Editor’s Note: From his base in Georgia, academic Emil Avdaliani follows regional security and economic trends and contributes frequently to Stimson on these topics. He is particularly expert on the issue of regional ties with Russia and China as countries hedge against changes in U.S. foreign policy.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
In June, Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan visited China and met his colleague Wang Yi to discuss bilateral relations. The trip reflected a strong Turkish desire to improve traditionally cold ties between Ankara and Beijing.
Fidan also visited Xinjiang, becoming the highest-ranking Turkish official to do so since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan went to the restive province in 2012. Chinese alleged mistreatment of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslim population had been a stumbling block to closer bilateral ties. In the past, Turkey had harshly criticized Beijing’s efforts to restrict religious practices among Uyghurs, who are Turks’ ethnic kin.
But recently it seems that Ankara and Beijing have managed to move beyond the Uyghur issue and focus on bilateral issues including energy, trade and even military cooperation.
During Fidan’s visit, Beijing expressed interest in increasing its investments in Turkey. In 2022 Chinese foreign direct investment in Turkey stood at $1.7 billion, a significant rise from past FDI but still much lower than European investment in Turkey. Turkey needs foreign investment to blunt economic headwinds reflected in the devaluation of the Turkish currency, the lira, which hit a historic low of 33 to the dollar on June 25.
On July 8, China’s biggest electric-car maker, BYD, announced that it would invest $1 billion in a new plant in Turkey to produce 150,000 electric and hybrid vehicles a year. The plant is to open by 2026 in the western Turkish province of Manisa and to employ 5,000 workers. The announcement comes as both the U.S. and the European Union increase barriers to importing Chinese EVs.
In May, Turkey’s energy minister Alparslan Bayraktar, went to Beijing to discuss nuclear and renewable energy, mining and minerals. The two sides also signed a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation. The latter is especially important as Turkey seeks China’s involvement in construction of Turkey’s third nuclear power plant.
Turkish-Chinese relations appeared to be on a positive trajectory after the two countries reached a strategic Partnership Agreement in 2010. Ankara was quick to join Beijing’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative in 2015. These steps were in line with a Turkish foreign policy pivot toward Eurasia after the European Union rejected Turkish admission for a variety of reasons including Erdogan’s increasing authoritarianism. Accordingly, Ankara has been looking for alternative sources of finance. Since 2016, the Beijing-run Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has provided around $4.3 billion to Turkey, the second largest recipient of such loans.
The two countries, however, remain divided over a large trade imbalance. China is Turkey’s second largest trading partner, but Ankara imported $45 billion from China in 2023 while China imported only $3.3 billion in Turkish goods. Turkey’s commercial ties with the West remain far more significant.
Moreover, just after Fidan’s visit to China, Turkey slapped a 40 percent tariff on cheap Chinese electric cars to shield Turkish domestic automakers from competition. Beijing criticized the decision and demanded the immediate revocation of the tariffs, highlighting the limits of what Turkey and China may be able to achieve.
Turkey is interested in closer cooperation with China not only because it seeks Chinese investment but because of an expanding trade route, known as the Middle Corridor, that runs from the Black Sea and Turkey’s eastern provinces to Central Asia via the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. The corridor has the potential to attract 20 percent of the overall containerized land trade between China and the EU. Given China’s growing interests in the Black Sea region — reflected in Chinese companies’ recent contract to build a major deep sea port in Georgia and expedite work on a China-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan railway — Turkey may view engagement with Beijing as benefiting both sides.
Indeed, for Turkey, closer ties with China could also pave the way for greater engagement with Central Asia where Beijing’s influence has been on the rise. China has also been actively investing in Iraq and given Ankara’s own ambitious vision for a trade route – the Development Road – to the Persian Gulf via Iraq, closer ties with China could boost the project’s prospects. The project serves Turkey’s ambitions to become a transit hub country in Eurasia.
The developing rapprochement between Turkey and China also highlights Ankara’s overall desire to shift toward Asia. At least since 2016, Turkey has sought stronger cooperation with the BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, both entities in which China plays a central role. Ankara has signaled that it could seek official membership in both groups. Turkey and China also share similar views on the war in Gaza; both have criticized the Israeli government and U.S. support for Tel Aviv.
Signaling closer ties with Beijing could also serve Ankara’s goal of gaining leverage with Washington. Similar to Saudi and Emirati foreign policy maneuvering, Turkey is not seeking a major rupture in ties with the U.S., a key NATO ally, but wants to enhance its profile as a significant middle power capable of independent action and conflict mediation. Indeed, this approach, rooted in the idea of a multi-vector foreign policy, was apparent in the behavior of other regional countries long before Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel last Oct. 7.
Ankara believes in the rise of a multi-polar world in which China is a powerhouse and Turkey is a key middle power. Improving ties with China could help Turkey further project its influence in the Black Sea. Turkey might also share with China its experience as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. Ultimately, however, there are limits to Turkish maneuverability in foreign policy. Too great a reliance on China could jeopardize already tense ties with the U.S. and the EU, which remain Turkey’s biggest trade and investment partners. While China could offer a valuable inflow of cash into Turkey’s battered economy, exacerbating competition between the EU and China or the U.S. and China could boomerang on Ankara.
Turkey and China Seek Rapprochement, Though It Will Be Limited in Scope
By Emil Avdaliani
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: From his base in Georgia, academic Emil Avdaliani follows regional security and economic trends and contributes frequently to Stimson on these topics. He is particularly expert on the issue of regional ties with Russia and China as countries hedge against changes in U.S. foreign policy.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
In June, Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan visited China and met his colleague Wang Yi to discuss bilateral relations. The trip reflected a strong Turkish desire to improve traditionally cold ties between Ankara and Beijing.
Fidan also visited Xinjiang, becoming the highest-ranking Turkish official to do so since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan went to the restive province in 2012. Chinese alleged mistreatment of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslim population had been a stumbling block to closer bilateral ties. In the past, Turkey had harshly criticized Beijing’s efforts to restrict religious practices among Uyghurs, who are Turks’ ethnic kin.
But recently it seems that Ankara and Beijing have managed to move beyond the Uyghur issue and focus on bilateral issues including energy, trade and even military cooperation.
During Fidan’s visit, Beijing expressed interest in increasing its investments in Turkey. In 2022 Chinese foreign direct investment in Turkey stood at $1.7 billion, a significant rise from past FDI but still much lower than European investment in Turkey. Turkey needs foreign investment to blunt economic headwinds reflected in the devaluation of the Turkish currency, the lira, which hit a historic low of 33 to the dollar on June 25.
On July 8, China’s biggest electric-car maker, BYD, announced that it would invest $1 billion in a new plant in Turkey to produce 150,000 electric and hybrid vehicles a year. The plant is to open by 2026 in the western Turkish province of Manisa and to employ 5,000 workers. The announcement comes as both the U.S. and the European Union increase barriers to importing Chinese EVs.
In May, Turkey’s energy minister Alparslan Bayraktar, went to Beijing to discuss nuclear and renewable energy, mining and minerals. The two sides also signed a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation. The latter is especially important as Turkey seeks China’s involvement in construction of Turkey’s third nuclear power plant.
Turkish-Chinese relations appeared to be on a positive trajectory after the two countries reached a strategic Partnership Agreement in 2010. Ankara was quick to join Beijing’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative in 2015. These steps were in line with a Turkish foreign policy pivot toward Eurasia after the European Union rejected Turkish admission for a variety of reasons including Erdogan’s increasing authoritarianism. Accordingly, Ankara has been looking for alternative sources of finance. Since 2016, the Beijing-run Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has provided around $4.3 billion to Turkey, the second largest recipient of such loans.
The two countries, however, remain divided over a large trade imbalance. China is Turkey’s second largest trading partner, but Ankara imported $45 billion from China in 2023 while China imported only $3.3 billion in Turkish goods. Turkey’s commercial ties with the West remain far more significant.
Moreover, just after Fidan’s visit to China, Turkey slapped a 40 percent tariff on cheap Chinese electric cars to shield Turkish domestic automakers from competition. Beijing criticized the decision and demanded the immediate revocation of the tariffs, highlighting the limits of what Turkey and China may be able to achieve.
Turkey is interested in closer cooperation with China not only because it seeks Chinese investment but because of an expanding trade route, known as the Middle Corridor, that runs from the Black Sea and Turkey’s eastern provinces to Central Asia via the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. The corridor has the potential to attract 20 percent of the overall containerized land trade between China and the EU. Given China’s growing interests in the Black Sea region — reflected in Chinese companies’ recent contract to build a major deep sea port in Georgia and expedite work on a China-Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan railway — Turkey may view engagement with Beijing as benefiting both sides.
Indeed, for Turkey, closer ties with China could also pave the way for greater engagement with Central Asia where Beijing’s influence has been on the rise. China has also been actively investing in Iraq and given Ankara’s own ambitious vision for a trade route – the Development Road – to the Persian Gulf via Iraq, closer ties with China could boost the project’s prospects. The project serves Turkey’s ambitions to become a transit hub country in Eurasia.
The developing rapprochement between Turkey and China also highlights Ankara’s overall desire to shift toward Asia. At least since 2016, Turkey has sought stronger cooperation with the BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, both entities in which China plays a central role. Ankara has signaled that it could seek official membership in both groups. Turkey and China also share similar views on the war in Gaza; both have criticized the Israeli government and U.S. support for Tel Aviv.
Signaling closer ties with Beijing could also serve Ankara’s goal of gaining leverage with Washington. Similar to Saudi and Emirati foreign policy maneuvering, Turkey is not seeking a major rupture in ties with the U.S., a key NATO ally, but wants to enhance its profile as a significant middle power capable of independent action and conflict mediation. Indeed, this approach, rooted in the idea of a multi-vector foreign policy, was apparent in the behavior of other regional countries long before Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel last Oct. 7.
Ankara believes in the rise of a multi-polar world in which China is a powerhouse and Turkey is a key middle power. Improving ties with China could help Turkey further project its influence in the Black Sea. Turkey might also share with China its experience as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. Ultimately, however, there are limits to Turkish maneuverability in foreign policy. Too great a reliance on China could jeopardize already tense ties with the U.S. and the EU, which remain Turkey’s biggest trade and investment partners. While China could offer a valuable inflow of cash into Turkey’s battered economy, exacerbating competition between the EU and China or the U.S. and China could boomerang on Ankara.
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