Editor’s Note: In advance of Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi’s planned visit to Washington this month, three Japanese scholars offer their views on how and why complete denuclearization should be emphasized in Japanese, South Korean, and American policy toward North Korea. In this first of three commentaries, Professor Nishida argues for a two-pronged strategy to addressing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons.
All three authors will appear at a public event on March 17, in-person and online. To join us, register here.
Andrew Oros, Senior Fellow and Director, Japan Program
Introduction
Despite stringent international economic sanctions imposed primarily through the UN Security Council, North Korea’s progress in nuclear and missile development, as well as in its nuclear doctrine, has been remarkable, particularly since negotiations with the Trump administration in 2018-2019 stalled. It is undeniable that North Korea no longer views denuclearization as a subject for negotiation — though it remains unclear whether it ever seriously considered it as such in the first place. North Korea itself has repeatedly emphasized this point since around 2022, including through the revision of its constitution in September 2023, which indicated that it will not engage in any denuclearization negotiations whatsoever. This basic position was reiterated at the most recent Party Congress held in February 2026, although Kim Jong Un left the possibility of talks with the United States slightly open if North Korea’s nuclear status is accepted.
As a result, particularly since the Biden administration took office in 2021, there has been a growing call within the United States to de-emphasize or even abandon setting North Korea’s denuclearization as a policy goal and instead accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, at least for the time being, and adopt more pragmatic risk reduction measures as the primary policy objective. This argument has been met with concerns in Japan and South Korea, and the Biden administration’s calibrated practical approach also ended up being half-hearted.
The argument that denuclearization should be completely abandoned is a minority view. Since the majority does not necessarily see denuclearization and risk reduction (via arms control) as mutually exclusive, the question here is how to combine these two policy options when addressing North Korea’s nuclear issue and where the optimal point for the best mix lies.
Denuclearization Remains a Vital Policy Goal
Despite North Korea’s aversion to “denuclearization,” it should not be downgraded or de-emphasized to a mere formal policy goal, in particular for non-proliferation. Lowering the banner of denuclearization would cement and justify North Korea’s de facto nuclear status and exonerate its abuse of the right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the detriment of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, setting a dangerous precedent following India. Would-be proliferators would likely think that enduring international sanctions for several years will lead to recognition as a de facto nuclear power and would be encouraged to follow suit.
The denuclearization banner holds significant political importance for U.S. regional allies, Japan and South Korea. A senior Japanese government official recently emphasized to the author the importance of sending a consistent message to North Korea. While this official did not specify why, one concerning development is the rise in nuclear armament arguments in Japan and South Korea. The national debates in those countries stem from various factors, but there is no doubt that North Korea’s significant progress in nuclear development is one of the key factors. For example, among various public opinion surveys on South Korea and Japan’s potential nuclear armament that asked respondents for their reasoning on the issue, Asan Institute’s survey published in 2021 found that 32.1% of South Koreans cited countering North Korea’s nuclear threats.
Amid President Trump’s transactional approach to alliances, namely his insistence that allies should shoulder greater burdens and increase their own defense efforts, de-emphasizing the goal of denuclearization would likely further intensify national debate on nuclear armament that is already growing in Japan and South Korea. Compared to a few years ago when arguments for de-emphasizing denuclearization goals seemed somewhat more persuasive, the fundamental premise regarding the reliability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence has changed significantly. Specifically, since the Trump administration returned to power, allied confidence in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence has been eroded by Washington’s harsh posture toward its allies and its apparent disregard for a rules-based international order, most recently exemplified by its use of force against Iran, reportedly for reasons including regime change.
In such circumstances, it must be said that the price of de-emphasizing denuclearization in order to pursue a risk reduction agreement with North Korea could be too high. While it is certainly true that nuclear armament debates in Japan and South Korea will not immediately turn into actual nuclear armament, the very rise of such debates in both countries will destabilize the region and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Even if North Korea’s denuclearization is to be de-emphasized and a risk reduction agreement with North Korea is to be pursued, it is simply inconceivable that North Korea would agree merely because denuclearization is de-emphasized. North Korea would demand recognition of its status as a nuclear-armed state and, furthermore, seek the lifting of various sanctions. For Japan, the United States, and South Korea (especially Japan and South Korea), these would be concessions difficult to readily accept. De-emphasis of denuclearization would thus keep the possibility of reaching an agreement with North Korea low and would likely lead to the same outcome as the Biden administration’s calibrated approach, which ended inconclusively. If the United States were to pursue a risk reduction agreement with North Korea while de-emphasizing North Korea’s denuclearization even under such a prospect, that very course of action would itself entail paying a price that is far too high.
What is the Best Mix?
Even if we continue to maintain denuclearization as a key policy objective, risk reduction is also critically important, especially given that North Korea’s nuclear doctrine has become highly aggressive. So how should we best blend these two policy objectives?
Like the relationship between the long-term policy goal of “a world without nuclear weapons” and the short-term policy of realistic and practical nuclear disarmament measures, denuclearization and risk reduction can be distinguished as policy goals in different timelines. Setting it as a long-term goal does not mean de-emphasizing it. For Japan, the only nation to have suffered atomic bombings in war, a “world without nuclear weapons” is not merely an aspirational goal. Of course, given the current harsh international security environment, most Japanese people do not believe a “world without nuclear weapons” can be achieved immediately. Nevertheless, they hold a strong conviction that continuing to hold that banner high, even as a long-term goal, is a matter of Japanese pride and dignity. Thus, Japan advocates achieving a world without nuclear weapons as strongly as promoting realistic and practical disarmament measures, taking into consideration security situations on the ground.
A problem of Japan and South Korea’s current policy on North Korea’s nuclear issue is that they only advocate denuclearization, but little has been said about practical measures such as risk reduction, fearing it would lead to recognizing North Korea as a de facto nuclear-armed state. This concern itself is a legitimate one that needs to be taken into consideration. How exactly should two-pronged policies of both denuclearization and risk reduction be combined and implemented in a way that addresses Japan and South Korea’s concerns while reducing nuclear risks stemming from North Korea’s dangerous nuclear doctrine?
This commentary proposes differentiating between multilateral and bilateral/regional settings, and between public and private settings. In multilateral or public settings like the United Nations and NPT forums, denuclearization should continue to be vigorously promoted while creating a situation of “agree to disagree” in bilateral/regional or private settings — if such meetings could ever take place — so that focus can be placed on risk reduction. Just as we strive for a “world without nuclear weapons” as a long-term goal, we must continue to pursue denuclearization in the context of a “Northeast Asia without nuclear weapons” or, by extension, a “world without nuclear weapons.” At the same time, even if denuclearization is promoted publicly in a multilateral setting, negotiators should deliberately avoid pushing it to the forefront in bilateral talks. One could then expect that something might come out of private, bilateral talks. Such a possibility may be lower than de-emphasizing the goal of denuclearization, but agreeing to anything, including on risk reduction with North Korea, may end up costing too high a price, as mentioned above. If that is the case, de-emphasizing denuclearization would not make much of a difference. In diplomacy, agreeing to disagree is standard practice. If North Korea cannot even manage that, it can be concluded that Pyongyang is not serious about negotiations in the first place.
Risk reduction does not always need to be carried out through an agreement; it can also be done unilaterally. For example, the United States can adopt a nuclear doctrine that does not preemptively destroy North Korea’s nuclear forces, in particular its second-strike capabilities. And/or, the United States can declare mutual co-existence with North Korea, as it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and not pursue regime change. Regional states could also commit to not targeting the leader of North Korea for preemptive or preventive assassination. Such unilateral risk reduction measures should be implemented through close consultations with allies, and together with strengthening extended deterrence.
Conclusion
If the highest priority is for North Korea to come to the negotiating table, de-emphasizing or abandoning denuclearization may be a way to go. However, we must consider the side effects of such an approach, in particular for regional non-proliferation under the current rapidly changing security environment. In this regard, it is essential for the United States to maintain the goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea. At the same time, we must face the reality of serious nuclear risks that North Korea poses to regional security. Rather than excessively fearing that pursuing risk reduction might grant North Korea the status of a nuclear-armed state, Japan and South Korea should support the U.S. pursuit of not only denuclearization, but also nuclear risk reduction in a manner that would not legitimize North Korea’s nuclear armament.
About the Author
Michiru Nishida is a professor at the School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, deputy director of the Research Center for Global Risk, and concurrent professor at the Research Center for Nuclear Abolition (RECNA), Nagasaki University. He is also a member and Senior Research Adviser of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN). He worked for many years in the field of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation as a diplomat and as Special Adviser for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
Pursuing Both Denuclearization and Risk Reduction in North Korea Engagement
By Michiru Nishida
Korean Peninsula
Editor’s Note: In advance of Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi’s planned visit to Washington this month, three Japanese scholars offer their views on how and why complete denuclearization should be emphasized in Japanese, South Korean, and American policy toward North Korea. In this first of three commentaries, Professor Nishida argues for a two-pronged strategy to addressing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons.
All three authors will appear at a public event on March 17, in-person and online. To join us, register here.
Andrew Oros, Senior Fellow and Director, Japan Program
Introduction
Despite stringent international economic sanctions imposed primarily through the UN Security Council, North Korea’s progress in nuclear and missile development, as well as in its nuclear doctrine, has been remarkable, particularly since negotiations with the Trump administration in 2018-2019 stalled. It is undeniable that North Korea no longer views denuclearization as a subject for negotiation — though it remains unclear whether it ever seriously considered it as such in the first place. North Korea itself has repeatedly emphasized this point since around 2022, including through the revision of its constitution in September 2023, which indicated that it will not engage in any denuclearization negotiations whatsoever. This basic position was reiterated at the most recent Party Congress held in February 2026, although Kim Jong Un left the possibility of talks with the United States slightly open if North Korea’s nuclear status is accepted.1Shreyas Reddy, “Kim Jong Un leaves door open to talks if US accepts North Korea’s nuclear status,” NK News, 26 February, 2026. https://www.nknews.org/2026/02/kim-jong-un-leaves-door-open-to-talks-if-us-accepts-north-koreas-nuclear-status/
As a result, particularly since the Biden administration took office in 2021, there has been a growing call within the United States to de-emphasize or even abandon setting North Korea’s denuclearization as a policy goal and instead accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, at least for the time being, and adopt more pragmatic risk reduction measures as the primary policy objective.2Jeffrey Lewis, “It’s Time to Accept That North Korea Has Nuclear Weapons,” The New York Times, 13 October, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/13/opinion/international-world/north-korea-us-nuclear.html; Frank Aum and Ankit Panda, “Pursuing Stable Coexistence: A Reorientation of U.S. Policy Toward North Korea,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/05/pursuing-stable-coexistence-a-reorientation-of-us-policy-toward-north-korea This argument has been met with concerns in Japan and South Korea,3Manseok Lee and Hyeongpil Ham, “Hope and Concern in Seoul,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2021. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-07/features/hope-and-concern-seoul. Hideshi Tokuchi, “Biden Seiken no Hossoku to Nihon no Anzen Hosho Senryaku” [Launch of the Biden Administration and Japan’s Security Strategy], March 2021. https://ssdpaki.la.coocan.jp/proposals/71.html. Also see for Japan’s concern Hirofumi Tosaki, “Daini Trump Seikenka deno Kitachosen Mondai- Brainstorming” [North Korea’s Nuclear Issues under the Second Trump Administration – Brainstorming], 24 December, 2024. https://www.jiia.or.jp/jpn/report/2024/12/research-report/missile-fy2024-01.html and the Biden administration’s calibrated practical approach also ended up being half-hearted.4Jenny Town, Senior Fellow and Director of 38 North Program, assessed the Biden administration’s North Korea policy as “there was little that was actually new.” https://www.stimson.org/2023/bidens-policy-record-a-mid-term-assessment/.
The argument that denuclearization should be completely abandoned is a minority view. Since the majority does not necessarily see denuclearization and risk reduction (via arms control) as mutually exclusive, the question here is how to combine these two policy options when addressing North Korea’s nuclear issue and where the optimal point for the best mix lies.
Denuclearization Remains a Vital Policy Goal
Despite North Korea’s aversion to “denuclearization,” it should not be downgraded or de-emphasized to a mere formal policy goal, in particular for non-proliferation. Lowering the banner of denuclearization would cement and justify North Korea’s de facto nuclear status and exonerate its abuse of the right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the detriment of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, setting a dangerous precedent following India. Would-be proliferators would likely think that enduring international sanctions for several years will lead to recognition as a de facto nuclear power and would be encouraged to follow suit.
The denuclearization banner holds significant political importance for U.S. regional allies, Japan and South Korea. A senior Japanese government official recently emphasized to the author the importance of sending a consistent message to North Korea. While this official did not specify why, one concerning development is the rise in nuclear armament arguments in Japan and South Korea. The national debates in those countries stem from various factors, but there is no doubt that North Korea’s significant progress in nuclear development is one of the key factors. For example, among various public opinion surveys on South Korea and Japan’s potential nuclear armament that asked respondents for their reasoning on the issue, Asan Institute’s survey published in 2021 found that 32.1% of South Koreans cited countering North Korea’s nuclear threats.
Amid President Trump’s transactional approach to alliances, namely his insistence that allies should shoulder greater burdens and increase their own defense efforts, de-emphasizing the goal of denuclearization would likely further intensify national debate on nuclear armament that is already growing in Japan and South Korea. Compared to a few years ago when arguments for de-emphasizing denuclearization goals seemed somewhat more persuasive, the fundamental premise regarding the reliability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence has changed significantly. Specifically, since the Trump administration returned to power, allied confidence in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence has been eroded by Washington’s harsh posture toward its allies and its apparent disregard for a rules-based international order, most recently exemplified by its use of force against Iran, reportedly for reasons including regime change.
In such circumstances, it must be said that the price of de-emphasizing denuclearization in order to pursue a risk reduction agreement with North Korea could be too high. While it is certainly true that nuclear armament debates in Japan and South Korea will not immediately turn into actual nuclear armament, the very rise of such debates in both countries will destabilize the region and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Even if North Korea’s denuclearization is to be de-emphasized and a risk reduction agreement with North Korea is to be pursued, it is simply inconceivable that North Korea would agree merely because denuclearization is de-emphasized. North Korea would demand recognition of its status as a nuclear-armed state and, furthermore, seek the lifting of various sanctions. For Japan, the United States, and South Korea (especially Japan and South Korea), these would be concessions difficult to readily accept. De-emphasis of denuclearization would thus keep the possibility of reaching an agreement with North Korea low and would likely lead to the same outcome as the Biden administration’s calibrated approach, which ended inconclusively. If the United States were to pursue a risk reduction agreement with North Korea while de-emphasizing North Korea’s denuclearization even under such a prospect, that very course of action would itself entail paying a price that is far too high.
What is the Best Mix?
Even if we continue to maintain denuclearization as a key policy objective, risk reduction is also critically important, especially given that North Korea’s nuclear doctrine has become highly aggressive. So how should we best blend these two policy objectives?
Like the relationship between the long-term policy goal of “a world without nuclear weapons” and the short-term policy of realistic and practical nuclear disarmament measures, denuclearization and risk reduction can be distinguished as policy goals in different timelines. Setting it as a long-term goal does not mean de-emphasizing it. For Japan, the only nation to have suffered atomic bombings in war, a “world without nuclear weapons” is not merely an aspirational goal. Of course, given the current harsh international security environment, most Japanese people do not believe a “world without nuclear weapons” can be achieved immediately. Nevertheless, they hold a strong conviction that continuing to hold that banner high, even as a long-term goal, is a matter of Japanese pride and dignity. Thus, Japan advocates achieving a world without nuclear weapons as strongly as promoting realistic and practical disarmament measures, taking into consideration security situations on the ground.
A problem of Japan and South Korea’s current policy on North Korea’s nuclear issue is that they only advocate denuclearization, but little has been said about practical measures such as risk reduction, fearing it would lead to recognizing North Korea as a de facto nuclear-armed state. This concern itself is a legitimate one that needs to be taken into consideration. How exactly should two-pronged policies of both denuclearization and risk reduction be combined and implemented in a way that addresses Japan and South Korea’s concerns while reducing nuclear risks stemming from North Korea’s dangerous nuclear doctrine?
This commentary proposes differentiating between multilateral and bilateral/regional settings, and between public and private settings. In multilateral or public settings like the United Nations and NPT forums, denuclearization should continue to be vigorously promoted while creating a situation of “agree to disagree” in bilateral/regional or private settings — if such meetings could ever take place — so that focus can be placed on risk reduction. Just as we strive for a “world without nuclear weapons” as a long-term goal, we must continue to pursue denuclearization in the context of a “Northeast Asia without nuclear weapons” or, by extension, a “world without nuclear weapons.”5Michiru Nishida, “A Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia: From a Japanese Security Perspective,” in Getting to Nuclear Zero in Northeast Asia, Routledge, 2025, 48-64. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003595441-5/nuclear-weapons-free-zone-northeast-asia-michiru-nishida?context=ubx&refId=12508e60-2dce-4044-9d46-e8d5fddd38d5. At the same time, even if denuclearization is promoted publicly in a multilateral setting, negotiators should deliberately avoid pushing it to the forefront in bilateral talks. One could then expect that something might come out of private, bilateral talks. Such a possibility may be lower than de-emphasizing the goal of denuclearization, but agreeing to anything, including on risk reduction with North Korea, may end up costing too high a price, as mentioned above. If that is the case, de-emphasizing denuclearization would not make much of a difference. In diplomacy, agreeing to disagree is standard practice. If North Korea cannot even manage that, it can be concluded that Pyongyang is not serious about negotiations in the first place.
Risk reduction does not always need to be carried out through an agreement; it can also be done unilaterally. For example, the United States can adopt a nuclear doctrine that does not preemptively destroy North Korea’s nuclear forces, in particular its second-strike capabilities.6George Perkovich, Fumihiko Yoshida and Michiru Nishida, Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2025, pp. 101-112. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/03/rethinking-a-political-approach-to-nuclear-abolition?lang=en And/or, the United States can declare mutual co-existence with North Korea, as it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and not pursue regime change.7What Should Be Done?: Practical Policies to Prevent Nuclear Catastrophe, Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA) Project, March 2024, pp. 27-28. https://www.apln.network/projects/nuclear-weapon-use-risk-reduction/what-should-be-done-practical-policies-to-prevent-nuclear-catastrophe Regional states could also commit to not targeting the leader of North Korea for preemptive or preventive assassination.8Ibid., pp. 32. Such unilateral risk reduction measures should be implemented through close consultations with allies, and together with strengthening extended deterrence.
Conclusion
If the highest priority is for North Korea to come to the negotiating table, de-emphasizing or abandoning denuclearization may be a way to go. However, we must consider the side effects of such an approach, in particular for regional non-proliferation under the current rapidly changing security environment. In this regard, it is essential for the United States to maintain the goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea. At the same time, we must face the reality of serious nuclear risks that North Korea poses to regional security. Rather than excessively fearing that pursuing risk reduction might grant North Korea the status of a nuclear-armed state, Japan and South Korea should support the U.S. pursuit of not only denuclearization, but also nuclear risk reduction in a manner that would not legitimize North Korea’s nuclear armament.
About the Author
Michiru Nishida is a professor at the School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, deputy director of the Research Center for Global Risk, and concurrent professor at the Research Center for Nuclear Abolition (RECNA), Nagasaki University. He is also a member and Senior Research Adviser of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN). He worked for many years in the field of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation as a diplomat and as Special Adviser for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
Notes
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