On February 1, 2024, the third anniversary of the coup, two members of the U.S. House of Representatives established the first-ever bipartisan Congressional Burma Caucus. On June 27, 2024, the caucus was formally launched, raising new questions and possibilities for the future of U.S. engagement in Burma. Throughout the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, various parts of the National Unity Government have called on international players, specifically the United States, to support the country’s path to democracy through requests of humanitarian and other forms of non-lethal assistance. With other, international conflicts across the globe such as the Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas war, the United States has struggled to shift attention and resources towards Myanmar. However, with the formation of the new caucus, U.S. prioritization of Myanmar could be changing.
The establishment of the caucus came over a year after President Biden signed the BURMA Act of 2022 into law as part of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Like the 2023 NDAA’s passage, the caucus is likely to breathe additional life into Myanmar’s resistance, as resistance members may feel that U.S. support for Myanmar is solidifying. The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Burmese legislative body in exile, expressed gratitude to the new caucus and the hope that “this caucus would create many more opportunities to help Myanmar and its people.” Mizzima News, which covers the resistance and other developments in Myanmar, described the creation of the caucus as a “historic move,” “pivotal step,” and “beacon of hope for democracy and human rights in Myanmar.”
The Burma Caucus demonstrates the continuing concern in the U.S. Congress over the civil war. Early public statements from caucus founders Rep. Betty McCollum (DFL-MN) and Rep. Bill Huizenga (R-MI) on the aims of the caucus appealed to “bolster congressional support for the Burmese people in their fight for democracy and human rights against the brutal military junta.” An advocacy group, Campaign for a New Myanmar, which helped to set up the caucus, indicated following the caucus’ establishment that they will work with the caucus to build support for sanctions against the junta and push the Biden administration to appoint a Special Envoy for Burma, which would send a stronger signal of U.S. interest.
Campaign for a New Myanmar has also stated that they will encourage the caucus to push the administration to establish an advisory group to evaluate the disposition of the funds seized from the Myanmar government following the coup, potentially an enormous untapped resource for the sustainable funding for the resistance. Further, they expect the caucus to use the 2022 BURMA Act to secure technical and non-lethal assistance for “Burmese pro-democracy groups, ethnic resistance organizations, and Burmese non-governmental and civil society organizations.” Among Burmese groups there are varying asks relating to non-lethal assistance from training programs and medical support requests by CSOs to drones, armored vehicles and radar jamming gear from armed resistance groups.
The Burma Caucus is beginning to follow through on those aspirations by introducing the BRAVE Burma Act in the House—a new bill to amend the 2022 BURMA Act that was passed with the 2023 NDAA—on the day of their formal launch. Should it pass, the new BRAVE Burma Act would bring more robust sanctions against the junta, as well as appoint a Special Coordinator for Burmese Democracy in the State Department. With the resistance’s gains in the wake of Operation 1027, sanctions are already cutting into the military regime’s ability to wage war against the resistance. With the goal of better enforcing sanctions and focusing on areas that will further constrain the junta’s key financial resources and military strength—for example, sanctions against Myanma Economic Bank, as well as the jet fuel industry—the new BRAVE Burma Act would be an effort to implement the 2022 BURMA Act.
However, it remains to be seen whether the caucus will truly be able to direct tangible U.S. support toward the resistance. To start, the caucus must overcome congressional disagreements over the specific terms of the 2022 BURMA Act that continue to hinder efforts to effectively allocate funding if it aims to pass the new BRAVE Burma Act. Congress has struggled to fully clarify and fund the 2022 BURMA Act agenda items outlined in the 2023 NDAA over the past year, leading to a lag in the implementation of the act itself. Congress also previously struggled to settle the matter of how much financing should be dedicated to Myanmar, with the House of Representatives and the Senate each having competing recommendations for funding last year.
In 2023, the Senate and House of Representative issued two markedly different bills debating U.S. spending in Myanmar. Senate Bill 2438, introduced by Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE) in July 2023, earmarked no less than $121 million for the country, specifying $25 million for non-lethal assistance. That text provided a broad definition of what U.S. “non-lethal assistance” could look like in Myanmar, including equipment and associated training to support atrocities prevention, protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance, investigations for human rights violations, local governance and provision of services for non-military-controlled areas, and medical trauma care, supplies, and training. The House of Representative Bill 4665 (H.R. 4665), by contrast, proposed $50 million to address the humanitarian crisis in the country. While fiscal decisions stagnated in 2023, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024 ultimately appropriated $121,000,000 for assistance in Myanmar, demonstrating a reconciliation between the Senate and House of Representatives. While the funding was more than what the House had initially put forward, the lower amount initially proposed in the House indicates that the caucus may need to fight an uphill battle with other members in the future to convince them of the value of additional tangible resources to Myanmar. Still, the creation of the caucus will help promote funding to be allocated to Burma, as well as expanding resources.
Beyond congressional politics, the caucus will also be hindered by the Biden administration’s own geopolitical aims. As the administration pursues more stable relations with China, it is unlikely to take steps that might suggest that the United States is attempting to tip the scales in favor of the resistance. For example, while sanctions against the junta for atrocities in Myanmar would be consistent with U.S. policy toward the situation in Myanmar thus far, the reappropriation of seized funds or travel of a hypothetical U.S. special envoy to what Chinese officials see as sensitive regions to meet with resistance groups would likely set off alarm bells in Beijing. The caucus has already been characterized by some Western media sources as encouraging “intervention,” a framing that could exacerbate fears in China that the United States is moving to influence the outcome of the civil war. As Biden seeks to turn down the temperature on U.S.-China relations, his administration will likely try to avoid actions on Myanmar that China could interpret as U.S. interference, which will also limit the success of some of the objectives of the caucus.
On balance, the creation of the first-ever U.S. Congressional Caucus on Burma is a pivotal moment for U.S. policy on Myanmar, guaranteeing a higher level of concentrated attention on the country. Though the new BRAVE Burma Act faces uncertain prospects for clearing both the House and the Senate, it would mark a significant step forward for the BURMA Act of 2022 if it ultimately does. A reported minimum of 30 members of Congress will now dedicate at least some time to considering what a true bipartisan U.S. policy on Myanmar should look like. If the caucus holds to its aims and finds ways to move the 2022 BURMA Act from paper to implementation, it could help improve U.S. initiatives to support the people of Myanmar on the road towards a democratic future. Yet the caucus must first overcome significant barriers to progress, including congressional disagreements over the original 2022 BURMA Act and its future as well as the broader geostrategic objectives of the White House. Whatever the outcome, Myanmar’s resistance movement will be watching.
The Promises and Challenges of a New U.S. Congressional Burma Caucus
By Sydney Tucker • Sarah Godek
Southeast Asia
On Thursday June 27, the U.S. House of Representatives officially launched the first-ever Congressional Burma Caucus into action. The Caucus will assist U.S. policymakers in maintaining a targeted focus on the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, in hopes of developing policy initiatives that support deliverables outlined in the 2022 BURMA Act passed with the 2023 NDAA. While the caucus represents renewed U.S. focus on Myanmar issues that is likely welcomed by many in Burma and has ambitious aims that would alter the course of U.S. policy on Myanmar, it may also face challenges in achieving them.
On February 1, 2024, the third anniversary of the coup, two members of the U.S. House of Representatives established the first-ever bipartisan Congressional Burma Caucus. On June 27, 2024, the caucus was formally launched, raising new questions and possibilities for the future of U.S. engagement in Burma. Throughout the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, various parts of the National Unity Government have called on international players, specifically the United States, to support the country’s path to democracy through requests of humanitarian and other forms of non-lethal assistance. With other, international conflicts across the globe such as the Ukraine War and the Israel-Hamas war, the United States has struggled to shift attention and resources towards Myanmar. However, with the formation of the new caucus, U.S. prioritization of Myanmar could be changing.
The establishment of the caucus came over a year after President Biden signed the BURMA Act of 2022 into law as part of the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Like the 2023 NDAA’s passage, the caucus is likely to breathe additional life into Myanmar’s resistance, as resistance members may feel that U.S. support for Myanmar is solidifying. The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Burmese legislative body in exile, expressed gratitude to the new caucus and the hope that “this caucus would create many more opportunities to help Myanmar and its people.” Mizzima News, which covers the resistance and other developments in Myanmar, described the creation of the caucus as a “historic move,” “pivotal step,” and “beacon of hope for democracy and human rights in Myanmar.”
The Burma Caucus demonstrates the continuing concern in the U.S. Congress over the civil war. Early public statements from caucus founders Rep. Betty McCollum (DFL-MN) and Rep. Bill Huizenga (R-MI) on the aims of the caucus appealed to “bolster congressional support for the Burmese people in their fight for democracy and human rights against the brutal military junta.” An advocacy group, Campaign for a New Myanmar, which helped to set up the caucus, indicated following the caucus’ establishment that they will work with the caucus to build support for sanctions against the junta and push the Biden administration to appoint a Special Envoy for Burma, which would send a stronger signal of U.S. interest.
Campaign for a New Myanmar has also stated that they will encourage the caucus to push the administration to establish an advisory group to evaluate the disposition of the funds seized from the Myanmar government following the coup, potentially an enormous untapped resource for the sustainable funding for the resistance. Further, they expect the caucus to use the 2022 BURMA Act to secure technical and non-lethal assistance for “Burmese pro-democracy groups, ethnic resistance organizations, and Burmese non-governmental and civil society organizations.” Among Burmese groups there are varying asks relating to non-lethal assistance from training programs and medical support requests by CSOs to drones, armored vehicles and radar jamming gear from armed resistance groups.
The Burma Caucus is beginning to follow through on those aspirations by introducing the BRAVE Burma Act in the House—a new bill to amend the 2022 BURMA Act that was passed with the 2023 NDAA—on the day of their formal launch. Should it pass, the new BRAVE Burma Act would bring more robust sanctions against the junta, as well as appoint a Special Coordinator for Burmese Democracy in the State Department. With the resistance’s gains in the wake of Operation 1027, sanctions are already cutting into the military regime’s ability to wage war against the resistance. With the goal of better enforcing sanctions and focusing on areas that will further constrain the junta’s key financial resources and military strength—for example, sanctions against Myanma Economic Bank, as well as the jet fuel industry—the new BRAVE Burma Act would be an effort to implement the 2022 BURMA Act.
However, it remains to be seen whether the caucus will truly be able to direct tangible U.S. support toward the resistance. To start, the caucus must overcome congressional disagreements over the specific terms of the 2022 BURMA Act that continue to hinder efforts to effectively allocate funding if it aims to pass the new BRAVE Burma Act. Congress has struggled to fully clarify and fund the 2022 BURMA Act agenda items outlined in the 2023 NDAA over the past year, leading to a lag in the implementation of the act itself. Congress also previously struggled to settle the matter of how much financing should be dedicated to Myanmar, with the House of Representatives and the Senate each having competing recommendations for funding last year.
In 2023, the Senate and House of Representative issued two markedly different bills debating U.S. spending in Myanmar. Senate Bill 2438, introduced by Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE) in July 2023, earmarked no less than $121 million for the country, specifying $25 million for non-lethal assistance. That text provided a broad definition of what U.S. “non-lethal assistance” could look like in Myanmar, including equipment and associated training to support atrocities prevention, protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance, investigations for human rights violations, local governance and provision of services for non-military-controlled areas, and medical trauma care, supplies, and training. The House of Representative Bill 4665 (H.R. 4665), by contrast, proposed $50 million to address the humanitarian crisis in the country. While fiscal decisions stagnated in 2023, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024 ultimately appropriated $121,000,000 for assistance in Myanmar, demonstrating a reconciliation between the Senate and House of Representatives. While the funding was more than what the House had initially put forward, the lower amount initially proposed in the House indicates that the caucus may need to fight an uphill battle with other members in the future to convince them of the value of additional tangible resources to Myanmar. Still, the creation of the caucus will help promote funding to be allocated to Burma, as well as expanding resources.
Beyond congressional politics, the caucus will also be hindered by the Biden administration’s own geopolitical aims. As the administration pursues more stable relations with China, it is unlikely to take steps that might suggest that the United States is attempting to tip the scales in favor of the resistance. For example, while sanctions against the junta for atrocities in Myanmar would be consistent with U.S. policy toward the situation in Myanmar thus far, the reappropriation of seized funds or travel of a hypothetical U.S. special envoy to what Chinese officials see as sensitive regions to meet with resistance groups would likely set off alarm bells in Beijing. The caucus has already been characterized by some Western media sources as encouraging “intervention,” a framing that could exacerbate fears in China that the United States is moving to influence the outcome of the civil war. As Biden seeks to turn down the temperature on U.S.-China relations, his administration will likely try to avoid actions on Myanmar that China could interpret as U.S. interference, which will also limit the success of some of the objectives of the caucus.
On balance, the creation of the first-ever U.S. Congressional Caucus on Burma is a pivotal moment for U.S. policy on Myanmar, guaranteeing a higher level of concentrated attention on the country. Though the new BRAVE Burma Act faces uncertain prospects for clearing both the House and the Senate, it would mark a significant step forward for the BURMA Act of 2022 if it ultimately does. A reported minimum of 30 members of Congress will now dedicate at least some time to considering what a true bipartisan U.S. policy on Myanmar should look like. If the caucus holds to its aims and finds ways to move the 2022 BURMA Act from paper to implementation, it could help improve U.S. initiatives to support the people of Myanmar on the road towards a democratic future. Yet the caucus must first overcome significant barriers to progress, including congressional disagreements over the original 2022 BURMA Act and its future as well as the broader geostrategic objectives of the White House. Whatever the outcome, Myanmar’s resistance movement will be watching.
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