Editor’s Note: Jennifer Blandin is a young expert in the Global Governance Innovation Network. This commentary is part of the GGIN’s Next Generation Experts series, which aims to elevate youth research and writing. Her research interests include global governance, international organizations, migration, and the role of regional institutions in shaping US-Latin American relations.

By Richard Ponzio, Director, Global Governance, Justice & Security Program

Regional organizations bridge global institutions and local realities through regional expertise, political legitimacy, and timely action. They work best when Member States prioritize regional cooperation over external alignment. From the 2000s to early 2010s, Latin American governments pursued greater regional autonomy by creating organizations to coordinate political, economic, and security priorities without relying primarily on external powers. This push coincided with the “Pink Tide,” a wave of left-leaning governments that came to power across the region in the late 1990s to early 2000s, as many governments prioritized regional integration, South-South cooperation, and greater political autonomy. Organizations like Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (CELAC) and The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), created in 2011, reflect this approach by giving governments forums to manage disputes, coordinate policy, and pursue regional priorities without direct U.S. participation. Rather than aligning around US-driven policies, these organizations seek to strengthen Latin America’s capacity to address regional challenges collectively. Today, the growing reliance on externally driven security initiatives, including the US-backed Shield of the Americas, shifts regional cooperation away from inclusive institutions and toward selective political alignment.

When Geopolitics Gets in the Way

Since the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy has shaped the political environment in which Latin American regional institutions operate. The Organization of American States (OAS), headquartered in Washington, D.C., continues to operate within this framework, often reflecting U.S. priorities on anti-communism, sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. Yet Latin America has never been politically monolithic; governments across the region have repeatedly pursued different visions of regional cooperation, while regional leaders and political movements have challenged external intervention and advocated for greater political autonomy. These efforts produced milestones, including the declaration of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace in 2014, which reaffirmed governments’ commitment to regional dialogue. 

The U.S. “Shield of the Americas” initiative reflects a recent model of regional cooperation organized around Washington’s strategic priorities rather than consensus among Latin American States. Announced in March of 2026, the initiative brings together the U.S. and like-minded Latin American governments to expand law enforcement, intelligence-sharing, and security cooperation in response to transnational crime, migration, and regional instability. By working through a selective US-led agenda rather than through an inclusive regional institution, the Shield allows participating governments to cooperate without resolving the political divisions that have weakened regional bodies such as CELAC. This approach may produce faster security cooperation in the short term, but it also gives governments fewer incentives to strengthen regional institutions capable of accommodating ideological diversity across Latin America.

CELAC and UNASUR: The Promise of Regionalism 

Latin America has developed a wide range of regional institutions to address economic integration, human rights, development finance, public health, and political cooperation. Organizations such as The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) promote economic and political coordination among Caribbean states, the Inter-American Development Bank finances regional development projects, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights monitors and protects human rights across the hemisphere. Building on this institutional landscape, CELAC brings together every sovereign country in Latin America and the Caribbean as a forum for political dialogue and regional coordination, while UNASUR promotes South American integration through political coordination and conflict mediation, both designed to strengthen regional autonomy without direct U.S. oversight. Unlike the OAS, both provide Latin American and Caribbean governments a platform to define priorities without direct U.S. participation. 

The Shield of the Americas shifts regional security cooperation away from inclusive institutions and toward a coalition of governments with strategic priorities. Proponents argue that this model responds more quickly to transnational crime, arms trafficking, migration, and cartel violence than larger regional organizations constrained by political divides. Its selective membership raises a broader question: Is hemispheric cooperation once again being organized around geopolitical alignment rather than regional inclusion? 

Latin American regional organizations remain imperfect. Many depend heavily on political consensus among governments with different ideological orientations and economic priorities, yet they represent an important effort to institutionalize regional autonomy in a region shaped by external influence. Venezuela since 2005 offers one of the clearest examples of how geopolitical polarization can weaken regional institutions. As Washington intensified sanctions and diplomatic pressure against the Maduro government, Latin American governments divided sharply over how to respond to Venezuela’s political crisis. Those disagreements increasingly became geopolitical loyalty tests. Instead of using regional organizations to mediate crisis, governments increasingly divided along competing ideological blocs. Those divisions weakened institutions that depended on political consensus to function. UNASUR became dormant under the weight of disputes over Venezuela in 2014, as multiple governments suspended their participation and Member States failed to reach consensus on regional crises. CELAC survived, but its activity has fluctuated with political and electoral cycles across the region. As governments change, incoming leaders often reorient their foreign policy priorities and commitment to regional integration. 

Why Latin America Needs Regional Consensus, Not Selective Coalitions

U.S. policymakers often fault Latin American regional organizations for being ineffective, ideological, or institutionally weak, while overlooking how Washington’s own preference for bilateral alliances and selective coalitions has helped produce fragility. When hemispheric politics are organized around geopolitical alignment rather than regional consensus, regional organizations struggle to endure. The result is a recurring cycle: Organizations emerge with ambitious visions of autonomy and integration, fracture under external pressure and ideological division, and are replaced by narrower initiatives that promise cooperation while further weakening the prospects for inclusive regional governance. Yet Latin America’s most pressing challenges — organized crime, migration, economic inequality, climate vulnerability, and democratic instability — cannot be addressed through fragmented alliances or shifting geopolitical blocs. They require sustained, region-wide coordination capable of transcending ideological differences. Strong, inclusive regional organizations are therefore not a luxury, but a necessity: They are the only viable foundation for collective action, long-term stability, and effective governance across the hemisphere.