Editor’s Note: From his base in Georgia, academic Emil Avdaliani follows regional security and economic trends and contributes frequently to Stimson on these topics. The author of a recent book, “China, Russia and New Eurasian Order,” he is particularly expert on regional ties with Russia and China and has also written for the Carnegie Endowment and for Trends Research and Advisory.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Russia is elevating its military-space cooperation with Iran to a new qualitative level. Tehran seeks to capitalize on Moscow’s isolation from the West to secure Russia’s advanced military technology.
The trend began to gain momentum in August 2022, when Russia sent Iran’s Khayyam satellite into orbit from a space launch station in Kazakhstan. The remote sensing craft was launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome using a Russian “Soyuz-2.1b” launch vehicle. In the West, this sparked concerns about potential military and intelligence uses. The launch was followed by a December 2022 agreement for Russia to cooperate with Iran in creating probing and telecommunications satellites, conducting joint testing and training, and building laboratory infrastructure and even a launch base.
In early 2023, Russia’s state corporation Roscosmos announced that it had concluded memorandums of cooperation in the field of launch services with two Iranian companies, SAHAB and SpaceOmid. Although identifying as private entities, the two companies belong to the Iranian state. An Iranian satellite built by Russian companies was launched from the Vostochny Cosmodrome in February 2023, while in October 2024 Iran sent two privately produced satellites to Russia which were placed into Earth orbit in November.
The latest launch is part of Iran’s broader space program, which aims to expand the country’s remote sensing capabilities. Tehran also announced that it would send up another three satellites by March 2025 to collect data in crisis situations. Moreover, Iran aims to complete construction of the Chabahar spaceport in the southeast of the country by 2028 and to launch a man into space. The Chabahar space center is expected to become the largest launch site for spacecraft in Western Asia. Its proximity to the equator improves the launch of spacecraft and reduces fuel consumption. Iran may need additional Russian support to achieve a manned mission.
The space advances coincide with rapid progress in Iran’s nuclear program, which worries experts concerned that Iran may move from threshold status to build weapons. Here, too, there are concerns that Russia, which once worked with Western countries to impede Iran’s nuclear progress, might contribute expertise or at least, do nothing to dissuade Iran from joining the nuclear weapons club.
Cooperation in the field of space technology goes back two decades to 2005, when the Kosmos-3M launch vehicle was launched from the Russian Plesetsk Cosmodrome and took into space Iran’s first artificial satellite — the Sina-1 Earth remote sensing satellite. In August 2015, the Russian corporation VNIIEM, as well as the scientific and production concern BARL, signed a preliminary agreement with the Iranian company Boniyan Danesh Sharg on the development, creation and subsequent operation of a space system for remote sensing of the Earth.
Russia may have become more amenable to expanded cooperation in space following Iran’s decision to supply Russia with drones and other necessary weapons for the war in Ukraine. A long-awaited strategic partnership between Moscow and Tehran is likely to be signed during the expected visit January 17 of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Russia, marking a deepening of a partnership established in the early 2000s. The two countries have extended their original agreement several times but have expressed a need to renew the document so that it better reflects the changes on the global stage. The space cooperation will likely be a cornerstone of the new agreement.
Despite occasional differences between the two countries, Iran remains committed to leveraging Russian expertise in its space ambitions. Tehran continues to rely on Moscow’s advanced capabilities, including the use of Russian and Kazakh space facilities, as it works toward developing the capacity to launch heavier satellites independently.
Iran’s space ambitions go beyond scientific exploration and reflect broader geopolitical and security objectives such as countering potential threats from Western powers. A critical area of focus is achieving greater independence in communications and navigation technology. Iranian officials have often emphasized the importance of bolstering the country’s broadcasting and telecommunications capabilities.
For instance, reliance on the US-operated Global Positioning System (GPS), which is controlled by the U.S. government, is viewed by Tehran as a major vulnerability. Iranian officials fear that, during periods of heightened tension, Washington could limit or block Iran’s access to the system, compromising critical infrastructure and national security. This explains Tehran’s decision to establish its own satellite navigation system similar to Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), which aims to reduce Russia’s vulnerabilities.
Iran’s first step toward navigation independence was the creation of Hoda, a Local Positioning System developed in 2016. However, the system currently lacks full national coverage and remains limited in its capabilities. Achieving a fully operational, homegrown satellite navigation system is a long-term endeavor that will require significant investment and technological advancement to provide coverage within Iran and potentially beyond its borders.
The collaboration between Tehran and Moscow in space exploration underscores a growing strategic alignment, despite international criticism. For Iran, Russia’s resources and technical expertise remain essential as it works to overcome domestic limitations. Meanwhile, Moscow sees the partnership as an opportunity to strengthen ties with a key ally amid its own isolation from Western nations.
While the Khayyam satellite and Iran’s broader space program are primarily viewed through the lens of their potential military and intelligence applications, their significance extends to the realm of geopolitical strategy. As Tehran seeks to assert greater autonomy in technology and reduce vulnerabilities to Western pressure, its space endeavors—and its reliance on Moscow—will likely remain central to its long-term goals. Since the U.S. sanctions Iran’s space bodies, collaboration with Russia is technological lifeline for Tehran.
It remains unclear whether this partnership can withstand international pressure and tensions between Moscow and Tehran, and whether Iran can achieve its ambitions of greater independence in space and navigation technology. For now, however, cooperation with Russia continues to offer Tehran a critical pathway to advancing its strategic interests.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
Iran-Russia Space Cooperation Deepens as Pezeshkian Visits Moscow
By Emil Avdaliani
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: From his base in Georgia, academic Emil Avdaliani follows regional security and economic trends and contributes frequently to Stimson on these topics. The author of a recent book, “China, Russia and New Eurasian Order,” he is particularly expert on regional ties with Russia and China and has also written for the Carnegie Endowment and for Trends Research and Advisory.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Russia is elevating its military-space cooperation with Iran to a new qualitative level. Tehran seeks to capitalize on Moscow’s isolation from the West to secure Russia’s advanced military technology.
The trend began to gain momentum in August 2022, when Russia sent Iran’s Khayyam satellite into orbit from a space launch station in Kazakhstan. The remote sensing craft was launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome using a Russian “Soyuz-2.1b” launch vehicle. In the West, this sparked concerns about potential military and intelligence uses. The launch was followed by a December 2022 agreement for Russia to cooperate with Iran in creating probing and telecommunications satellites, conducting joint testing and training, and building laboratory infrastructure and even a launch base.
In early 2023, Russia’s state corporation Roscosmos announced that it had concluded memorandums of cooperation in the field of launch services with two Iranian companies, SAHAB and SpaceOmid. Although identifying as private entities, the two companies belong to the Iranian state. An Iranian satellite built by Russian companies was launched from the Vostochny Cosmodrome in February 2023, while in October 2024 Iran sent two privately produced satellites to Russia which were placed into Earth orbit in November.
The latest launch is part of Iran’s broader space program, which aims to expand the country’s remote sensing capabilities. Tehran also announced that it would send up another three satellites by March 2025 to collect data in crisis situations. Moreover, Iran aims to complete construction of the Chabahar spaceport in the southeast of the country by 2028 and to launch a man into space. The Chabahar space center is expected to become the largest launch site for spacecraft in Western Asia. Its proximity to the equator improves the launch of spacecraft and reduces fuel consumption. Iran may need additional Russian support to achieve a manned mission.
The space advances coincide with rapid progress in Iran’s nuclear program, which worries experts concerned that Iran may move from threshold status to build weapons. Here, too, there are concerns that Russia, which once worked with Western countries to impede Iran’s nuclear progress, might contribute expertise or at least, do nothing to dissuade Iran from joining the nuclear weapons club.
Cooperation in the field of space technology goes back two decades to 2005, when the Kosmos-3M launch vehicle was launched from the Russian Plesetsk Cosmodrome and took into space Iran’s first artificial satellite — the Sina-1 Earth remote sensing satellite. In August 2015, the Russian corporation VNIIEM, as well as the scientific and production concern BARL, signed a preliminary agreement with the Iranian company Boniyan Danesh Sharg on the development, creation and subsequent operation of a space system for remote sensing of the Earth.
Russia may have become more amenable to expanded cooperation in space following Iran’s decision to supply Russia with drones and other necessary weapons for the war in Ukraine. A long-awaited strategic partnership between Moscow and Tehran is likely to be signed during the expected visit January 17 of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Russia, marking a deepening of a partnership established in the early 2000s. The two countries have extended their original agreement several times but have expressed a need to renew the document so that it better reflects the changes on the global stage. The space cooperation will likely be a cornerstone of the new agreement.
Despite occasional differences between the two countries, Iran remains committed to leveraging Russian expertise in its space ambitions. Tehran continues to rely on Moscow’s advanced capabilities, including the use of Russian and Kazakh space facilities, as it works toward developing the capacity to launch heavier satellites independently.
Iran’s space ambitions go beyond scientific exploration and reflect broader geopolitical and security objectives such as countering potential threats from Western powers. A critical area of focus is achieving greater independence in communications and navigation technology. Iranian officials have often emphasized the importance of bolstering the country’s broadcasting and telecommunications capabilities.
For instance, reliance on the US-operated Global Positioning System (GPS), which is controlled by the U.S. government, is viewed by Tehran as a major vulnerability. Iranian officials fear that, during periods of heightened tension, Washington could limit or block Iran’s access to the system, compromising critical infrastructure and national security. This explains Tehran’s decision to establish its own satellite navigation system similar to Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), which aims to reduce Russia’s vulnerabilities.
Iran’s first step toward navigation independence was the creation of Hoda, a Local Positioning System developed in 2016. However, the system currently lacks full national coverage and remains limited in its capabilities. Achieving a fully operational, homegrown satellite navigation system is a long-term endeavor that will require significant investment and technological advancement to provide coverage within Iran and potentially beyond its borders.
The collaboration between Tehran and Moscow in space exploration underscores a growing strategic alignment, despite international criticism. For Iran, Russia’s resources and technical expertise remain essential as it works to overcome domestic limitations. Meanwhile, Moscow sees the partnership as an opportunity to strengthen ties with a key ally amid its own isolation from Western nations.
While the Khayyam satellite and Iran’s broader space program are primarily viewed through the lens of their potential military and intelligence applications, their significance extends to the realm of geopolitical strategy. As Tehran seeks to assert greater autonomy in technology and reduce vulnerabilities to Western pressure, its space endeavors—and its reliance on Moscow—will likely remain central to its long-term goals. Since the U.S. sanctions Iran’s space bodies, collaboration with Russia is technological lifeline for Tehran.
It remains unclear whether this partnership can withstand international pressure and tensions between Moscow and Tehran, and whether Iran can achieve its ambitions of greater independence in space and navigation technology. For now, however, cooperation with Russia continues to offer Tehran a critical pathway to advancing its strategic interests.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
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