The Arctic has attracted significant media attention since the inauguration of the Second Trump administration, particularly surrounding the escalation of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric vis-à-vis Greenland, including his recent insistence that the U.S. will go “as far as we have to go” to gain control of the self-governing territory of Denmark. The Second Lady Usha Vance’s planned trip to Greenland —initially with one of her sons to visit Greenland’s cultural and historical sites and attend the annual dogsled race — was met with strong criticism from both local Greenland and Danish officials. Her visit became even more controversial after Vice President Vance announced on March 25 that he would join his wife in her Greenland visit to “check out” its security.
As diplomatic tension rises between the U.S. and Denmark, and as Greenlanders pushed back on U.S. outreach, criticizing the visit as “very aggressive”, the administration’s itinerary of their Greenland visit on March 28 changed considerably as the trip was quickly slimmed to only include a visit to the U.S. military base in Greenland.
Trump’s Renewed Interest in Greenland: Unorthodox But Not Unprecedented
President Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. The president had previously expressed his strong interest in gaining control of Greenland, suggesting in August 2019 that the administration was interested in purchasing Greenland. Back then, his comments were largely dismissed, and Trump himself admitted that the issue was not an urgent policy priority for him.
Five years later, Trump has made clear that he has not lost interest in Greenland. If anything, the president seems to be reviving the issue with greater intensity and overt attempts to advance the issue this time around. Even before the January inauguration, Donald Trump Jr visited to Greenland. Within 60 days of his inauguration, Trump declared his administration’s intention to gain control of Greenland “one way or the other” in his address to the Congress on March 4, 2025.
President Trump’s articulated interest in gaining control of the area that, although described as a “semi-autonomous” region, belongs to Denmark—a U.S. ally—is unorthodox, to say the least. However, the idea of a U.S. purchase of Greenland is not an unprecedented move by a U.S. president. In fact, the 33rd U.S. President, Harry Truman, secretly reached out to Denmark with a proposal of purchasing Greenland in 1946.
Truman’s proposal was made in the wake of the Cold War and as the U.S. grappled with the security threat posed by the Soviet Union. At that point, the North Atlantic passage, known as the GIUK Gap—the waterway that runs through Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom—was considered a critical choke point for the Soviet Union’s Northern Fleet. This made the GIUK Gap a strategically important gateway for the U.S. and its trans-Atlantic allies to invest their military buildup on to make sure that the GIUK Gap “remains shut” to deny Soviet military an access to the northern passage.
Almost eighty years later, with improved accessibility for transport as well as the rich mineral reserve due to thinning and melting of the Arctic ice, the Arctic has resurfaced as the domain of strategic competition between the U.S. and like-minded countries on the one hand, and their strategic competitors on the other—namely Russia and China. Russia has identified the control of the Northern Sea Routes (NSR) as the country’s priority for its energy transport and has been steadily taking measures toward that goal, including through the expansion the military capability in the Arctic. These measures include the re-opening of Soviet-era military bases and the expansion of its Northern Fleet. Russia has also conducted military operations to showcase its military capability in the Arctic, such as the March 2021 maneuver in which three Russian nuclear submarines surfaced in the Arctic by breaking through the ice during a military drill.
China has also begun to pay greater attention to the Arctic in the last few years. In the 2018 Arctic Strategy, China identified itself as a “near-Arctic state”, with an intent to build a “silk road on ice” looking for opportunities for economic and infrastructure investment. Over the last decade, China has picked up its pace on investment in the Arctic since becoming a permanent observer in the Arctic Council in 2013. Between 2012-2018, for example, China’s investment in Greenland amounted to approximately $2 billion—roughly over 12% of Greenland’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Furthermore, China made significant investments in other infrastructure and scientific research-oriented projects in Arctic countries, including Finland, Sweden, and Norway, before some of these countries began to pay closer scrutiny to the mechanisms for foreign direct investments in or around 2022. In addition, as China-Russia security cooperation grows, the two countries have begun to coordinate military actions in the Arctic. This cooperation was noticed when the two nations conducted a joint military exercise in the Bering Sea in the summer of 2023, as well as when their bombers conducted a joint aerial patrol near Alaska in July 2024. Most recently, the Chinese and Russian Coast Guards conducted a joint patrol in the Arctic in October 2024, triggering further security concerns.
Taken together, these developments show that, as unorthodox as Trump’s approach on the Arctic may be, his reinvigorated interest in Greenland points to a broader reality that the Arctic is being recognized as a strategically important region for U.S. national security interests.
In other words, fiery rhetoric aside, Trump’s instinct for the Arctic is in the right place.
Reemergence of the North Pacific in Japan’s Strategic Landscape
To most Japanese, the Arctic is a place for scientific exploration and expeditions. During the Cold War, however, the North Pacific, which includes the Bearing Sea adjacent to the Arctic, was the frontline of the Cold War in the Far East. Indeed, this was the area where Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) worked closely with the U.S. Navy on anti-submarine and other naval surveillance operations to keep the Soviet military in check.
Fast forward to the 21st century, and Japan has not been oblivious to the rising importance of the Arctic, either. The Japanese government, following Japan’s ascendance to the Arctic Council as a permanent observer in 2013, issued its Arctic Policy in 2015 which focuses on (1) environment, (2) indigenous population, (3) science and technology, (4) promoting the rule of law, (5) utilization of the Arctic passage route, (6) natural resource development, and (7) regional security. This policy was incorporated into Japan’s Third Basic Plan for Ocean Policy, most recently updated in 2018. Despite the regional security consideration, Japan’s approach to the Arctic has been firmly rooted in three areas – scientific research, promotion of international cooperation, and sustainable development of the Arctic.
However, as the geostrategic competition in the Arctic seems to intensify, the North Pacific may re-enter Japan’s strategic landscape. Namely, the greater interest by China on engaging the Arctic countries through investments in infrastructure and energy developments in the region has compelled Japan to work with U.S. and European partners to ensure that the Arctic remains “free and open and is governed by the rule of law”.
Indeed, Japan has been reenergizing its outreach to Northern Europe –
When then-foreign minister Yoko Kamikawa visited Sweden in January 2024, she unveiled Japan’s Northern European Diplomacy Initiative with four focus areas: the Arctic, gender issues, broader economic cooperation (including cooperation in science and technology), and defense. While cooperation in the Arctic under this initiative is centered in cooperation in scientific research, environmental preservation, and human resources development, the countries that have high stakes in the Arcti,c such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland have been identified as the countries with which Japan seeks to strengthen its defense relations.
What’s more, China’s growing cooperation with Russia only aggravates Japan’s concern of China’s behavior in the Arctic.
North Pacific in the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Given the emergence of the Arctic as the next ground for geostrategic competition, security cooperation in the Arctic and the broader North Pacific may re-emerge as places for deeper U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation as Japan looks to push for greater cooperation with Northern European countries. In fact, despite rising tensions in the trans-Atlantic alliance over the handling of the Russia-Ukraine war and trade, the Arctic provides a unique opportunity for greater cooperation. Indeed, Japan’s approach to the Arctic—primarily focused on scientific research and environmental conservation—makes Tokyo well-positioned to facilitate the cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and North Europe at a critical juncture for the future of the trans-Atlantic alliance.
In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan can leverage the assets and capabilities that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has already developed to enhance its role in surveillance and intelligence-gathering in the North Pacific. Even after the Cold War, the JMSDF maintained its surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations in the North to keep not only North Korea’s but also China’s and Russia’s military behavior in check. These efforts may need to be enhanced once again, especially given the elevated level of military activities by China and Russia.
The biggest challenge for Japan may lie in resource allocation. Japan has spent the last 10-15 years redirecting its defense investment and its force posture to focus more on defending the Southwestern Islands. The resurgence of the Cold War-era challenge from the North could complicate the ongoing effort, as Japan now has to respond to the security concern in the North once again. However, as Japan anticipates a U.S. request to “do more” in the U.S.-Japan alliance, enhancing its investment to support Japan’s capability for North Pacific security can offer a meaningful option.
Back to the Future? The Implications of Growing Strategic Competition in the Arctic for the US-Japan Alliance
By Yuki Tatsumi
Japan
The Trump administration has recently and dramatically elevated the level of U.S. strategic attention toward the Arctic. While the blunt rhetoric coming out of the administration regarding the status of Greenland dominates media headlines, the growing geostrategic importance of the Arctic is quickly being realized, suggesting that the North Pacific—once the area of close U.S.-Japan defense cooperation during the Cold War—may re-enter the strategic debate between Tokyo and Washington.
The Arctic has attracted significant media attention since the inauguration of the Second Trump administration, particularly surrounding the escalation of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric vis-à-vis Greenland, including his recent insistence that the U.S. will go “as far as we have to go” to gain control of the self-governing territory of Denmark. The Second Lady Usha Vance’s planned trip to Greenland —initially with one of her sons to visit Greenland’s cultural and historical sites and attend the annual dogsled race — was met with strong criticism from both local Greenland and Danish officials. Her visit became even more controversial after Vice President Vance announced on March 25 that he would join his wife in her Greenland visit to “check out” its security.
As diplomatic tension rises between the U.S. and Denmark, and as Greenlanders pushed back on U.S. outreach, criticizing the visit as “very aggressive”, the administration’s itinerary of their Greenland visit on March 28 changed considerably as the trip was quickly slimmed to only include a visit to the U.S. military base in Greenland.
Trump’s Renewed Interest in Greenland: Unorthodox But Not Unprecedented
President Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. The president had previously expressed his strong interest in gaining control of Greenland, suggesting in August 2019 that the administration was interested in purchasing Greenland. Back then, his comments were largely dismissed, and Trump himself admitted that the issue was not an urgent policy priority for him.
Five years later, Trump has made clear that he has not lost interest in Greenland. If anything, the president seems to be reviving the issue with greater intensity and overt attempts to advance the issue this time around. Even before the January inauguration, Donald Trump Jr visited to Greenland. Within 60 days of his inauguration, Trump declared his administration’s intention to gain control of Greenland “one way or the other” in his address to the Congress on March 4, 2025.
President Trump’s articulated interest in gaining control of the area that, although described as a “semi-autonomous” region, belongs to Denmark—a U.S. ally—is unorthodox, to say the least. However, the idea of a U.S. purchase of Greenland is not an unprecedented move by a U.S. president. In fact, the 33rd U.S. President, Harry Truman, secretly reached out to Denmark with a proposal of purchasing Greenland in 1946.
Truman’s proposal was made in the wake of the Cold War and as the U.S. grappled with the security threat posed by the Soviet Union. At that point, the North Atlantic passage, known as the GIUK Gap—the waterway that runs through Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom—was considered a critical choke point for the Soviet Union’s Northern Fleet. This made the GIUK Gap a strategically important gateway for the U.S. and its trans-Atlantic allies to invest their military buildup on to make sure that the GIUK Gap “remains shut” to deny Soviet military an access to the northern passage.
Almost eighty years later, with improved accessibility for transport as well as the rich mineral reserve due to thinning and melting of the Arctic ice, the Arctic has resurfaced as the domain of strategic competition between the U.S. and like-minded countries on the one hand, and their strategic competitors on the other—namely Russia and China. Russia has identified the control of the Northern Sea Routes (NSR) as the country’s priority for its energy transport and has been steadily taking measures toward that goal, including through the expansion the military capability in the Arctic. These measures include the re-opening of Soviet-era military bases and the expansion of its Northern Fleet. Russia has also conducted military operations to showcase its military capability in the Arctic, such as the March 2021 maneuver in which three Russian nuclear submarines surfaced in the Arctic by breaking through the ice during a military drill.
China has also begun to pay greater attention to the Arctic in the last few years. In the 2018 Arctic Strategy, China identified itself as a “near-Arctic state”, with an intent to build a “silk road on ice” looking for opportunities for economic and infrastructure investment. Over the last decade, China has picked up its pace on investment in the Arctic since becoming a permanent observer in the Arctic Council in 2013. Between 2012-2018, for example, China’s investment in Greenland amounted to approximately $2 billion—roughly over 12% of Greenland’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Furthermore, China made significant investments in other infrastructure and scientific research-oriented projects in Arctic countries, including Finland, Sweden, and Norway, before some of these countries began to pay closer scrutiny to the mechanisms for foreign direct investments in or around 2022. In addition, as China-Russia security cooperation grows, the two countries have begun to coordinate military actions in the Arctic. This cooperation was noticed when the two nations conducted a joint military exercise in the Bering Sea in the summer of 2023, as well as when their bombers conducted a joint aerial patrol near Alaska in July 2024. Most recently, the Chinese and Russian Coast Guards conducted a joint patrol in the Arctic in October 2024, triggering further security concerns.
Taken together, these developments show that, as unorthodox as Trump’s approach on the Arctic may be, his reinvigorated interest in Greenland points to a broader reality that the Arctic is being recognized as a strategically important region for U.S. national security interests.
In other words, fiery rhetoric aside, Trump’s instinct for the Arctic is in the right place.
Reemergence of the North Pacific in Japan’s Strategic Landscape
To most Japanese, the Arctic is a place for scientific exploration and expeditions. During the Cold War, however, the North Pacific, which includes the Bearing Sea adjacent to the Arctic, was the frontline of the Cold War in the Far East. Indeed, this was the area where Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) worked closely with the U.S. Navy on anti-submarine and other naval surveillance operations to keep the Soviet military in check.
Fast forward to the 21st century, and Japan has not been oblivious to the rising importance of the Arctic, either. The Japanese government, following Japan’s ascendance to the Arctic Council as a permanent observer in 2013, issued its Arctic Policy in 2015 which focuses on (1) environment, (2) indigenous population, (3) science and technology, (4) promoting the rule of law, (5) utilization of the Arctic passage route, (6) natural resource development, and (7) regional security. This policy was incorporated into Japan’s Third Basic Plan for Ocean Policy, most recently updated in 2018. Despite the regional security consideration, Japan’s approach to the Arctic has been firmly rooted in three areas – scientific research, promotion of international cooperation, and sustainable development of the Arctic.
However, as the geostrategic competition in the Arctic seems to intensify, the North Pacific may re-enter Japan’s strategic landscape. Namely, the greater interest by China on engaging the Arctic countries through investments in infrastructure and energy developments in the region has compelled Japan to work with U.S. and European partners to ensure that the Arctic remains “free and open and is governed by the rule of law”.
Indeed, Japan has been reenergizing its outreach to Northern Europe –
When then-foreign minister Yoko Kamikawa visited Sweden in January 2024, she unveiled Japan’s Northern European Diplomacy Initiative with four focus areas: the Arctic, gender issues, broader economic cooperation (including cooperation in science and technology), and defense. While cooperation in the Arctic under this initiative is centered in cooperation in scientific research, environmental preservation, and human resources development, the countries that have high stakes in the Arcti,c such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland have been identified as the countries with which Japan seeks to strengthen its defense relations.
What’s more, China’s growing cooperation with Russia only aggravates Japan’s concern of China’s behavior in the Arctic.
North Pacific in the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Given the emergence of the Arctic as the next ground for geostrategic competition, security cooperation in the Arctic and the broader North Pacific may re-emerge as places for deeper U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation as Japan looks to push for greater cooperation with Northern European countries. In fact, despite rising tensions in the trans-Atlantic alliance over the handling of the Russia-Ukraine war and trade, the Arctic provides a unique opportunity for greater cooperation. Indeed, Japan’s approach to the Arctic—primarily focused on scientific research and environmental conservation—makes Tokyo well-positioned to facilitate the cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and North Europe at a critical juncture for the future of the trans-Atlantic alliance.
In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan can leverage the assets and capabilities that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has already developed to enhance its role in surveillance and intelligence-gathering in the North Pacific. Even after the Cold War, the JMSDF maintained its surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations in the North to keep not only North Korea’s but also China’s and Russia’s military behavior in check. These efforts may need to be enhanced once again, especially given the elevated level of military activities by China and Russia.
The biggest challenge for Japan may lie in resource allocation. Japan has spent the last 10-15 years redirecting its defense investment and its force posture to focus more on defending the Southwestern Islands. The resurgence of the Cold War-era challenge from the North could complicate the ongoing effort, as Japan now has to respond to the security concern in the North once again. However, as Japan anticipates a U.S. request to “do more” in the U.S.-Japan alliance, enhancing its investment to support Japan’s capability for North Pacific security can offer a meaningful option.
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