Editor’s Note: Arman Mahmoudian has been a frequent contributor to Stimson about Iranian military strategy and its regional proxies and partners.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
On Oct. 1, Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles against Israel, fully aware of several critical risks.
First, Iranian leaders knew they did not hold a military upper hand against Israel, the strongest conventional power – and only country with nuclear weapons — in the Middle East. Second, they understood that such an act might provoke U.S. intervention, which could have devastating consequences for Iran. Third, Iran was likely aware that the Hamas assault on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, had triggered such strong anxiety about survival and deep thirst for revenge within Israel that its leaders were bound to respond even harder than they did to a lesser Iranian attack in April.
Unlike Israel, which, with allied help, intercepted many Iranian missiles in April and this week, Iran is also conscious that its aerial defense systems are not adequately prepared to protect the country effectively. Additionally, its other pillars of deterrence strategy—its aerial capabilities and proxy forces— are of questionable efficiency. Iran’s April 13 attack, a reprisal for the Israeli killing of seven Iranian military officers in Damascus, demonstrated significant challenges for Iran’s ability to overcome Israel’s sophisticated air defense systems. On top of that, Israel’s multi-layered intelligence and military operations against Hezbollah—the pager explosions, decapitation of the organization’s high command, and aerial strikes on Hezbollah’s arms depots—have left the key component of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” unable to fully employ its military strength.
Given these unfavorable odds, the pressing question is why Iran chose to gamble on such an attack. Officially, the Islamic Republic has cited revenge as the motive, particularly for the deaths of long-time Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, blown up in a Tehran guest house in July, and Abbas Nilforoushan, a brigadier general in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), who was killed alongside Nasrallah in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
However, the rationale behind Iran’s decision could be more nuanced. Like other world leaders, Iranian statesmen are not oblivious to history. They are likely familiar with the ancient Chinese method of execution known as Lingchi, or “death by a thousand cuts,” where the victim is slowly worn down by numerous small strikes rather than a single fatal blow. In the face of Israel’s relentless covert and overt operations against Iran—including the assassinations of nuclear and aerospace scientists, IRGC commanders, sabotage of drone and missile sites, uranium enrichment facilities and assorted cyberattacks going back more than a decade, as well as the elimination of Hezbollah’s leadership—Iranian leaders may have concluded that they are enduring a version of “death by a thousand cuts.”
In this context, Iran’s decision to act could be seen as an acknowledgment that confrontation with Israel was inevitable. By striking while they still had the ability to do so, Iranian leaders might have calculated that they could restore a semblance of deterrence. Furthermore, by initiating what they may have hoped would be a limited conflict, Iran likely aimed to raise the costs for Israel, believing that a more aggressive posture might force Israel to reconsider its actions.
Another possible calculation is that Tehran noticed the increasing frequency and scope of Israeli attacks on various components of the Axis of Resistance in Yemen and Syria as well as Lebanon and Gaza. This could be interpreted as part of a broader Israeli roll-back strategy to significantly contain Iran’s proxies. Iran may have gambled that by escalating, it could reduce tensions in the long run, forcing Israel to reassess its rollback efforts by creating a temporary pause.
However, in all these calculations, Iran faces a significant flaw: its lack of military superiority. The American model of restoring deterrence through strength, or the Soviet approach of de-escalation by escalation, rely on either possessing a clear military advantage or the capacity to inflict severe destruction on the enemy. Iran lacks both, making either of these strategies unsustainable.
Several tactical and operational factors may have influenced Iran’s decision to take this gamble, nevertheless. The notable degradation of Hezbollah’s high command might have pushed Iran to act in an attempt to buy time for Hezbollah to regroup. By taking the initiative, Iran may have hoped to deter the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from fully utilizing their capacity against Hezbollah. Moreover, the continued lack of decisive action from Iran, while Israel steadily “salami sliced” the leadership of the Axis of Resistance, risked diminishing Iran’s political influence in the region and over its partners and proxies.
Simply put, Iran may have calculated that failing to respond would eventually lead its allied militias to question their loyalty and commitment, especially if they perceived that Tehran was unwilling to take the same risks they were being asked to endure. Without a visible Iranian response, these militias might start doubting the value of putting their lives on the line while Iran refrained from making similar sacrifices.
The primary challenge for Iran, however, is that there is no guarantee that decisive action will alter Israel’s core strategy of rolling back Iranian influence or prevent the IDF from launching more forceful strikes on Iran itself. This could lead to a “ping-pong” style exchange of fire, in which Iran, due to its underlying vulnerabilities—such as international isolation, the absence of a conventional air force, a fragile air defense system, and a severely strained economy—might ultimately pay a heavy price.
Iran might be hoping to avoid such costs by banking on several factors. Tehran could be counting on the possibility that Israel’s military operations in Lebanon will prove more difficult than anticipated, especially after Israel suffered eight fatalities on the second day of its ground incursion into south Lebanon this week. In this scenario, Iran might calculate that Israel would be reluctant to open an all-out war with Iran while already facing challenges on multiple fronts.
Additionally, Tehran may be optimistic that the U.S. presidential election and the war in Ukraine could shift American priorities, potentially leading the U.S. to exert more pressure on Israel to exercise restraint. However, the problem Iran faces is that, while American society remains polarized over Middle Eastern policies, the segment of the population that strongly supports the U.S.-Israeli alliance remains significant in both political parties. As a result, it remains difficult to predict which direction U.S. policy might take, leaving Iran’s strategic gamble shrouded in uncertainty.
All these calculations and counter-calculations have brought the region to the brink of the wider war that many analysts have dreaded for the past year. The last thing the U.S. can afford is to add further uncertainty by remaining ambiguous about the limits of its involvement. In this volatile situation, America must take a clear, decisive stand and communicate it bluntly. The region needs clarity, and the U.S. must demonstrate resolve, leaving no room for doubt about its position and intentions.
Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow at the USF Global and National Security Institute. He is also an adjunct professor at the University of South Florida’s Judy Genshaft Honors College, teaching courses on Russia, the Middle East, and International Security Follow him on LinkedIn and on X @MahmoudianArman.
Why Iran Struck Israel Despite the Risks
By Arman Mahmoudian
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Arman Mahmoudian has been a frequent contributor to Stimson about Iranian military strategy and its regional proxies and partners.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
On Oct. 1, Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles against Israel, fully aware of several critical risks.
First, Iranian leaders knew they did not hold a military upper hand against Israel, the strongest conventional power – and only country with nuclear weapons — in the Middle East. Second, they understood that such an act might provoke U.S. intervention, which could have devastating consequences for Iran. Third, Iran was likely aware that the Hamas assault on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, had triggered such strong anxiety about survival and deep thirst for revenge within Israel that its leaders were bound to respond even harder than they did to a lesser Iranian attack in April.
Unlike Israel, which, with allied help, intercepted many Iranian missiles in April and this week, Iran is also conscious that its aerial defense systems are not adequately prepared to protect the country effectively. Additionally, its other pillars of deterrence strategy—its aerial capabilities and proxy forces— are of questionable efficiency. Iran’s April 13 attack, a reprisal for the Israeli killing of seven Iranian military officers in Damascus, demonstrated significant challenges for Iran’s ability to overcome Israel’s sophisticated air defense systems. On top of that, Israel’s multi-layered intelligence and military operations against Hezbollah—the pager explosions, decapitation of the organization’s high command, and aerial strikes on Hezbollah’s arms depots—have left the key component of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” unable to fully employ its military strength.
Given these unfavorable odds, the pressing question is why Iran chose to gamble on such an attack. Officially, the Islamic Republic has cited revenge as the motive, particularly for the deaths of long-time Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, blown up in a Tehran guest house in July, and Abbas Nilforoushan, a brigadier general in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), who was killed alongside Nasrallah in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
However, the rationale behind Iran’s decision could be more nuanced. Like other world leaders, Iranian statesmen are not oblivious to history. They are likely familiar with the ancient Chinese method of execution known as Lingchi, or “death by a thousand cuts,” where the victim is slowly worn down by numerous small strikes rather than a single fatal blow. In the face of Israel’s relentless covert and overt operations against Iran—including the assassinations of nuclear and aerospace scientists, IRGC commanders, sabotage of drone and missile sites, uranium enrichment facilities and assorted cyberattacks going back more than a decade, as well as the elimination of Hezbollah’s leadership—Iranian leaders may have concluded that they are enduring a version of “death by a thousand cuts.”
In this context, Iran’s decision to act could be seen as an acknowledgment that confrontation with Israel was inevitable. By striking while they still had the ability to do so, Iranian leaders might have calculated that they could restore a semblance of deterrence. Furthermore, by initiating what they may have hoped would be a limited conflict, Iran likely aimed to raise the costs for Israel, believing that a more aggressive posture might force Israel to reconsider its actions.
Another possible calculation is that Tehran noticed the increasing frequency and scope of Israeli attacks on various components of the Axis of Resistance in Yemen and Syria as well as Lebanon and Gaza. This could be interpreted as part of a broader Israeli roll-back strategy to significantly contain Iran’s proxies. Iran may have gambled that by escalating, it could reduce tensions in the long run, forcing Israel to reassess its rollback efforts by creating a temporary pause.
However, in all these calculations, Iran faces a significant flaw: its lack of military superiority. The American model of restoring deterrence through strength, or the Soviet approach of de-escalation by escalation, rely on either possessing a clear military advantage or the capacity to inflict severe destruction on the enemy. Iran lacks both, making either of these strategies unsustainable.
Several tactical and operational factors may have influenced Iran’s decision to take this gamble, nevertheless. The notable degradation of Hezbollah’s high command might have pushed Iran to act in an attempt to buy time for Hezbollah to regroup. By taking the initiative, Iran may have hoped to deter the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from fully utilizing their capacity against Hezbollah. Moreover, the continued lack of decisive action from Iran, while Israel steadily “salami sliced” the leadership of the Axis of Resistance, risked diminishing Iran’s political influence in the region and over its partners and proxies.
Simply put, Iran may have calculated that failing to respond would eventually lead its allied militias to question their loyalty and commitment, especially if they perceived that Tehran was unwilling to take the same risks they were being asked to endure. Without a visible Iranian response, these militias might start doubting the value of putting their lives on the line while Iran refrained from making similar sacrifices.
The primary challenge for Iran, however, is that there is no guarantee that decisive action will alter Israel’s core strategy of rolling back Iranian influence or prevent the IDF from launching more forceful strikes on Iran itself. This could lead to a “ping-pong” style exchange of fire, in which Iran, due to its underlying vulnerabilities—such as international isolation, the absence of a conventional air force, a fragile air defense system, and a severely strained economy—might ultimately pay a heavy price.
Iran might be hoping to avoid such costs by banking on several factors. Tehran could be counting on the possibility that Israel’s military operations in Lebanon will prove more difficult than anticipated, especially after Israel suffered eight fatalities on the second day of its ground incursion into south Lebanon this week. In this scenario, Iran might calculate that Israel would be reluctant to open an all-out war with Iran while already facing challenges on multiple fronts.
Additionally, Tehran may be optimistic that the U.S. presidential election and the war in Ukraine could shift American priorities, potentially leading the U.S. to exert more pressure on Israel to exercise restraint. However, the problem Iran faces is that, while American society remains polarized over Middle Eastern policies, the segment of the population that strongly supports the U.S.-Israeli alliance remains significant in both political parties. As a result, it remains difficult to predict which direction U.S. policy might take, leaving Iran’s strategic gamble shrouded in uncertainty.
All these calculations and counter-calculations have brought the region to the brink of the wider war that many analysts have dreaded for the past year. The last thing the U.S. can afford is to add further uncertainty by remaining ambiguous about the limits of its involvement. In this volatile situation, America must take a clear, decisive stand and communicate it bluntly. The region needs clarity, and the U.S. must demonstrate resolve, leaving no room for doubt about its position and intentions.
Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow at the USF Global and National Security Institute. He is also an adjunct professor at the University of South Florida’s Judy Genshaft Honors College, teaching courses on Russia, the Middle East, and International Security Follow him on LinkedIn and on X @MahmoudianArman.
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