Editor’s Note: Shahir Shahidsaless is a veteran analyst of Iranian affairs, with a specialty on Iran’s nuclear negotiating strategy and overall defense posture. He has written for Stimson in the past about Iran’s security dilemmas with the U.S and Israel.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
President Donald Trump’s announcement on April 7 that there would be “direct talks” between Iran and the U.S. beginning this weekend in Oman was the latest in a head-snapping exchange of comments between the two countries in recent weeks.
Following letters between Trump and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—of which only fragments have leaked to the media—their verbal clashes had escalated to levels rarely seen in U.S.-Iran relations.
On March 30, in a telephone interview with NBC News, Trump escalated his rhetoric, stating, “If they don’t make a deal, there will be bombing – and it will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before.” Trump added that “there’s a chance that if they don’t make a deal, I will impose secondary tariffs on them like I did four [actually six] years ago,” referring to the sanctions he implemented after his administration withdrew from a landmark nuclear deal achieved by his predecessor. According to some estimates, Iranian crude oil and condensate exports plunged from more than 2.5 million barrels per day in 2017—the year before Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or Iran nuclear deal—to less than 0.4 million barrels per day in 2020. Iranian exports have since recovered to nearly 2 million barrels per day, most of it exported to China. Under secondary sanctions, any country trading with Iran would risk additional heavy tariffs – potentially on top of those Trump has already announced. That would make it extremely costly for Iran’s trade partners to continue doing business. By explicitly framing secondary tariffs as the next step if negotiations falter, Trump signaled an intent to choke Iran’s revenue streams rather than resort to immediate strikes.
Trump combined threats of new economic pain with openness to reducing tensions. On Air Force One on March 30, he noted, “If they’re (Iranians) going to make a deal, then we’re never going to put secondary tariffs on. We can hope they have a great, long, and successful life as a country.”
Khamenei referenced Trump’s remarks in a sermon marking the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan: “If any act of aggression comes from outside — though its likelihood is not high — it will most certainly be met with a firm retaliatory blow,” he said. “If the enemy, as in certain previous years, entertains the idea of inciting sedition within the country, the nation will respond to the instigators as it did in those years — with decisive resolve.”
When Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Khamenei refused to negotiate with him but predicted that there would not be a military confrontation. After the latest threats, the Iranian leader modified this stance—agreeing to indirect talks with the U.S. — while conceding that war is possible although its likelihood in his view was “not high.” Following Trump’s remarks April 7 in the Oval Office, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed that “Iran and the United States will meet in Oman on Saturday” for “high-level talks,” but clarified that the talks would initially be indirect. “It is as much an opportunity as it is a test,” Araghchi added. “The ball is in America’s court.”
Khamenei’s insistence on initial indirect talks – through Oman, a frequent mediator between the U.S. and Iran – reflects concerns about a loss of face by engaging with the president responsible for assassinating Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the Iranian Quds Force, in 2020. Khamenei fears that direct talks could erode his conservative social base. He also worries about public humiliation—especially after Trump’s confrontational handling of Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office, an event widely covered by Iran’s hardline media. As New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman once wrote, “If I’ve learned one thing covering world affairs, it’s this: The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation.”
Iran is also moving forward without its most experienced America expert, former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who was forced out of his position as vice president for strategic affairs in March after Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Ejei advised him to resign due to numerous lawsuits against him.
A key question for Iran’s negotiators will be the extent of U.S. demands. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon has dominated U.S. and Israeli concerns for more than two decades. However, linking the nuclear question to Iran’s support for regional militias seems like a deal breaker. Iran is also resisting the so-called “Libya model” – referenced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on April 7 as he met with Trump – which would require Iran to give up all of its nuclear work.
In terms of the nuclear issue, there appear to be divisions within the Trump administration. On March 16, White House National Security Advisor Mike Waltz told ABC News, “All options are on the table to ensure [Iran] does not have one [a nuclear weapon]. And that’s all aspects of Iran’s program. That’s the missiles, the weaponization, the enrichment. They can either hand it over and give it up in a way that is verifiable, or they can face a whole series of other consequences.”
On March 23, Waltz again explicitly stated that Iran must abandon uranium enrichment, suggesting his earlier remarks were no slip of the tongue. If this reflects Trump’s position, it would create a significant impasse.
However, Trump envoy Steve Witkoff – who will represent the U.S. in Oman this weekend — has suggested that the U.S. is only concerned about weaponization. He told conservative interviewer Tucker Carlson on March 21 that “We should create a verification program so that nobody worries about weaponization of your nuclear material… because the alternative is not a very good alternative.”
For years, the Obama administration pursued a “zero enrichment” policy but ultimately agreed to allow Iran to have limited enrichment under stringent verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Given Iran’s long-standing nuclear program and the significant investments it has made in developing the full nuclear fuel cycle, it is highly unlikely that Tehran would agree now to halt enrichment entirely.
Iran’s position, as stated by its UN mission on March 9, is that discussions on “any potential militarization of Iran’s nuclear program” can be considered but that if “the aim [is] the dismantlement of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program to claim that what Obama failed to achieve has now been accomplished, such negotiations will never take place.”
Given growing economic distress and political disaffection in the country, Iran might accept limitations on its nuclear program, including a permanent commitment to the Additional Protocol (AP) of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which permits snap inspections of suspect sites, alongside a permanent halt to 60 percent enrichment and a restricted allowance for 20 percent enriched uranium.
Annex I of the JCPOA specifies that Iran would provisionally apply the AP and later ratify it in parliament. The AP—featuring short-notice inspections in as little as two hours—is the toughest diplomatic mechanism to prevent weaponization. However, it requires strong UN Security Council backing, with automatic international sanctions if Iran were to withdraw.
In return, Iran is likely to continue to insist on guarantees that any economic sanctions eased under a new agreement will not be reinstated by a future president, as Trump did in 2018. Critical sanctions, such as those on oil sales and the Central Bank of Iran, were passed into law by the U.S. Congress, meaning that a president can only waive them temporarily unless Congress acts.
The road ahead is bumpy. But the alternative—war—would likely accelerate Iranian efforts toward weaponization while further destabilizing an already volatile Middle East. Those who assume this would be a quick conflict, limited to taking out three key nuclear sites – at Natanz, Fordow, and Arak — are mistaken. Striking these sites could set off a chain of tit-for-tat escalations, could trigger escalating reprisals that turn into a broader regional conflict.
Scholars of international relations—including James Fearon, Robert Jervis, and Geoffrey Blainey—have long argued that wars often arise not from calculated strategy but from misperceptions and miscalculations about intentions and consequences.
In light of all these factors, the path of diplomacy, however fraught, remains more likely and preferable than the path of war. The coming weeks will decide whether there is enough common ground to allow diplomacy to triumph over conflict.
Shahir Shahidsaless is an Iranian-Canadian political analyst and freelance journalist specializing in Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the wider Middle East, and U.S. foreign policy in the region. His work has been featured on numerous websites focusing on the Middle East and he also contributes regularly to BBC Persian.
Diplomacy or Conflict? Trump and Khamenei’s High-Stakes Gamble
By Shahir Shahidsaless
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Shahir Shahidsaless is a veteran analyst of Iranian affairs, with a specialty on Iran’s nuclear negotiating strategy and overall defense posture. He has written for Stimson in the past about Iran’s security dilemmas with the U.S and Israel.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
President Donald Trump’s announcement on April 7 that there would be “direct talks” between Iran and the U.S. beginning this weekend in Oman was the latest in a head-snapping exchange of comments between the two countries in recent weeks.
Following letters between Trump and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—of which only fragments have leaked to the media—their verbal clashes had escalated to levels rarely seen in U.S.-Iran relations.
On March 30, in a telephone interview with NBC News, Trump escalated his rhetoric, stating, “If they don’t make a deal, there will be bombing – and it will be bombing the likes of which they have never seen before.” Trump added that “there’s a chance that if they don’t make a deal, I will impose secondary tariffs on them like I did four [actually six] years ago,” referring to the sanctions he implemented after his administration withdrew from a landmark nuclear deal achieved by his predecessor. According to some estimates, Iranian crude oil and condensate exports plunged from more than 2.5 million barrels per day in 2017—the year before Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or Iran nuclear deal—to less than 0.4 million barrels per day in 2020. Iranian exports have since recovered to nearly 2 million barrels per day, most of it exported to China. Under secondary sanctions, any country trading with Iran would risk additional heavy tariffs – potentially on top of those Trump has already announced. That would make it extremely costly for Iran’s trade partners to continue doing business. By explicitly framing secondary tariffs as the next step if negotiations falter, Trump signaled an intent to choke Iran’s revenue streams rather than resort to immediate strikes.
Trump combined threats of new economic pain with openness to reducing tensions. On Air Force One on March 30, he noted, “If they’re (Iranians) going to make a deal, then we’re never going to put secondary tariffs on. We can hope they have a great, long, and successful life as a country.”
Khamenei referenced Trump’s remarks in a sermon marking the end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan: “If any act of aggression comes from outside — though its likelihood is not high — it will most certainly be met with a firm retaliatory blow,” he said. “If the enemy, as in certain previous years, entertains the idea of inciting sedition within the country, the nation will respond to the instigators as it did in those years — with decisive resolve.”
When Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, Khamenei refused to negotiate with him but predicted that there would not be a military confrontation. After the latest threats, the Iranian leader modified this stance—agreeing to indirect talks with the U.S. — while conceding that war is possible although its likelihood in his view was “not high.” Following Trump’s remarks April 7 in the Oval Office, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed that “Iran and the United States will meet in Oman on Saturday” for “high-level talks,” but clarified that the talks would initially be indirect. “It is as much an opportunity as it is a test,” Araghchi added. “The ball is in America’s court.”
Khamenei’s insistence on initial indirect talks – through Oman, a frequent mediator between the U.S. and Iran – reflects concerns about a loss of face by engaging with the president responsible for assassinating Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the Iranian Quds Force, in 2020. Khamenei fears that direct talks could erode his conservative social base. He also worries about public humiliation—especially after Trump’s confrontational handling of Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office, an event widely covered by Iran’s hardline media. As New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman once wrote, “If I’ve learned one thing covering world affairs, it’s this: The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation.”
Iran is also moving forward without its most experienced America expert, former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who was forced out of his position as vice president for strategic affairs in March after Judiciary Chief Gholam Hossein Ejei advised him to resign due to numerous lawsuits against him.
A key question for Iran’s negotiators will be the extent of U.S. demands. Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon has dominated U.S. and Israeli concerns for more than two decades. However, linking the nuclear question to Iran’s support for regional militias seems like a deal breaker. Iran is also resisting the so-called “Libya model” – referenced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on April 7 as he met with Trump – which would require Iran to give up all of its nuclear work.
In terms of the nuclear issue, there appear to be divisions within the Trump administration. On March 16, White House National Security Advisor Mike Waltz told ABC News, “All options are on the table to ensure [Iran] does not have one [a nuclear weapon]. And that’s all aspects of Iran’s program. That’s the missiles, the weaponization, the enrichment. They can either hand it over and give it up in a way that is verifiable, or they can face a whole series of other consequences.”
On March 23, Waltz again explicitly stated that Iran must abandon uranium enrichment, suggesting his earlier remarks were no slip of the tongue. If this reflects Trump’s position, it would create a significant impasse.
However, Trump envoy Steve Witkoff – who will represent the U.S. in Oman this weekend — has suggested that the U.S. is only concerned about weaponization. He told conservative interviewer Tucker Carlson on March 21 that “We should create a verification program so that nobody worries about weaponization of your nuclear material… because the alternative is not a very good alternative.”
For years, the Obama administration pursued a “zero enrichment” policy but ultimately agreed to allow Iran to have limited enrichment under stringent verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Given Iran’s long-standing nuclear program and the significant investments it has made in developing the full nuclear fuel cycle, it is highly unlikely that Tehran would agree now to halt enrichment entirely.
Iran’s position, as stated by its UN mission on March 9, is that discussions on “any potential militarization of Iran’s nuclear program” can be considered but that if “the aim [is] the dismantlement of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program to claim that what Obama failed to achieve has now been accomplished, such negotiations will never take place.”
Given growing economic distress and political disaffection in the country, Iran might accept limitations on its nuclear program, including a permanent commitment to the Additional Protocol (AP) of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which permits snap inspections of suspect sites, alongside a permanent halt to 60 percent enrichment and a restricted allowance for 20 percent enriched uranium.
Annex I of the JCPOA specifies that Iran would provisionally apply the AP and later ratify it in parliament. The AP—featuring short-notice inspections in as little as two hours—is the toughest diplomatic mechanism to prevent weaponization. However, it requires strong UN Security Council backing, with automatic international sanctions if Iran were to withdraw.
In return, Iran is likely to continue to insist on guarantees that any economic sanctions eased under a new agreement will not be reinstated by a future president, as Trump did in 2018. Critical sanctions, such as those on oil sales and the Central Bank of Iran, were passed into law by the U.S. Congress, meaning that a president can only waive them temporarily unless Congress acts.
The road ahead is bumpy. But the alternative—war—would likely accelerate Iranian efforts toward weaponization while further destabilizing an already volatile Middle East. Those who assume this would be a quick conflict, limited to taking out three key nuclear sites – at Natanz, Fordow, and Arak — are mistaken. Striking these sites could set off a chain of tit-for-tat escalations, could trigger escalating reprisals that turn into a broader regional conflict.
Scholars of international relations—including James Fearon, Robert Jervis, and Geoffrey Blainey—have long argued that wars often arise not from calculated strategy but from misperceptions and miscalculations about intentions and consequences.
In light of all these factors, the path of diplomacy, however fraught, remains more likely and preferable than the path of war. The coming weeks will decide whether there is enough common ground to allow diplomacy to triumph over conflict.
Shahir Shahidsaless is an Iranian-Canadian political analyst and freelance journalist specializing in Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the wider Middle East, and U.S. foreign policy in the region. His work has been featured on numerous websites focusing on the Middle East and he also contributes regularly to BBC Persian.
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