Editor’s Note: A frequent contributor to Stimson on Middle East conflicts and diplomacy, Giorgio Cafiero has a particular expertise about the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are preparing for Donald Trump’s return to the White House hopeful that he can bring peace to the region, but on some levels uncertain and concerned.
Policymakers in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain, in particular, had a close relationship with the U.S. during Trump’s first administration and are perhaps the most optimistic about his electoral victory.
Trump’s first foreign trip in his prior term was to Riyadh. Trump also forged a close relationship with de facto Saudi ruler Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), underscored by Trump’s minimization of MBS’s alleged role in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018. In his first term, Trump’s lack of emphasis on human rights, writ large, sat well with GCC leaders who resented the Obama administration’s criticisms of authoritarian governance in the Arab world and response to the 2010-2011 Arab Spring.
Gulf states, for the most part, valued Trump’s transactional and highly personal approach to foreign policy because of how similar it is to the ways in which GCC officials do business with each other and on the international stage. The extent to which high-ranking figures in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries have maintained close contact with Trump and his inner circle throughout the past four years could also bode well for their ability to strike deals with the second Trump administration.
On the other hand, GCC leaders have concerns about Trump’s unpredictability and whether his policies could fuel greater instability in the Middle East. Trump’s return follows significant changes in the region, and it remains unclear how the incoming Trump team will adjust to the new environment.
A Regional Shift on Iran
Unlike the situation in Trump’s first term, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE lobbied the U.S. to support their blockade of Qatar, quit the Iran nuclear deal, and impose “maximum pressure” on Tehran, Gulf states in the past few years have sought to address their differences through diplomacy, dialogue, and cooperation. This has led to an easing of tensions within the GCC and an overall détente with Iran.
If, as some have predicted, Trump imposes a policy of “maximum pressure 2.0” on Iran, seeking to choke off more Iranian oil exports, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states will be nervous about how this could impact their interests. They bore the brunt of Iranian retaliation after Trump withdrew in 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and do not want to be caught in the crossfire between the U.S.-Israel alliance and Iran.
It remains unclear whether the next Trump administration will pressure GCC states into aligning with an aggressive anti-Iranian foreign policy agenda and what options the Gulf Arab governments would have for resisting such pressure.
Differences Over Israel
Rather than lobbying Trump to isolate Qatar or intensify pressure on Iran, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will probably seek to convince the new administration to use U.S. leverage to restrain Israel and bring an end to Israel’s widening wars with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.
At a minimum, achieving durable cease-fires in Gaza and Lebanon will be necessary if Trump hopes to build on his signature Middle East achievement of his first term, the so-called Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and four Arab states – the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. Even then, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia – the real prize for Israel – would agree to recognize Israel without concessions on the issue of Palestinian statehood that the current Israeli government and parliament have vehemently opposed. Arab statesmen are concerned about domestic and regional backlash if they support closer overt ties with Israel. As a consequence of the past 13 months of carnage in Gaza and the expansion of the war into Lebanon, it could be many years before other Arab states would consider joining the normalization camp even as they seek to retain or expand economic and defense ties with Washington.
The Centrality of Yemen
The situation in Yemen will also have a major impact on how GCC states evaluate Trump’s second term. When Trump left the White House in early 2021, the Saudi war on Yemen’s Houthi movement was still raging and the Trump administration made large arms sales to Riyadh and other Arab capitals a pillar of its Middle East policy. However, since April 2022 there has been a truce between Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah, the formal name for the Houthi militants. The Saudis and most other GCC states have declined to join a U.S.- and U.K.-led maritime operation to counter Houthi targeting of commercial shipping and have viewed American and British bombing of Houthi targets as counterproductive and destabilizing.
Riyadh will want the U.S. to avoid moves that increase the risk of renewed Houthi attacks against the kingdom, which is focused on achieving the ambitious economic goals of its Vision 2030. However, if Houthi maritime attacks continue after next Jan. 20, Trump may well extend the Biden administration’s bombing campaign in Yemen with the aim of establishing deterrence over the de facto regime in Sana’a. Trump could also put the Houthis back on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, which would complicate humanitarian aid to Yemen.
It will be interesting to see if the Emirati leadership can persuade the incoming U.S. administration to strengthen ties with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-backed southern separatist group in Yemen which seeks to convince Washington and other global capitals that it can be an effective bulwark against the Houthis. Any moves by the Trump administration to legitimize the STC would upset Saudi Arabia and Oman, which strongly favor Yemeni unity and have concerns about the STC’s intentions and ability to govern a breakaway state in the south.
Given Trump’s penchant for mixing business and politics along with “mercantilist statecraft,” some observers predict that his Middle East policy decisions will “simply go to the highest bidder.” GCC states will undoubtedly use their lobbyists in Washington and personal relationships with Trump, his relatives, and other members of his team to try to influence the next U.S. administration.
In the absence of clear principles or a comprehensive vision for the Middle East, Trump will probably approach the region in an idiosyncratic manner, possibly challenging GCC policymakers to easily understand his decisions. If Trump fails to provide the leadership Gulf states seek from Washington, his return may push Arab states to further diversify their alliances and look to forge even deeper ties with China, Russia, and even Iran.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
What Trump 2.0 Could Mean for the Gulf Cooperation Council
By Giorgio Cafiero
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: A frequent contributor to Stimson on Middle East conflicts and diplomacy, Giorgio Cafiero has a particular expertise about the Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are preparing for Donald Trump’s return to the White House hopeful that he can bring peace to the region, but on some levels uncertain and concerned.
Policymakers in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain, in particular, had a close relationship with the U.S. during Trump’s first administration and are perhaps the most optimistic about his electoral victory.
Trump’s first foreign trip in his prior term was to Riyadh. Trump also forged a close relationship with de facto Saudi ruler Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS), underscored by Trump’s minimization of MBS’s alleged role in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018. In his first term, Trump’s lack of emphasis on human rights, writ large, sat well with GCC leaders who resented the Obama administration’s criticisms of authoritarian governance in the Arab world and response to the 2010-2011 Arab Spring.
Gulf states, for the most part, valued Trump’s transactional and highly personal approach to foreign policy because of how similar it is to the ways in which GCC officials do business with each other and on the international stage. The extent to which high-ranking figures in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries have maintained close contact with Trump and his inner circle throughout the past four years could also bode well for their ability to strike deals with the second Trump administration.
On the other hand, GCC leaders have concerns about Trump’s unpredictability and whether his policies could fuel greater instability in the Middle East. Trump’s return follows significant changes in the region, and it remains unclear how the incoming Trump team will adjust to the new environment.
A Regional Shift on Iran
Unlike the situation in Trump’s first term, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE lobbied the U.S. to support their blockade of Qatar, quit the Iran nuclear deal, and impose “maximum pressure” on Tehran, Gulf states in the past few years have sought to address their differences through diplomacy, dialogue, and cooperation. This has led to an easing of tensions within the GCC and an overall détente with Iran.
If, as some have predicted, Trump imposes a policy of “maximum pressure 2.0” on Iran, seeking to choke off more Iranian oil exports, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states will be nervous about how this could impact their interests. They bore the brunt of Iranian retaliation after Trump withdrew in 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and do not want to be caught in the crossfire between the U.S.-Israel alliance and Iran.
It remains unclear whether the next Trump administration will pressure GCC states into aligning with an aggressive anti-Iranian foreign policy agenda and what options the Gulf Arab governments would have for resisting such pressure.
Differences Over Israel
Rather than lobbying Trump to isolate Qatar or intensify pressure on Iran, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will probably seek to convince the new administration to use U.S. leverage to restrain Israel and bring an end to Israel’s widening wars with Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.
At a minimum, achieving durable cease-fires in Gaza and Lebanon will be necessary if Trump hopes to build on his signature Middle East achievement of his first term, the so-called Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and four Arab states – the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. Even then, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia – the real prize for Israel – would agree to recognize Israel without concessions on the issue of Palestinian statehood that the current Israeli government and parliament have vehemently opposed. Arab statesmen are concerned about domestic and regional backlash if they support closer overt ties with Israel. As a consequence of the past 13 months of carnage in Gaza and the expansion of the war into Lebanon, it could be many years before other Arab states would consider joining the normalization camp even as they seek to retain or expand economic and defense ties with Washington.
The Centrality of Yemen
The situation in Yemen will also have a major impact on how GCC states evaluate Trump’s second term. When Trump left the White House in early 2021, the Saudi war on Yemen’s Houthi movement was still raging and the Trump administration made large arms sales to Riyadh and other Arab capitals a pillar of its Middle East policy. However, since April 2022 there has been a truce between Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah, the formal name for the Houthi militants. The Saudis and most other GCC states have declined to join a U.S.- and U.K.-led maritime operation to counter Houthi targeting of commercial shipping and have viewed American and British bombing of Houthi targets as counterproductive and destabilizing.
Riyadh will want the U.S. to avoid moves that increase the risk of renewed Houthi attacks against the kingdom, which is focused on achieving the ambitious economic goals of its Vision 2030. However, if Houthi maritime attacks continue after next Jan. 20, Trump may well extend the Biden administration’s bombing campaign in Yemen with the aim of establishing deterrence over the de facto regime in Sana’a. Trump could also put the Houthis back on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, which would complicate humanitarian aid to Yemen.
It will be interesting to see if the Emirati leadership can persuade the incoming U.S. administration to strengthen ties with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-backed southern separatist group in Yemen which seeks to convince Washington and other global capitals that it can be an effective bulwark against the Houthis. Any moves by the Trump administration to legitimize the STC would upset Saudi Arabia and Oman, which strongly favor Yemeni unity and have concerns about the STC’s intentions and ability to govern a breakaway state in the south.
Given Trump’s penchant for mixing business and politics along with “mercantilist statecraft,” some observers predict that his Middle East policy decisions will “simply go to the highest bidder.” GCC states will undoubtedly use their lobbyists in Washington and personal relationships with Trump, his relatives, and other members of his team to try to influence the next U.S. administration.
In the absence of clear principles or a comprehensive vision for the Middle East, Trump will probably approach the region in an idiosyncratic manner, possibly challenging GCC policymakers to easily understand his decisions. If Trump fails to provide the leadership Gulf states seek from Washington, his return may push Arab states to further diversify their alliances and look to forge even deeper ties with China, Russia, and even Iran.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
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