Editor’s Note: A frequent contributor to Stimson on Middle East conflicts and diplomacy, Giorgio Cafiero has a particular expertise analyzing the foreign policies of Arab states in the Levant and bordering the Persian Gulf.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
President Donald Trump is meeting this week with leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which have deepened relations with U.S. arch-rival China since his first presidential trip to the region in 2017.
Throughout this century, GCC members have actively diversified their international alliances and partnerships amid a global transition from a U.S.-dominated order to a less Western-centric landscape. This recalibration, which has intensified this year due to the Trump administration’s abrupt economic moves including high tariffs and its rhetoric and actions in relation to Gaza, reflects a pragmatic response to evolving geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics.
Arab monarchies along the Persian Gulf are asserting greater strategic autonomy and hedging amid growing doubts about Washington’s long-term commitment to their security. By cultivating a broad spectrum of relationships, including with rival global powers, GCC states have positioned themselves to extract geopolitical, economic, and diplomatic benefits. China, with the world’s second-largest economy, has been the most important actor in the Gulf Arabs’ “Look East” foreign policy pivot.
While historically aligned with the West and reliant on the American security umbrella, GCC members have pursued a delicate balancing act, deepening commercial, financial, energy, trade, technology, and investment ties with China and other Asian powerhouses. Different states have occupied various points along a spectrum with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), at one end, the sole Gulf Arab monarchy to have joined BRICS+ as it positions itself as the GCC state most independent from Washington across multiple spheres. At the other end lies Qatar, which hosts the largest U.S. military presence in the Middle East at a base in al-Udeid and is the Gulf Arab monarchy most deeply anchored within the U.S. geopolitical orbit.
Against the backdrop of rising U.S.-China tensions and an ongoing trade war, GCC states may face increasing pressure from President Trump to align more decisively with Washington. During his visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE and a summit with all six GCC heads of state, Trump will seek to draw these monarchies more firmly into Washington’s sphere of influence.
However, Trump is unlikely to succeed in reversing a regional trend toward closer ties with China. China remains the top importer of Gulf oil and gas, providing the GCC states with a dependable market for their hydrocarbon exports. At the same time, China and the Gulf Arab monarchies are forging multidimensional partnerships that align with their respective long-term development agendas.
Notably, the synergies between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 underscore shared strategic aims. China plays a pivotal role in the economic diversification strategies of all GCC states, contributing significantly to the growth of non-hydrocarbon sectors such as tourism, clean energy, advanced technology, finance, health, infrastructure, and logistics. In the sphere of digitization, Chinese firms and expertise will also be integral to sweeping economic transitions underway across the Gulf.
GCC members are conscious that they possess considerable leverage in their dealings with the U.S. Although they continue to rely on American security guarantees, Washington, in turn, depends on GCC states to advance key U.S. economic and geopolitical objectives.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are well positioned to support Trump’s domestic economic agenda through substantial investments in the U.S. economy. On the diplomatic front, GCC members have demonstrated their effectiveness as bridges between the U.S. and some of Washington’s adversaries such as Russia and Iran while the Trump administration seeks to freeze the conflict in Ukraine and reach a new nuclear deal with Tehran. The White House also needs its GCC partners to make progress on a wide array of sensitive regional issues from the rehabilitation of Syria, Lebanon, and eventually Gaza to security in the Red Sea, where the Trump administration recently ended, at least for now, a nearly two-month bombing campaign against Houthi rebels.
Ironically, the Trump administration’s efforts to counter and compete with China may only enhance Gulf Arab states’ bargaining power. The “China card” has become a powerful diplomatic tool that GCC leaders can skillfully wield to extract concessions from Washington such as Saudi Arabia’s efforts to acquire nuclear technology and more advanced U.S. weaponry.
At the same time, policymakers across the GCC are likely attuned to Washington’s red lines—particularly in the realm of security and defense. From an American perspective, this domain remains the most sensitive aspect of Sino-Gulf Arab relations, and it is where the U.S. retains significant leverage to constrain China’s still minimal footprint in the region, with only one military base in Djibouti. However, when it comes to economic, trade, and investment ties, it would be naïve to expect Trump’s brief visits to Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi to curtail the momentum of GCC-China relations.
There is every reason to expect the GCC states to continue strengthening ties with Washington and Beijing simultaneously. In a grander context, however, a new geopolitical reality is emerging. While growing U.S.-China rivalry places greater pressure on small states, such as Panama, to choose sides, for “middle powers” like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, this rising tension presents both risks and opportunities—enabling them to play the two powers off against one another to their advantage.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
Trump Returns to a More Multipolar GCC
By Giorgio Cafiero
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: A frequent contributor to Stimson on Middle East conflicts and diplomacy, Giorgio Cafiero has a particular expertise analyzing the foreign policies of Arab states in the Levant and bordering the Persian Gulf.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
President Donald Trump is meeting this week with leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which have deepened relations with U.S. arch-rival China since his first presidential trip to the region in 2017.
Throughout this century, GCC members have actively diversified their international alliances and partnerships amid a global transition from a U.S.-dominated order to a less Western-centric landscape. This recalibration, which has intensified this year due to the Trump administration’s abrupt economic moves including high tariffs and its rhetoric and actions in relation to Gaza, reflects a pragmatic response to evolving geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics.
Arab monarchies along the Persian Gulf are asserting greater strategic autonomy and hedging amid growing doubts about Washington’s long-term commitment to their security. By cultivating a broad spectrum of relationships, including with rival global powers, GCC states have positioned themselves to extract geopolitical, economic, and diplomatic benefits. China, with the world’s second-largest economy, has been the most important actor in the Gulf Arabs’ “Look East” foreign policy pivot.
While historically aligned with the West and reliant on the American security umbrella, GCC members have pursued a delicate balancing act, deepening commercial, financial, energy, trade, technology, and investment ties with China and other Asian powerhouses. Different states have occupied various points along a spectrum with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), at one end, the sole Gulf Arab monarchy to have joined BRICS+ as it positions itself as the GCC state most independent from Washington across multiple spheres. At the other end lies Qatar, which hosts the largest U.S. military presence in the Middle East at a base in al-Udeid and is the Gulf Arab monarchy most deeply anchored within the U.S. geopolitical orbit.
Against the backdrop of rising U.S.-China tensions and an ongoing trade war, GCC states may face increasing pressure from President Trump to align more decisively with Washington. During his visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE and a summit with all six GCC heads of state, Trump will seek to draw these monarchies more firmly into Washington’s sphere of influence.
However, Trump is unlikely to succeed in reversing a regional trend toward closer ties with China. China remains the top importer of Gulf oil and gas, providing the GCC states with a dependable market for their hydrocarbon exports. At the same time, China and the Gulf Arab monarchies are forging multidimensional partnerships that align with their respective long-term development agendas.
Notably, the synergies between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 underscore shared strategic aims. China plays a pivotal role in the economic diversification strategies of all GCC states, contributing significantly to the growth of non-hydrocarbon sectors such as tourism, clean energy, advanced technology, finance, health, infrastructure, and logistics. In the sphere of digitization, Chinese firms and expertise will also be integral to sweeping economic transitions underway across the Gulf.
GCC members are conscious that they possess considerable leverage in their dealings with the U.S. Although they continue to rely on American security guarantees, Washington, in turn, depends on GCC states to advance key U.S. economic and geopolitical objectives.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are well positioned to support Trump’s domestic economic agenda through substantial investments in the U.S. economy. On the diplomatic front, GCC members have demonstrated their effectiveness as bridges between the U.S. and some of Washington’s adversaries such as Russia and Iran while the Trump administration seeks to freeze the conflict in Ukraine and reach a new nuclear deal with Tehran. The White House also needs its GCC partners to make progress on a wide array of sensitive regional issues from the rehabilitation of Syria, Lebanon, and eventually Gaza to security in the Red Sea, where the Trump administration recently ended, at least for now, a nearly two-month bombing campaign against Houthi rebels.
Ironically, the Trump administration’s efforts to counter and compete with China may only enhance Gulf Arab states’ bargaining power. The “China card” has become a powerful diplomatic tool that GCC leaders can skillfully wield to extract concessions from Washington such as Saudi Arabia’s efforts to acquire nuclear technology and more advanced U.S. weaponry.
At the same time, policymakers across the GCC are likely attuned to Washington’s red lines—particularly in the realm of security and defense. From an American perspective, this domain remains the most sensitive aspect of Sino-Gulf Arab relations, and it is where the U.S. retains significant leverage to constrain China’s still minimal footprint in the region, with only one military base in Djibouti. However, when it comes to economic, trade, and investment ties, it would be naïve to expect Trump’s brief visits to Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi to curtail the momentum of GCC-China relations.
There is every reason to expect the GCC states to continue strengthening ties with Washington and Beijing simultaneously. In a grander context, however, a new geopolitical reality is emerging. While growing U.S.-China rivalry places greater pressure on small states, such as Panama, to choose sides, for “middle powers” like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, this rising tension presents both risks and opportunities—enabling them to play the two powers off against one another to their advantage.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
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