promote deescalation and its quest to deter further Iranian aggression.
Oman
Between March 1–13, Oman’s major ports cities — Duqm, Salalah, and Sohar — were struck by drones, widely attributed to Iran, though Muscat refrained from direct accusations until the attack on March 13. Oman remains the least targeted GCC state, and Muscat is the only Gulf capital so far spared from attacks, allowing it to keep diplomatic channels open with Tehran and potentially help achieve an off-ramp from the war. Oman has also been the only GCC state to openly condemn Operation Epic Fury, reflecting Muscat’s independence and willingness to criticize aspects of U.S. foreign policy that lack support from the United Nations. With Iran’s new Supreme Leader denying that Tehran was behind the attacks on Oman, it seems Tehran values its relationship with the Sultanate and seeks to preserve it despite the serious crises with the other GCC members. An important question to consider is whether Muscat’s relationship with Tehran will lead to further resentment in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh towards Oman, with other Gulf officials possibly seeing Muscat as failing to support collective interests of GCC states.
The Road Ahead for the Gulf
Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to wage war on Iran is set to significantly reshape Gulf security in ways that remain unclear. The conflict has, ironically, so far empowered Tehran although any notion of an Iranian victory remains relative at this stage, given the significant economic and geopolitical consequences the country will have to contend with for a long time in the post-war period. Still, from the U.S. sanctions waiver on seaborne Iranian oil and Iran’s de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz to the resistance shown by the Iranian regime despite the assassination of key leaders to the IRGC’s purported demonstration of ballistic missile capabilities far beyond previous assessments, the past few weeks of fighting have showcased the Islamic Republic’s strength and resilience.
Prioritizing efforts to disrupt the global economy by attacking GCC states over its 2021–26 “Neighbors First” foreign policy approach, Iran has provoked widespread anger in the Gulf — targeting civilians during Ramadan, striking key sites, and effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz at the expense of most Gulf Arab states’ economic health — further eroding trust. Such aggression has greatly damaged GCC states’ reputations for safety and stability. Disturbing questions are being raised about what this means for the foreign direct investment environment and the future of tourism, aviation, and logistics sectors in the Gulf, as well as the prospects for economic development and diversification agendas such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030.
Because geography is not malleable, GCC states must find a way to coexist with what will likely be an increasingly radical and aggressive “IRGC state” after the assassination of long-time Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and succession by his hardline son, Mojtaba. At the same time, GCC leaders’ frustration with Washington for following Netanyahu’s counsel, and ignoring Gulf warnings, have deepened doubts about U.S. reliability as a security guarantor. Gulf states understand better than ever the serious risks of being overly reliant on the U.S. for protection from external threats, while seeing few opportunities for change in the immediate future.
Most if not all GCC states are likely to continue some form of diplomatic engagement with Iran after the war ends. Yet, that engagement will take place in a post-détente period shaped by grievances that will last for many years, if not decades.
Where the American-Israeli War on Iran Leaves the Gulf Arabs
By Giorgio Cafiero
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University. A frequent contributor to Stimson on Middle East conflicts and diplomacy, Cafiero has a particular expertise about the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
The US-Israel-Iran conflict, now in its fourth week, has unfolded into a nightmarish and escalating war that no Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member sought.
Gulf diplomats, especially Oman’s, worked hard to prevent this scenario, aware that any American or Israeli strike on Iran could provoke Tehran into retaliating on Gulf countries’ soil. Such foresight has been tragically validated since February 28 with thousands of Iranian missile and drone attacks inflicting severe human, economic, and security costs on the GCC states.
By March 1, all six GCC states had come under attack. Tehran framed its assaults as retaliation against alleged Gulf complicity in allowing the U.S. military to wage Operation Epic Fury from bases on the Arabian Peninsula. Yet the Gulf states denied such involvement and Tehran has offered no evidence to demonstrate otherwise. While Iran has sought to justify these attacks on the grounds that it is targeting military installations, the strikes have also hit civilian infrastructure such as airports, hotels, apartment complexes, energy facilities, and maritime ports.
The past few weeks have revealed the vulnerabilities of GCC members’ high-value targets despite the hundreds of billions of dollars the Gulf states have invested in their defense. Nevertheless, aided primarily by U.S. military support, Gulf states have intercepted the bulk of Iranian projectiles, while local security forces have to the best of their abilities sought to maintain daily life for citizens and expatriates under fire.
GCC members have responded cautiously, relying on defensive measures and diplomatic gestures to put more pressure on Tehran. The UAE shut down its embassy in Tehran and withdrew its ambassador while Qatar and Saudi Arabia have expelled some military/diplomatic officials from their capitals.
Concerns that retaliatory strikes on Iran could provoke further escalation, including attacks on desalination plants (beyond a Bahraini one hit on March 8) that would render Gulf cities uninhabitable, have largely restrained offensive action. Other factors include risks of President Donald Trump unilaterally declaring “victory,” leaving the GCC states fighting Iran alone with Israel, and any real or perceived alignment between Tel Aviv and the Gulf monarchies against Tehran fueling backlash from segments of Gulf and wider Muslim societies still infuriated by Israeli actions in Gaza following October 7, 2023.
These risks notwithstanding, GCC states are moving toward a more confrontational posture with long-term negative ramifications for relations with Iran.
“Our thinking does not stop at a ceasefire, but rather turns toward solutions that ensure lasting security in the Arabian Gulf, curbing the nuclear threat, missiles, drones, and the bullying of the straits,” wrote Anwar Gargash, a senior adviser to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed. “It is inconceivable that this aggression should turn into a permanent state of threat,” he wrote, adding that Gulf states might respond to Iran’s attacks by deepening their ties with Washington.
Saudi Arabia is now permitting U.S. forces to operate from its territory, signaling a potential shift from restraint toward strategies designed to force Tehran to bear a greater cost for making Gulf states collateral damage in a war initiated by Washington and Tel Aviv.
In short, as much as the Gulf countries did not want this war, there is a growing sense among at least some of them that they are being forced into regarding the conflict as their own. Following are the latest factors affecting the calculations of the GCC states:
United Arab Emirates
Despite its large Iranian expatriate population and important trade ties with Tehran, the UAE has been the Islamic Republic’s primary GCC target, with Iran launching hundreds of ballistic missiles and at least 1,700 drones at Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and other parts of the country. Struck locations include Dubai International Airport, the Shah gas field, Abu Dhabi’s Ruwais Industrial Complex, Fujairah’s oil trading hub, and two Amazon data centers, disrupting consumer apps and banking. Debris from intercepted weapons caused fires at Jebel Ali Port, Burj Al Arab, and the Dubai International Financial Centre Innovation Hub. Military sites hit include Al-Dhafra Air Base and Camp de la Paix, housing French forces.
Abu Dhabi’s ties with Israel — spanning cybersecurity, defense, and intelligence — have heightened Iran’s threat perception, despite the restoration of full diplomatic ties with Iran in 2022 following Emirati diplomatic outreach beginning in 2019. Beyond this, the UAE’s centrality in regional supply chains, logistics, aviation, finance, and energy makes it a prime target as Tehran seeks to harm the U.S. by jolting the global economy.
Kuwait
Having hit Ali Al Salem Air Base and Camp Buehring, Iran’s attacks on Kuwait seem heavily focused on the U.S. military presence in the oil-rich country. Kuwait International Airport and Mina Al-Ahmadi refinery have also been struck. On March 24, Kuwaiti authorities announced that seven overhead power lines were damaged by falling shrapnel from air defense interceptions, causing partial outages in several areas. Kuwaiti-Iranian relations had been relatively stable since the 2015–16 “Abdali Cell” case – in which 25 Kuwaiti Shi’ites were charged with amassing weapons and explosives for terror attacks. Like their counterparts in the UAE, Kuwaiti authorities have arrested individuals accused of running Hezbollah-linked cells since the war against Iran started.
Bahrain
Bahrain’s small size, Shi’ite majority, and proximity to Iran make it highly vulnerable. Attacks have targeted the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters, the Financial Harbour Towers housing the Israeli embassy, and BAPCO’s oil processing facility on Sitra. Sectarian tensions amplify instability, as seen after the 2016 Saudi execution of Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, a prominent Saudi Shi’ite cleric, with some Bahrainis cheering Iranian strikes on a U.S. base. Iran’s targeting reflects opposition to Bahrain’s U.S. alliance and role in the Abraham Accords. An Iranian parliamentarian’s open call on March 11 for annexing Bahrain speaks to Persian revisionist ambitions that to no small degree inform Manama’s threat perceptions of the Islamic Republic.
Qatar
Despite historically pragmatic ties with Iran, especially since the start of the 2017-21 Saudi- and Emirati-led blockade of Doha, Qatar has suffered strikes on Al Udeid Air Base, which hosts U.S. Central Command, and Tehran targeted Doha’s Hamad International Airport. Iran views Qatar, an extremely close U.S. ally, as complicit in American-Israeli aggression. Iranian attacks, in response to the Israeli bombing of its South Pars gas field shared with Qatar’s North Dome, have severely harmed Qatar’s LNG sector, particularly at Ras Laffan Industrial City, following Tehran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, requiring Doha to suspend LNG production. Iranian strikes so far have taken out 17% of the country’s LNG capacity, which is estimated to take three to five years to recover, causing a severe impact on the global economy as well as Qatari income. This war has prompted Qatar to declare force majeure on major LNG supply contracts with Belgium, China, Italy, and South Korea. Realistic about such dangers, Doha spent many years trying to avert this conflict. As a regional mediator, Qatar’s political leadership long advocated for the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the CEO of QatarEnergy warned Washington about the dangers of attacks on Iran’s gas fields, emphasizing the threat to Qatar’s North Dome.
Saudi Arabia
Hundreds of Iranian missiles and drones have targeted Saudi Arabia’s key military, oil, and civilian sites, including Prince Sultan Air Base, King Khalid Airport, Ras Tanura refinery, Shaybah oilfield, the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, the Red Sea port of Yanbu, and a residential building in Kharj. These attacks shattered the Riyadh-Tehran détente established with a March 2023 agreement brokered by China. According to the New York Times, which cited “people briefed by American officials,” Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has been urging Trump to continue the war, arguing that the US-Israeli military campaign presents a “historic opportunity” to remake the Middle East. However, some skepticism of this reporting is warranted. With Washington and Tel Aviv failing so far to achieve a decisive victory, a disinformation campaign appears to be underway, aimed at shifting blame onto GCC states, including Saudi Arabia. Given the strategic importance of Vision 2030 and regional stability for Saudi Arabia, one must question whether the Saudi leader would truly want this war to be prolonged and intensified. Nonetheless, Riyadh is being forced to strike a delicate balance between efforts to promote deescalation and its quest to deter further Iranian aggression.
Oman
Between March 1–13, Oman’s major ports cities — Duqm, Salalah, and Sohar — were struck by drones, widely attributed to Iran, though Muscat refrained from direct accusations until the attack on March 13. Oman remains the least targeted GCC state, and Muscat is the only Gulf capital so far spared from attacks, allowing it to keep diplomatic channels open with Tehran and potentially help achieve an off-ramp from the war. Oman has also been the only GCC state to openly condemn Operation Epic Fury, reflecting Muscat’s independence and willingness to criticize aspects of U.S. foreign policy that lack support from the United Nations. With Iran’s new Supreme Leader denying that Tehran was behind the attacks on Oman, it seems Tehran values its relationship with the Sultanate and seeks to preserve it despite the serious crises with the other GCC members. An important question to consider is whether Muscat’s relationship with Tehran will lead to further resentment in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh towards Oman, with other Gulf officials possibly seeing Muscat as failing to support collective interests of GCC states.
The Road Ahead for the Gulf
Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to wage war on Iran is set to significantly reshape Gulf security in ways that remain unclear. The conflict has, ironically, so far empowered Tehran although any notion of an Iranian victory remains relative at this stage, given the significant economic and geopolitical consequences the country will have to contend with for a long time in the post-war period. Still, from the U.S. sanctions waiver on seaborne Iranian oil and Iran’s de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz to the resistance shown by the Iranian regime despite the assassination of key leaders to the IRGC’s purported demonstration of ballistic missile capabilities far beyond previous assessments, the past few weeks of fighting have showcased the Islamic Republic’s strength and resilience.
Prioritizing efforts to disrupt the global economy by attacking GCC states over its 2021–26 “Neighbors First” foreign policy approach, Iran has provoked widespread anger in the Gulf — targeting civilians during Ramadan, striking key sites, and effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz at the expense of most Gulf Arab states’ economic health — further eroding trust. Such aggression has greatly damaged GCC states’ reputations for safety and stability. Disturbing questions are being raised about what this means for the foreign direct investment environment and the future of tourism, aviation, and logistics sectors in the Gulf, as well as the prospects for economic development and diversification agendas such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030.
Because geography is not malleable, GCC states must find a way to coexist with what will likely be an increasingly radical and aggressive “IRGC state” after the assassination of long-time Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and succession by his hardline son, Mojtaba. At the same time, GCC leaders’ frustration with Washington for following Netanyahu’s counsel, and ignoring Gulf warnings, have deepened doubts about U.S. reliability as a security guarantor. Gulf states understand better than ever the serious risks of being overly reliant on the U.S. for protection from external threats, while seeing few opportunities for change in the immediate future.
Most if not all GCC states are likely to continue some form of diplomatic engagement with Iran after the war ends. Yet, that engagement will take place in a post-détente period shaped by grievances that will last for many years, if not decades.
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