Editor’s Note: Justin Snyder is a young expert in the Global Governance Innovation Network. This commentary is part of the GGIN’s Next Generation Experts series, which aims to elevate youth research and writing. Justin Snyder’s interests and research center on climate, global governance, and conflict resolution.
By Rebecca Snyder, Research Associate, Global Governance, Justice, and Security Program
Since World War II, the United Nations has anchored a multilateral system designed to coordinate collective responses to conflict and channel accountability through shared rules and institutions. That system rested on the expectation that even major powers would accept institutional constraint — an expectation now under sustained pressure. In recent weeks, President Nicolás Maduro, a sitting head of state, was forcibly removed from Venezuela and transferred to the United States to face charges brought by U.S. authorities. Publicly framed as a step toward accountability, the operation was not the result of an extradition process, international tribunal, or any form of collective authorization. Instead, it reflected unilateral power exercised in pursuit of national interest, outside established multilateral frameworks designed to adjudicate accountability and constrain the use of force.
Institutions Under Strain
This shift toward unilateral action has unfolded alongside growing paralysis within the UN system, most visibly in the Security Council, where veto power and political resistance increasingly block collective action. In 2024, seven draft resolutions — the highest number since 1986 — failed to be adopted due to vetoes cast by permanent members, reflecting deepening deadlock. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s veto has blocked Security Council sanctions and other collective responses against Russia despite widespread international condemnation of its invasion. That paralysis showed up again in early January, when an emergency Security Council meeting on Venezuela and Maduro produced no resolution.
International courts also face challenges. Recent efforts by the International Criminal Court to pursue investigations linked to Israel have been met with political retaliation, including sanctions imposed by the U.S. on ICC judges involved in the cases. Resistance has extended beyond international courts, with the U.S. sanctioning Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, for her reporting on Gaza and corporate complicity in genocide, defying long-standing immunity for UN diplomats. What emerges is a system in which accountability is increasingly shaped by political pressure rather than legal process.
The Erosion of Legitimacy
The erosion of international accountability predates today’s crises, even if its consequences are now harder to ignore. For much of the post-war period, accountability was understood through multilateral institutions and negotiated processes, even as outcomes remained shaped by power asymmetries and multilateral action reflected the preferences of major powers.
Over time, power asymmetries eroded the credibility of international accountability, a pattern visible in the enforcement record of international courts: From the International Criminal Court’s founding through the early 2020s, 47 of the 54 individuals indicted were African, while no American or European political or military leader was charged. Once the Court moved to pursue cases implicating leaders of powerful Global North states, such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, it faced intense political backlash and challenges to its authority and legitimacy.
A renewed emphasis on sovereignty as the ultimate source of political legitimacy has reshaped debates over international accountability, with opposition framed in terms of jurisdiction and consent. U.S. officials have argued that international courts lack authority over nationals of states that never ratified the Rome Statute. Russia has gone further, passing domestic legislation explicitly refusing to recognize or enforce rulings by international courts to which it has not signed on. Beyond jurisdictional objections, external enforcement is increasingly portrayed as an abuse of power rather than an application of international law. China has been a consistent proponent of this view, framing international courts, investigations, and related accountability efforts as coercive interference in domestic affairs. Through its doctrine of non-interference, Beijing recasts legal scrutiny as political pressure exercised without consent. What has emerged is a growing contestation over who may enforce international law and under what conditions such enforcement is considered legitimate.
Bypassing Multilateralism
Against the backdrop of declining cooperation in multilateral institutions, new forms of governance are beginning to take shape. As a workaround to Security Council veto paralysis and the ICC’s jurisdictional limits, European and allied states are advancing a special tribunal on the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine. The Trump administration’s proposed Board of Peace is a more overt example. Intended to oversee next steps in Gaza without formal multilateral authorization, the body brings together a select group of states and individuals chosen by Trump. Defending the model, Donald Trump argued that once formed, the board could “do pretty much whatever we want to do,” while still acting “in conjunction with the United Nations.” While such arrangements are administratively flexible, narrow the circle of accountability, and reduce exposure to multilateral scrutiny and process, they allow decision-makers to act without the consent of global UN membership. Whatever its ultimate effectiveness, the Board of Peace reflects growing frustration with multilateral institutions.
The Case for Repair
The drift away from the multilateral system highlights the need to re-imagine its existing systems and power structures. Article 109 of the UN Charter was designed for moments like this, providing a mechanism to convene a Charter review conference where Member States can reconsider core institutional features, including the Security Council and its veto, when political realities outgrow the existing framework. Many of today’s UN members were neither sovereign nor present at the Charter’s drafting, having emerged from colonial rule only decades later, leaving them bound by power arrangements they had little role in shaping. A review conference would not eliminate power politics, but it would force a direct reckoning with a post-war architecture that no longer matches today’s power distribution and conflicts.
Others question whether existing institutions can still be relied upon to deliver accountability. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney argued that the current moment reflects a rupture rather than a transition: Multilateral institutions no longer function as intended and no longer reliably constrain great-power behavior. Countries, he suggested, can no longer assume institutional protection and must prepare for an international order shaped by fewer shared constraints. His diagnosis captures the mood of frustration, but risks mistaking institutional paralysis for inevitability.
What is at Stake?
None of this is to deny the system’s failures or inequities, but it is to recognize what is at stake in abandoning multilateral cooperation. Even amid paralysis, the United Nations still coordinates life-saving humanitarian assistance at a scale no coalition of willing states could replicate, reaching more than 116 million people in 2024, and continues to deploy political missions and peacekeepers to contain conflicts that would escalate if left unchecked. Beyond implementation, it remains the principal forum in which all Member States, large and small, can convene on formally equal terms to articulate priorities and negotiate collective responses to shared challenges. The UN has also produced enduring normative standards, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which for the first time set minimum standards of dignity and protection for all people. Article 109 offers a way to confront institutional mismatch without surrendering capacity — a chance to adapt the architecture rather than allow accountability to migrate into discretionary, power-hungry hands. The UN system was built to deliver accountability; the question now is whether states will renew that capacity, or whether accountability will increasingly be decided by who has the power to act.
The United Nations Was Built to Deliver Accountability. Can It Still Do So?
By Justin Snyder
International & Regional Organizations
Editor’s Note: Justin Snyder is a young expert in the Global Governance Innovation Network. This commentary is part of the GGIN’s Next Generation Experts series, which aims to elevate youth research and writing. Justin Snyder’s interests and research center on climate, global governance, and conflict resolution.
By Rebecca Snyder, Research Associate, Global Governance, Justice, and Security Program
Since World War II, the United Nations has anchored a multilateral system designed to coordinate collective responses to conflict and channel accountability through shared rules and institutions. That system rested on the expectation that even major powers would accept institutional constraint — an expectation now under sustained pressure. In recent weeks, President Nicolás Maduro, a sitting head of state, was forcibly removed from Venezuela and transferred to the United States to face charges brought by U.S. authorities. Publicly framed as a step toward accountability, the operation was not the result of an extradition process, international tribunal, or any form of collective authorization. Instead, it reflected unilateral power exercised in pursuit of national interest, outside established multilateral frameworks designed to adjudicate accountability and constrain the use of force.
Institutions Under Strain
This shift toward unilateral action has unfolded alongside growing paralysis within the UN system, most visibly in the Security Council, where veto power and political resistance increasingly block collective action. In 2024, seven draft resolutions — the highest number since 1986 — failed to be adopted due to vetoes cast by permanent members, reflecting deepening deadlock. In the case of Ukraine, Russia’s veto has blocked Security Council sanctions and other collective responses against Russia despite widespread international condemnation of its invasion. That paralysis showed up again in early January, when an emergency Security Council meeting on Venezuela and Maduro produced no resolution.
International courts also face challenges. Recent efforts by the International Criminal Court to pursue investigations linked to Israel have been met with political retaliation, including sanctions imposed by the U.S. on ICC judges involved in the cases. Resistance has extended beyond international courts, with the U.S. sanctioning Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, for her reporting on Gaza and corporate complicity in genocide, defying long-standing immunity for UN diplomats. What emerges is a system in which accountability is increasingly shaped by political pressure rather than legal process.
The Erosion of Legitimacy
The erosion of international accountability predates today’s crises, even if its consequences are now harder to ignore. For much of the post-war period, accountability was understood through multilateral institutions and negotiated processes, even as outcomes remained shaped by power asymmetries and multilateral action reflected the preferences of major powers.
Over time, power asymmetries eroded the credibility of international accountability, a pattern visible in the enforcement record of international courts: From the International Criminal Court’s founding through the early 2020s, 47 of the 54 individuals indicted were African, while no American or European political or military leader was charged. Once the Court moved to pursue cases implicating leaders of powerful Global North states, such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, it faced intense political backlash and challenges to its authority and legitimacy.
A renewed emphasis on sovereignty as the ultimate source of political legitimacy has reshaped debates over international accountability, with opposition framed in terms of jurisdiction and consent. U.S. officials have argued that international courts lack authority over nationals of states that never ratified the Rome Statute. Russia has gone further, passing domestic legislation explicitly refusing to recognize or enforce rulings by international courts to which it has not signed on. Beyond jurisdictional objections, external enforcement is increasingly portrayed as an abuse of power rather than an application of international law. China has been a consistent proponent of this view, framing international courts, investigations, and related accountability efforts as coercive interference in domestic affairs. Through its doctrine of non-interference, Beijing recasts legal scrutiny as political pressure exercised without consent. What has emerged is a growing contestation over who may enforce international law and under what conditions such enforcement is considered legitimate.
Bypassing Multilateralism
Against the backdrop of declining cooperation in multilateral institutions, new forms of governance are beginning to take shape. As a workaround to Security Council veto paralysis and the ICC’s jurisdictional limits, European and allied states are advancing a special tribunal on the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine. The Trump administration’s proposed Board of Peace is a more overt example. Intended to oversee next steps in Gaza without formal multilateral authorization, the body brings together a select group of states and individuals chosen by Trump. Defending the model, Donald Trump argued that once formed, the board could “do pretty much whatever we want to do,” while still acting “in conjunction with the United Nations.” While such arrangements are administratively flexible, narrow the circle of accountability, and reduce exposure to multilateral scrutiny and process, they allow decision-makers to act without the consent of global UN membership. Whatever its ultimate effectiveness, the Board of Peace reflects growing frustration with multilateral institutions.
The Case for Repair
The drift away from the multilateral system highlights the need to re-imagine its existing systems and power structures. Article 109 of the UN Charter was designed for moments like this, providing a mechanism to convene a Charter review conference where Member States can reconsider core institutional features, including the Security Council and its veto, when political realities outgrow the existing framework. Many of today’s UN members were neither sovereign nor present at the Charter’s drafting, having emerged from colonial rule only decades later, leaving them bound by power arrangements they had little role in shaping. A review conference would not eliminate power politics, but it would force a direct reckoning with a post-war architecture that no longer matches today’s power distribution and conflicts.
Others question whether existing institutions can still be relied upon to deliver accountability. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney argued that the current moment reflects a rupture rather than a transition: Multilateral institutions no longer function as intended and no longer reliably constrain great-power behavior. Countries, he suggested, can no longer assume institutional protection and must prepare for an international order shaped by fewer shared constraints. His diagnosis captures the mood of frustration, but risks mistaking institutional paralysis for inevitability.
What is at Stake?
None of this is to deny the system’s failures or inequities, but it is to recognize what is at stake in abandoning multilateral cooperation. Even amid paralysis, the United Nations still coordinates life-saving humanitarian assistance at a scale no coalition of willing states could replicate, reaching more than 116 million people in 2024, and continues to deploy political missions and peacekeepers to contain conflicts that would escalate if left unchecked. Beyond implementation, it remains the principal forum in which all Member States, large and small, can convene on formally equal terms to articulate priorities and negotiate collective responses to shared challenges. The UN has also produced enduring normative standards, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which for the first time set minimum standards of dignity and protection for all people. Article 109 offers a way to confront institutional mismatch without surrendering capacity — a chance to adapt the architecture rather than allow accountability to migrate into discretionary, power-hungry hands. The UN system was built to deliver accountability; the question now is whether states will renew that capacity, or whether accountability will increasingly be decided by who has the power to act.
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