Editor’s Note: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

By Middle East Program Team

On August 9, Russia and Syria reached a deal that significantly reduces Russian control over two military outposts from the Assad era.

The Russian side tried to portray the agreement as an important step that would boost ties between the two states. “We believe ⁠that reaching this agreement will give further impetus to the development of the full range of relations between our countries, which are based on a long history of friendship ​and partnership,” Russia’s Foreign Ministry argued.

The reality could be strikingly different. Damascus is reinstating full control over the two facilities, including Hmeimim airport and the commercial ⁠berth ⁠at Tartus port. The military sections of the two facilities are to transition within three months into joint training facilities with a fraction of Russian troops, while the Dubai-based DP World logistics company modernizes Tartus and other Syrian ports.

The agreement is the result of nearly a year and a half of negotiations between Damascus and Moscow that started after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024. In the first weeks after Assad’s downfall, Moscow rapidly reduced its footprint at the Hmeimim airbase and the naval facility at Tartous, and the new authorities in Damascus cancelled a long-term concession previously granted to the Russian engineering company Stroytransgaz. Russian forces also withdrew from Qamishli airport in northeastern Syria and curtailed patrols near the Israeli frontier.

Despite the sharp reduction in Russian presence and control, Moscow is likely to remain an important actor in Syria. Interestingly, Russia will open a cultural center in Damascus in the near future. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has also made two visits to Russia — in October 2025 and again in early 2026 — and the two economies retain important links.

Syria inherited enormous reconstruction requirements alongside approximately $1.2 billion in Assad-era obligations to Russia. Russian technical expertise also remains difficult to replace in several sectors. This is particularly relevant to major infrastructure built or designed with Soviet assistance. Three large dams on the Euphrates illustrate the problem. Decades of deterioration and war have left important elements of Syrian infrastructure requiring extensive rehabilitation, and only Russian engineers possess institutional knowledge of Soviet-era systems.

Moreover, rather than immediately dismantling arrangements inherited from the Assad period, the new Syrian authorities have continued working with the Russian state-linked company, Goznak, to print Syrian currency.

Energy and food security create additional incentives. Russia is among the main oil and wheat suppliers to Syria, providing 46,000-60,000 barrels of oil per day. To this should be added the legacy of decades of Soviet and Russian arms supplies. Most Assad-era weapons are of Soviet/Russia provenance. Replacing them with the technology of Western or Turkish origin would need years, if not decades.

Additionally, there are significant geopolitical considerations. Russia remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council, giving Moscow diplomatic weight that Syria cannot simply disregard. Russian diplomatic support — or at a minimum Russian neutrality — retains considerable value for the Syrian government as it seeks to re-establish its diplomatic bona fides on the regional and international stages.

A continued Russian presence also potentially gives Damascus another channel through which Israeli behavior can be moderated. Moscow maintained extensive communications with Israel throughout the Assad era, including military deconfliction mechanisms. Preserving some level of Russian engagement could therefore be useful to Damascus as it seeks to constrain Israeli military activity and reduce its occupation of Syrian territory without entering into direct confrontation. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that Russia is no longer the principal external provider of Syrian security. Turkey’s influence has expanded dramatically, while Washington and the European Union possess far greater leverage than Moscow over sanctions relief and Syria’s reintegration into the international system.

Influence in the Wider Region

As a global energy actor, Russia can influence oil and gas prices and has close energy ties with Turkey and Iran in addition to partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and lately Oman. It is also an important trading partner for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Iran, and Turkey. Increasingly, Russia has expanded its role in developing civilian nuclear energy in the Middle East and North Africa. The Russian state-run company, Rosatom, has signed major deals with regional countries laying the foundation for decades-long relationships in the field, which often translate into geopolitical clout. 

All this does not obscure a weakening geopolitical position in the Middle East and Africa. The loss of the Tartus and Hmeimim facilities is a major blow. These bases had long served Moscow’s interests not only in Syria but as a launching pad for Russian power projection in the eastern Mediterranean and the African continent. The Tartous facility was critical in that regard as it served as a repair and replenishment center for Russia. Without Syria, a vital geographic link with the African Corps, the former Wagner Group, so critical to Russia’s economic and wider interests in the heart of the African continent, has been severely diminished. Russia’s retreat in Syria means that it will have less leverage vis-a-vis Gulf states and Turkey, making Russia a secondary power rather than a major power broker. Given its weakened posture, Russia will likely avoid exclusive alignment with any single regional bloc and will strive to maintain transactional type of relations with key Middle East players.  

Moreover, the war in Ukraine is taking a toll on Russia’s posture in the entire Middle East and the damage looks likely to be long-term. Moscow has taken a minimal role during the US-Israel war on Iran apart from the experience the Islamic Republic has apparently garnered from Russia over drone warfare. To this should be added Russia’s apparent inability to block Turkey’s expanding influence in the South Caucasus — evident in Ankara’s decision to restore rail links with Armenia. Turkey is also interested in uniting the Turkic world via the Organization of Turkic States in which Azerbaijan plays an important role as a link to Central Asia. Declining confidence in Washington, however, may encourage regional governments to diversify their partnerships and Russia can benefit by presenting itself as an additional diplomatic, energy, military, and political partner that increases their strategic autonomy.

Regarding Syria, the relationship with Moscow must also contend with serious political disputes. A Syrian court on August 11 sentenced Assad in absentia to death for crimes against humanity during the 14-year civil war. Assad fled to Moscow in 2024, and Russia continues to provide him protection, giving no indication that it intends to surrender its former longtime ally.

In conclusion, the emerging arrangement between Moscow and Damascus bears little resemblance to the strategic privileges Russia enjoyed under the Assad dynasty. Damascus is increasingly interested in converting Russian military infrastructure into assets serving Syrian priorities. Russia’s presence has shifted from the predominantly military model developed after its 2015 intervention toward a hybrid relationship combining logistics, trade, and infrastructure. When it comes to security, Russia can contribute to Syria’s strategic balancing, but it can no longer determine the country’s security architecture.