Editor’s Note: Karim Safieddine is a researcher and writer based in Lebanon. He is a PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh.

By Middle East Program Team

Talks in Rome this week between Lebanon and Israel are expected to focus on expanding pilot zones in south Lebanon, resolving border disputes, and advancing a new security framework. But achieving safety and sovereignty for Lebanon requires serious policy reconsideration in both Washington and Beirut. 

The Rome talks follow Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Washington last month, the first by a Lebanese head of state since 2009. His most important job was to convince President Donald Trump that Israel’s continued attacks on south Lebanon will not lead to a durable peace. Official readouts of the meeting suggest that the chemistry between the two leaders, a matter of high importance to the U.S. president, was good. But it is by no means clear whether Aoun achieved his primary objective.

According to the Lebanese side, the topics of discussion included the shaky Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, the possibility of Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and the security capacity of the Lebanese state. The visit came amid ongoing US-mediated efforts to implement a new annex to a “Trilateral Framework” through “pilot zones,” in which disarmament of Hezbollah, Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployment, reconstruction, and Israeli withdrawal occur in stages.

The first pilot zone operations began July 20 in the villages of Froun, Srifa, and Zawtar al-Gharbiya. They were overseen by a Lebanon Military Coordination Group, established as part of the framework agreement. However, unsurprisingly, the rollout was swiftly countered by renewed Israeli fire near LAF positions, reinforcing the Lebanese claim that persistent Israeli military activity remains the primary obstacle to the framework’s implementation. 

Another challenge to the Lebanese peace process is the lack of a clearly articulated vision among American policymakers of a post-Hezbollah and post-Israeli occupation Lebanon. Israel’s repeated interventions in Lebanon, albeit in response to Hezbollah bombing of northern Israel, have yet to achieve strategic success. While Hezbollah has lost much of its cross-sectarian legitimacy and faces serious skepticism even from within the Shi’ite community, external aggression will invariably revive its popularity absent a vision for how social relations can be navigated in a country riddled with ethno-sectarian divisions and victimhood. 

Short-Term Military Wins, Strategic Failure

Israel has undoubtedly caused massive damage to Hezbollah since the group began bombing Israel on October 8, 2023, in solidarity with Hamas. Some of Hezbollah’s own leaders have conceded these losses and acknowledged that, at a minimum, a “technical revision” is needed.

However, the most recent war has exposed a fundamental Israeli weakness: Israel is not ready to engage in a war of annihilation against Hezbollah, as that would entail a full-fledged ground invasion and enormous Israeli losses. Despite this, Israel’s military elite still wants a definitive end to Hezbollah’s regional capacity, while Israel’s political elite cannot afford to ignore the threat perceptions of an increasingly militarized Israeli public. The vast majority of Jewish Israelis see a need for a security zone in south Lebanon, but there is no assurance that such a zone would facilitate the dismantlement of Hezbollah as a militant organization. 

Despite the deaths of over 4,000 Lebanese since a March 2 provisional ceasefire, Hezbollah has made it clear that it does not intend to disarm, whether voluntarily or by force. Furthermore, Hezbollah has found innovative and subtle new ways to transfer cash and other resources, and to train its cadres. After the 2024 war, with the help of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the group leveraged a lull in fighting to reorganize, rebuild smuggling networks, and advance a decentralized guerrilla framework. It further expanded drone production, enabling sustained attacks against Israeli military infrastructure in South Lebanon despite significant battlefield losses.

In the face of these challenges, the Israeli army clearly is not interested in mounting a large ground invasion. However, indefinite partial military pressure will not resolve the Israeli and Lebanese state’s dilemma. Israel’s continued destruction in south Lebanon is reviving Hezbollah’s legitimacy at a time when the country needs a new model of governance based on the collective interests of the Lebanese. In other words, destruction without a political strategy only reproduces the conditions that led to state breakdown.

Can the Lebanese State Do the Job?

Aoun’s second job in Washington was to persuade Trump that the Lebanese state can consolidate control over the entire country. However, Aoun’s speech at the Lebanese Embassy indicated an approach to disarmament that differs from what is apparently envisioned by the U.S., as he’s aware of the domestic consequences of the perpetual assault on Hezbollah from a foreign power. Aoun also presented an alternative historical reading, explaining that Hezbollah’s continued existence can only be explained in the context of repeated Israeli military campaigns and occupations.

Under Aoun, the Lebanese state has begun reasserting its presence in areas formerly tightly controlled by Hezbollah. It has enhanced its oversight of borders, ports, and smuggling networks, in addition to targeting informal channels and cash flow mechanisms which sustain Hezbollah’s financial capacity. These developments come in the context of increased security cooperation between the Syrian and Lebanese governments with a strong focus on intelligence sharing and border cooperation, including monitoring ISIS networks and tracking movements and smuggling efforts linked to Hezbollah. The Lebanese government has also pushed to bring reconstruction, compensation, and public spending mechanisms under state institutions rather than party-linked networks, despite limitations with regard to resources.

The last point is not a detail. While Trump promised to “help Lebanon a lot,” it isn’t clear if Aoun sufficiently made the case that statecraft based on sovereignty and not subservience cannot be adequately pursued without large economic and military resources. These are necessary to regain the trust of a disillusioned population, especially the Shi’ite community. There also needs to be a deterrent to Israeli overreach, and more U.S. pressure on Israel to let go of a buffer zone in the south.

The elevation of Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam was accompanied by a sense of optimism and a vision Aoun articulated during his inaugural speech in January 2025. Today, practical limitations and the absence of a robust and proactive strategy will have crowded out the visionary spirit of that speech. 

Politics and diplomacy are the way to resolve the conflict, accompanied by a new vision of Lebanon that is positively received by the Shi’ite population. It is imperative for Washington to support Lebanese state-building efforts, unlock key resources, and push against violations of the country’s sovereignty so that this Lebanese idea is realized, articulated, and recognized.

In addition, on a local level, the government needs to clearly deviate from the legacy of former cabinets by advancing an aggressive financial restructuring and challenging sectarian accommodation. If the process is reconciliatory, follows a bold and strong negotiation with the Iranian government as well as the Israelis, and brings in powerful cross-sectarian stakeholders, the Shi’ite community will finally see a viable alternative at a time when the Hezbollah-Iran model has clearly failed.