Editor’s Note: Mehrzad Boroujerdi is one of the foremost experts on the politicians who rose to prominence after Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution. He has studied Iran’s elections over the past 40 years in-depth and uncovered patterns of participation that tend to yield victories for moderates or hardliners.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Only one reformist/moderate candidate survived the Islamic Republic of Iran’s draconian vetting process to vie to become Iran’s next president in the June 28 elections after the untimely death in a helicopter crash of Ebrahim Raisi.
Masoud Pezeshkian, a 69-year-heart surgeon, initially generated significant interest. He is uniquely experienced, having served as both the minister of health under the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami and as a deputy speaker of parliament. Additionally, he stands to gain from his Azeri heritage in a country where ethnic groups traditionally support their own, and Azeris make up the second-largest ethnic group. His credentials are further bolstered by his status as a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War and his unblemished record of financial propriety in a system often marred by corruption, encapsulated by the Italian proverb, “public money is like holy water; everyone helps themselves to it.”
Yet, Pezeshkian, whose early debate performances were underwhelming, might also be defeated by electoral math. The biggest challenge he faces is not necessarily from his rivals but rather from the apathy of Iranian voters, who may abstain from voting in large numbers after being repeatedly disappointed that presidential elections have not fundamentally changed the nature of a political system in which a “Supreme Leader” not chosen through direct elections has the final say on all key issues.
The average participation rate in presidential elections in Iran over the past twenty years has been a very respectable 68%, with a corresponding 52% for parliamentary elections. However, since 2012, participation in presidential elections has dropped by 24%, and parliamentary elections have seen a 23% decline. This decrease is attributed to the growing divide between the state and the citizenry, fueled by factors such as the suppression of the Green Movement in 2009, the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in 2022 against enforced veiling, and worsening economic conditions due to sanctions and managerial ineptitude.
Data shows that over the last two decades, reformist and moderate candidates have won presidential elections (in 2001, 2013, and 2017) when voter participation exceeded 70%. This trend excludes the 2009 election, which many believe was stolen from moderate candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi to give Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a second term even though 85% of voters turned out.
According to this historical pattern, the moderate camp would need about 42 million out of 61 million eligible voters to participate for a victory on June 28. Given that only 29 million people voted in the 2021 presidential election and only 25 million turned out in March 2024 parliamentary elections, it is reasonable to ask whether Pezeshkian can mobilize two out of every three eligible Iranians to cast their ballots. This may prove to be an especially Herculean task, considering the time constraints preventing him from establishing robust electoral headquarters nationwide and maintaining a strong campaign presence.
Pezeshkian has so far walked a tightrope, trying to appeal to a skeptical, if not angry, public while distinguishing himself from the rest of the candidates. On the one hand, he has emphasized his respect for the Supreme Leader and the Islamic system. On the other hand, he has highlighted his personal piety, opposition to the morality police arresting women for dress code violations, and, importantly, his refusal to see himself as the sole sage on the stage.
His detractors argue that even if elected, he will not be able to achieve much given the weakness of the presidency and that high voter turnout rates only serve to legitimize a brutal state. However, Pezeshkian’s supporters counter by reminding them that Iranians experienced more freedom (albeit limited) under presidents like Khatami and Rouhani compared to Ahmadinejad and Raisi. Therefore, they argue, voting for a like-minded candidate such as Pezeshkian is the right choice given the available options.
One potential way Pezeshkian might overcome the tough electoral math is if the election goes to a second round. Article 17 of the Iranian constitution stipulates that if no candidate wins a majority in the first round, a runoff election will take place between the two candidates with the highest number of votes.
This has only occurred once, in 2005, when a fierce contest between Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad motivated 62% of voters to cast their ballots. A voter turnout rate of 60% (about 36 million voters) could also work in Pezeshkian’s favor.
Outcomes of Previous Presidential Runs of 2004 Presidential Candidates
| Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf | Saeed Jalili | Masoud Pezeshkian | Alireza Zakani | Amir-Hossein Qazizadeh-Hashemi | Mostafa Pourmohammadi |
| 2005 (finished 4th with 4 million votes [14%] | | | | | |
| 2013 (finished 2nd, with 6 million votes [16%] | 2013 (3rd; 11%) | 2013 (withdrew) | 2013 (disqualified) | | 2013 (declared but didn’t run) |
| 2017 (withdrew) | | | 2017 (disqualified) | | |
| 2021 (withdrew) | 2021 (disqualified) | 2021 (withdrew) | 2021 (finished 4th, with 1 million votes [3%] | |
As shown in the table above, many of the men competing for president have long harbored ambitions of winning that office.
It is expected that so-called “cover candidates” like Tehran mayor Alireza Zakani and current vice president Amir-Hossein Qazizadeh-Hashemi may withdraw to consolidate the conservative vote.
All eyes will be on whether either of the two conservative heavyweights — parliament speaker Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf or former national security adviser Saeed Jalili — will do the same. Unity has not been a hallmark of conservatives in presidential elections.
Conversely, the reformist/moderate camp does not face the ordeal of splitting votes by fielding multiple candidates, as the camp did in the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections. Furthermore, Pezeshkian is a more appealing candidate than the sole moderate in the 2021 elections, Abdolnaser Hemmati, a former Iranian Central Bank governor, who only received 8% of the vote.
By narrowing the field to just two candidates in a potential runoff, Pezeshkian could consolidate the reformist and moderate vote, making his path to the presidency more feasible despite the initial electoral challenges.
Mehrzad Boroujerdi is vice provost and dean of the College of Arts, Sciences, and Education at Missouri University of Science and Technology. He is the author of Iranian Intellectuals and the West: Tormented Triumph of Nativism, and co-author of Postrevolutionary Iran: A Political Handbook.
The Electoral Conundrum Facing Iran’s Sole Reformist Presidential Candidate
By Mehrzad Boroujerdi
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Mehrzad Boroujerdi is one of the foremost experts on the politicians who rose to prominence after Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution. He has studied Iran’s elections over the past 40 years in-depth and uncovered patterns of participation that tend to yield victories for moderates or hardliners.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
Only one reformist/moderate candidate survived the Islamic Republic of Iran’s draconian vetting process to vie to become Iran’s next president in the June 28 elections after the untimely death in a helicopter crash of Ebrahim Raisi.
Masoud Pezeshkian, a 69-year-heart surgeon, initially generated significant interest. He is uniquely experienced, having served as both the minister of health under the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami and as a deputy speaker of parliament. Additionally, he stands to gain from his Azeri heritage in a country where ethnic groups traditionally support their own, and Azeris make up the second-largest ethnic group. His credentials are further bolstered by his status as a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War and his unblemished record of financial propriety in a system often marred by corruption, encapsulated by the Italian proverb, “public money is like holy water; everyone helps themselves to it.”
Yet, Pezeshkian, whose early debate performances were underwhelming, might also be defeated by electoral math. The biggest challenge he faces is not necessarily from his rivals but rather from the apathy of Iranian voters, who may abstain from voting in large numbers after being repeatedly disappointed that presidential elections have not fundamentally changed the nature of a political system in which a “Supreme Leader” not chosen through direct elections has the final say on all key issues.
The average participation rate in presidential elections in Iran over the past twenty years has been a very respectable 68%, with a corresponding 52% for parliamentary elections. However, since 2012, participation in presidential elections has dropped by 24%, and parliamentary elections have seen a 23% decline. This decrease is attributed to the growing divide between the state and the citizenry, fueled by factors such as the suppression of the Green Movement in 2009, the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement in 2022 against enforced veiling, and worsening economic conditions due to sanctions and managerial ineptitude.
Data shows that over the last two decades, reformist and moderate candidates have won presidential elections (in 2001, 2013, and 2017) when voter participation exceeded 70%. This trend excludes the 2009 election, which many believe was stolen from moderate candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi to give Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a second term even though 85% of voters turned out.
According to this historical pattern, the moderate camp would need about 42 million out of 61 million eligible voters to participate for a victory on June 28. Given that only 29 million people voted in the 2021 presidential election and only 25 million turned out in March 2024 parliamentary elections, it is reasonable to ask whether Pezeshkian can mobilize two out of every three eligible Iranians to cast their ballots. This may prove to be an especially Herculean task, considering the time constraints preventing him from establishing robust electoral headquarters nationwide and maintaining a strong campaign presence.
Pezeshkian has so far walked a tightrope, trying to appeal to a skeptical, if not angry, public while distinguishing himself from the rest of the candidates. On the one hand, he has emphasized his respect for the Supreme Leader and the Islamic system. On the other hand, he has highlighted his personal piety, opposition to the morality police arresting women for dress code violations, and, importantly, his refusal to see himself as the sole sage on the stage.
His detractors argue that even if elected, he will not be able to achieve much given the weakness of the presidency and that high voter turnout rates only serve to legitimize a brutal state. However, Pezeshkian’s supporters counter by reminding them that Iranians experienced more freedom (albeit limited) under presidents like Khatami and Rouhani compared to Ahmadinejad and Raisi. Therefore, they argue, voting for a like-minded candidate such as Pezeshkian is the right choice given the available options.
One potential way Pezeshkian might overcome the tough electoral math is if the election goes to a second round. Article 17 of the Iranian constitution stipulates that if no candidate wins a majority in the first round, a runoff election will take place between the two candidates with the highest number of votes.
This has only occurred once, in 2005, when a fierce contest between Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad motivated 62% of voters to cast their ballots. A voter turnout rate of 60% (about 36 million voters) could also work in Pezeshkian’s favor.
Outcomes of Previous Presidential Runs of 2004 Presidential Candidates
As shown in the table above, many of the men competing for president have long harbored ambitions of winning that office.
It is expected that so-called “cover candidates” like Tehran mayor Alireza Zakani and current vice president Amir-Hossein Qazizadeh-Hashemi may withdraw to consolidate the conservative vote.
All eyes will be on whether either of the two conservative heavyweights — parliament speaker Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf or former national security adviser Saeed Jalili — will do the same. Unity has not been a hallmark of conservatives in presidential elections.
Conversely, the reformist/moderate camp does not face the ordeal of splitting votes by fielding multiple candidates, as the camp did in the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections. Furthermore, Pezeshkian is a more appealing candidate than the sole moderate in the 2021 elections, Abdolnaser Hemmati, a former Iranian Central Bank governor, who only received 8% of the vote.
By narrowing the field to just two candidates in a potential runoff, Pezeshkian could consolidate the reformist and moderate vote, making his path to the presidency more feasible despite the initial electoral challenges.
Mehrzad Boroujerdi is vice provost and dean of the College of Arts, Sciences, and Education at Missouri University of Science and Technology. He is the author of Iranian Intellectuals and the West: Tormented Triumph of Nativism, and co-author of Postrevolutionary Iran: A Political Handbook.
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