Editor’s Note: Zozan Alloush is an independent political and development consultant and Senior Advisor on Governance and Mediation with the DeFacto Platform for Dialogue and Development, an independent Syrian organization based in Damascus that focuses on dialogue facilitation, mediation support, and policy engagement. DeFacto has been active since the early days of the Assad regime’s fall working across Suwayda, the coastal areas, Afrin, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zor, supporting locally driven dialogue and stabilization efforts.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Over the past week, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and aligned Kurdish Autonomous Administration have witnessed a rapid series of setbacks, losing control first over Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo and then the entire western Euphrates area, which the SDF handed over to the Syrian Ministry of Defense.
This was followed by the entry of Arab tribal groups into the Eastern Euphrates cities of Tabqa and Raqqa, long controlled by the SDF, as well as the oil fields of eastern Deir ez-Zor. These developments have reshaped Syria’s map of control, particularly along the strategic M4 highway.
Despite these shifts and the outbreak of clashes, channels of negotiation and mediation remain open. There is a narrow but important space for dialogue between the SDF and the Syrian government to prevent the country from sliding into another cycle of terrorism and revenge amid rising sectarian and ethnic polarization and the escalation of hate speech and violence across the country.
U.S. Protection Wanes
These developments have been accompanied by a growing sense of Kurdish disappointment toward the United States. While Washington has long presented itself as a strategic ally in the fight against ISIS, at critical moments it has confined its role to that of a passive observer or a cautious mediator. Kurdish leaders engaging directly with Americans have expressed to this analyst clear surprise at this approach, which the leaders say demand unilateral concessions more than a balanced, political integration process. This decline in political support and concrete guarantees has reinforced the belief among many Kurdish actors that reliance on the U.S. umbrella is no longer a safe option, and that shifting international interests can override past commitments at any time.
There are an estimated 2-3.5 million Kurds in Syria, about 10% of the total population. They are mainly concentrated in northern and eastern Syria, bordering Kurdish areas in Turkey and Iraq.
Their sense of abandonment by the U.S. does not necessarily imply a complete rupture, but it does compel the Kurds to reassess their position realistically and to seek more sustainable, Syrian-based arrangements away from uncertain external bets. Such a shift could ultimately cost Washington a reliable and low-maintenance partner in counterterrorism and may prompt a broader Kurdish reassessment of trust in U.S. regional policies — particularly after groups previously designated as terrorist organizations gained control over areas that had originally been liberated from ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
Amid these developments, Syria’s transitional president Ahmad Al-Sharaa issued a presidential decree acknowledging the existence of Syrian Kurds as a people with a distinct language, culture, and identity, representing a first step toward historical recognition. The decree can also be interpreted as the transitional authorities’ reading of Article Two of the March 10, 2025 agreement between President Al-Sharaa and SDF commander Gen. Mazloum Abdi in which the SDF promised to integrate its forces into a new Syrian army.
Many legal experts consider this step to hold significant national value in addressing Kurdish historical grievances. Nevertheless, the decree requires clarification of certain terms and incorporation into both the current constitutional declaration and a future permanent constitution. A decree alone cannot constitute a lasting guarantee or a comprehensive solution to the Kurdish issue, particularly since any presidential decree can be amended or revoked by executive decision. The absence of binding guarantees therefore remains a central Kurdish concern.
The SDF’s Next Steps
The SDF has refocused its efforts on Hasakah province, which includes several large Kurdish-majority areas as well as key economic resources. This allows the SDF to reorganize its position within the ceasefire framework and the process of full integration into Syrian state institutions.
Among the most notable points of understanding between the SDF and Damascus — potentially shaping future governance in these areas — is the first official delineation of Kurdish regions and the establishment of a local security force under the Ministry of Interior in Ain al-Arab/Kobane. This force is to be appointed based on candidate lists proposed by the SDF. The agreement also includes cooperation in combating ISIS, arrangements for the return of displaced persons to Afrin and Sheikh Maqsoud, and mechanisms for sharing economic resources.
These understandings open the possibility of a formula that preserves a degree of specificity for Kurdish regions, while adopting forms of administrative decentralization that grant local populations greater space to manage their own affairs and pursue development, similar to arrangements in other ethnic areas such as Suwayda, home to many Syrian Druze. From a practical perspective, the Kurdish future in Syria depends on the ability of the parties to translate these political commitments into tangible realities and to ensure sustained coordination between local leaderships and the central government.
The most serious challenge lies in balancing central authority with the transformation of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration into formal administrative units after more than a decade of separation from Damascus. Within this context, the issue of women and their role within future military and security structures remains unresolved. While women played a central role within the SDF, the conceptual and institutional framework of the emerging Syrian army does not yet appear prepared to accommodate this experience.
In general, Kurds today are facing direct governmental escalation targeting their regions. They have become firmly convinced that an agreement reached on January 6, 2026 in Paris was not limited to southern Syria, but also extends to northeastern Syria. This means that Kurds, wary of bearing the consequences of regional agreements, now face two clear options: to demonstrate a degree of flexibility, pragmatism, and adaptation in order to preserve their distinctiveness and vision of governance and self-administration away from rigid central authority, or to resist and rely on the Kurdish militia card as a last resort to safeguard Kurdish identity and collective existence, and to endure as a political force.
What Future Awaits Syria’s Kurds?
By Zozan Alloush
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Zozan Alloush is an independent political and development consultant and Senior Advisor on Governance and Mediation with the DeFacto Platform for Dialogue and Development, an independent Syrian organization based in Damascus that focuses on dialogue facilitation, mediation support, and policy engagement. DeFacto has been active since the early days of the Assad regime’s fall working across Suwayda, the coastal areas, Afrin, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zor, supporting locally driven dialogue and stabilization efforts.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Over the past week, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and aligned Kurdish Autonomous Administration have witnessed a rapid series of setbacks, losing control first over Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo and then the entire western Euphrates area, which the SDF handed over to the Syrian Ministry of Defense.
This was followed by the entry of Arab tribal groups into the Eastern Euphrates cities of Tabqa and Raqqa, long controlled by the SDF, as well as the oil fields of eastern Deir ez-Zor. These developments have reshaped Syria’s map of control, particularly along the strategic M4 highway.
Despite these shifts and the outbreak of clashes, channels of negotiation and mediation remain open. There is a narrow but important space for dialogue between the SDF and the Syrian government to prevent the country from sliding into another cycle of terrorism and revenge amid rising sectarian and ethnic polarization and the escalation of hate speech and violence across the country.
U.S. Protection Wanes
These developments have been accompanied by a growing sense of Kurdish disappointment toward the United States. While Washington has long presented itself as a strategic ally in the fight against ISIS, at critical moments it has confined its role to that of a passive observer or a cautious mediator. Kurdish leaders engaging directly with Americans have expressed to this analyst clear surprise at this approach, which the leaders say demand unilateral concessions more than a balanced, political integration process. This decline in political support and concrete guarantees has reinforced the belief among many Kurdish actors that reliance on the U.S. umbrella is no longer a safe option, and that shifting international interests can override past commitments at any time.
There are an estimated 2-3.5 million Kurds in Syria, about 10% of the total population. They are mainly concentrated in northern and eastern Syria, bordering Kurdish areas in Turkey and Iraq.
Their sense of abandonment by the U.S. does not necessarily imply a complete rupture, but it does compel the Kurds to reassess their position realistically and to seek more sustainable, Syrian-based arrangements away from uncertain external bets. Such a shift could ultimately cost Washington a reliable and low-maintenance partner in counterterrorism and may prompt a broader Kurdish reassessment of trust in U.S. regional policies — particularly after groups previously designated as terrorist organizations gained control over areas that had originally been liberated from ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
Amid these developments, Syria’s transitional president Ahmad Al-Sharaa issued a presidential decree acknowledging the existence of Syrian Kurds as a people with a distinct language, culture, and identity, representing a first step toward historical recognition. The decree can also be interpreted as the transitional authorities’ reading of Article Two of the March 10, 2025 agreement between President Al-Sharaa and SDF commander Gen. Mazloum Abdi in which the SDF promised to integrate its forces into a new Syrian army.
Many legal experts consider this step to hold significant national value in addressing Kurdish historical grievances. Nevertheless, the decree requires clarification of certain terms and incorporation into both the current constitutional declaration and a future permanent constitution. A decree alone cannot constitute a lasting guarantee or a comprehensive solution to the Kurdish issue, particularly since any presidential decree can be amended or revoked by executive decision. The absence of binding guarantees therefore remains a central Kurdish concern.
The SDF’s Next Steps
The SDF has refocused its efforts on Hasakah province, which includes several large Kurdish-majority areas as well as key economic resources. This allows the SDF to reorganize its position within the ceasefire framework and the process of full integration into Syrian state institutions.
Among the most notable points of understanding between the SDF and Damascus — potentially shaping future governance in these areas — is the first official delineation of Kurdish regions and the establishment of a local security force under the Ministry of Interior in Ain al-Arab/Kobane. This force is to be appointed based on candidate lists proposed by the SDF. The agreement also includes cooperation in combating ISIS, arrangements for the return of displaced persons to Afrin and Sheikh Maqsoud, and mechanisms for sharing economic resources.
These understandings open the possibility of a formula that preserves a degree of specificity for Kurdish regions, while adopting forms of administrative decentralization that grant local populations greater space to manage their own affairs and pursue development, similar to arrangements in other ethnic areas such as Suwayda, home to many Syrian Druze. From a practical perspective, the Kurdish future in Syria depends on the ability of the parties to translate these political commitments into tangible realities and to ensure sustained coordination between local leaderships and the central government.
The most serious challenge lies in balancing central authority with the transformation of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration into formal administrative units after more than a decade of separation from Damascus. Within this context, the issue of women and their role within future military and security structures remains unresolved. While women played a central role within the SDF, the conceptual and institutional framework of the emerging Syrian army does not yet appear prepared to accommodate this experience.
In general, Kurds today are facing direct governmental escalation targeting their regions. They have become firmly convinced that an agreement reached on January 6, 2026 in Paris was not limited to southern Syria, but also extends to northeastern Syria. This means that Kurds, wary of bearing the consequences of regional agreements, now face two clear options: to demonstrate a degree of flexibility, pragmatism, and adaptation in order to preserve their distinctiveness and vision of governance and self-administration away from rigid central authority, or to resist and rely on the Kurdish militia card as a last resort to safeguard Kurdish identity and collective existence, and to endure as a political force.
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