A Game of Risk with Aging Nuclear Power Plants
Yet another aging Soviet-era nuclear power plant could be at risk in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as the fighting has expanded into Russia’s Kursk Oblast over the past month. Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) is located just 60 kilometers (37 miles) northeast of the border, and both Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voiced concern about the risk of an incident there as Ukraine’s troops unexpectedly crossed into Russian territory and expanded their foothold over the past weeks. There is precedent for these concerns: Russia seized Ukraine’s Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants early in the war and has conducted a dangerous occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) ever since. (Russian troops withdrew from the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (CNPP) after five weeks of occupation). Furthermore, the ZNPP has suffered significantly (as outlined below) while frontline fighting has ebbed and flowed in its vicinity.
A healthy dose of critical thinking is in order regarding whether Ukraine intends or would even be able to seize the KNPP in a tit-for-tat or as a bargaining chip. As of the time of writing, the Institute for the Study of War’s interactive map of the battlefields showed Ukraine’s armed forces apparently still closer to Ukraine than to KNPP. Ukraine’s stated intentions and strategic goals do not include seizing the KNPP. The likelihood of such a turn of events seems low for practical as well as strategic reasons: Ukraine has much international support to lose and little more than headaches to gain from such a risky gamble. Meanwhile, Russia’s allegations of Ukrainian plans to attack the KNPP, a narrative vigorously refuted by Kyiv as “insane” propaganda, may indeed have more in common with the Kremlin’s documented history of spreading disinformation about alleged Ukrainian plans to create a “dirty bomb” and other falsehoods. It is wise to consider the situation in the light of that history.
Yet while seizure and occupation of the KNPP seems at best a distant risk, the situation at the ZNPP illustrates the possibility of other previously unthinkable threats, including the risk of accidental strikes on the facility or loss of critical external sources of power. In addition, it is possible that Moscow’s prioritizing of the war in Ukraine is undermining traditional “guns, guards, and gates” security at KNPP and other Russian nuclear facilities. Long-held assumptions that governments are the guarantors of nuclear security and agents of international collaboration to support and strengthen globally accepted norms have been undermined. The encroachment of fighting toward yet another nuclear power plant centers on questions about how international regimes should evolve to address these threats in the future.
How Did We Get Here?
Russia has occupied three nuclear facilities since its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These facilities include a small research reactor in Sevastopol, seized as part of Russia’s takeover of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, the temporary seizure of the Chornobyl facility in February 2022, and the two-years-and-counting occupation of the Zaporizhzhia plant.
The Chornobyl nuclear facility, where all nuclear reactors have been shut down since December 2000, still requires monitoring and maintenance. During the Russian occupation of the area, Ukrainian power plant employees resorted to stealing fuel from Russian forces to keep generators running and prevent the release of radioactive material. Although estimates of risk posed to the wider environment from such a release vary, the power provided by Ukrenergo, which was temporarily cut off in March, and backup diesel generators, is required to cool 20,000 spent fuel rods kept at the site and power the air conditioning that prevents dangerous corrosion at reactor 4, the site of Europe’s worst nuclear disaster. Russian forces in Chornobyl were also accused of stealing sources of ionizing radiation, damaging and looting facilities, and kicking up radioactive dust throughout the area during their occupation. Despite Russia’s occupation of Chornobyl being short-lived, the actions taken by the power plant’s employees to prevent radioactive material release reveal the threats it posed to the safety of the region, and the occupation overall set a dangerous precedent for the seizure of nuclear sites during the war.
Nuclear security and safety have been severely compromised since Russia’s seizure of the ZNPP in March 2022. The infrastructure supplying power to the plant has suffered significant damage since the beginning of the war, causing blackouts in the nearby town of Enerhodar, forcing the plant to shut down all its reactors and rely on generators for safety and security measures. IAEA chief Rafael Mariano Grossi has released several statements to emphasize the need for strengthening norms surrounding nuclear facilities in warzones, including the “Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict,” and the “Concrete Principles to Help Ensure Nuclear Safety and Security At ZNPP,” that have helped set standards for nuclear safety and security under such unique circumstances. Despite these efforts, there have been reports of nearby shelling, drone attacks, and fires at ZNPP that put the facilities and nearby communities at great risk while undermining international norms. Damage to the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam caused massive flooding in the region and forced workers to drill 11 wells to supply the water needed to cool the plant’s reactors. Recurring blackouts, staff turnover and shortages, and lack of operator knowledge as a result of Russia’s management of the plant have escalated the risk of human error at ZNPP. Finally, recent indications that Russia is preparing to restart one or more reactors at the plant show that these risks will only grow as the occupation continues.
What’s at Stake
Each of these instances reveal just how vulnerable the NPPs are during war and occupation. In the case of the KNPP, the closer the fighting gets to the facility, the higher the risk of an incident, the consequences of which could be serious. IAEA chief Mariano Grossi personally visited the Kursk facility at the end of August to assess the situation, making special note of how particularly vulnerable to any kind of incident the Kursk facility – a cousin of the infamous Chornobyl plant – is to any kind of incident given its lack of an external containment structure. As the conflict continues in Ukraine and spreads into Russia, it is essential that the international community states strongly and often that undermining the safety and security of NPPs is a threat not only to these occupied facilities but also to the norms that ensure the safety and security of NPPs everywhere.
Reaffirmation and strengthening of nuclear security principles, practices, and norms is vital not just to managing the Russia-Ukraine crisis, but also to navigating one of the most significant expansions of interest in nuclear energy in decades due to its potential to both help meet surging energy needs and meet carbon neutral climate change goals. This interest, in addition, coincides with a wave of new nuclear technology that raises the potential both for cheaper, faster, and wider access to nuclear energy, perhaps in other areas of geopolitical instability, as well as for new security and proliferation concerns. As the chances that conflict could threaten a burgeoning nuclear energy industry grow worldwide, now is the time for the international community to re-focus and recommit to the future of nuclear security.
Kursk Nuclear Power Plant at Risk?
By Christina McAllister • Braden Holt
Nonproliferation
Russian allegations that its Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, some 60 kilometers from the border with Ukraine, is at risk of attack after Kyiv’s surprise incursion in recent weeks may fit with broader disinformation patterns, but other less sensational risks to both Ukrainian and Russian plants due to the ongoing conflict should be taken seriously. The international community should focus on buttressing broader international norms as interest in nuclear power to meet energy and climate goals spreads across the globe.
A Game of Risk with Aging Nuclear Power Plants
Yet another aging Soviet-era nuclear power plant could be at risk in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as the fighting has expanded into Russia’s Kursk Oblast over the past month. Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) is located just 60 kilometers (37 miles) northeast of the border, and both Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voiced concern about the risk of an incident there as Ukraine’s troops unexpectedly crossed into Russian territory and expanded their foothold over the past weeks. There is precedent for these concerns: Russia seized Ukraine’s Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plants early in the war and has conducted a dangerous occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) ever since. (Russian troops withdrew from the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (CNPP) after five weeks of occupation). Furthermore, the ZNPP has suffered significantly (as outlined below) while frontline fighting has ebbed and flowed in its vicinity.
A healthy dose of critical thinking is in order regarding whether Ukraine intends or would even be able to seize the KNPP in a tit-for-tat or as a bargaining chip. As of the time of writing, the Institute for the Study of War’s interactive map of the battlefields showed Ukraine’s armed forces apparently still closer to Ukraine than to KNPP. Ukraine’s stated intentions and strategic goals do not include seizing the KNPP. The likelihood of such a turn of events seems low for practical as well as strategic reasons: Ukraine has much international support to lose and little more than headaches to gain from such a risky gamble. Meanwhile, Russia’s allegations of Ukrainian plans to attack the KNPP, a narrative vigorously refuted by Kyiv as “insane” propaganda, may indeed have more in common with the Kremlin’s documented history of spreading disinformation about alleged Ukrainian plans to create a “dirty bomb” and other falsehoods. It is wise to consider the situation in the light of that history.
Yet while seizure and occupation of the KNPP seems at best a distant risk, the situation at the ZNPP illustrates the possibility of other previously unthinkable threats, including the risk of accidental strikes on the facility or loss of critical external sources of power. In addition, it is possible that Moscow’s prioritizing of the war in Ukraine is undermining traditional “guns, guards, and gates” security at KNPP and other Russian nuclear facilities. Long-held assumptions that governments are the guarantors of nuclear security and agents of international collaboration to support and strengthen globally accepted norms have been undermined. The encroachment of fighting toward yet another nuclear power plant centers on questions about how international regimes should evolve to address these threats in the future.
How Did We Get Here?
Russia has occupied three nuclear facilities since its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. These facilities include a small research reactor in Sevastopol, seized as part of Russia’s takeover of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, the temporary seizure of the Chornobyl facility in February 2022, and the two-years-and-counting occupation of the Zaporizhzhia plant.
The Chornobyl nuclear facility, where all nuclear reactors have been shut down since December 2000, still requires monitoring and maintenance. During the Russian occupation of the area, Ukrainian power plant employees resorted to stealing fuel from Russian forces to keep generators running and prevent the release of radioactive material. Although estimates of risk posed to the wider environment from such a release vary, the power provided by Ukrenergo, which was temporarily cut off in March, and backup diesel generators, is required to cool 20,000 spent fuel rods kept at the site and power the air conditioning that prevents dangerous corrosion at reactor 4, the site of Europe’s worst nuclear disaster. Russian forces in Chornobyl were also accused of stealing sources of ionizing radiation, damaging and looting facilities, and kicking up radioactive dust throughout the area during their occupation. Despite Russia’s occupation of Chornobyl being short-lived, the actions taken by the power plant’s employees to prevent radioactive material release reveal the threats it posed to the safety of the region, and the occupation overall set a dangerous precedent for the seizure of nuclear sites during the war.
Nuclear security and safety have been severely compromised since Russia’s seizure of the ZNPP in March 2022. The infrastructure supplying power to the plant has suffered significant damage since the beginning of the war, causing blackouts in the nearby town of Enerhodar, forcing the plant to shut down all its reactors and rely on generators for safety and security measures. IAEA chief Rafael Mariano Grossi has released several statements to emphasize the need for strengthening norms surrounding nuclear facilities in warzones, including the “Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict,” and the “Concrete Principles to Help Ensure Nuclear Safety and Security At ZNPP,” that have helped set standards for nuclear safety and security under such unique circumstances. Despite these efforts, there have been reports of nearby shelling, drone attacks, and fires at ZNPP that put the facilities and nearby communities at great risk while undermining international norms. Damage to the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam caused massive flooding in the region and forced workers to drill 11 wells to supply the water needed to cool the plant’s reactors. Recurring blackouts, staff turnover and shortages, and lack of operator knowledge as a result of Russia’s management of the plant have escalated the risk of human error at ZNPP. Finally, recent indications that Russia is preparing to restart one or more reactors at the plant show that these risks will only grow as the occupation continues.
What’s at Stake
Each of these instances reveal just how vulnerable the NPPs are during war and occupation. In the case of the KNPP, the closer the fighting gets to the facility, the higher the risk of an incident, the consequences of which could be serious. IAEA chief Mariano Grossi personally visited the Kursk facility at the end of August to assess the situation, making special note of how particularly vulnerable to any kind of incident the Kursk facility – a cousin of the infamous Chornobyl plant – is to any kind of incident given its lack of an external containment structure. As the conflict continues in Ukraine and spreads into Russia, it is essential that the international community states strongly and often that undermining the safety and security of NPPs is a threat not only to these occupied facilities but also to the norms that ensure the safety and security of NPPs everywhere.
Reaffirmation and strengthening of nuclear security principles, practices, and norms is vital not just to managing the Russia-Ukraine crisis, but also to navigating one of the most significant expansions of interest in nuclear energy in decades due to its potential to both help meet surging energy needs and meet carbon neutral climate change goals. This interest, in addition, coincides with a wave of new nuclear technology that raises the potential both for cheaper, faster, and wider access to nuclear energy, perhaps in other areas of geopolitical instability, as well as for new security and proliferation concerns. As the chances that conflict could threaten a burgeoning nuclear energy industry grow worldwide, now is the time for the international community to re-focus and recommit to the future of nuclear security.
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