Editor’s Note: Arash Reisinezhad is a Visiting Scholar at the Department of Government in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University. He is also a visiting fellow of the Middle East Centre at London School of Economics and a former Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Tehran. Reisinezhad’s publications include The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia, (Palgrave-MacMillan, 2018) and Iran and the New Silk Road (in Persian). His research focuses on geopolitics and political risk analysis, geoeconomic corridors, security and strategic studies, and foreign policy analysis, with a particular emphasis on the Middle East and its broader global implications.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives project
A recent visit by Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Saudi Arabia to meet his Saudi counterpart marked another important step in the two-year-old détente between Tehran and Riyadh. Araghchi’s trip came shortly after Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman visited Tehran, the highest-level Saudi royal to come to the Islamic Republic in decades.
Prince Khalid met Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian, pledging to strengthen security, economic, and cultural cooperation between the historic rivals. The timing of the visit, just before the resumption of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks, highlighted Saudi Arabia’s strategic interest in promoting regional stability through diplomacy.
The thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia was set in motion after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) roll-back strategy to curb Iranian regional influence backfired during the Trump administration’s first term. At one point, the Saudi royal openly threatened to extend the conflict into Iranian territory, stating, “We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran.” However, the Saudis failed to defeat the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen and Saudi support for Trump’s withdrawal from an Obama-era nuclear deal led to the 2019 drone attack on Saudi Aramco’s facilities, which laid bare Saudi vulnerabilities. Riyadh, disappointed by Washington’s reluctance to intervene at the time, reevaluated its confrontational approach. Iraqi and Chinese mediation paved the way for renewed diplomatic engagement with Iran after years of hostility.
The renewed Iran-Saudi relationship has shifted regional dynamics. Iranian officials have publicly expressed interest in developing economic and security ties with Saudi Arabia while MBS has demonstrated support for Iran’s inclusion in a new Middle Eastern economic framework. In a striking U-turn from Trump’s first term, Riyadh has also signaled a willingness to facilitate a new nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States.
What shifts in geopolitics and national interests’ calculations have driven Riyadh’s dramatic policy reversal? The main driver is the weakening of Iran’s regional position.
Israel’s blows to Hamas and Hezbollah, and most notably, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, have all eroded the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, significantly diminishing Tehran’s ability to project power. A weakened Iran poses less of a threat to Saudi national security and regional influence, making engagement a less risky option for Riyadh.
The second major factor is the rise of Israel as a potential hegemonic force in the region. While in some ways appreciative of Israeli actions against Iran’s partners, Israel’s military successes have also made Saudi leaders wary. Saudi leaders now consider Iran as a counterbalance than a threat. This new strategic calculus has led Riyadh to quietly oppose further military strikes against Iran, seeing it as vital to maintaining a multipolar balance in the Middle East.
The third factor behind the Saudi pivot is growing Turkish influence in the Levant under the leadership of President Recep Tayeb Erdoğan. Following the collapse of the Baathist regime in Syria, Türkiye has supported a former jihadist, interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa. From Riyadh’s perspective, Iran’s so-called “Shia Crescent” is now being replaced by an “Ottoman Crescent” powered by Türkiye’s economic infrastructure, ideology and regional ambitions.
The fourth major element driving Saudi Arabia’s strategic transformation is its ambitious Vision 2030 initiative. This long-term blueprint aims to reposition Saudi Arabia as a key node in the global economic supply chain and the leader of regional development. With a young population, Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability to foster economic engagement and soft power. The pivot to diplomacy and trade over conflict is necessary for implementing Vision 2030.
The fifth and perhaps most ambitious factor is MBS’s strategy to rebrand Saudi Arabia from a purveyor of Wahhabi fundamentalism to a beacon of development and moderation. Through megaprojects and massive infrastructure investments, Riyadh is striving to be seen as a modernizing force in the Middle East. In this context, a weakened Iran helps emphasize Saudi Arabia’s narrative of progress.
Iranians “watched with envy” President Donald Trump’s trip to three Arab countries across the Persian Gulf in May. While Trump praised the infrastructure in Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi, Iranians were contending with shortages of water and electricity.
Iran needs foreign investment and an end to crippling U.S. economic sanctions to revive its fortunes. For Riyadh, this is a welcome opportunity: a less assertive Iran is more likely to accept a Saudi-led regional framework.
Despite an Iranian history of resenting and looking down on Arab monarchies, many young Iranians, based on my research and personal experience, see the current Saudi leadership as a compelling modernizing archetype. This view is subtly influencing Iranian discourse on the most significant factor in Iran’s future foreign and domestic policies: the sensitive process of succession to Supreme Leader Khamenei.
Taken together, these factors have transformed a once-adversarial relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia into one of cautious cooperation. The transformation could foster a new Persian Gulf-centric security architecture—a modern reinterpretation of the “Two Pillars” policy devised by the U.S. under the Shah to support both Saudi Arabia and Iran as dual anchors of regional stability and power.
Interestingly, the original U.S. policy was aimed at securing the Persian Gulf against the infiltration of the Soviet Union and pan-Arab regimes. Under the Nixon and Ford administrations, however, this doctrine evolved into more of a Sole Pillar policy centered around Pahlavi Iran.
This developing engagement between two historic rivals reflects a broader recalibration of regional alliances, power balances, and strategic identities throughout the Middle East. Whether this new balance holds will depend not just on the Persian Gulf states, but on how Washington responds. If the U.S. continues to disengage or misread the region’s evolving priorities, it may find itself watching from the sidelines as a new regional order takes shape—one in which Beijing, not Washington, is the preferred guest at the table.
A New Two Pillar Policy in the Persian Gulf?
By Arash Reisinezhad
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Arash Reisinezhad is a Visiting Scholar at the Department of Government in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University. He is also a visiting fellow of the Middle East Centre at London School of Economics and a former Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Tehran. Reisinezhad’s publications include The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia, (Palgrave-MacMillan, 2018) and Iran and the New Silk Road (in Persian). His research focuses on geopolitics and political risk analysis, geoeconomic corridors, security and strategic studies, and foreign policy analysis, with a particular emphasis on the Middle East and its broader global implications.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives project
A recent visit by Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Saudi Arabia to meet his Saudi counterpart marked another important step in the two-year-old détente between Tehran and Riyadh. Araghchi’s trip came shortly after Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman visited Tehran, the highest-level Saudi royal to come to the Islamic Republic in decades.
Prince Khalid met Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian, pledging to strengthen security, economic, and cultural cooperation between the historic rivals. The timing of the visit, just before the resumption of U.S.-Iran nuclear talks, highlighted Saudi Arabia’s strategic interest in promoting regional stability through diplomacy.
The thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia was set in motion after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) roll-back strategy to curb Iranian regional influence backfired during the Trump administration’s first term. At one point, the Saudi royal openly threatened to extend the conflict into Iranian territory, stating, “We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran.” However, the Saudis failed to defeat the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen and Saudi support for Trump’s withdrawal from an Obama-era nuclear deal led to the 2019 drone attack on Saudi Aramco’s facilities, which laid bare Saudi vulnerabilities. Riyadh, disappointed by Washington’s reluctance to intervene at the time, reevaluated its confrontational approach. Iraqi and Chinese mediation paved the way for renewed diplomatic engagement with Iran after years of hostility.
The renewed Iran-Saudi relationship has shifted regional dynamics. Iranian officials have publicly expressed interest in developing economic and security ties with Saudi Arabia while MBS has demonstrated support for Iran’s inclusion in a new Middle Eastern economic framework. In a striking U-turn from Trump’s first term, Riyadh has also signaled a willingness to facilitate a new nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States.
What shifts in geopolitics and national interests’ calculations have driven Riyadh’s dramatic policy reversal? The main driver is the weakening of Iran’s regional position.
Israel’s blows to Hamas and Hezbollah, and most notably, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, have all eroded the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, significantly diminishing Tehran’s ability to project power. A weakened Iran poses less of a threat to Saudi national security and regional influence, making engagement a less risky option for Riyadh.
The second major factor is the rise of Israel as a potential hegemonic force in the region. While in some ways appreciative of Israeli actions against Iran’s partners, Israel’s military successes have also made Saudi leaders wary. Saudi leaders now consider Iran as a counterbalance than a threat. This new strategic calculus has led Riyadh to quietly oppose further military strikes against Iran, seeing it as vital to maintaining a multipolar balance in the Middle East.
The third factor behind the Saudi pivot is growing Turkish influence in the Levant under the leadership of President Recep Tayeb Erdoğan. Following the collapse of the Baathist regime in Syria, Türkiye has supported a former jihadist, interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa. From Riyadh’s perspective, Iran’s so-called “Shia Crescent” is now being replaced by an “Ottoman Crescent” powered by Türkiye’s economic infrastructure, ideology and regional ambitions.
The fourth major element driving Saudi Arabia’s strategic transformation is its ambitious Vision 2030 initiative. This long-term blueprint aims to reposition Saudi Arabia as a key node in the global economic supply chain and the leader of regional development. With a young population, Saudi Arabia seeks regional stability to foster economic engagement and soft power. The pivot to diplomacy and trade over conflict is necessary for implementing Vision 2030.
The fifth and perhaps most ambitious factor is MBS’s strategy to rebrand Saudi Arabia from a purveyor of Wahhabi fundamentalism to a beacon of development and moderation. Through megaprojects and massive infrastructure investments, Riyadh is striving to be seen as a modernizing force in the Middle East. In this context, a weakened Iran helps emphasize Saudi Arabia’s narrative of progress.
Iranians “watched with envy” President Donald Trump’s trip to three Arab countries across the Persian Gulf in May. While Trump praised the infrastructure in Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi, Iranians were contending with shortages of water and electricity.
Iran needs foreign investment and an end to crippling U.S. economic sanctions to revive its fortunes. For Riyadh, this is a welcome opportunity: a less assertive Iran is more likely to accept a Saudi-led regional framework.
Despite an Iranian history of resenting and looking down on Arab monarchies, many young Iranians, based on my research and personal experience, see the current Saudi leadership as a compelling modernizing archetype. This view is subtly influencing Iranian discourse on the most significant factor in Iran’s future foreign and domestic policies: the sensitive process of succession to Supreme Leader Khamenei.
Taken together, these factors have transformed a once-adversarial relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia into one of cautious cooperation. The transformation could foster a new Persian Gulf-centric security architecture—a modern reinterpretation of the “Two Pillars” policy devised by the U.S. under the Shah to support both Saudi Arabia and Iran as dual anchors of regional stability and power.
Interestingly, the original U.S. policy was aimed at securing the Persian Gulf against the infiltration of the Soviet Union and pan-Arab regimes. Under the Nixon and Ford administrations, however, this doctrine evolved into more of a Sole Pillar policy centered around Pahlavi Iran.
This developing engagement between two historic rivals reflects a broader recalibration of regional alliances, power balances, and strategic identities throughout the Middle East. Whether this new balance holds will depend not just on the Persian Gulf states, but on how Washington responds. If the U.S. continues to disengage or misread the region’s evolving priorities, it may find itself watching from the sidelines as a new regional order takes shape—one in which Beijing, not Washington, is the preferred guest at the table.
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