Editor’s Note: Abdullah F. Alrebh is an associate professor of sociology of religion and sociological theory at Grand Valley State University. His research focuses on politics, culture, religion, and authority in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and the Islamic world. He earned a PhD from Michigan State University, East Lansing in 2014, in addition to an MA in sociology from Michigan State University and an MA in Arabic literature from King Saud University. Alrebh has published multiple academic articles and book chapters focusing on religion, authority, and education with a primary focus on Middle Eastern countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. He is the author of “Covering the Kingdom: Saudi Arabia in the Western Press During the 20th Century” (Routledge, 2024).

By Middle East Program Team

The future of Shi’ite Islam’s supreme religious authority after Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani dies has attracted considerable scholarly attention and intense geopolitical scrutiny. For decades, the Grand Marja’iyya in Najaf has served as a critical anchor for transnational Shi’ite communities and as a moderating force in Middle Eastern geopolitics.

As Ayatollah Sistani nears his 96^th birthday, conventional readings of the succession question assume either a direct dynastic inheritance by the ayatollah’s eldest son, Sayyid Muhammad Ridha al-Sistani, or the exclusion of Sistani sons to avoid any perception of hereditary rule.

This article proposes a more nuanced, sociologically grounded alternative: a transition toward an era of referential pluralism in which a multi-marja’ landscape will emerge, guided discreetly by the enduring administrative apparatus of the Sistani household.

To understand the trajectory of the succession, one must first assess the scholarly credentials and the significant age advantage held by the Sistani brothers as well as a comparative examination of the academic output of Sayyid Muhammad Ridha and Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sistani.

Both are prominent and highly respected teachers of Baḥth al-Khārij, the final and most advanced stage of study in the Shi’ite seminary. Translating roughly to “study beyond the text,” Baḥth al-Khārij requires students to move beyond standard textbooks and independently research primary sources to form their own legal conclusions. Equivalent to doctoral-level jurisprudential research, these studies are designed to train scholars to reach the level of independent jurists or mujtahids.

Other external candidates for succession, including Grand Ayatollahs Baqir al-Irawani, Hassan al-Jawahiri, and Muhammad Baqir Al Radi, are all approaching eighty years of age and suffer from various health issues. By contrast, the Sistani brothers, who are decades younger, are optimally positioned to consolidate their scholarly authority and avoid another succession crisis within a few years, granting them a significant practical edge in the rigorous environment of the Najaf seminary.

Despite this advantage, the core obstacle to either son assuming the singular role of the Supreme Marja’ is the inheritance stigma. The foundational principle of the Najaf seminary dictates that the Marja’iyya cannot be inherited through bloodlines.

The system is strictly predicated on the concept of a’lamiyya, meaning the quality of being the most learned in jurisprudence. This status must be rigorously verified through the gradual and informal consensus of experts known as ahl al-khibra. Any overt attempt to pass the mantle of supreme authority directly from father to son would severely undermine the historic legitimacy of the Marja’iyya.

Such a move would be perceived as a violation of the Hawza’s meritocratic traditions and would inevitably trigger fractures and rivalries within the seminary establishment. Therefore, navigating this stigma remains the paramount challenge for the Sistani household.

Iran Provides a Precedent

Within this institutional framework, the assumption that the eldest son must naturally inherit the father’s position is contradicted by both political and religious history.

In Iran, for example, Mostafa Khamenei is four years older than his brother Mojtaba Khamenei, yet Mojtaba was declared the successor to the Supreme Leadership after his father was killed by Israeli strikes at the beginning of the war with Iran. Also passed over was Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s older brother, Mohammad Khamenei, born in 1935. Mohammad was one of the compilers of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and has served as a member of the Islamic Consultative Assembly representing Mashhad.

This pattern suggests that seniority by birth does not determine succession outcomes, even in systems where familial ties are relevant.

The phenomenon of seniors serving under the leadership of juniors also prevails in the religious sphere of Najaf. A prime example is the late Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Saeed al-Hakim, who lived from 1936 to 2021.

He formally proclaimed his position as a Marja’ while his father, Ayatollah Muhammad Ali al-Hakim, who lived from 1911 to 2011, was still alive and actively serving the seminary. Notably, this was not a case of conflict or rivalry; rather, the father continued to teach and issue religious opinions while his son’s authority grew through scholarly recognition, demonstrating that multiple centers of authority can coexist within the same family without institutional friction.

The younger al-Hakim’s ascension while his father remained active illustrates that jurisprudential weight, social consensus, and institutional backing can readily override traditional age hierarchies. In the context of the Sistani succession, these precedents suggest that the younger brother, Sayyid Muhammad Baqir, could viably ascend to a prominent referential position without violating structural norms, even if this places him in a role of higher public religious authority than his older brother.

Najaf vs. Tehran Distinction

However, analysts often mistakenly conflate the structural dynamics of Najaf with those of Tehran, creating a deeply flawed comparative analysis. The succession mechanics in Iran rely on rigid constitutional political mechanisms, primarily the Assembly of Experts, which operates with the backing of state security and the deep state.

In Tehran, an institutional drive for stability can result in the election of a figure like Mojtaba Khamenei, even if his father did not explicitly wish for his son to succeed him. This top-down, politically engineered precedent demonstrates that a father’s desire against dynastic succession is not necessarily fulfilled by the state apparatus. However, this model is fundamentally non-transferable to Najaf.

The Iraqi Hawza lacks an electoral body and relies entirely on organic, gradual consensus among senior jurists. Furthermore, Najaf purposefully maintains strict independence from formal political authority, a defining characteristic that distinguishes it from the Wilayat al-Faqih system in Iran. This structural reality renders any attempt to engineer a dynastic succession in Najaf not only institutionally illegitimate but also practically unworkable, regardless of the scholarly credentials of the candidates involved.

Referential Pluralism

Given the absence of a singular agreed-upon successor and the advanced age of the senior external contenders, the expected landscape in the post-Sistani era is one of referential pluralism. It is highly unlikely that Najaf will immediately consolidate around a sole, undisputed Grand Marja’ as it did with Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, who secured the position within two years of the passing of previous Grand Marja’ in 1992.

Instead, the Hawza is poised to enter a multi-marja’ era, similar to the phase that followed the passing of Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei in 1992. Within this pluralistic framework, both Sistani sons will likely hold prominent positions as highly respected jurists and teachers.

They will be significant figures, reinforced by the administrative machinery of the Sistani household, which will continue to operate as a discreet guiding force. However, neither will initially claim the absolute supreme authority currently wielded by their father, at least not in the immediate transitional phase following his passing.

In this pluralistic landscape, the Sistani household’s most strategic move would be a pivot from overt supreme leadership to a profound administrative and guiding role. The quiet succession scenario involves Sayyid Muhammad Ridha utilizing his immense administrative experience and existing institutional network to discreetly direct support toward a senior external candidate, such as al-Irawani, to manage the immediate transitional phase.

This strategic cooperation, in which each brother serves the other’s long-term interests without competing for the same immediate role, reflects a solid consensus within the narrowest circle of the Marja’iyya. By supporting an external candidate, Muhammad Ridha would neutralize the dynastic stigma while preserving the household’s influence.

His administrative machinery, which has long managed the logistical and financial affairs of the Sistani office, would serve as the backbone of this transitional arrangement, ensuring continuity. Simultaneously, this provides an ideal environment for Muhammad Baqir, who possesses scholarly competence and remains detached from daily political administration, to continue building his referential authority, which he should declare immediately after the passing of his father.

The inheritance of the administrative structure would ensure a smooth transfer of competence, allowing the Sistani legacy and moderate approach to continue without radical changes. In this sense, the household’s strategy is not about dynastic succession in the traditional sense, but about institutional continuity achieved through strategic delegation and phased role differentiation.

This potential scenario is close to what happened to Sistani’s father in 1992, when he assumed his position while several senior scholars were still active in Najaf (Sayyid Abd al-A‘la al-Sabziwari, d. 1993) and Qom (Sayyid Mohammad-Reza Golpaygani, d. 1993, and Sheikh Muhammad-Ali al-Araki, d. 1994). At that time, the institutional body of al-Khoei pledged loyalty to Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, despite those prominent figures still being present. Shortly afterward, al-Sistani became the undisputed Grand Marja‘.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the post-Sistani era will test the resilience of the Najaf seminary and its emphasis on religious guidance rather than state power. By embracing a multi-marja’ framework managed by the administrative apparatus of the Sistani household, the institution should be able to navigate this precarious transition.

This approach would preserve the independence and legitimacy of the Hawza, avoiding the pitfalls of dynastic succession while ensuring that the scholarly and moderating influence of the Sistani family remains a stabilizing force in Iraq and the broader Middle East for decades to come. The success of this model could not only determine the future of the Najaf seminary but shape the religious and political landscape of Shi’ite Islam for generations.

Header image: Golestan Palace. By Maziar Abidian