The fall of the Assad dynasty in Syria has drastically diminished Moscow’s influence in the country and, by extension, the wider Middle East, while Turkey has emerged as the biggest beneficiary.

Turkey plans to establish military bases across Syria, integrate economically through reconstruction, and turn the country into a forward defense zone or buffer state. These shifts come at the expense of Russian power projection in Syria and deepen Moscow’s suspicions that Ankara no longer relies on Russia as it once did. Turkey can now talk directly to a friendly government in Damascus, and Russian military formations no longer constitute a constraint for the Turks if they move against Kurdish forces in Syria’s northeast.

Russia and Turkey were on opposing sides during the long Syrian civil war, which erupted during the Arab Spring of 2011.  Tensions hardened after Russia entered the conflict by providing air support for Bashar al-Assad in September 2015, acting in concert with Iran and Iran-backed militias on the ground. Nevertheless, Turkey and Russia compartmentalized their differences by setting clear red lines.

One of the most significant crises occurred in November 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian warplane that briefly entered its airspace. However, relations between the two countries quickly recovered, particularly after Moscow supported Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan following a failed coup attempt against him in July 2016.

By 2017, Turkey had seemingly accepted Russia’s deep military involvement in Syria and shifted its focus from toppling Assad to securing its borders and trying to neutralize the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) militia. Along with Iran, Russia, and Turkey attempted to mediate the Syrian conflict through the Astana Process, a diplomatic framework aimed at stabilizing the war-torn country while maintaining a delicate balance of power among regional powers.

In terms of regional security, Turkey and Russia still have strong incentives to continue engagement. Russia, faced with the new political realities in Syria, is likely to opt for a pragmatic approach to retain its military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim.  Moscow has already opened negotiations with Syria’s interim government, focusing on expanding economic ties and potential involvement of Russian companies in postwar reconstruction.

The Syrian government is also interested in keeping Russia as a partner in regional security issues given Russia’s role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Ties to Russia also provide a potential counterbalance to Israeli influence and interference in Syria. But to achieve significant cooperation with the new rulers in Damascus, Russia will have to factor in Turkish interests. Russia is likely to use a strategy similar to its approach in the Black Sea theater and the South Caucasus, where Ankara’s ally, Azerbaijan, has confronted and prevailed over Moscow’s partner, Armenia. Moscow stresses its primacy in both areas but has had to heed Turkish interests. Russian withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh – the Armenian majority enclave that Azerbaijan seized in 2023 – should be seen in this light.

Russia also needs Turkey as a link with the West, even if ongoing direct talks between the U.S. and Russia have reduced that dependence. With Moscow and Washington unable to reach a meaningful agreement on a Ukraine cease-fire so far, they might still seek out Ankara as a mediator in both capitals as well as in embattled Kyiv.

Energy is also a major factor. Given that all pipelines carrying natural gas overland from Russia to Europe are now out of operation, the TurkStream route stretching from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea is the only way Russian energy exports can still access the European Union. Some 15.75 billion cubic meters of gas are exported yearly via TurkStream to Turkey, Hungary, and other countries in Europe. Russia cannot afford to jeopardize ties with Turkey and risk losing TurkStream, the last strategic economic tool Moscow still possesses with the EU.

For Turkey, meanwhile, working with Russia on Syria and the wider Middle East remains a strategic necessity. Turkish officials have argued that there has been no rupture in relations with Russia despite Assad’s fall. Indeed, on April 25, Russia and Turkey reportedly held consultations in Istanbul regarding the Middle East at the level of deputy foreign ministers. Moreover, Turkey continues to regard Russia as a counterbalance to Israel, which has opposed the emergence of a unified Syria as well as a geopolitically powerful Turkey. Turkey and Russia also need each other to prevent the resurgence of ISIS.

In the South Caucasus, both countries support the 3+3 initiative, which involves Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia with Iran, Turkey, and Russia. The 3+3 initiative aims to exclude non-regional powers from the region. Ankara and Moscow have long argued that the South Caucasus should be free of non-regional actors whose presence, they assert, causes instability. Iran is less powerful in this format, but Tehran also agrees to the concept – a rare consensus among three major competitors.

Thus, the fall of Assad and the radical shift in the balance of power in Syria, while adding new friction points to their relationship, have not necessarily diminished Russia-Turkey ties. Indeed, the two have proved adept at maintaining a delicate balance between rivalry and cooperation. For the moment, cooperation prevails. 

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.