SAV Q&A with Bidushi Dhungel: Nepal’s Political Revolution and Quest for a More Equitable Future
On Monday, September 8, Nepal experienced a remarkable and rapid political upheaval as youth-led protests gave way to violence and widespread destruction. South Asian Voices spoke with Bidushi Dhungel, the Country Representative for Nepal at the National Democratic Institute.
On Monday, September 8, Nepal experienced a remarkable and rapid political upheaval as youth-led protests gave way to violence and widespread destruction that left 72 people dead, the collapse of the government, and the swearing-in of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim prime minister. South Asian Voices spoke with Bidushi Dhungel on Friday, September 12, about the causes and evolution of the protests, the political dynamics playing out as the interim government took shape, and the possible paths ahead for Nepal. Ms. Dhungel is the Country Representative for Nepal at the National Democratic Institute; with over 15 years of experience in democracy and governance, research, and journalism, she is a seasoned observer of Nepal’s democratic actors, institutions, and processes.
What prompted these protests in Nepal? How did they evolve and what was the state’s response, starting before the prime minister’s resignation until the recent parliamentary dissolution?
Bidushi Dhungel: Well, the protest was prompted by several things—primarily, frustration with a corrupt political elite, and there was, of course, a social media ban, which is the angle that a lot of the international reporting has hinged on. In this case, all but a few social media outlets were banned by the now prior government on the grounds of a lack of registration, issues of taxation, etc.—and that included Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, all the major social media sites.
As a result of that, everyone went on TikTok. And what was trending on TikTok was what was happening with the protests in Indonesia, and what was happening in the Philippines with the “nepo babies” trend, which is focused on exposing the luxurious lifestyles of politicians’ families. That quickly caught on in Nepal and young people from Gen Z started creating content that contextualized that narrative for Nepal. In fact, this kind of critique was already taking place prior to the ban, but it really gained momentum once the ban took hold and all energies shifted focus to one platform.
But all of this was exacerbated by a political elite who haven’t really been listening to the demands and needs of a young population for years. This microcosm of events happening on TikTok regionally was impacting the way in which young folks are understanding those issues at home and looking for an outlet to express frustrations. And so whether it was through the “nepo baby” trend or seeing these images of people storming the parliament in Indonesia, these trends had a great impact and this energy was to be channeled through a peaceful protest on September 8.
Protests like the one planned do happen quite often in Nepal, and at least once a year or once every couple of years there is a youth-led mobilization. Over the past 10 to 15 years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of mobilization of young people—mostly Gen Z in recent years, but it’s usually quite contained and peaceful. And to date these actions have been somewhat impactful, but nothing like the scale we have seen in the last week.
In this case, the social media trend just took off, the ban came into place, and the call for that protest became a culmination of all these various types of frustrations pouring out onto the street. So, on Monday, September 8, a protest was called for at 9 AM.
There were large swaths of people in the streets that day, even more than one would expect. We don’t know exactly how many, but there were several thousands of people on the street that Monday morning. Perhaps this was because all the messaging was happening through one social media platform – and since there was no other platform to be able to communicate, it snowballed very fast. The slogans people were raising at the protest were things like, “you guys are in fancy cars while we’re giving our blood and sweat in the Gulf.” The messages very much focused on anti-corruption first and foremost, and then the social media ban.
Beyond the immediate triggers, what were the underlying causes of the protests?
Bidushi Dhungel: First, this has all been bubbling underneath the surface for a very long time. We’ve seen small outbursts of that frustration over the past 15 years or so—even before the new constitution, for example, which was 10 years ago now. There have been multiple youth-led movements bursts of frustration, which were very much rooted in this dissatisfaction with a lack of governance, accountability, service delivery, access to education, health, job creation—all of it. And there’s also just overall frustration with Nepal’s economic situation and the dependency on remittances, where young people have to go out to Gulf countries for livelihoods, job opportunities.
Again, this was also built on general dissatisfaction with the political elite, as well as a sense of alienation among young people due to the inability for political parties to allow for shifts in generational leadership—and their outright refusal to change their way of doing business. One of the root causes is seen to be that the same set of leaders have been at the helm for effectively the duration of Nepal’s democratic trajectory, at least since 1990 or perhaps even slightly before. The general understanding is that, within the political parties, leadership change only happens when someone dies. So, there has been mounting frustration with that scenario within the political parties and beyond. For that reason, when young people spill over onto the streets, many of them are actually supporters or members of the political parties themselves, but acting in the role of an average citizen for something like an anti-corruption movement like this.
I think people are also seeing what kind of progress and prosperity there is outside of the country, and that some within the political elite are living that life while most young people are suffering. There are questions doing the rounds like, for example: “whose tax money are you using for this yacht in France?” So, there’s popular dissatisfaction with the gap between the political elite and their families on the one hand and the majority of the country’s youth on the other, and the protests became the manifestation of that frustration for the young generation.
Another reason why this situation spiraled into what it is right now could be because this has been the first moment in a very long time when the two biggest parties have come together to form a coalition government, which effectively leaves the country without a strong opposition party. The Nepali Congress and the UML party formed an alliance, which is not really a natural alliance. If one of them had been outside of the government at this time, the natural step would have been for that party to play the role of the opposition – and that vacuum of opposition created a unique dynamic.
Frustrations with the ongoing game of political musical chairs was also an issue, with the same folks being prime minister repeatedly—which is linked to the inability of political parties and political party leadership to hand over power. It’s a parliamentary democracy, so, technically, the party leader will be prime minister if they win an election, but the party leader has been the same person for a very long time.
What’s interesting about Nepal is that, even with the constitution of 2015 being a very open, liberal, progressive, and federal constitution, the institutions of government, and specifically the political parties, didn’t really democratize in the same way. So, that contradiction has also been playing out for a very long time. The Constitution is trying to effectively decentralize the state; it’s pushing to liberalize, to make institutions and processes inclusive, and take everything down to the people. Yet, the structure of the political parties, the primary institutions that would be leading that process, aren’t getting anywhere near that stage internally. This is another major problem.
Coming back to the current moment, what were some of the specific demands of the protestors? How did the protests snowball into the dramatic political transition that has unfolded over the past week?
Bidushi Dhungel: It’s important to clarify that the protesters were not actually demanding to topple the government at first. Initially, their central demand was for an end to corruption. And then, as part of that, they demanded that the political leadership should make way for a new generation of leaders because they are so corrupt and that they should be held accountable for their corruption. That was the context in which that initial protest took place.
The protest started off peacefully initially on Monday. And then, as the protesters made their way through the streets, they landed in front of the parliament building and tore through the barricades. There was conspicuously very little security on duty, perhaps an indication of the government’s failure to anticipate the size of the protest or their dismissal of the protestors altogether. As the protests continued and grew, the aggression on the part of the state grew. Police initially started with lathi charges, with water cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas—which is the norm for every protest here.
“It’s important to clarify that the protesters were not demanding to topple the government. Their demand was for an end to corruption.”
But something switched at one point. The government’s statement on this is that when protesters started to vandalize public property—throwing stones at Parliament, trying to tear down the gate—that’s when the situation changed and there was an order, someone gave an order for the use of live ammunition. Protestors were shot at and killed and hospitals in the vicinity began overflowing with young people in school uniforms, some of them declared dead on the spot. As you can imagine, that created an immediate crisis and a crisis of legitimacy for the political governing class.
Anger from that incident then spilled over into the next day, in part because throughout that first day the prime minister did not resign. Late in the evening, the home minister resigned. But by that point, the death toll had crossed 20 and widespread public disdain for everything the parties and their leaders stood for grew multifold over a few hours and one night. The anger and frustration, especially given the context of the killing of youth, was overflowing, and a resignation from a home minister just wasn’t going to cut it. Prime Minister K.P. Oli refused to resign. And by the next morning, literally everyone in Kathmandu and in other urban centers throughout the country were out on the street.
This was now no longer just a Gen Z movement. Everyone came out on the street in anger and frustration and disgust over the way these young protesters were treated and shot at—and the grotesque misuse of power and impunity the political leaders had become accustomed to. The numbers grew massively on Tuesday. As the numbers grew, the pressure started to mount, and at around 2:30 PM, Prime Minister Oli resigned. Rumors abound that the Army refused him protection until he resigned.
This created another important turning point. When Oli resigned, those who say they organized the protest, the leadership of the Gen Z group, basically said: “Well, our job is done. Let’s go home. We can have a victory rally tomorrow.” But by that point another set of folks were already on the street—some of them had joined even on day one – and that’s when vandalism and arson and burning down of public property started. Almost every single government building was attacked. Every single politician or leader’s home was burned down or irreparably damaged, and that continued throughout the day.
So there was a sense that there could be bigger changes at hand beyond the initial objective?
Bidushi Dhungel: Well, I think that the protesters’ whole game plan changed quickly, and perhaps the drivers of the whole protest also changed. This is all still very unclear, but then over the next few hours things really escalated with all of the arson, looting, and everything being burnt down. All the political leaders were attacked. And their houses were being set on fire, including the prime minister’s—I really can’t think of a leader who was spared. And then any business house that had any affiliation to the state or parties was also attacked. It even got to a point where they were just letting folks out of jail: almost all the big jails in Nepal were broken into and all the inmates were set free, including some political leaders put behind bars.
It got to a point of lawlessness, and people were fearful. Many people then started to plead for the Army to come out onto the street to tame the situation. The public itself started to feel unsafe and there was a call for the army to step in—perhaps without realizing the full implications [of a military mobilization], or maybe out of genuine fear. By 10pm on Tuesday, the army had stepped in and effectively called a curfew to try and stabilize the situation. Throughout the day, the army also slowly moved some leaders into army camps and barracks as their homes were targeted. The curfew was lifted only on Saturday morning at 6 am, after the interim government’s Prime Minister Sushila Karki was sworn in. This was to the relief of many, as doubts about the Army playing an even more active role than it already had, were growing.
Could you speak a bit more about the mix of different actors, interests, and agendas that were confluent during this moment of opportunity for real, massive change?
Bidushi Dhungel: One of the major characteristics of the Gen Z movement was that it was leaderless. There was no stated leader. There were no party flags. It was supposed to be a broad youth movement where people come out in the street, where they have banners and all of that, and then they go home.
But as I’ve said the violence then provoked something else which came to a head on Tuesday. And here all of the pent-up interests and agendas that have been floating around for the past ten years came together—including calls for the restoration of the monarchy, calls for a Hindu state, calls for a party-less system, calls for a directly elected prime minister. Basically, everything flushed into that movement.
Because there are those frustrations that also exist in Nepal in different pockets of society. And those agendas, and those leaders, and those communities are very different from those of the young Gen Z movement and its leadership, and the tactics that they would use are very different.
There are all kinds of allegations right now about who was really behind all this arson, the burning down of parliament and all this public and private property. But I think what is clear is that it was no longer just a group of young Gen Z activists. There were all sorts of other interests that came into play.
To that point, could you add a bit more color on the interesting moment on Tuesday (September 9), when different representatives of the Gen Z movement started to say, “this has gone too far, stop”? For example, some of them came online and stressed the need to protect public records, right?
Bidushi Dhungel: Well yes, on Tuesday, there were concerted efforts made by the cohort of leaders of the Gen Z protests, in addition to basically everyone else in the public space, calling for the preservation of the state’s property. One example is efforts to protect the Department of Archeology. In that instance, it was the Gen Z folks that stood by all night to make sure that the looters and the arsonists couldn’t burn it down.
And even in the case of Singha Durbar and other government buildings which did burn, there were also pleas from many within the Gen Z leaders group trying to make the point that: “This is no longer us. We’ve already won for the day, and we’ve gone home. This is someone else.” So, I think that was established. Some anger and frustration with the police and army for being unable or unwilling to intervene has also found voice on social media.
Tellingly, this separation—between Gen Z activists and those who engaged in arson, looting and vandalism—has also been somewhat verified and validated by the political class who was attacked, who said: “We understand that this wasn’t the protesters on the street on Monday. This was a whole other group of people.”
Can you give us a sense of how the political situation evolved from the military intervention on Tuesday through all the negotiations until Saturday (September 13)? With former Chief Justice Sushila Karki being sworn in as interim prime minister on Friday, where do things stand?
Bidushi Dhungel: One issue with the Gen Z protesters is that they are still struggling to come to terms with who exactly the leader is. For the past week, the army [who has mediating negotiations] was trying to identify a single leader or maybe two leaders, when in fact there’s a whole cohort of folks that are claiming ownership of the protest. In fact, that number was increasing by the day as it became more apparent how much power that leader or those leaders could be wielding going forward. So, trying to verify or identify the real or authentic leader has been a contested process.
However, from Tuesday onward, one individual, Sudan Gurung stepped up to lead Gen Z across the board. There are still some contestations ongoing regarding who is the leader—and it seems many who organized the protest on day one retreated out of shock and/or fear of the repercussions of it all. But Sudan has clearly been the public face of this movement so far. So, this has been the group with which many of the ongoing negotiations have been conducted.
On the topic of the interim prime minister, what the Gen Z protesters did was start this long discussion on the topic on Discord that went on for hours, and they did a virtual poll. The person who won the poll is actually the person who they nominated: Sushila Karki. This may have been largely due to her public image as a clean and courageous former Chief Justice who had taken some strong decisions against political bigwigs, but also because she was on the ground on Tuesday morning condemning the government and leaders for opening fire on the youth. But, on the face of it at least, it does look like there were genuine efforts to make this democratic within the Gen Z movement. However, that too, is not without contestation, particularly given the need for an extra-constitutional step that would need to be taken to swear her in.
However, having said that, given the tendency in the perceptions of average Nepalis to give everything some conspiratorial and/or geopolitical analysis, there are already a slew of questions and allegations coming in regarding the legitimacy of the Gen Z movement’s process. Such as: “Who is this Sudan Gurung fellow? Is he a royalist? Is he backed by India? And who are all of these people who voted for this person on Discord? And can you vote for a prime minister on Discord? Is that okay?” And there are other big questions circulating too, like: “Why did the army wait till everything burned down before acting? Who really ordered the shooting on Monday afternoon?”
And as I hinted, another more concrete area of contention right now focuses on the constitution itself, and whether the decision to dissolve parliament and swear in the Interim Prime Minister can be justified and this Constitution kept intact. Technically the constitution of Nepal, as it stands today, does not have a provision for a former chief justice to be prime minister—in fact an article disallows it. So, technically there was no constitutional basis through which she could be appointed prime minister. That would then be skirting extra-constitutional territory, which is then being debated to all ends by everyone.
But protesters exerted pressure to ensure that this person becomes prime minister. And so, some people are calling it bullying. Some people are saying you can’t terrorize the president into appointing a prime minister. But this is what the course of events has been. Then there was another major question around whether the parliament should be dissolved before or after this prime minister is to be declared. Ultimately the parliament was dissolved, and almost immediately, mainstream parties retaliated by crying foul, calling it a violation of the Constitution and its spirit.
So for this reason the situation is still a bit volatile right now. Sushila Karki took office with the President swearing her in, citing [a broad interpretation of] Article 61 of the Constitution, which talks about the role of the president in safeguarding national unity and as the guardian of Nepal’s constitution. Several actors have questioned the constitutionality of this appointment. The thinking right now is that the Constitution can be put into some kind of an induced coma out of political necessity, until the completion of the federal election which the Interim government has called for March 5, and then revived later with the right surgeons on standby.
In the meantime, the president will continue to act as the guardian of this current constitution while the Interim Government focuses on the key tasks—understood as elections and justice for those who lost their lives on September 8, accountability for the looting, arson and destruction caused on Sept 9, and then accountability for all cases of political and bureaucratic corruption since 1990. The legitimacy of the government, however, depends on if you want to look at it from a constitutional standpoint, or if you want to look at it from a more pragmatic standpoint.
You’ve spent a lot of time engaged with the political process over your career, including as an organizer, and you have seen Nepal go through massive transitions and interim governments before. But this is such a novel and uncertain moment— can you tell us what is so unique about this historical moment?
Bidushi Dhungel: What makes the situation most unique is really the timeframe in which this all has happened. This was complete upheaval in what was essentially just four to five days. It was Monday when the initial protests took place. By Friday, we already had an interim government.
The reason for that, I’m assuming, is largely the role that social media has been playing in all of this, from the organization of the protest to the way in which people are responding to the assault of information, disinformation, and misinformation that has led all stakeholders to want to get this over quickly—because the longer it festers, the more disinformation, misinformation and conspiracy theories take shape and hold. This urgency in terms of timeline, I’ve never seen before.
The second unique point here is that while democratic revolutions have been the norm in Nepal’s recent history, this one is interesting because it seems to follow the Bangladesh playbook. That said, we have to recognize that Nepal’s democratic trajectory and Bangladesh’s democracy are very different. Even before Monday, relative to the region, one could say that Nepal was doing fairly well in formal democratic terms—in terms of inclusion, governance, even in terms of some of the economic indicators. So, at least on paper, things were looking alright. The opposition certainly wasn’t boycotting elections, for one. So, it is a very different scenario but one in which a similar kind of frustration was able to mount. Then the state response, meaning the way in which protests were handled, is also similar to what we’ve seen in Bangladesh.
But my point is that Nepal was, in an overall sense, a functioning democratic state on Sunday. Not without its problems, of course—corruption, obviously being one of the biggest and there is still work that needs to be done on inclusion. There are also implementation challenges with federalism. There are all sorts of issues, but it certainly was not an authoritarian regime or a one-party state or even a two-party state. Nepal had a relatively vibrant and pluralist society, and still, this kind of movement emerged and was successful in toppling a regime.
Then a third unique point is that this is the first movement that is effectively not party-centric, that is not led by political parties. There wasn’t a single political party flag on the streets that led to this protest and that led to this outcome. So, this is another major turning point because it begins to question the relevance of political parties, in terms of power, change, democracy, and all of that. It puts center stage the disconnect between the parties and the youth—particularly urban youth.
What challenges might the interim government in Nepal face moving forward, especially in the context of a similar interim government in Bangladesh struggling with political transition over a year on?
Bidushi Dhungel: The first challenge on this path is going to be the legitimacy of the interim government and the way that that plays out. There are multiple factors—who will take up cabinet positions, how many cabinet positions, what will be the terms of reference?
But beyond that, because we have moved into some blurry space in terms of the constitutionality of this, there is a bit of a vacuum. And even though the formation of an interim government helps prevent lawlessness and anarchy, a Pandora’s box has been opened and there will be a slew of interests and agendas that this interim government will now have to deal with.
“And even though the formation of an interim government helps prevent lawlessness and anarchy, a Pandora’s box has been opened and there will be a slew of interests and agendas that this interim government will now have to deal with.”
In this new space, for example, there will be demands for constitutional amendment, for the restoration of the monarchy, for the dissolution of federalism, for the restoration of a Hindu state or, perhaps, more authority to the Madhesh province. There will be all kinds of things that now resurface as a result of what has happened in the past couple of days. I think that those are going to be the major challenges.
A clear and concise interim government mandate, and the ability of the government to stick to it, is the only way to meet the March 5 election date.
In terms of opportunities, the hope is that if this triggers some kind of handover of power within the political parties, that an intra-party reform process will take place which will re-energize the democratic space in Nepal. A transfer of power within these institutions would be great. I think there is still an opportunity in terms of some kind of introspection about what the longstanding party leaders and political elite were doing wrong. And there could be reform-minded individuals within those institutions that will now try and really push forward some of those reforms within the political parties around intra-party democracy, intra-party governance, candidate selection, electoral reform, all kinds of things like that. I think that’s going to be a major opportunity.
But the challenges are many. If you go back to how the constitution was forged in 2015, even after 10 years of deliberation, not all sides were happy, and it’s a very fragile agreement. And again that Pandora’s box, now opened, will inevitably bring to fore other grievances and demands that will need to be addressed. Another major one is the issue of the Madhesh province, which was seeking more autonomy, so that too will likely surface. And we cannot know which way it will go, because there are also forces that would want to see all of these things move back and the dissolution of federalism and all of that. So, we’ll have to see, to be honest.
What has been the reaction so far from external actors such as China and India, and how will their role be perceived?
Bidushi Dhungel: There hasn’t been a huge response. There was a joint statement from the United States, UK, Japan, Korea, that was focused on freedom of expression, the right to assemble, those kinds of things, and to ensure that Nepal will hold on to that. There was a video message from the British ambassador to say, we’ll be standing with Nepal through this process as its oldest partner in development. There were also a couple of U.S. senators that came up with statements in support of Nepal and its new democratic transition, with a focus on trying to keep hold on to some of the gains that were made in 2015. Then later after the interim government was announced, the United States and others did come out with statements in support.
But India is the big one. Prime Minister Modi hasn’t really commented except to say the loss of life is very sad, stability of Nepal is important, etc., and then later to commend Prime Minister Sushila Karki as the first woman Prime Minister as a symbol for women’s empowerment. I think that’s the formal line. But you know, the pitfall of Nepal is that anytime anything happens politically, there’s always an India angle, real or perceived. There’s always some kind of conspiracy that is pegged to the Indian establishment, or the BJP more recently. No one really knows the extent to which these claims are true or not, but those kind of narratives are present here too. There are large numbers of people who think that this is all orchestrated with the backing of the Indian establishment. There are large numbers of people who think certain individuals are associated. There are large numbers of people who think this interim government is a puppet government. But there’s nothing to substantiate it. So, we will have to see how all of this plays out.
China was conspicuously quiet until the interim PM took office, when it, too, offered its congratulations. We do know that in the past few years the Chinese have been more active in terms of engaging with political actors than it ever has been in the past. It was busy investing in the political pipeline of the mainstream existing parties, so it may be a little bit blindsided right now. So maybe that role is yet to be seen.
Do you have any parting thoughts you’d like to share as we gaze ahead at this uncertain future in Nepal?
Bidushi Dhungel: To begin with, the protest on September 8 urgently necessitates that young people play a decisive role in determining political outcomes in Nepal. What followed on September 9, however, goes deeper—suggesting that the way in which Nepal’s political elites have run state institutions and parties has alienated the masses, and not just Gen Z. It has made too many enemies and engaged in too many dirty deeds.
Amid all this, another major grievance that has surfaced is the erosion of boundaries between business and politics. Businessmen entering politics have been acting as powerbrokers and shaping policy in favor of business elites, and politicians have been using them to make more money and win elections. This week businesses aligned with parties and leaders or actively involved in politics were singled out and burnt to the ground. Politicians most engaged in backhanded deals with those businessmen were most violently attacked. The desperate need to separate the two has now become glaring. The question is whether the political parties can step up to meet this challenge. The old guards will need to let go, and a process of internal reform will be the only way for survival and relevance.
Lastly, the Constitution is hanging on for now, but attempts to discredit the Interim Government and create instability could invite more crises. Like before, the solution lies in forging dialogue and consensus—among the old and the new.
Views expressed are the interviewee’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
SAV Q&A with Bidushi Dhungel: Nepal’s Political Revolution and Quest for a More Equitable Future
South Asia
Originally published in South Asian Voices
On Monday, September 8, Nepal experienced a remarkable and rapid political upheaval as youth-led protests gave way to violence and widespread destruction that left 72 people dead, the collapse of the government, and the swearing-in of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim prime minister. South Asian Voices spoke with Bidushi Dhungel on Friday, September 12, about the causes and evolution of the protests, the political dynamics playing out as the interim government took shape, and the possible paths ahead for Nepal. Ms. Dhungel is the Country Representative for Nepal at the National Democratic Institute; with over 15 years of experience in democracy and governance, research, and journalism, she is a seasoned observer of Nepal’s democratic actors, institutions, and processes.
What prompted these protests in Nepal? How did they evolve and what was the state’s response, starting before the prime minister’s resignation until the recent parliamentary dissolution?
Bidushi Dhungel: Well, the protest was prompted by several things—primarily, frustration with a corrupt political elite, and there was, of course, a social media ban, which is the angle that a lot of the international reporting has hinged on. In this case, all but a few social media outlets were banned by the now prior government on the grounds of a lack of registration, issues of taxation, etc.—and that included Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, all the major social media sites.
As a result of that, everyone went on TikTok. And what was trending on TikTok was what was happening with the protests in Indonesia, and what was happening in the Philippines with the “nepo babies” trend, which is focused on exposing the luxurious lifestyles of politicians’ families. That quickly caught on in Nepal and young people from Gen Z started creating content that contextualized that narrative for Nepal. In fact, this kind of critique was already taking place prior to the ban, but it really gained momentum once the ban took hold and all energies shifted focus to one platform.
But all of this was exacerbated by a political elite who haven’t really been listening to the demands and needs of a young population for years. This microcosm of events happening on TikTok regionally was impacting the way in which young folks are understanding those issues at home and looking for an outlet to express frustrations. And so whether it was through the “nepo baby” trend or seeing these images of people storming the parliament in Indonesia, these trends had a great impact and this energy was to be channeled through a peaceful protest on September 8.
Protests like the one planned do happen quite often in Nepal, and at least once a year or once every couple of years there is a youth-led mobilization. Over the past 10 to 15 years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of mobilization of young people—mostly Gen Z in recent years, but it’s usually quite contained and peaceful. And to date these actions have been somewhat impactful, but nothing like the scale we have seen in the last week.
In this case, the social media trend just took off, the ban came into place, and the call for that protest became a culmination of all these various types of frustrations pouring out onto the street. So, on Monday, September 8, a protest was called for at 9 AM.
There were large swaths of people in the streets that day, even more than one would expect. We don’t know exactly how many, but there were several thousands of people on the street that Monday morning. Perhaps this was because all the messaging was happening through one social media platform – and since there was no other platform to be able to communicate, it snowballed very fast. The slogans people were raising at the protest were things like, “you guys are in fancy cars while we’re giving our blood and sweat in the Gulf.” The messages very much focused on anti-corruption first and foremost, and then the social media ban.
Beyond the immediate triggers, what were the underlying causes of the protests?
Bidushi Dhungel: First, this has all been bubbling underneath the surface for a very long time. We’ve seen small outbursts of that frustration over the past 15 years or so—even before the new constitution, for example, which was 10 years ago now. There have been multiple youth-led movements bursts of frustration, which were very much rooted in this dissatisfaction with a lack of governance, accountability, service delivery, access to education, health, job creation—all of it. And there’s also just overall frustration with Nepal’s economic situation and the dependency on remittances, where young people have to go out to Gulf countries for livelihoods, job opportunities.
Again, this was also built on general dissatisfaction with the political elite, as well as a sense of alienation among young people due to the inability for political parties to allow for shifts in generational leadership—and their outright refusal to change their way of doing business. One of the root causes is seen to be that the same set of leaders have been at the helm for effectively the duration of Nepal’s democratic trajectory, at least since 1990 or perhaps even slightly before. The general understanding is that, within the political parties, leadership change only happens when someone dies. So, there has been mounting frustration with that scenario within the political parties and beyond. For that reason, when young people spill over onto the streets, many of them are actually supporters or members of the political parties themselves, but acting in the role of an average citizen for something like an anti-corruption movement like this.
I think people are also seeing what kind of progress and prosperity there is outside of the country, and that some within the political elite are living that life while most young people are suffering. There are questions doing the rounds like, for example: “whose tax money are you using for this yacht in France?” So, there’s popular dissatisfaction with the gap between the political elite and their families on the one hand and the majority of the country’s youth on the other, and the protests became the manifestation of that frustration for the young generation.
Another reason why this situation spiraled into what it is right now could be because this has been the first moment in a very long time when the two biggest parties have come together to form a coalition government, which effectively leaves the country without a strong opposition party. The Nepali Congress and the UML party formed an alliance, which is not really a natural alliance. If one of them had been outside of the government at this time, the natural step would have been for that party to play the role of the opposition – and that vacuum of opposition created a unique dynamic.
Frustrations with the ongoing game of political musical chairs was also an issue, with the same folks being prime minister repeatedly—which is linked to the inability of political parties and political party leadership to hand over power. It’s a parliamentary democracy, so, technically, the party leader will be prime minister if they win an election, but the party leader has been the same person for a very long time.
What’s interesting about Nepal is that, even with the constitution of 2015 being a very open, liberal, progressive, and federal constitution, the institutions of government, and specifically the political parties, didn’t really democratize in the same way. So, that contradiction has also been playing out for a very long time. The Constitution is trying to effectively decentralize the state; it’s pushing to liberalize, to make institutions and processes inclusive, and take everything down to the people. Yet, the structure of the political parties, the primary institutions that would be leading that process, aren’t getting anywhere near that stage internally. This is another major problem.
Coming back to the current moment, what were some of the specific demands of the protestors? How did the protests snowball into the dramatic political transition that has unfolded over the past week?
Bidushi Dhungel: It’s important to clarify that the protesters were not actually demanding to topple the government at first. Initially, their central demand was for an end to corruption. And then, as part of that, they demanded that the political leadership should make way for a new generation of leaders because they are so corrupt and that they should be held accountable for their corruption. That was the context in which that initial protest took place.
The protest started off peacefully initially on Monday. And then, as the protesters made their way through the streets, they landed in front of the parliament building and tore through the barricades. There was conspicuously very little security on duty, perhaps an indication of the government’s failure to anticipate the size of the protest or their dismissal of the protestors altogether. As the protests continued and grew, the aggression on the part of the state grew. Police initially started with lathi charges, with water cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas—which is the norm for every protest here.
“It’s important to clarify that the protesters were not demanding to topple the government. Their demand was for an end to corruption.”
But something switched at one point. The government’s statement on this is that when protesters started to vandalize public property—throwing stones at Parliament, trying to tear down the gate—that’s when the situation changed and there was an order, someone gave an order for the use of live ammunition. Protestors were shot at and killed and hospitals in the vicinity began overflowing with young people in school uniforms, some of them declared dead on the spot. As you can imagine, that created an immediate crisis and a crisis of legitimacy for the political governing class.
Anger from that incident then spilled over into the next day, in part because throughout that first day the prime minister did not resign. Late in the evening, the home minister resigned. But by that point, the death toll had crossed 20 and widespread public disdain for everything the parties and their leaders stood for grew multifold over a few hours and one night. The anger and frustration, especially given the context of the killing of youth, was overflowing, and a resignation from a home minister just wasn’t going to cut it. Prime Minister K.P. Oli refused to resign. And by the next morning, literally everyone in Kathmandu and in other urban centers throughout the country were out on the street.
This was now no longer just a Gen Z movement. Everyone came out on the street in anger and frustration and disgust over the way these young protesters were treated and shot at—and the grotesque misuse of power and impunity the political leaders had become accustomed to. The numbers grew massively on Tuesday. As the numbers grew, the pressure started to mount, and at around 2:30 PM, Prime Minister Oli resigned. Rumors abound that the Army refused him protection until he resigned.
This created another important turning point. When Oli resigned, those who say they organized the protest, the leadership of the Gen Z group, basically said: “Well, our job is done. Let’s go home. We can have a victory rally tomorrow.” But by that point another set of folks were already on the street—some of them had joined even on day one – and that’s when vandalism and arson and burning down of public property started. Almost every single government building was attacked. Every single politician or leader’s home was burned down or irreparably damaged, and that continued throughout the day.
So there was a sense that there could be bigger changes at hand beyond the initial objective?
Bidushi Dhungel: Well, I think that the protesters’ whole game plan changed quickly, and perhaps the drivers of the whole protest also changed. This is all still very unclear, but then over the next few hours things really escalated with all of the arson, looting, and everything being burnt down. All the political leaders were attacked. And their houses were being set on fire, including the prime minister’s—I really can’t think of a leader who was spared. And then any business house that had any affiliation to the state or parties was also attacked. It even got to a point where they were just letting folks out of jail: almost all the big jails in Nepal were broken into and all the inmates were set free, including some political leaders put behind bars.
It got to a point of lawlessness, and people were fearful. Many people then started to plead for the Army to come out onto the street to tame the situation. The public itself started to feel unsafe and there was a call for the army to step in—perhaps without realizing the full implications [of a military mobilization], or maybe out of genuine fear. By 10pm on Tuesday, the army had stepped in and effectively called a curfew to try and stabilize the situation. Throughout the day, the army also slowly moved some leaders into army camps and barracks as their homes were targeted. The curfew was lifted only on Saturday morning at 6 am, after the interim government’s Prime Minister Sushila Karki was sworn in. This was to the relief of many, as doubts about the Army playing an even more active role than it already had, were growing.
Could you speak a bit more about the mix of different actors, interests, and agendas that were confluent during this moment of opportunity for real, massive change?
Bidushi Dhungel: One of the major characteristics of the Gen Z movement was that it was leaderless. There was no stated leader. There were no party flags. It was supposed to be a broad youth movement where people come out in the street, where they have banners and all of that, and then they go home.
But as I’ve said the violence then provoked something else which came to a head on Tuesday. And here all of the pent-up interests and agendas that have been floating around for the past ten years came together—including calls for the restoration of the monarchy, calls for a Hindu state, calls for a party-less system, calls for a directly elected prime minister. Basically, everything flushed into that movement.
Because there are those frustrations that also exist in Nepal in different pockets of society. And those agendas, and those leaders, and those communities are very different from those of the young Gen Z movement and its leadership, and the tactics that they would use are very different.
There are all kinds of allegations right now about who was really behind all this arson, the burning down of parliament and all this public and private property. But I think what is clear is that it was no longer just a group of young Gen Z activists. There were all sorts of other interests that came into play.
To that point, could you add a bit more color on the interesting moment on Tuesday (September 9), when different representatives of the Gen Z movement started to say, “this has gone too far, stop”? For example, some of them came online and stressed the need to protect public records, right?
Bidushi Dhungel: Well yes, on Tuesday, there were concerted efforts made by the cohort of leaders of the Gen Z protests, in addition to basically everyone else in the public space, calling for the preservation of the state’s property. One example is efforts to protect the Department of Archeology. In that instance, it was the Gen Z folks that stood by all night to make sure that the looters and the arsonists couldn’t burn it down.
And even in the case of Singha Durbar and other government buildings which did burn, there were also pleas from many within the Gen Z leaders group trying to make the point that: “This is no longer us. We’ve already won for the day, and we’ve gone home. This is someone else.” So, I think that was established. Some anger and frustration with the police and army for being unable or unwilling to intervene has also found voice on social media.
Tellingly, this separation—between Gen Z activists and those who engaged in arson, looting and vandalism—has also been somewhat verified and validated by the political class who was attacked, who said: “We understand that this wasn’t the protesters on the street on Monday. This was a whole other group of people.”
Can you give us a sense of how the political situation evolved from the military intervention on Tuesday through all the negotiations until Saturday (September 13)? With former Chief Justice Sushila Karki being sworn in as interim prime minister on Friday, where do things stand?
Bidushi Dhungel: One issue with the Gen Z protesters is that they are still struggling to come to terms with who exactly the leader is. For the past week, the army [who has mediating negotiations] was trying to identify a single leader or maybe two leaders, when in fact there’s a whole cohort of folks that are claiming ownership of the protest. In fact, that number was increasing by the day as it became more apparent how much power that leader or those leaders could be wielding going forward. So, trying to verify or identify the real or authentic leader has been a contested process.
However, from Tuesday onward, one individual, Sudan Gurung stepped up to lead Gen Z across the board. There are still some contestations ongoing regarding who is the leader—and it seems many who organized the protest on day one retreated out of shock and/or fear of the repercussions of it all. But Sudan has clearly been the public face of this movement so far. So, this has been the group with which many of the ongoing negotiations have been conducted.
On the topic of the interim prime minister, what the Gen Z protesters did was start this long discussion on the topic on Discord that went on for hours, and they did a virtual poll. The person who won the poll is actually the person who they nominated: Sushila Karki. This may have been largely due to her public image as a clean and courageous former Chief Justice who had taken some strong decisions against political bigwigs, but also because she was on the ground on Tuesday morning condemning the government and leaders for opening fire on the youth. But, on the face of it at least, it does look like there were genuine efforts to make this democratic within the Gen Z movement. However, that too, is not without contestation, particularly given the need for an extra-constitutional step that would need to be taken to swear her in.
However, having said that, given the tendency in the perceptions of average Nepalis to give everything some conspiratorial and/or geopolitical analysis, there are already a slew of questions and allegations coming in regarding the legitimacy of the Gen Z movement’s process. Such as: “Who is this Sudan Gurung fellow? Is he a royalist? Is he backed by India? And who are all of these people who voted for this person on Discord? And can you vote for a prime minister on Discord? Is that okay?” And there are other big questions circulating too, like: “Why did the army wait till everything burned down before acting? Who really ordered the shooting on Monday afternoon?”
And as I hinted, another more concrete area of contention right now focuses on the constitution itself, and whether the decision to dissolve parliament and swear in the Interim Prime Minister can be justified and this Constitution kept intact. Technically the constitution of Nepal, as it stands today, does not have a provision for a former chief justice to be prime minister—in fact an article disallows it. So, technically there was no constitutional basis through which she could be appointed prime minister. That would then be skirting extra-constitutional territory, which is then being debated to all ends by everyone.
But protesters exerted pressure to ensure that this person becomes prime minister. And so, some people are calling it bullying. Some people are saying you can’t terrorize the president into appointing a prime minister. But this is what the course of events has been. Then there was another major question around whether the parliament should be dissolved before or after this prime minister is to be declared. Ultimately the parliament was dissolved, and almost immediately, mainstream parties retaliated by crying foul, calling it a violation of the Constitution and its spirit.
So for this reason the situation is still a bit volatile right now. Sushila Karki took office with the President swearing her in, citing [a broad interpretation of] Article 61 of the Constitution, which talks about the role of the president in safeguarding national unity and as the guardian of Nepal’s constitution. Several actors have questioned the constitutionality of this appointment. The thinking right now is that the Constitution can be put into some kind of an induced coma out of political necessity, until the completion of the federal election which the Interim government has called for March 5, and then revived later with the right surgeons on standby.
In the meantime, the president will continue to act as the guardian of this current constitution while the Interim Government focuses on the key tasks—understood as elections and justice for those who lost their lives on September 8, accountability for the looting, arson and destruction caused on Sept 9, and then accountability for all cases of political and bureaucratic corruption since 1990. The legitimacy of the government, however, depends on if you want to look at it from a constitutional standpoint, or if you want to look at it from a more pragmatic standpoint.
You’ve spent a lot of time engaged with the political process over your career, including as an organizer, and you have seen Nepal go through massive transitions and interim governments before. But this is such a novel and uncertain moment— can you tell us what is so unique about this historical moment?
Bidushi Dhungel: What makes the situation most unique is really the timeframe in which this all has happened. This was complete upheaval in what was essentially just four to five days. It was Monday when the initial protests took place. By Friday, we already had an interim government.
The reason for that, I’m assuming, is largely the role that social media has been playing in all of this, from the organization of the protest to the way in which people are responding to the assault of information, disinformation, and misinformation that has led all stakeholders to want to get this over quickly—because the longer it festers, the more disinformation, misinformation and conspiracy theories take shape and hold. This urgency in terms of timeline, I’ve never seen before.
The second unique point here is that while democratic revolutions have been the norm in Nepal’s recent history, this one is interesting because it seems to follow the Bangladesh playbook. That said, we have to recognize that Nepal’s democratic trajectory and Bangladesh’s democracy are very different. Even before Monday, relative to the region, one could say that Nepal was doing fairly well in formal democratic terms—in terms of inclusion, governance, even in terms of some of the economic indicators. So, at least on paper, things were looking alright. The opposition certainly wasn’t boycotting elections, for one. So, it is a very different scenario but one in which a similar kind of frustration was able to mount. Then the state response, meaning the way in which protests were handled, is also similar to what we’ve seen in Bangladesh.
But my point is that Nepal was, in an overall sense, a functioning democratic state on Sunday. Not without its problems, of course—corruption, obviously being one of the biggest and there is still work that needs to be done on inclusion. There are also implementation challenges with federalism. There are all sorts of issues, but it certainly was not an authoritarian regime or a one-party state or even a two-party state. Nepal had a relatively vibrant and pluralist society, and still, this kind of movement emerged and was successful in toppling a regime.
Then a third unique point is that this is the first movement that is effectively not party-centric, that is not led by political parties. There wasn’t a single political party flag on the streets that led to this protest and that led to this outcome. So, this is another major turning point because it begins to question the relevance of political parties, in terms of power, change, democracy, and all of that. It puts center stage the disconnect between the parties and the youth—particularly urban youth.
What challenges might the interim government in Nepal face moving forward, especially in the context of a similar interim government in Bangladesh struggling with political transition over a year on?
Bidushi Dhungel: The first challenge on this path is going to be the legitimacy of the interim government and the way that that plays out. There are multiple factors—who will take up cabinet positions, how many cabinet positions, what will be the terms of reference?
But beyond that, because we have moved into some blurry space in terms of the constitutionality of this, there is a bit of a vacuum. And even though the formation of an interim government helps prevent lawlessness and anarchy, a Pandora’s box has been opened and there will be a slew of interests and agendas that this interim government will now have to deal with.
“And even though the formation of an interim government helps prevent lawlessness and anarchy, a Pandora’s box has been opened and there will be a slew of interests and agendas that this interim government will now have to deal with.”
In this new space, for example, there will be demands for constitutional amendment, for the restoration of the monarchy, for the dissolution of federalism, for the restoration of a Hindu state or, perhaps, more authority to the Madhesh province. There will be all kinds of things that now resurface as a result of what has happened in the past couple of days. I think that those are going to be the major challenges.
A clear and concise interim government mandate, and the ability of the government to stick to it, is the only way to meet the March 5 election date.
In terms of opportunities, the hope is that if this triggers some kind of handover of power within the political parties, that an intra-party reform process will take place which will re-energize the democratic space in Nepal. A transfer of power within these institutions would be great. I think there is still an opportunity in terms of some kind of introspection about what the longstanding party leaders and political elite were doing wrong. And there could be reform-minded individuals within those institutions that will now try and really push forward some of those reforms within the political parties around intra-party democracy, intra-party governance, candidate selection, electoral reform, all kinds of things like that. I think that’s going to be a major opportunity.
But the challenges are many. If you go back to how the constitution was forged in 2015, even after 10 years of deliberation, not all sides were happy, and it’s a very fragile agreement. And again that Pandora’s box, now opened, will inevitably bring to fore other grievances and demands that will need to be addressed. Another major one is the issue of the Madhesh province, which was seeking more autonomy, so that too will likely surface. And we cannot know which way it will go, because there are also forces that would want to see all of these things move back and the dissolution of federalism and all of that. So, we’ll have to see, to be honest.
What has been the reaction so far from external actors such as China and India, and how will their role be perceived?
Bidushi Dhungel: There hasn’t been a huge response. There was a joint statement from the United States, UK, Japan, Korea, that was focused on freedom of expression, the right to assemble, those kinds of things, and to ensure that Nepal will hold on to that. There was a video message from the British ambassador to say, we’ll be standing with Nepal through this process as its oldest partner in development. There were also a couple of U.S. senators that came up with statements in support of Nepal and its new democratic transition, with a focus on trying to keep hold on to some of the gains that were made in 2015. Then later after the interim government was announced, the United States and others did come out with statements in support.
But India is the big one. Prime Minister Modi hasn’t really commented except to say the loss of life is very sad, stability of Nepal is important, etc., and then later to commend Prime Minister Sushila Karki as the first woman Prime Minister as a symbol for women’s empowerment. I think that’s the formal line. But you know, the pitfall of Nepal is that anytime anything happens politically, there’s always an India angle, real or perceived. There’s always some kind of conspiracy that is pegged to the Indian establishment, or the BJP more recently. No one really knows the extent to which these claims are true or not, but those kind of narratives are present here too. There are large numbers of people who think that this is all orchestrated with the backing of the Indian establishment. There are large numbers of people who think certain individuals are associated. There are large numbers of people who think this interim government is a puppet government. But there’s nothing to substantiate it. So, we will have to see how all of this plays out.
China was conspicuously quiet until the interim PM took office, when it, too, offered its congratulations. We do know that in the past few years the Chinese have been more active in terms of engaging with political actors than it ever has been in the past. It was busy investing in the political pipeline of the mainstream existing parties, so it may be a little bit blindsided right now. So maybe that role is yet to be seen.
Do you have any parting thoughts you’d like to share as we gaze ahead at this uncertain future in Nepal?
Bidushi Dhungel: To begin with, the protest on September 8 urgently necessitates that young people play a decisive role in determining political outcomes in Nepal. What followed on September 9, however, goes deeper—suggesting that the way in which Nepal’s political elites have run state institutions and parties has alienated the masses, and not just Gen Z. It has made too many enemies and engaged in too many dirty deeds.
Amid all this, another major grievance that has surfaced is the erosion of boundaries between business and politics. Businessmen entering politics have been acting as powerbrokers and shaping policy in favor of business elites, and politicians have been using them to make more money and win elections. This week businesses aligned with parties and leaders or actively involved in politics were singled out and burnt to the ground. Politicians most engaged in backhanded deals with those businessmen were most violently attacked. The desperate need to separate the two has now become glaring. The question is whether the political parties can step up to meet this challenge. The old guards will need to let go, and a process of internal reform will be the only way for survival and relevance.
Lastly, the Constitution is hanging on for now, but attempts to discredit the Interim Government and create instability could invite more crises. Like before, the solution lies in forging dialogue and consensus—among the old and the new.
Views expressed are the interviewee’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of South Asian Voices, the Stimson Center, or our supporters.
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