Editor’s Note: Kristian Patrick Alexander is a Senior Fellow and Lead Researcher at the Rabdan Security and Defense Institute in the United Arab Emirates and an advisor at Gulf States Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He previously worked as a Senior Fellow at Trends Research and Advisory in Abu Dhabi and was an Assistant Professor at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Iran enters 2026 amid the most severe internal turmoil since the founding of the Islamic Republic.
The latest wave of protests, driven by economic collapse, the relentless devaluation of the rial, and growing public anger at unresponsive governance, has triggered a legitimacy crisis that the regime can no longer easily suppress or ignore.
This domestic upheaval unfolds against the backdrop of a dramatically altered geopolitical environment shaped by U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed pressure campaign, including sanctions, explicit threats, and a more confrontational rhetorical posture. Despite a resumption of US-Iran talks in Oman on February 6, recent developments suggest that political pressure on the U.S. administration to “act decisively” is mounting, raising regional concern that Washington may shift from verbal threats to concrete coercive measures. Public references to a possible “agreement” with Iran may serve as diplomatic positioning or strategic messaging, while parallel military preparations leave open the possibility of limited strikes or covert action designed to degrade specific capabilities without triggering full-scale war.
For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), these converging pressures make the present moment exceptionally perilous. The Gulf has long lived at the intersection of US–Iran tensions, and today’s dynamic raises the possibility not only of prolonged Iranian unrest but of miscalculation, escalation, or even direct conflict. Gulf states therefore are responding with caution. Their muted public reactions reflect not indifference, but a sober recognition that instability in Iran, whether through repression, transition, or collapse, poses profound risks to their own economic and security environments. Senior Gulf officials have underlined in recent statements that the region “cannot afford another conflict” with Iran and have stressed the need for a durable political framework rather than ad hoc crisis management, with some governments going so far as to signal that they will not allow their territory, airspace, and waters to be used to launch offensive operations against Iran.
Iran’s Internal Crisis: A Regime Under Strain, Not Yet Defeated
The 2025–26 protests differ fundamentally from earlier waves. They are broader, more persistent, and more explicitly aimed at dismantling the political foundations of the Islamic Republic. Recent accounts of the regime’s response reveal a more systematic and violent crackdown, with special units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducting targeted arrests, deploying live fire, and carrying out punitive operations in restive provinces.
This severe repression has reportedly deepened internal rifts within Iran’s security structure, contributing to a growing moral and psychological strain on some Basij and provincial IRGC units. However, the coercive apparatus remains intact at the senior level and willing to deploy overwhelming force. In response to signs of local dissent within the ranks, Tehran has reportedly rotated more loyal IRGC contingents from other provinces, signaling its capacity and intent to maintain control.
For GCC policymakers, this combination of intense social pressure and institutional resilience points toward a prolonged, volatile crisis rather than rapid transformation, one in which instability is chronic, unpredictable, and increasingly difficult for outside actors to shape.
Scenario One: Regime Survival Through Militarized Repression
A probable scenario remains regime survival through intensified repression. Tehran frames the protests as a foreign conspiracy, expands its reliance on the IRGC for internal control, and uses selective regional provocations to reassert deterrence. The regime may harden into a more openly militarized order, what some analysts describe as an “IRGC Republic,” in which ideological rigidity and nationalist defiance overshadow any impulse toward reform.
For the GCC, a surviving but embattled regime represents a familiar threat: a hostile but deterrable Iran capable of leveraging drones, cyber operations, and regional proxies to signal resilience. Iran’s vast arsenal of short-range missiles ensures that Gulf states remain within range of retaliatory fire. In addition to its land-based missile forces, Iran has expanded its maritime strike capabilities, including anti-ship ballistic missiles, explosive-laden drone boats, and swarming fast-attack craft — tactics designed to overwhelm naval escorts and disrupt Gulf shipping lanes.
Scenario Two: Leadership Transition Under an Unchanged System
A second pathway involves a leadership transition, through the departure of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei via incapacitation or internal pressure but without substantial reform of the system. Trump’s highly personalized criticism of the Supreme Leader has accelerated speculation about this possibility. Within Iran’s elite, quiet contingency planning for succession has long been underway, with the IRGC poised to exert decisive influence over any political transition.
What distinguishes this scenario from the first is not a change in the system but a change in the political personality leading it. A successor, whether Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, a senior cleric acceptable to the IRGC, or a leadership council, would lack Khamenei’s long-established authority and may feel compelled to assert credibility through stronger nationalist rhetoric, rapid decision-making, or visible displays of resolve.
For the GCC, this introduces uncertainty absent in Scenario One: a new and largely untested leader may behave more unpredictably as he balances competing IRGC factions, clerical expectations, and public pressure. Even if the system remains intact, the transition period could generate signaling missteps, sharper external messaging, or shifts in regional posture driven by the need to consolidate power at home.
A post-Khamenei order may create diplomatic openings, but it could also intensify Iran’s nationalist posture as new leaders attempt to consolidate authority. This risk is compounded by the uncertainty of U.S. policy, which alternates between confrontational rhetoric and engagement. Recent diplomatic maneuvers highlight this ambiguity: Tehran has pressed to narrow the agenda of talks to the nuclear file and to exclude regional actors from the table. At the same time, senior Iranian officials signal conditional flexibility on uranium enrichment levels, even as they publicly insist that missiles and regional networks are off-limits. For Gulf governments, such moves suggest a leadership seeking sanctions relief and time, possibly to reposition and harden offensive assets, without accepting constraints on the tools that most directly threaten GCC security.
Scenario Three: Partial or Full Regime Collapse
A full collapse remains unlikely in the short term but poses the gravest risks for Gulf security. Analysts increasingly warn that if Iran unravels, it will do so unevenly and violently, resembling the fragmentation of Syria or Libya but on a far larger scale. Competing IRGC factions, provincial power centers, clerical networks, and armed non-state groups could battle for control, while Iran’s regional proxies might act autonomously rather than in coordination with Tehran.
For the GCC, the consequences would be immediate and severe. A collapsed Iran could generate large refugee flows, with the United Arab Emirates, especially Dubai, as a primary destination due to its existing Iranian expatriate community and economic attractiveness. Such an influx would bring complex security and administrative challenges, including vetting, immigration control, and the risk of infiltration by Iranian intelligence or armed actors.
A weakening Tehran might lose control of missile stockpiles or sensitive nuclear materials, raising fears of proliferation to rogue commanders or militias. Maritime stability in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman could be jeopardized. There is also concern that embattled Iranian factions could resort to escalatory actions, including proxy attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure, to force external powers into imposing a ceasefire or negotiating a settlement.
External Pressures and the Risk of US–Iran Escalation
Rather than a standalone scenario, the prospect of U.S. military action represents an external pressure that could profoundly shape any of the internal pathways described above. Whether Iran stabilizes, undergoes leadership transition, or faces fragmentation, the risk of confrontation or coercive measures short of war, remains a critical variable influencing GCC security calculations.
Recent efforts to reopen communication channels, including US–Iran talks in Oman on February 6, have created a narrow diplomatic opening. However, these discussions reportedly remain limited in scope, with Washington pressing for rapid steps on uranium enrichment and inspections, and Iran insisting on sanctions relief while ruling out negotiations on missiles or regional posture. The February 11 visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington has added another layer of uncertainty about the potential for military strikes. The Netanyahu–Trump meeting reinforced perceptions in the region that military contingencies remain actively under consideration, even if presented as leverage rather than immediate intent.
There has also been increasing discussion of coercive tools such as a US-led naval blockade or maritime interception operation designed to pressure Iran without immediately resorting to large-scale attacks. Such a blockade could involve intercepting Iranian oil shipments, restricting access to key shipping lanes, or imposing enhanced maritime inspections, measures that would place GCC waters at the center of escalating tensions. At the same time, some observers assess that if force were used, it might take the form of a limited, precise strike or covert operation aimed at degrading missile, drone, or nuclear infrastructure rather than a broad campaign, allowing Washington to signal resolve while trying to manage escalation.
Washington has deployed significant naval and air assets to the Gulf. These movements, presented as deterrence, have already prompted regional caution. Airlines have rerouted or suspended flights over Middle Eastern airspace, including temporary pauses to Dubai, Bahrain, and Doha, affecting aviation hubs and raising concerns about economic fallout. U.S. forces have also intercepted an Iranian drone approaching an American carrier, while Iranian military vessels and unmanned systems have increased activity around commercial shipping lanes, an indication of how swiftly a single incident could trigger escalation.
For GCC states, these dynamics reinforce long-standing fears of being drawn into a confrontation they neither seek nor control. Iran has stated that any attack or blockade-level pressure will be treated as an act of war, including toward states hosting U.S. forces. Missile and drone units on both sides appear to be on heightened readiness, further compressing decision-making timelines and increasing the likelihood of misinterpretation.
Regardless of whether Iran stabilizes, transitions, collapses, or faces external military pressure, its proxy network and missile–nuclear infrastructure remain defining constants.
A surviving regime will continue employing proxies as tools of deterrence and influence, although its ability to do so may be significantly reduced if it emerges from the current crisis weakened, exposed, or with elements of its strategic infrastructure degraded. In such a scenario, Iran’s regional partners may reassess their long-term alignment, with groups such as Hezbollah or Iraqi militias potentially seeking greater accommodation with their host governments, and actors like the Houthis exploring pragmatic understandings with international stakeholders. By contrast, a collapsing regime risks losing control over these networks entirely, creating fragmentation within proxy structures and generating unpredictable armed actors across multiple theaters whose loyalties and operational priorities may no longer align with Tehran.
Implications for GCC Policymakers: Managing a Long, Unpredictable Crisis
The GCC’s cautious response reflects a pragmatic assessment of risk. Gulf states fear not only a belligerent Iran but also Iranian fragmentation, escalation, and strategic miscalculation. Preparing for these contingencies requires a multi-layered strategy including strengthening integrated air and missile defense systems; expanding counter-drone and anti-ship capabilities; preparing managed pathways for potential Iranian refugee inflows; enhancing maritime domain awareness; conducting joint naval coordination to manage blockade-related risks; maintaining discreet channels with Iranian actors; and reinforcing financial-sector resilience against geopolitical shocks.
Ultimately, the Gulf must prepare for all plausible Iranian futures — an IRGC-dominated regime, a leadership transition, a prolonged collapse, or US–Iran confrontation — while maintaining strategic restraint and diplomatic agility. The emerging consensus in several Gulf capitals is that containment, crisis diplomacy, and investment in resilience are more sustainable than either maximalist pressure or wishful thinking about sudden transformation in Tehran.
Scenarios for Iran’s Future and Implications for GCC Security
By Kristian Patrick Alexander
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Kristian Patrick Alexander is a Senior Fellow and Lead Researcher at the Rabdan Security and Defense Institute in the United Arab Emirates and an advisor at Gulf States Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He previously worked as a Senior Fellow at Trends Research and Advisory in Abu Dhabi and was an Assistant Professor at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
Iran enters 2026 amid the most severe internal turmoil since the founding of the Islamic Republic.
The latest wave of protests, driven by economic collapse, the relentless devaluation of the rial, and growing public anger at unresponsive governance, has triggered a legitimacy crisis that the regime can no longer easily suppress or ignore.
This domestic upheaval unfolds against the backdrop of a dramatically altered geopolitical environment shaped by U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed pressure campaign, including sanctions, explicit threats, and a more confrontational rhetorical posture. Despite a resumption of US-Iran talks in Oman on February 6, recent developments suggest that political pressure on the U.S. administration to “act decisively” is mounting, raising regional concern that Washington may shift from verbal threats to concrete coercive measures. Public references to a possible “agreement” with Iran may serve as diplomatic positioning or strategic messaging, while parallel military preparations leave open the possibility of limited strikes or covert action designed to degrade specific capabilities without triggering full-scale war.
For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), these converging pressures make the present moment exceptionally perilous. The Gulf has long lived at the intersection of US–Iran tensions, and today’s dynamic raises the possibility not only of prolonged Iranian unrest but of miscalculation, escalation, or even direct conflict. Gulf states therefore are responding with caution. Their muted public reactions reflect not indifference, but a sober recognition that instability in Iran, whether through repression, transition, or collapse, poses profound risks to their own economic and security environments. Senior Gulf officials have underlined in recent statements that the region “cannot afford another conflict” with Iran and have stressed the need for a durable political framework rather than ad hoc crisis management, with some governments going so far as to signal that they will not allow their territory, airspace, and waters to be used to launch offensive operations against Iran.
Iran’s Internal Crisis: A Regime Under Strain, Not Yet Defeated
The 2025–26 protests differ fundamentally from earlier waves. They are broader, more persistent, and more explicitly aimed at dismantling the political foundations of the Islamic Republic. Recent accounts of the regime’s response reveal a more systematic and violent crackdown, with special units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducting targeted arrests, deploying live fire, and carrying out punitive operations in restive provinces.
This severe repression has reportedly deepened internal rifts within Iran’s security structure, contributing to a growing moral and psychological strain on some Basij and provincial IRGC units. However, the coercive apparatus remains intact at the senior level and willing to deploy overwhelming force. In response to signs of local dissent within the ranks, Tehran has reportedly rotated more loyal IRGC contingents from other provinces, signaling its capacity and intent to maintain control.
For GCC policymakers, this combination of intense social pressure and institutional resilience points toward a prolonged, volatile crisis rather than rapid transformation, one in which instability is chronic, unpredictable, and increasingly difficult for outside actors to shape.
Scenario One: Regime Survival Through Militarized Repression
A probable scenario remains regime survival through intensified repression. Tehran frames the protests as a foreign conspiracy, expands its reliance on the IRGC for internal control, and uses selective regional provocations to reassert deterrence. The regime may harden into a more openly militarized order, what some analysts describe as an “IRGC Republic,” in which ideological rigidity and nationalist defiance overshadow any impulse toward reform.
For the GCC, a surviving but embattled regime represents a familiar threat: a hostile but deterrable Iran capable of leveraging drones, cyber operations, and regional proxies to signal resilience. Iran’s vast arsenal of short-range missiles ensures that Gulf states remain within range of retaliatory fire. In addition to its land-based missile forces, Iran has expanded its maritime strike capabilities, including anti-ship ballistic missiles, explosive-laden drone boats, and swarming fast-attack craft — tactics designed to overwhelm naval escorts and disrupt Gulf shipping lanes.
Scenario Two: Leadership Transition Under an Unchanged System
A second pathway involves a leadership transition, through the departure of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei via incapacitation or internal pressure but without substantial reform of the system. Trump’s highly personalized criticism of the Supreme Leader has accelerated speculation about this possibility. Within Iran’s elite, quiet contingency planning for succession has long been underway, with the IRGC poised to exert decisive influence over any political transition.
What distinguishes this scenario from the first is not a change in the system but a change in the political personality leading it. A successor, whether Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, a senior cleric acceptable to the IRGC, or a leadership council, would lack Khamenei’s long-established authority and may feel compelled to assert credibility through stronger nationalist rhetoric, rapid decision-making, or visible displays of resolve.
For the GCC, this introduces uncertainty absent in Scenario One: a new and largely untested leader may behave more unpredictably as he balances competing IRGC factions, clerical expectations, and public pressure. Even if the system remains intact, the transition period could generate signaling missteps, sharper external messaging, or shifts in regional posture driven by the need to consolidate power at home.
A post-Khamenei order may create diplomatic openings, but it could also intensify Iran’s nationalist posture as new leaders attempt to consolidate authority. This risk is compounded by the uncertainty of U.S. policy, which alternates between confrontational rhetoric and engagement. Recent diplomatic maneuvers highlight this ambiguity: Tehran has pressed to narrow the agenda of talks to the nuclear file and to exclude regional actors from the table. At the same time, senior Iranian officials signal conditional flexibility on uranium enrichment levels, even as they publicly insist that missiles and regional networks are off-limits. For Gulf governments, such moves suggest a leadership seeking sanctions relief and time, possibly to reposition and harden offensive assets, without accepting constraints on the tools that most directly threaten GCC security.
Scenario Three: Partial or Full Regime Collapse
A full collapse remains unlikely in the short term but poses the gravest risks for Gulf security. Analysts increasingly warn that if Iran unravels, it will do so unevenly and violently, resembling the fragmentation of Syria or Libya but on a far larger scale. Competing IRGC factions, provincial power centers, clerical networks, and armed non-state groups could battle for control, while Iran’s regional proxies might act autonomously rather than in coordination with Tehran.
For the GCC, the consequences would be immediate and severe. A collapsed Iran could generate large refugee flows, with the United Arab Emirates, especially Dubai, as a primary destination due to its existing Iranian expatriate community and economic attractiveness. Such an influx would bring complex security and administrative challenges, including vetting, immigration control, and the risk of infiltration by Iranian intelligence or armed actors.
A weakening Tehran might lose control of missile stockpiles or sensitive nuclear materials, raising fears of proliferation to rogue commanders or militias. Maritime stability in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman could be jeopardized. There is also concern that embattled Iranian factions could resort to escalatory actions, including proxy attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure, to force external powers into imposing a ceasefire or negotiating a settlement.
External Pressures and the Risk of US–Iran Escalation
Rather than a standalone scenario, the prospect of U.S. military action represents an external pressure that could profoundly shape any of the internal pathways described above. Whether Iran stabilizes, undergoes leadership transition, or faces fragmentation, the risk of confrontation or coercive measures short of war, remains a critical variable influencing GCC security calculations.
Recent efforts to reopen communication channels, including US–Iran talks in Oman on February 6, have created a narrow diplomatic opening. However, these discussions reportedly remain limited in scope, with Washington pressing for rapid steps on uranium enrichment and inspections, and Iran insisting on sanctions relief while ruling out negotiations on missiles or regional posture. The February 11 visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington has added another layer of uncertainty about the potential for military strikes. The Netanyahu–Trump meeting reinforced perceptions in the region that military contingencies remain actively under consideration, even if presented as leverage rather than immediate intent.
There has also been increasing discussion of coercive tools such as a US-led naval blockade or maritime interception operation designed to pressure Iran without immediately resorting to large-scale attacks. Such a blockade could involve intercepting Iranian oil shipments, restricting access to key shipping lanes, or imposing enhanced maritime inspections, measures that would place GCC waters at the center of escalating tensions. At the same time, some observers assess that if force were used, it might take the form of a limited, precise strike or covert operation aimed at degrading missile, drone, or nuclear infrastructure rather than a broad campaign, allowing Washington to signal resolve while trying to manage escalation.
Washington has deployed significant naval and air assets to the Gulf. These movements, presented as deterrence, have already prompted regional caution. Airlines have rerouted or suspended flights over Middle Eastern airspace, including temporary pauses to Dubai, Bahrain, and Doha, affecting aviation hubs and raising concerns about economic fallout. U.S. forces have also intercepted an Iranian drone approaching an American carrier, while Iranian military vessels and unmanned systems have increased activity around commercial shipping lanes, an indication of how swiftly a single incident could trigger escalation.
For GCC states, these dynamics reinforce long-standing fears of being drawn into a confrontation they neither seek nor control. Iran has stated that any attack or blockade-level pressure will be treated as an act of war, including toward states hosting U.S. forces. Missile and drone units on both sides appear to be on heightened readiness, further compressing decision-making timelines and increasing the likelihood of misinterpretation.
Regardless of whether Iran stabilizes, transitions, collapses, or faces external military pressure, its proxy network and missile–nuclear infrastructure remain defining constants.
A surviving regime will continue employing proxies as tools of deterrence and influence, although its ability to do so may be significantly reduced if it emerges from the current crisis weakened, exposed, or with elements of its strategic infrastructure degraded. In such a scenario, Iran’s regional partners may reassess their long-term alignment, with groups such as Hezbollah or Iraqi militias potentially seeking greater accommodation with their host governments, and actors like the Houthis exploring pragmatic understandings with international stakeholders. By contrast, a collapsing regime risks losing control over these networks entirely, creating fragmentation within proxy structures and generating unpredictable armed actors across multiple theaters whose loyalties and operational priorities may no longer align with Tehran.
Implications for GCC Policymakers: Managing a Long, Unpredictable Crisis
The GCC’s cautious response reflects a pragmatic assessment of risk. Gulf states fear not only a belligerent Iran but also Iranian fragmentation, escalation, and strategic miscalculation. Preparing for these contingencies requires a multi-layered strategy including strengthening integrated air and missile defense systems; expanding counter-drone and anti-ship capabilities; preparing managed pathways for potential Iranian refugee inflows; enhancing maritime domain awareness; conducting joint naval coordination to manage blockade-related risks; maintaining discreet channels with Iranian actors; and reinforcing financial-sector resilience against geopolitical shocks.
Ultimately, the Gulf must prepare for all plausible Iranian futures — an IRGC-dominated regime, a leadership transition, a prolonged collapse, or US–Iran confrontation — while maintaining strategic restraint and diplomatic agility. The emerging consensus in several Gulf capitals is that containment, crisis diplomacy, and investment in resilience are more sustainable than either maximalist pressure or wishful thinking about sudden transformation in Tehran.
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