In international negotiations, while the interests and will of the States engaged in the process guide the outcome, the people in the room matter. Stimson brought together some of the original stakeholders involved in the ATT process, including diplomats and civil society researchers and advocates, a decade after its adoption to provide reflections on the ATT’s past decade and key insights into the treaty’s current impact and future trajectory.
Read all the commentaries and the report on the ATT at 10 webpage.
Ten years ago, I spoke on a High-Level panel during the UN General Assembly Ministerial Week to celebrate the first 50 States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty and its forthcoming entry into force. It was an exciting day, full of grandiose speeches and proclamations of the transformative effect the ATT would have on the arms trade, and the benefit to people worldwide who otherwise would suffer armed violence, persistent conflict, human rights abuse, and displacement. A decade on, how many of those ambitions have been realized? To families bombed in Gaza or Kyiv, shot at in Juba, or persecuted by armed gangs in Haiti, the answer must feel like not much.
At the recent ATT Preparatory Meeting for the 10th Conference of States Parties, the process seemed unchanged since my last attendance in 2019: an all-male panel discussing gender balance in delegations, grumblings about unpaid contributions, and colorful slides showing declining reporting trends. Like the meetings before them, there was minimal discussion of actual arms transfers. The one time a delegate of Palestine highlighted arms transfers being used against civilians in Gaza, the Chair reminded delegates to “stick to the agenda topics.” As the topic at that particular moment was an assessment of how well Articles 6 (absolute prohibition on transfers that will be used in war crimes) and Article 7 (risk assessment of arms being used in violations of IHRL and IHL), I struggled to think of a more relevant real-world topic.
Inside these conference rooms, the ATT seems far from success amidst a world overshadowed by conflict and tragedy. The real dynamism of the ATT thrives outside these confines. Globally, civil society groups are challenging their governments’ arms supplies to conflict zones and human rights violators by using legal avenues under the ATT. Legal processes are underway from Canada to Brazil to the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and Denmark, as campaigners utilize the ATT to mount legal challenges against arms transfer decisions. This, in essence, is what the ATT has made possible. This ability marks a pivotal shift: governments can no longer justify arms transfers with the morally bankrupt argument of “someone else will do it.”
One of the most glaring tests of the ATT emerged shortly after its entry into force. Since March 2015, the Saudi-led coalition’s actions in Yemen have displaced millions and triggered famine, starkly illustrating the human cost of arms transfers. Despite repeated calls and evidence from civil society at ATT meetings, formal responses often skirted real-world arms transfer discussions, focusing instead on financial contributions and procedural mechanisms. Campaigners intensified efforts back home, leading to legal challenges in countries like the UK, where court decisions fluctuated amidst escalating humanitarian crises. Meanwhile, the arms industry profits soared, underscoring the urgent need for rigorous accountability in arms export decisions.
It is impossible to meaningfully discuss the impact of any current arms controls without addressing Israel’s war on Gaza. The daily footage of relentless bombings on homes, hospitals, and schools and the raw pain and destruction of whole families being wiped out has raised public consciousness worldwide. It is not only civil society mounting these challenges. The government of Nicaragua made a legal challenge to the ICJ to stop Germany’s military support to Israel. Nicaragua is not an ATT States Party and indeed was critical of the treaty during negotiations. But it is interesting to see a state invoke international law to attempt to halt arms transfers, and perhaps indicative of the effect the ATT has had in embedding an understanding of the link between arms transfers and atrocities. In the Netherlands, work by Oxfam, PAX, and The Rights Forum against the Dutch government stopped the export of F-35 fighter jet parts, and following public pressure, Canada, Spain, and Italy have discontinued new export licenses. Public pressure continues to grow in the UK, France, Denmark, and other ATT States Party countries concerning their arms transfer decisions.
Between a campaign launch of Control Arms in 2003 through to treaty adoption in 2013 the campaign for the ATT was in full throttle for ten years. The work began before then, with Nobel Laureates and academics looking at how the success of then recent Mine Ban Treaty could be replicated for the conventional arms trade. The campaign elevated this work to an international profile, boiled down the objectives to a global treaty, and distilled messaging down to ‘No Arms for Atrocities.’ Three States – Mali, Costa Rica, and Cambodia thought this sounded a good enough idea to support publicly. Almost all the rest said it was crazy, idealistic, and impossible to achieve. It increased our campaigning determination. By 2005, over 50 states had endorsed the call, and when the UK led a group of 7 “co-authors” in drafting and submitting the first UN Resolution Toward an Arms Trade Treaty, the campaign helped mobilize 154 governments to vote yes. Over the next seven long years of formal UN process, Prep Coms, Open Ended Working Groups, Groups of Governmental Experts, and an international plethora of side events, regional workshops, and campaign conferences, the Treaty was adopted.
Campaigning for a treaty requires high expectations and perseverance. However, achieving a treaty marks just the beginning; maintaining momentum post-adoption proves challenging. The initial enthusiasm diminishes, and funding becomes scarce as larger organizations and governments shift focus. Bigger organizations cycle on to other campaign issues, as do governments. Funding becomes much, much harder.
Official meetings often succumb to bureaucratic tendencies, establishing necessary frameworks and funding mechanisms, albeit with administrative challenges. ATT discussions have often been dominated by funding contributions, highlighting disparities between richer and poorer states in meeting financial obligations. While there were threats of repercussions for defaulters, penalties for actual treaty violations remained minimal. Participating in Conferences of States Parties (CSPs) often feels procedural.
So to the question of does the ATT work, its true impact emerges in legal challenges, parliamentary scrutiny, and media critiques spotlighting the arms deals that fuel atrocities. The ATT provides a legal framework crucial for curbing arms supplies to where they are likely to be used in violations of international law, yet its implementation lacks teeth without robust enforcement mechanisms and clear reporting standards. Campaigners and others mounting court cases are, in this context, a sign of success.
Of course, some of the successes of the last ten years are also to be found within the bureaucratic maze. Establishing national control lists, having funding available for implementation projects, and states completing national reports on their arms transfer activity — all of this matters. It is these less exciting but crucial aspects that can most contribute to the vital work of preventing diversion. One aspect all states agreed on was the need to stop the illicit trade in arms. And given that 99% of arms deals begin in the licit trade, bringing that under control is essential. The huge grey area between the licit and illicit trade is an issue States Parties can use the ATT to address.
The ATT is not going to do it by itself. No law or treaty does. Stigma and norm-building are crucial but require effort to sustain. The energy outside the formal process, especially highlighted by the bombing of Palestinian, shows no sign of abating. This does not mean giving up on the CSP process. States Parties and observers should revitalize these meetings, have the political courage to tackle the difficult issues and be prepared to challenge other states, including allies, when the Treaty is violated. Specifically, they should:
- Talk about transfer denials. The ATT is there to stop arms transfers that fuel atrocities. To see the success, states parties need to share examples of where they have actually denied a transfer. Specifics are helpful, but where this is too much for diplomatic stomachs to bear, generics would be a start, such as “This year, we denied exports worth x amount of small arms, fighter jet components, and bombs due to the overriding risk of humanitarian law violations.”
- Back up commitments with finance. The global arms trade is worth over $100 billion. Can we not find even 1% of that to finance the efforts to ensure it is properly regulated?
- Support civil society. The ATT came into being following the dedicated effort of civil society around the world doggedly campaigning. For any treaty to work, governments need that critical voice for accountability, combined with the technical skills and longevity of experience that many NGOs bring. Civil society needs funding to participate effectively.
- Abide by treaty obligations: Compliance with the Treaty is essential. Stop selling weapons where there is reasonable knowledge they will be used in war crimes. Take risk assessment seriously and deny transfers with clear risk of IHL and IHRL violations, and publicize these actions.
As for the CSPs, as States Parties convene, the challenge lies in revitalizing these forums to foster genuine dialogue and concrete action toward a safer, more accountable global arms trade regime. States Parties have the power to make these work. Will they rise to the challenge?
Anna Macdonald was a leader in the campaign for the Arms Trade Treaty, serving as Director of Control Arms 2014-19 and prior to that Head of Arms Control at Oxfam 2003-14 and co-chair of the Control Arms Coalition. She is currently a humanitarian advocacy consultant.
Beyond the Conference Room: The Real Impact of the Arms Trade Treaty
By Anna Macdonald
Conventional Arms
In international negotiations, while the interests and will of the States engaged in the process guide the outcome, the people in the room matter. Stimson brought together some of the original stakeholders involved in the ATT process, including diplomats and civil society researchers and advocates, a decade after its adoption to provide reflections on the ATT’s past decade and key insights into the treaty’s current impact and future trajectory.
Read all the commentaries and the report on the ATT at 10 webpage.
Ten years ago, I spoke on a High-Level panel during the UN General Assembly Ministerial Week to celebrate the first 50 States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty and its forthcoming entry into force. It was an exciting day, full of grandiose speeches and proclamations of the transformative effect the ATT would have on the arms trade, and the benefit to people worldwide who otherwise would suffer armed violence, persistent conflict, human rights abuse, and displacement. A decade on, how many of those ambitions have been realized? To families bombed in Gaza or Kyiv, shot at in Juba, or persecuted by armed gangs in Haiti, the answer must feel like not much.
At the recent ATT Preparatory Meeting for the 10th Conference of States Parties, the process seemed unchanged since my last attendance in 2019: an all-male panel discussing gender balance in delegations, grumblings about unpaid contributions, and colorful slides showing declining reporting trends. Like the meetings before them, there was minimal discussion of actual arms transfers. The one time a delegate of Palestine highlighted arms transfers being used against civilians in Gaza, the Chair reminded delegates to “stick to the agenda topics.” As the topic at that particular moment was an assessment of how well Articles 6 (absolute prohibition on transfers that will be used in war crimes) and Article 7 (risk assessment of arms being used in violations of IHRL and IHL), I struggled to think of a more relevant real-world topic.
Inside these conference rooms, the ATT seems far from success amidst a world overshadowed by conflict and tragedy. The real dynamism of the ATT thrives outside these confines. Globally, civil society groups are challenging their governments’ arms supplies to conflict zones and human rights violators by using legal avenues under the ATT. Legal processes are underway from Canada to Brazil to the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, and Denmark, as campaigners utilize the ATT to mount legal challenges against arms transfer decisions. This, in essence, is what the ATT has made possible. This ability marks a pivotal shift: governments can no longer justify arms transfers with the morally bankrupt argument of “someone else will do it.”
One of the most glaring tests of the ATT emerged shortly after its entry into force. Since March 2015, the Saudi-led coalition’s actions in Yemen have displaced millions and triggered famine, starkly illustrating the human cost of arms transfers. Despite repeated calls and evidence from civil society at ATT meetings, formal responses often skirted real-world arms transfer discussions, focusing instead on financial contributions and procedural mechanisms. Campaigners intensified efforts back home, leading to legal challenges in countries like the UK, where court decisions fluctuated amidst escalating humanitarian crises. Meanwhile, the arms industry profits soared, underscoring the urgent need for rigorous accountability in arms export decisions.
It is impossible to meaningfully discuss the impact of any current arms controls without addressing Israel’s war on Gaza. The daily footage of relentless bombings on homes, hospitals, and schools and the raw pain and destruction of whole families being wiped out has raised public consciousness worldwide. It is not only civil society mounting these challenges. The government of Nicaragua made a legal challenge to the ICJ to stop Germany’s military support to Israel. Nicaragua is not an ATT States Party and indeed was critical of the treaty during negotiations. But it is interesting to see a state invoke international law to attempt to halt arms transfers, and perhaps indicative of the effect the ATT has had in embedding an understanding of the link between arms transfers and atrocities. In the Netherlands, work by Oxfam, PAX, and The Rights Forum against the Dutch government stopped the export of F-35 fighter jet parts, and following public pressure, Canada, Spain, and Italy have discontinued new export licenses. Public pressure continues to grow in the UK, France, Denmark, and other ATT States Party countries concerning their arms transfer decisions.
Between a campaign launch of Control Arms in 2003 through to treaty adoption in 2013 the campaign for the ATT was in full throttle for ten years. The work began before then, with Nobel Laureates and academics looking at how the success of then recent Mine Ban Treaty could be replicated for the conventional arms trade. The campaign elevated this work to an international profile, boiled down the objectives to a global treaty, and distilled messaging down to ‘No Arms for Atrocities.’ Three States – Mali, Costa Rica, and Cambodia thought this sounded a good enough idea to support publicly. Almost all the rest said it was crazy, idealistic, and impossible to achieve. It increased our campaigning determination. By 2005, over 50 states had endorsed the call, and when the UK led a group of 7 “co-authors” in drafting and submitting the first UN Resolution Toward an Arms Trade Treaty, the campaign helped mobilize 154 governments to vote yes. Over the next seven long years of formal UN process, Prep Coms, Open Ended Working Groups, Groups of Governmental Experts, and an international plethora of side events, regional workshops, and campaign conferences, the Treaty was adopted.
Campaigning for a treaty requires high expectations and perseverance. However, achieving a treaty marks just the beginning; maintaining momentum post-adoption proves challenging. The initial enthusiasm diminishes, and funding becomes scarce as larger organizations and governments shift focus. Bigger organizations cycle on to other campaign issues, as do governments. Funding becomes much, much harder.
Official meetings often succumb to bureaucratic tendencies, establishing necessary frameworks and funding mechanisms, albeit with administrative challenges. ATT discussions have often been dominated by funding contributions, highlighting disparities between richer and poorer states in meeting financial obligations. While there were threats of repercussions for defaulters, penalties for actual treaty violations remained minimal. Participating in Conferences of States Parties (CSPs) often feels procedural.
So to the question of does the ATT work, its true impact emerges in legal challenges, parliamentary scrutiny, and media critiques spotlighting the arms deals that fuel atrocities. The ATT provides a legal framework crucial for curbing arms supplies to where they are likely to be used in violations of international law, yet its implementation lacks teeth without robust enforcement mechanisms and clear reporting standards. Campaigners and others mounting court cases are, in this context, a sign of success.
Of course, some of the successes of the last ten years are also to be found within the bureaucratic maze. Establishing national control lists, having funding available for implementation projects, and states completing national reports on their arms transfer activity — all of this matters. It is these less exciting but crucial aspects that can most contribute to the vital work of preventing diversion. One aspect all states agreed on was the need to stop the illicit trade in arms. And given that 99% of arms deals begin in the licit trade, bringing that under control is essential. The huge grey area between the licit and illicit trade is an issue States Parties can use the ATT to address.
The ATT is not going to do it by itself. No law or treaty does. Stigma and norm-building are crucial but require effort to sustain. The energy outside the formal process, especially highlighted by the bombing of Palestinian, shows no sign of abating. This does not mean giving up on the CSP process. States Parties and observers should revitalize these meetings, have the political courage to tackle the difficult issues and be prepared to challenge other states, including allies, when the Treaty is violated. Specifically, they should:
As for the CSPs, as States Parties convene, the challenge lies in revitalizing these forums to foster genuine dialogue and concrete action toward a safer, more accountable global arms trade regime. States Parties have the power to make these work. Will they rise to the challenge?
Anna Macdonald was a leader in the campaign for the Arms Trade Treaty, serving as Director of Control Arms 2014-19 and prior to that Head of Arms Control at Oxfam 2003-14 and co-chair of the Control Arms Coalition. She is currently a humanitarian advocacy consultant.
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