Taking Stock
What a difference a year makes. As Donald Trump notches the one-year mark of his turbulent second term at the helm of the U.S. government this month, it seems a fitting moment to catch a breath and take stock of his record on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While policies and practices related to WMD non-proliferation have not been a focus of the administration’s first year, serving to insulate the field somewhat, the contradictions and disruptions have taken a toll. From federal government downsizing to rejection of multilateral institutions to reprimands of European allies, the drama of the last 12 months has had both greater and lesser ripple-on effects for the domestic and international communities and frameworks dedicated to keeping the world safe from WMD risks and threats. It remains to be seen how permanent these changes will be, and whether opportunities for new approaches and leadership can be seized.
Disruption at Home
National Nuclear Security Administration staff were among the first to be impacted by chaotic firings of federal employees by the controversial Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), while a State Department reorganization in April aimed to cut 15% of staff and merged bureaus responsible for arms control and non-proliferation, putting it under an Under Secretary that would also oversee the bureaus for political-military affairs, narcotics and law enforcement, and counterterrorism, along with a new bureau for emerging threats. Many private sector and civil society organizations that support the federal government’s nonproliferation work were likewise caught up in the administration’s freeze on foreign aid contracts, some having to cut staff while waiting to find out whether their work would continue. While key offices and staff across the federal government remain in place, the disruption and uncertainty have had an impact on morale and will affect the pool of available expertise going forward. Meanwhile, the administration’s end-run around the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing and other regulatory processes for prototyping commercial advanced nuclear technology runs the risk of undermining confidence not just in the safety but also the security and proliferation resistance of the new reactors.
America First
Beyond U.S. borders, the administration’s interpretation and application of the America First policy have a range of immediate and potential longer-term impacts. National customs and law enforcement authorities find it hard to enforce complex sanctions and strategic trade controls on dual-use goods amid more disrupted and uncertain trade and supply chain policies, such as those introduced by Trump’s approach to tariffs. The administration this month also made good on its threat to withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO), depriving the organization of its biggest government funder. Among the many serious impacts the withdrawal of this funding has on the organization, it affects the capacity of offices and programs that have become increasingly important to preparing member states to detect and respond to deliberate as well as natural and accidental biological threats. Yet the United States is also the largest funder for several key nonproliferation multilateral organizations that have so far fared better. Away from the headlines, the United States signaled continuing strong support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its nuclear nonproliferation mission despite attaching restrictive strings to its funding. Signs are also encouraging for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), making slow but encouraging progress towards eventual elimination of Syria’s remaining CW stockpile: The bill appropriating U.S. budget dues passed the House of Representatives this month with bipartisan support. At the United Nations in September 2025, President Trump surprised the biological weapons nonproliferation community by announcing a U.S. initiative to leverage artificial intelligence for verification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a proposal the U.S. delegation to the BWC Meeting of States Parties later elaborated on.
A Friend in Need?
Nevertheless, other administration actions work in direct opposition to these positive signals, particularly in the nuclear arena. U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in June, while explicitly aimed at preventing development of nuclear weapons, were an unmistakable vote of no-confidence in the painstaking diplomatic work of the IAEA under the multilateral framework of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). And despite embrace of alliances in the National Security Strategy (NSS), unconcern and outright hostility toward Europe in the first months of the new administration sparked serious contemplation of an alternative to the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If such an alternative focused on the existing French or UK nuclear arsenal, or both, it might not strictly qualify as proliferation, and some analysts have underscored that the U.S. umbrella is not so easy or likely to be replaced. More recent U.S. saber-rattling over Greenland has raised fresh fears of the NATO alliance cracking altogether, however, raising anxiety levels anew over the sturdiness and reliability of U.S. extended deterrence. The drama, meanwhile, added to the ongoing debate around nuclear weapons in South Korea, another beneficiary of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, with Trump’s surprise “approval” of a South Korean nuclear-powered submarine raising further questions. And while Japan’s experience as a target of nuclear weapons casts a long shadow over domestic politics, even there headlines have captured comments from unexpected places seeming to countenance at least discussion of nuclear weapons acquisition.
New Opportunities?
It is hard to tell in this period of disruption how much the America First and freewheeling transactional approach to world affairs will impact nonproliferation frameworks. These frameworks were already under strain globally from Russian nuclear saber-rattling and great power arsenal modernization, use of chemicals in assassinations and in Ukraine that tests the limits of the CWC, Russian disinformation campaigns, and the risks generated by rapid developments in artificial intelligence and other technologies. For now, there is comfort in the substantial network of U.S. resources and commitments and in the international legal frameworks that endure. Prominent among these are robust U.S. export controls on dual-use goods and the obligations of all countries under UN Security Council resolution 1540 not to support proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery. In light of tariff-induced trade disruptions and dislocations, the international nonproliferation community should double down on support for implementation of resolution 1540 everywhere, but especially in the Global South where many countries still lack basic implementing laws and regulations. But with the United States abdicating or undermining trust in its leadership in many global arenas, it is important also to reconsider long- held nonproliferation assumptions and imagine new possibilities. What more can be done for CBRN security by the private sector and civil society? Can they lead where governments fail? Can they leverage new technologies to bring costs of nonproliferation down and support for nonproliferation institutions up? And can Europe and other beneficiaries of the U.S. nuclear umbrella take this opportunity to question foundational assumptions about the value and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence? What new or changed institutions could become of value in replacing the old institutions if they fall? Amid all these questions, governments and organizations that care about nonproliferation need to seize with both hands the opportunities presented to create new partnerships and diversify leadership and funding.
The United States and WMD Nonproliferation, One Year On
By Christina McAllister
Nonproliferation
For decades, the United States has been a leader in preventing the proliferation of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons of mass destruction. Key U.S. resources and commitments endure, but a year of transactional and freewheeling policymaking has taken a toll on an international nonproliferation regime already under strain. It is time to question old assumptions and identify additional sources of leadership.
Taking Stock
What a difference a year makes. As Donald Trump notches the one-year mark of his turbulent second term at the helm of the U.S. government this month, it seems a fitting moment to catch a breath and take stock of his record on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While policies and practices related to WMD non-proliferation have not been a focus of the administration’s first year, serving to insulate the field somewhat, the contradictions and disruptions have taken a toll. From federal government downsizing to rejection of multilateral institutions to reprimands of European allies, the drama of the last 12 months has had both greater and lesser ripple-on effects for the domestic and international communities and frameworks dedicated to keeping the world safe from WMD risks and threats. It remains to be seen how permanent these changes will be, and whether opportunities for new approaches and leadership can be seized.
Disruption at Home
National Nuclear Security Administration staff were among the first to be impacted by chaotic firings of federal employees by the controversial Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), while a State Department reorganization in April aimed to cut 15% of staff and merged bureaus responsible for arms control and non-proliferation, putting it under an Under Secretary that would also oversee the bureaus for political-military affairs, narcotics and law enforcement, and counterterrorism, along with a new bureau for emerging threats. Many private sector and civil society organizations that support the federal government’s nonproliferation work were likewise caught up in the administration’s freeze on foreign aid contracts, some having to cut staff while waiting to find out whether their work would continue. While key offices and staff across the federal government remain in place, the disruption and uncertainty have had an impact on morale and will affect the pool of available expertise going forward. Meanwhile, the administration’s end-run around the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing and other regulatory processes for prototyping commercial advanced nuclear technology runs the risk of undermining confidence not just in the safety but also the security and proliferation resistance of the new reactors.
America First
Beyond U.S. borders, the administration’s interpretation and application of the America First policy have a range of immediate and potential longer-term impacts. National customs and law enforcement authorities find it hard to enforce complex sanctions and strategic trade controls on dual-use goods amid more disrupted and uncertain trade and supply chain policies, such as those introduced by Trump’s approach to tariffs. The administration this month also made good on its threat to withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO), depriving the organization of its biggest government funder. Among the many serious impacts the withdrawal of this funding has on the organization, it affects the capacity of offices and programs that have become increasingly important to preparing member states to detect and respond to deliberate as well as natural and accidental biological threats. Yet the United States is also the largest funder for several key nonproliferation multilateral organizations that have so far fared better. Away from the headlines, the United States signaled continuing strong support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its nuclear nonproliferation mission despite attaching restrictive strings to its funding. Signs are also encouraging for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), making slow but encouraging progress towards eventual elimination of Syria’s remaining CW stockpile: The bill appropriating U.S. budget dues passed the House of Representatives this month with bipartisan support. At the United Nations in September 2025, President Trump surprised the biological weapons nonproliferation community by announcing a U.S. initiative to leverage artificial intelligence for verification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a proposal the U.S. delegation to the BWC Meeting of States Parties later elaborated on.
A Friend in Need?
Nevertheless, other administration actions work in direct opposition to these positive signals, particularly in the nuclear arena. U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in June, while explicitly aimed at preventing development of nuclear weapons, were an unmistakable vote of no-confidence in the painstaking diplomatic work of the IAEA under the multilateral framework of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). And despite embrace of alliances in the National Security Strategy (NSS), unconcern and outright hostility toward Europe in the first months of the new administration sparked serious contemplation of an alternative to the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If such an alternative focused on the existing French or UK nuclear arsenal, or both, it might not strictly qualify as proliferation, and some analysts have underscored that the U.S. umbrella is not so easy or likely to be replaced. More recent U.S. saber-rattling over Greenland has raised fresh fears of the NATO alliance cracking altogether, however, raising anxiety levels anew over the sturdiness and reliability of U.S. extended deterrence. The drama, meanwhile, added to the ongoing debate around nuclear weapons in South Korea, another beneficiary of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, with Trump’s surprise “approval” of a South Korean nuclear-powered submarine raising further questions. And while Japan’s experience as a target of nuclear weapons casts a long shadow over domestic politics, even there headlines have captured comments from unexpected places seeming to countenance at least discussion of nuclear weapons acquisition.
New Opportunities?
It is hard to tell in this period of disruption how much the America First and freewheeling transactional approach to world affairs will impact nonproliferation frameworks. These frameworks were already under strain globally from Russian nuclear saber-rattling and great power arsenal modernization, use of chemicals in assassinations and in Ukraine that tests the limits of the CWC, Russian disinformation campaigns, and the risks generated by rapid developments in artificial intelligence and other technologies. For now, there is comfort in the substantial network of U.S. resources and commitments and in the international legal frameworks that endure. Prominent among these are robust U.S. export controls on dual-use goods and the obligations of all countries under UN Security Council resolution 1540 not to support proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery. In light of tariff-induced trade disruptions and dislocations, the international nonproliferation community should double down on support for implementation of resolution 1540 everywhere, but especially in the Global South where many countries still lack basic implementing laws and regulations. But with the United States abdicating or undermining trust in its leadership in many global arenas, it is important also to reconsider long- held nonproliferation assumptions and imagine new possibilities. What more can be done for CBRN security by the private sector and civil society? Can they lead where governments fail? Can they leverage new technologies to bring costs of nonproliferation down and support for nonproliferation institutions up? And can Europe and other beneficiaries of the U.S. nuclear umbrella take this opportunity to question foundational assumptions about the value and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence? What new or changed institutions could become of value in replacing the old institutions if they fall? Amid all these questions, governments and organizations that care about nonproliferation need to seize with both hands the opportunities presented to create new partnerships and diversify leadership and funding.
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