The recent appointment of Saddam Haftar as deputy commander of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) is not merely a familial reshuffle; it is a calculated move to consolidate power within a closed clan-based system that has effectively hijacked eastern Libya. This decision, orchestrated by the 83-year-old warlord Khalifa Haftar, sidelines his once-favored son Khaled — recently promoted to general — and installs the younger Saddam as heir apparent. Behind this dynastic maneuvering lies a deeper truth: The Haftar project was never about national unity or state-building. It is, and has always been, a personalistic enterprise built on coercion, foreign patronage, and violence.
Since 2014, the Haftar-led coalition has exploited Libya’s fragmented security environment to present itself as a national alternative. In reality, it functions as a mafia-like structure, centralizing power through a blend of repression and economic predation. Research indicates that by 2019, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) under Haftar’s command absorbed approximately one-third of all eastern public expenditure — financed largely through parallel banking operations and illicit sales of oil, often orchestrated by Haftar’s inner circle. In one documented instance, forces under Saddam Haftar’s command sidestepped a national oil blockade to sell nearly six million barrels of crude, netting over $400 million through a private company.
The LAAF’s consolidation strategy has evolved in clear phases: from cooperative alliances with local militias and tribes, to competitive elimination of rivals, and finally to outright coercion. This transition was made possible by unwavering foreign support through arms and airpower; Russia-supplied mercenaries and political cover; and even diplomatic legitimacy offered by France. With this backing, Haftar systematically weakened once-powerful allies — such as Faraj Ga’im and Ibrahim al-Jadhran — through assassination, abduction, or financial strangulation. By 2017, his forces were committing extrajudicial killings with impunity, dumping bodies in Benghazi’s suburbs to signal the cost of dissent.
Saddam’s rise is consistent with this pattern of clan-centric militarization. Unlike his brother Khaled, who maintained a more conventional military profile, Saddam cut his teeth leading the Tariq Ben Ziyad Brigade — a unit implicated by Amnesty International in war crimes, including torture and summary executions. His leadership style embodies the fusion of violence and illicit profit that characterizes the Haftar regime. Under his command, forces have engaged in human trafficking, fuel smuggling, and Captagon sales, weaving criminality into the fabric of governance.
The broader implication is clear: The Haftar clan is not preparing for reconciliation or integration into a unified Libyan state. It is insulating itself against potential instability following the patriarch’s death. This is not governance; it is organized crime disguised as counterterrorism. The “Vision 2030” development program, often touted by Haftar’s propagandists, is a hollow promise meant to camouflage a system built on fear and extraction.
Libya’s future will not be secured by strongmen or their sons. It requires inclusive dialogue, accountable institutions, and the demilitarization of political life. The Haftar model — kleptocratic, violent, and unaccountable — is the greatest obstacle to that future. Until the global community stops treating it as part of the solution, Libya will remain a nation divided, bleeding resources and hope in equal measure.
Clan Haftar Reshuffles
By Hafed Al Ghwell
Middle East & North Africa
The appointment of Saddam Haftar as deputy commander of the Libyan National Army is more than a family reshuffle. It reflects the tightening grip of a clan-based system that has hijacked eastern Libya. By sidelining other contenders, Khalifa Haftar is securing his legacy through a network built on coercion, foreign patronage, and economic predation. Saddam’s rise, shaped by his command of the Tariq Ben Ziyad Brigade and its record of abuses, shows how violence and illicit profit sustain this order. What is presented as counterterrorism or stability is, in practice, the consolidation of a mafia-like structure that drains Libya’s resources and suppresses dissent. This moment matters because it reveals how the Haftar project, long supported by external powers, continues to block reconciliation and state-building, ensuring that Libya’s divisions and corruption endure beyond the aging warlord himself.
The recent appointment of Saddam Haftar as deputy commander of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) is not merely a familial reshuffle; it is a calculated move to consolidate power within a closed clan-based system that has effectively hijacked eastern Libya. This decision, orchestrated by the 83-year-old warlord Khalifa Haftar, sidelines his once-favored son Khaled — recently promoted to general — and installs the younger Saddam as heir apparent. Behind this dynastic maneuvering lies a deeper truth: The Haftar project was never about national unity or state-building. It is, and has always been, a personalistic enterprise built on coercion, foreign patronage, and violence.
Since 2014, the Haftar-led coalition has exploited Libya’s fragmented security environment to present itself as a national alternative. In reality, it functions as a mafia-like structure, centralizing power through a blend of repression and economic predation. Research indicates that by 2019, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) under Haftar’s command absorbed approximately one-third of all eastern public expenditure — financed largely through parallel banking operations and illicit sales of oil, often orchestrated by Haftar’s inner circle. In one documented instance, forces under Saddam Haftar’s command sidestepped a national oil blockade to sell nearly six million barrels of crude, netting over $400 million through a private company.
The LAAF’s consolidation strategy has evolved in clear phases: from cooperative alliances with local militias and tribes, to competitive elimination of rivals, and finally to outright coercion. This transition was made possible by unwavering foreign support through arms and airpower; Russia-supplied mercenaries and political cover; and even diplomatic legitimacy offered by France. With this backing, Haftar systematically weakened once-powerful allies — such as Faraj Ga’im and Ibrahim al-Jadhran — through assassination, abduction, or financial strangulation. By 2017, his forces were committing extrajudicial killings with impunity, dumping bodies in Benghazi’s suburbs to signal the cost of dissent.
Saddam’s rise is consistent with this pattern of clan-centric militarization. Unlike his brother Khaled, who maintained a more conventional military profile, Saddam cut his teeth leading the Tariq Ben Ziyad Brigade — a unit implicated by Amnesty International in war crimes, including torture and summary executions. His leadership style embodies the fusion of violence and illicit profit that characterizes the Haftar regime. Under his command, forces have engaged in human trafficking, fuel smuggling, and Captagon sales, weaving criminality into the fabric of governance.
The broader implication is clear: The Haftar clan is not preparing for reconciliation or integration into a unified Libyan state. It is insulating itself against potential instability following the patriarch’s death. This is not governance; it is organized crime disguised as counterterrorism. The “Vision 2030” development program, often touted by Haftar’s propagandists, is a hollow promise meant to camouflage a system built on fear and extraction.
Libya’s future will not be secured by strongmen or their sons. It requires inclusive dialogue, accountable institutions, and the demilitarization of political life. The Haftar model — kleptocratic, violent, and unaccountable — is the greatest obstacle to that future. Until the global community stops treating it as part of the solution, Libya will remain a nation divided, bleeding resources and hope in equal measure.
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