At a recent informal roundtable discussion in Washington, a former senior European defense official was asked about the state of Europe’s thinking about an independent continental nuclear deterrent capability given the growing Russian threat and uncertainty about the transatlantic alliance emanating from Washington. His response was to question the need for such a discussion and point out that it would take Europe at least a decade to develop such a capability. That answer crystalized the importance and urgency of discussing how to credibly start scoping out such a project, what it would entail, what existing European assets it could or would need to build upon, and what it might mean for global efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The conversation also underlined the pivotal moment in which we find ourselves. The shared transatlantic goals and structures created after World War II, including a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe, can no longer be considered as givens. This is undoubtedly hard for many on both sides of the Atlantic to contemplate, but as norms and common assumptions in places as diverse as Ukraine, Venezuela, and Nigeria continue to be shattered, the need for at least consideration of future options through dialogue and discussion seems all the more urgent.
Uncertainty and threats from the U.S. and Russia have awakened a new fundamental insecurity in Europe. While NATO seems to have remained, for now, in the good graces of the Trump Administration — primarily due to the alliance’s willingness to adopt a 5% of GDP target on defense spending and the deft diplomacy of Secretary General Rutte — underlying official U.S. attitudes toward Europe’s security, as vividly illustrated in the 2025 U.S. National Security strategy, pose serious questions as to the extent and depth of U.S. commitments to Europe’s security. An upcoming review of U.S. forces stationed across Europe may be a critical indicator of U.S. commitment or concern. Meanwhile, Russian recalcitrance over finding a peaceful way out of the Ukraine war, dismissive statements about Europe’s role and interests, and a pattern of hybrid probing of Europe’s defenses seem to point to a more aggressive posture in the near term and possibly a genuine military threat in the longer term.
Underpinning European defense has been the credible availability of U.S. nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, to respond to any Russian effort to threaten or actually use nuclear weapons in a move against Europe. Arguably, this abiding U.S. commitment is what kept the Cold War chilled and enabled the flourishing of a European economic and political identity over the past 80 years. Russian nuclear saber rattling over the past four years in response to Western help for Ukraine has provided an initial inkling of how this accepted premise has begun to erode. The careful and calibrated statements by the Biden Administration in the first three years of the war have given way to silence and apparent indifference under Trump.
In the face of these changes, the European response has been visible and clear, but also inadequate. A stepped-up commitment to common security institutions like NATO, greater resource allocations, steps toward autonomous defense capabilities such as a fortified defense industrial base, and more concerted positions among major European leaders are welcome and essential. There has also been a larger conversation about the need for European strategic autonomy over the medium- to long-term. Yet there is hesitancy over how Europe could credibly respond to a viable Russian threat through military means: Using either conventional and/or nuclear weapons is either still off the table or mired in existing capabilities that are militarily and politically insufficient. There are no apparent Europe-owned capabilities and mechanisms either in the toolbox or on the horizon that would be adequate to cause Moscow to fundamentally alter its calculus.
The two European nations that have nuclear weapons are Great Britain and France. Great Britain, a lynchpin in the transatlantic alliance but now outside of the European Union where some of the frontier discussions about a European defense identify are occurring, possesses a nuclear capability that is highly dependent on U.S. technology and command and control. A shriveling U.S. commitment to Europe’s defense could undermine the utility and flexibility of that capability. France has jealously (and correctly, now in hindsight) kept its nuclear “force du frappe” independent of both the U.S. and NATO. Together, these systems as they now stand would be in no position to substitute for the current U.S. nuclear umbrella. New arrangements and systems among European nations are essential if Europe is to demonstrate its own independent resolve and fortitude in the face of threatened Russian aggression.
To demonstrate both a deterrent effect to Moscow and a signal of independence from the U.S., Europe has three possible military options it can pursue separately or in combination: (1) seeking a new broader based nuclear armament capability, (2) building off of the existing French and to some extent British systems, or (3) establishing a strengthened, forward-deployed conventional military capability. A key question separating the first two from the third is what the marginal deterrent value of just a credible nuclear capability would be over a visibly and seriously strengthened conventional force. The last few months have seen some preliminary discussions and consideration of how the French systems might be extended to involve other European nations. In particular, Poland and Germany have both recognized the potential need for such a continental deterrent and suggested they could either support some sort of extension of France’s system or work on a new, joint system.
One serious obstacle to fielding a new multinational nuclear deterrent capability is the 55-year-old nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Among other treaty requirements, the NPT includes agreements by existing nuclear-armed states not to transfer weapons, the refusal of non-nuclear states to acquire them, and a commitment by all to peaceful nuclear cooperation, overseen by the IAEA. The treaty has served as the cornerstone of global nuclear efforts, preventing proliferation and fostering disarmament. Amendments or exceptions to the treaty require a majority of nuclear-armed states to approve, and given the current international environment, that seems unlikely.
Given the potential existential nature of the security threat Europe may face, treaty abrogation may need to be eventually placed on the table. Undoubtedly, this would be a huge step for Europe and the global nonproliferation regime of the last 50 years. European leaders would have to renounce a cornerstone of European security, and doing so would, at the very least, remove a powerful international obstacle to a number of other countries around the world interested in acquiring nuclear arms. The fact that this is even under consideration is a powerful indicator of what is at stake in this new and unprecedented global reality.
Another concern is that normalizing discussion of a new or strengthened European nuclear deterrent may be seen as a signal and irreparable step in the termination of transatlantic security cooperation and hasten the acceptance and eventual deployment of a European system. This is certainly the concern of those in Europe and the United States who feel that the U.S. nuclear umbrella, while under stress, remains intact and viable. This is a legitimate and serious concern that needs to be factored into all stages of the discussion, but it should not be considered sufficient to force the issue off the table entirely.
Finally, what would be the implications for U.S. national security if Europe chooses to follow its own path on nuclear weapons capability? Even if such a step seems to align well with the current national security thinking of the Trump Administration, it would likely cause serious disquiet in Congress with Democrats and probably more than a few Republicans worried about accelerated proliferation. It could insert new dynamics and challenges into U.S. alliances in other parts of the world, including Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia as those countries start to seriously contemplate the need to go nuclear, while also emboldening U.S. adversaries to move down the same path. More nuclear weapons in the hands of friends and foes will in turn likely limit U.S. advantages and freedom of movement. In some ways, this disquiet was reflected in the 2025 NDAA, which contained a number of provisions requiring the Trump administration to continue supporting Ukraine in its struggle against Russia. This could have implications after the 2026 mid-term elections if Democrats are in control of one or both houses of Congress, thus putting them in a position to strengthen U.S. support for European defense. Moreover, a post- Trump administration may also want to retain options to support Europe and limit nuclear proliferation.
Wishing these challenges away will not make them disappear. As the U.S. upending of global norms and practices early in 2026 through the abduction of Venezuelan strongman Maduro has demonstrated, realities and assumptions can shift fast. There is an inherent value in starting with this as an agenda item as part of transatlantic security dialogue to adjust attitudes to actual geopolitical realities. If a new European nuclear deterrent is even a remote possibility that could take a long time to realize, then the need for discussion and dialogue to consider whether and how to approach it is now.
Considering a European Nuclear Deterrent
By Andrew Hyde
Grand Strategy
At a recent informal roundtable discussion in Washington, a former senior European defense official was asked about the state of Europe’s thinking about an independent continental nuclear deterrent capability given the growing Russian threat and uncertainty about the transatlantic alliance emanating from Washington. His response was to question the need for such a discussion and point out that it would take Europe at least a decade to develop such a capability. That answer crystalized the importance and urgency of discussing how to credibly start scoping out such a project, what it would entail, what existing European assets it could or would need to build upon, and what it might mean for global efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The conversation also underlined the pivotal moment in which we find ourselves. The shared transatlantic goals and structures created after World War II, including a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe, can no longer be considered as givens. This is undoubtedly hard for many on both sides of the Atlantic to contemplate, but as norms and common assumptions in places as diverse as Ukraine, Venezuela, and Nigeria continue to be shattered, the need for at least consideration of future options through dialogue and discussion seems all the more urgent.
Uncertainty and threats from the U.S. and Russia have awakened a new fundamental insecurity in Europe. While NATO seems to have remained, for now, in the good graces of the Trump Administration — primarily due to the alliance’s willingness to adopt a 5% of GDP target on defense spending and the deft diplomacy of Secretary General Rutte — underlying official U.S. attitudes toward Europe’s security, as vividly illustrated in the 2025 U.S. National Security strategy, pose serious questions as to the extent and depth of U.S. commitments to Europe’s security. An upcoming review of U.S. forces stationed across Europe may be a critical indicator of U.S. commitment or concern. Meanwhile, Russian recalcitrance over finding a peaceful way out of the Ukraine war, dismissive statements about Europe’s role and interests, and a pattern of hybrid probing of Europe’s defenses seem to point to a more aggressive posture in the near term and possibly a genuine military threat in the longer term.
Underpinning European defense has been the credible availability of U.S. nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, to respond to any Russian effort to threaten or actually use nuclear weapons in a move against Europe. Arguably, this abiding U.S. commitment is what kept the Cold War chilled and enabled the flourishing of a European economic and political identity over the past 80 years. Russian nuclear saber rattling over the past four years in response to Western help for Ukraine has provided an initial inkling of how this accepted premise has begun to erode. The careful and calibrated statements by the Biden Administration in the first three years of the war have given way to silence and apparent indifference under Trump.
In the face of these changes, the European response has been visible and clear, but also inadequate. A stepped-up commitment to common security institutions like NATO, greater resource allocations, steps toward autonomous defense capabilities such as a fortified defense industrial base, and more concerted positions among major European leaders are welcome and essential. There has also been a larger conversation about the need for European strategic autonomy over the medium- to long-term. Yet there is hesitancy over how Europe could credibly respond to a viable Russian threat through military means: Using either conventional and/or nuclear weapons is either still off the table or mired in existing capabilities that are militarily and politically insufficient. There are no apparent Europe-owned capabilities and mechanisms either in the toolbox or on the horizon that would be adequate to cause Moscow to fundamentally alter its calculus.
The two European nations that have nuclear weapons are Great Britain and France. Great Britain, a lynchpin in the transatlantic alliance but now outside of the European Union where some of the frontier discussions about a European defense identify are occurring, possesses a nuclear capability that is highly dependent on U.S. technology and command and control. A shriveling U.S. commitment to Europe’s defense could undermine the utility and flexibility of that capability. France has jealously (and correctly, now in hindsight) kept its nuclear “force du frappe” independent of both the U.S. and NATO. Together, these systems as they now stand would be in no position to substitute for the current U.S. nuclear umbrella. New arrangements and systems among European nations are essential if Europe is to demonstrate its own independent resolve and fortitude in the face of threatened Russian aggression.
To demonstrate both a deterrent effect to Moscow and a signal of independence from the U.S., Europe has three possible military options it can pursue separately or in combination: (1) seeking a new broader based nuclear armament capability, (2) building off of the existing French and to some extent British systems, or (3) establishing a strengthened, forward-deployed conventional military capability. A key question separating the first two from the third is what the marginal deterrent value of just a credible nuclear capability would be over a visibly and seriously strengthened conventional force. The last few months have seen some preliminary discussions and consideration of how the French systems might be extended to involve other European nations. In particular, Poland and Germany have both recognized the potential need for such a continental deterrent and suggested they could either support some sort of extension of France’s system or work on a new, joint system.
One serious obstacle to fielding a new multinational nuclear deterrent capability is the 55-year-old nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Among other treaty requirements, the NPT includes agreements by existing nuclear-armed states not to transfer weapons, the refusal of non-nuclear states to acquire them, and a commitment by all to peaceful nuclear cooperation, overseen by the IAEA. The treaty has served as the cornerstone of global nuclear efforts, preventing proliferation and fostering disarmament. Amendments or exceptions to the treaty require a majority of nuclear-armed states to approve, and given the current international environment, that seems unlikely.
Given the potential existential nature of the security threat Europe may face, treaty abrogation may need to be eventually placed on the table. Undoubtedly, this would be a huge step for Europe and the global nonproliferation regime of the last 50 years. European leaders would have to renounce a cornerstone of European security, and doing so would, at the very least, remove a powerful international obstacle to a number of other countries around the world interested in acquiring nuclear arms. The fact that this is even under consideration is a powerful indicator of what is at stake in this new and unprecedented global reality.
Another concern is that normalizing discussion of a new or strengthened European nuclear deterrent may be seen as a signal and irreparable step in the termination of transatlantic security cooperation and hasten the acceptance and eventual deployment of a European system. This is certainly the concern of those in Europe and the United States who feel that the U.S. nuclear umbrella, while under stress, remains intact and viable. This is a legitimate and serious concern that needs to be factored into all stages of the discussion, but it should not be considered sufficient to force the issue off the table entirely.
Finally, what would be the implications for U.S. national security if Europe chooses to follow its own path on nuclear weapons capability? Even if such a step seems to align well with the current national security thinking of the Trump Administration, it would likely cause serious disquiet in Congress with Democrats and probably more than a few Republicans worried about accelerated proliferation. It could insert new dynamics and challenges into U.S. alliances in other parts of the world, including Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia as those countries start to seriously contemplate the need to go nuclear, while also emboldening U.S. adversaries to move down the same path. More nuclear weapons in the hands of friends and foes will in turn likely limit U.S. advantages and freedom of movement. In some ways, this disquiet was reflected in the 2025 NDAA, which contained a number of provisions requiring the Trump administration to continue supporting Ukraine in its struggle against Russia. This could have implications after the 2026 mid-term elections if Democrats are in control of one or both houses of Congress, thus putting them in a position to strengthen U.S. support for European defense. Moreover, a post- Trump administration may also want to retain options to support Europe and limit nuclear proliferation.
Wishing these challenges away will not make them disappear. As the U.S. upending of global norms and practices early in 2026 through the abduction of Venezuelan strongman Maduro has demonstrated, realities and assumptions can shift fast. There is an inherent value in starting with this as an agenda item as part of transatlantic security dialogue to adjust attitudes to actual geopolitical realities. If a new European nuclear deterrent is even a remote possibility that could take a long time to realize, then the need for discussion and dialogue to consider whether and how to approach it is now.
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