Editor’s Note: Arman Mahmoudian is an expert on the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ – non-state militant groups that have been supported by Iran and share an anti-Israel and anti-U.S. ideology. He is a frequent contributor to Stimson on these topics and has written presciently about the dynamics leading up to Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
One of the reasons the U.S. is working so hard to achieve a Gaza cease-fire is to prevent hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah from expanding into a full-scale war.
Since the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack on southern Israel, Hezbollah has launched numerous rocket and missile attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel and engaged in skirmishes with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that have led to the evacuation of more than 150,000 Israelis and Lebanese from their homes. Israel has assassinated senior Hezbollah figures and bombed targets as far north as the Beqaa Valley.
Hezbollah traces its origins to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which was aimed at removing the Palestine Liberation Organization from the country. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with Syrian permission, sent 5000 troops to the Beqaa Valley to train Shi’ite Lebanese fighters who later formed Hezbollah.
Initially, Hezbollah’s primary mission was in the mostly Shi’ite-populated south, targeting occupying Israeli forces and Israel-backed Christian Maronite militia. Over time, however, Hezbollah developed into the most powerful national actor in Lebanon and a potent player throughout the region.
Hezbollah’s reach grew as a result of the U.S. war on terror, particularly the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. The U.S. presence in Iraq, strategically located between Iran and Syria, heightened the sense of vulnerability for both nations, prompting them to enhance their capabilities to harm Americans. Their objectives were to keep the U.S. struggling in Iraq to prevent the U.S. from targeting Iran or to force a U.S. withdrawal. Syria allowed former Ba’athists and al-Qaeda operatives to carry out operations against the U.S. from its territory, while Iran grew its network of regional proxies with Hezbollah at the forefront.
Immediately after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Hezbollah created a new force known as Unit 3800 to oversee operations against the U.S. military. A small number of elite troops trained Iraqi fighters to conduct kidnappings and small unit tactical operations. They also learned to use sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), incorporating lessons learned from operations in southern Lebanon, which had led to an Israeli withdrawal in 2000.
Hezbollah provided funds and weapons to these fighters. It also rapidly expanded ties with Iraqi militias, including the Badr Organization, Saraya al-Khorasani, and the al-Mahdi Corps. In addition to military aid, Hezbollah supported Iraqi Shi’ite militias and political parties through a large media presence, particularly al-Manar TV.
Stage two of Hezbollah’s expansion came during the Arab Spring, beginning in late 2010. The chaos and instability allowed Hezbollah to not only increase its presence in Iraq and Syria but also to explore new opportunities in Yemen and Bahrain.
As civil war engulfed Syria, Hezbollah deployed thousands of fighters to support President Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah fighters played a crucial role in major battles, such as the Battle of Qusayr in 2013, which was pivotal in reclaiming territory from rebel forces. Additionally, Hezbollah provided training and strategic advice to Syrian government forces, leveraging expertise in urban warfare and guerrilla tactics. According to regional sources, at least until 2021, Hezbollah was still operating at 116 sites, from the deep south of Syria in Dara to the north in Aleppo.
In Yemen, Hezbollah smuggled in disassembled weapons and trained Houthi fighters in guerrilla warfare, logistics, and the use of advanced weaponry, including missile technology. Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force also directed attacks on Saudis. Hezbollah’s leadership, including top leader Hassan Nasrallah, participated in propaganda campaigns to bolster the Houthi cause and counter Saudi narratives.
In Bahrain, Hezbollah’s activities have been more covert, focusing on supporting Shi’ite opposition groups. According to Bahraini sources, Hezbollah cooperated with Iran to form a Shi’ite militia in Bahrain, known as the al-Ashtar Brigades, which since its establishment in 2013 has carried out more than 20 attacks against Bahraini security forces and police.
In Iraq, Hezbollah’s role also expanded significantly during the Arab Spring. In 2014, Hezbollah established a command center to oversee and plan all actions in Iraq. Hezbollah also expedited the delivery of weapons and provided extensive training and support to Iraqi Shi’ite militias including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and the Badr Organization. Hezbollah operatives participated in combat operations alongside Iraqi militias against ISIS.
The 2020s were another transformative period for Hezbollah, marked by three pivotal events: the killing of Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani by a U.S. drone in January 2020, the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022, and the escalation of hostilities with Israel following the Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, 2023.
The death of Soleimani had profound implications for Hezbollah’s operations in Iraq. Soleimani was a key figure coordinating Iran’s network of proxies. Fearful of losing its grip on Iraq in the aftermath of his death, Iran assigned Hezbollah to fill this gap.
Hezbollah intensified its training of Iraqi militias, focusing on advanced military tactics, urban warfare, and the use of sophisticated weaponry. Hezbollah also took on the role of providing strategic guidance for operations against U.S. and coalition forces, including planning and executing attacks on military bases and convoys. At the same time, Hezbollah increased its influence over pro-Iranian factions within the Iraqi government that have called for the expulsion of the remaining 2,500 U.S. troops in the country.
The Ukraine war also gave Hezbollah a boost by undercutting Russia’s role in Syria. Moscow pulled troops from Syria, leaving a power vacuum that was filled by both the IRGC and Hezbollah. This not only gave Hezbollah an opportunity to expand its presence but also enabled the militia to present itself as a valuable player capable of protecting Russian interests.
Ten months into the Gaza war, Hezbollah has engaged in frequent clashes with Israeli forces including sniper fire and anti-tank missile strikes. Hezbollah has deployed more rocket launchers and anti-aircraft systems to deter Israeli air strikes and prepare for potential escalation. Hezbollah has closely coordinated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad; on March 4, 2024, Hamas and Hezbollah carried out simultaneous rocket attacks against Israel.
While the chaos abroad has enabled Hezbollah to expand its regional influence, internal chaos serves the same purpose. Over 80% of Lebanese are living in poverty due to the country’s financial turmoil and the devaluation of Lebanon’s pound. These dire circumstances have helped Hezbollah. Its financial backbone, the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association (AQAH), has been offering Lebanese personal loans in exchange for gold and foreign currency, making Hezbollah the largest holder of gold reserves in the country. Additionally, Hezbollah, through its global financial network, including gold mines in Venezuela, has been injecting foreign currency and gold into Lebanon. Given the weak value of the Lebanese currency, this has granted Hezbollah enormous purchasing power, enabling the militia to extend its economic presence by acquiring numerous construction and solar energy projects.
The spoils Hezbollah has collected likely make the militia cautious about escalating the current exchange of fire with Israel. On the one hand, the group knows that holding back could undermine its soft power and influence. On the other hand, major strikes against Israel that unleash the full power of the IDF could endanger all of Hezbollah’s achievements. There are pressures within Israel for the IDF to turn its attention north as operations wane in Gaza.
Throughout the last four decades, Hezbollah has demonstrated a noteworthy ability to capitalize on regional instability and conflict. Whether during the U.S. war on terror, the Arab Spring, or the tumultuous events of the 2020’s, each round has provided Hezbollah with new opportunities to extend its reach. This pattern underscores Hezbollah’s role as an agent of chaos, in the view of this analyst, that takes advantage of power vacuums to navigate and exploit the shifting dynamics of the region.
Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow at the Global and National Security Institute (GNSI), and a lecturer at the University of South Florida (USF). His handle on X, formerly known as Twitter, is @MahmoudianArman
How Hezbollah Grew Over Four Decades, Profiting From Chaos
By Arman Mahmoudian
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Arman Mahmoudian is an expert on the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ – non-state militant groups that have been supported by Iran and share an anti-Israel and anti-U.S. ideology. He is a frequent contributor to Stimson on these topics and has written presciently about the dynamics leading up to Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
One of the reasons the U.S. is working so hard to achieve a Gaza cease-fire is to prevent hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah from expanding into a full-scale war.
Since the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack on southern Israel, Hezbollah has launched numerous rocket and missile attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel and engaged in skirmishes with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that have led to the evacuation of more than 150,000 Israelis and Lebanese from their homes. Israel has assassinated senior Hezbollah figures and bombed targets as far north as the Beqaa Valley.
Hezbollah traces its origins to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which was aimed at removing the Palestine Liberation Organization from the country. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with Syrian permission, sent 5000 troops to the Beqaa Valley to train Shi’ite Lebanese fighters who later formed Hezbollah.
Initially, Hezbollah’s primary mission was in the mostly Shi’ite-populated south, targeting occupying Israeli forces and Israel-backed Christian Maronite militia. Over time, however, Hezbollah developed into the most powerful national actor in Lebanon and a potent player throughout the region.
Hezbollah’s reach grew as a result of the U.S. war on terror, particularly the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. The U.S. presence in Iraq, strategically located between Iran and Syria, heightened the sense of vulnerability for both nations, prompting them to enhance their capabilities to harm Americans. Their objectives were to keep the U.S. struggling in Iraq to prevent the U.S. from targeting Iran or to force a U.S. withdrawal. Syria allowed former Ba’athists and al-Qaeda operatives to carry out operations against the U.S. from its territory, while Iran grew its network of regional proxies with Hezbollah at the forefront.
Immediately after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Hezbollah created a new force known as Unit 3800 to oversee operations against the U.S. military. A small number of elite troops trained Iraqi fighters to conduct kidnappings and small unit tactical operations. They also learned to use sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), incorporating lessons learned from operations in southern Lebanon, which had led to an Israeli withdrawal in 2000.
Hezbollah provided funds and weapons to these fighters. It also rapidly expanded ties with Iraqi militias, including the Badr Organization, Saraya al-Khorasani, and the al-Mahdi Corps. In addition to military aid, Hezbollah supported Iraqi Shi’ite militias and political parties through a large media presence, particularly al-Manar TV.
Stage two of Hezbollah’s expansion came during the Arab Spring, beginning in late 2010. The chaos and instability allowed Hezbollah to not only increase its presence in Iraq and Syria but also to explore new opportunities in Yemen and Bahrain.
As civil war engulfed Syria, Hezbollah deployed thousands of fighters to support President Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah fighters played a crucial role in major battles, such as the Battle of Qusayr in 2013, which was pivotal in reclaiming territory from rebel forces. Additionally, Hezbollah provided training and strategic advice to Syrian government forces, leveraging expertise in urban warfare and guerrilla tactics. According to regional sources, at least until 2021, Hezbollah was still operating at 116 sites, from the deep south of Syria in Dara to the north in Aleppo.
In Yemen, Hezbollah smuggled in disassembled weapons and trained Houthi fighters in guerrilla warfare, logistics, and the use of advanced weaponry, including missile technology. Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force also directed attacks on Saudis. Hezbollah’s leadership, including top leader Hassan Nasrallah, participated in propaganda campaigns to bolster the Houthi cause and counter Saudi narratives.
In Bahrain, Hezbollah’s activities have been more covert, focusing on supporting Shi’ite opposition groups. According to Bahraini sources, Hezbollah cooperated with Iran to form a Shi’ite militia in Bahrain, known as the al-Ashtar Brigades, which since its establishment in 2013 has carried out more than 20 attacks against Bahraini security forces and police.
In Iraq, Hezbollah’s role also expanded significantly during the Arab Spring. In 2014, Hezbollah established a command center to oversee and plan all actions in Iraq. Hezbollah also expedited the delivery of weapons and provided extensive training and support to Iraqi Shi’ite militias including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and the Badr Organization. Hezbollah operatives participated in combat operations alongside Iraqi militias against ISIS.
The 2020s were another transformative period for Hezbollah, marked by three pivotal events: the killing of Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani by a U.S. drone in January 2020, the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022, and the escalation of hostilities with Israel following the Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, 2023.
The death of Soleimani had profound implications for Hezbollah’s operations in Iraq. Soleimani was a key figure coordinating Iran’s network of proxies. Fearful of losing its grip on Iraq in the aftermath of his death, Iran assigned Hezbollah to fill this gap.
Hezbollah intensified its training of Iraqi militias, focusing on advanced military tactics, urban warfare, and the use of sophisticated weaponry. Hezbollah also took on the role of providing strategic guidance for operations against U.S. and coalition forces, including planning and executing attacks on military bases and convoys. At the same time, Hezbollah increased its influence over pro-Iranian factions within the Iraqi government that have called for the expulsion of the remaining 2,500 U.S. troops in the country.
The Ukraine war also gave Hezbollah a boost by undercutting Russia’s role in Syria. Moscow pulled troops from Syria, leaving a power vacuum that was filled by both the IRGC and Hezbollah. This not only gave Hezbollah an opportunity to expand its presence but also enabled the militia to present itself as a valuable player capable of protecting Russian interests.
Ten months into the Gaza war, Hezbollah has engaged in frequent clashes with Israeli forces including sniper fire and anti-tank missile strikes. Hezbollah has deployed more rocket launchers and anti-aircraft systems to deter Israeli air strikes and prepare for potential escalation. Hezbollah has closely coordinated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad; on March 4, 2024, Hamas and Hezbollah carried out simultaneous rocket attacks against Israel.
While the chaos abroad has enabled Hezbollah to expand its regional influence, internal chaos serves the same purpose. Over 80% of Lebanese are living in poverty due to the country’s financial turmoil and the devaluation of Lebanon’s pound. These dire circumstances have helped Hezbollah. Its financial backbone, the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association (AQAH), has been offering Lebanese personal loans in exchange for gold and foreign currency, making Hezbollah the largest holder of gold reserves in the country. Additionally, Hezbollah, through its global financial network, including gold mines in Venezuela, has been injecting foreign currency and gold into Lebanon. Given the weak value of the Lebanese currency, this has granted Hezbollah enormous purchasing power, enabling the militia to extend its economic presence by acquiring numerous construction and solar energy projects.
The spoils Hezbollah has collected likely make the militia cautious about escalating the current exchange of fire with Israel. On the one hand, the group knows that holding back could undermine its soft power and influence. On the other hand, major strikes against Israel that unleash the full power of the IDF could endanger all of Hezbollah’s achievements. There are pressures within Israel for the IDF to turn its attention north as operations wane in Gaza.
Throughout the last four decades, Hezbollah has demonstrated a noteworthy ability to capitalize on regional instability and conflict. Whether during the U.S. war on terror, the Arab Spring, or the tumultuous events of the 2020’s, each round has provided Hezbollah with new opportunities to extend its reach. This pattern underscores Hezbollah’s role as an agent of chaos, in the view of this analyst, that takes advantage of power vacuums to navigate and exploit the shifting dynamics of the region.
Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow at the Global and National Security Institute (GNSI), and a lecturer at the University of South Florida (USF). His handle on X, formerly known as Twitter, is @MahmoudianArman
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