Editor’s Note: Sina Azodi is an expert on the history of Iran’s nuclear program and its nuclear diplomacy with the West. He is a frequent contributor to Stimson on that topic.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
The man appointed to be Iran’s next foreign minister is well-known in the West as one of the top negotiators of the 2015 nuclear deal. Like his late predecessor, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Abbas Araghchi started his career as a political analyst in the foreign ministry but rose through the ranks with more distinction.
Araghchi’s appointment should be seen as a positive development at a time of high and rising tension in the region. In addition to his long experience in international affairs and nuclear talks, he enjoys robust “revolutionary” credentials that could partially shield him from domestic criticism should Iran make concessions on key issues.
“Araghchi is one of the most professional diplomats at the foreign ministry who has a very good reputation,” Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian ambassador to Germany and spokesman for nuclear talks in the early 2000s, told this analyst in an interview. “He has no affiliation with any political front and is respected by the majority of them.”
Araghchi was born in 1962 in Tehran to a conservative, religious family of merchants. Like many young Iranians, he volunteered to fight in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, an experience that shaped his worldview. Defending Iran’s ballistic missile program, for example, he asserted at a conference in 2018 that “We still remember the French Super Etendards (jets), British Chieftain tanks, German chemical weapons, U.S. AWACS planes & Saudi dollars [that fueled Iraq’s war against Iran.] Our missile program is defensive.”
The future nuclear negotiator joined the foreign ministry at the end of that war and earned a B.A. in international relations from the ministry’s School of International Relations. Araghchi also earned a master’s in political science in 1991 from the Islamic Azad University in central Tehran. Araghchi honed his fluent English in England, where he earned a PhD in politics and government from the University of Kent in 1996 under the supervision of Professor David McLellan, a British scholar of Marxism. Araghchi’s dissertation, “The Evolution of the Concept of Political Participation in Twentieth-Century Islamic Political Thought,” analyzes the compatibility of the Western concept of political participation with religion in Islamic societies. Araghchi concludes that modern Islamic political thought has sought to reconcile the absolute sovereignty of God with popular sovereignty, integrating elements of Western democracy with Islamic principles to create democratic institutions within the framework of Islamic law.
A career diplomat, Araghchi has held several significant roles, including Iran’s ambassador to Finland from 1999 to 2003 and head of the Foreign Ministry’s Western Europe department from 2003 to 2004, when Iran first negotiated with Britain, France and Germany about its advancing nuclear program. He was promoted to Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal Affairs in 2005. In 2008, he became ambassador to Japan, a position he held until becoming director for Asia and Pacific Affairs from 2011 to 2013.
Then Foreign Minister Javad Zarif recruited Araghchi to be his deputy in nuclear talks after the 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani. Described by his American counterpart, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, in a 2018 memoir as “steely, determined [and] calm” and an expert on the details of the nuclear fuel cycle, Araghchi played a key role in the negotiations that culminated in 2015 in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany.
The Trump administration quit the JCPOA in 2018 while Iran was in full compliance with the deal, which traded sanctions relief for verifiable curbs on the Iranian nuclear program. After the Biden administration came to office in 2021 and sought to revive the agreement, Araghchi led the Iranian negotiation team in Vienna. He reportedly had a draft ready for signing. However, as Rouhani complained in June 2021 after he left office, Araghchi was not given the “authority” to finalize the deal. Replaced by Abdollahian, a career Arabist with close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), after the election of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi, Araghchijoined the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations, a body that advises the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Araghchi has remained a fierce defender of the JCPOA and the nuclear talks since leaving office. According to him, the agreement had three distinct benefits for Iran. First, it lifted sanctions. Second, it legitimized Iran’s nuclear program including enrichment of uranium. Third, it neutralized the “securitization project” of Iran’s adversaries who portray the Islamic Republic as a serious threat to international peace.
On relations with the U.S., Araghchi has adopted a pragmatic stance. In January 2024, he stated that as long as the Islamic Republic adheres to its revolutionary and anti-imperialistic discourse, resolving fundamental issues with the U.S. is not possible but differences can be managed. “Either you abandon the anti-imperialistic discourse, which means you are no longer the Islamic Republic, or you must confront the United States,” he said. “Therefore, resolving the problem is not feasible, but managing it is imaginable.”
Despite his expertise, Araghchi will likely face significant challenges at the foreign ministry. To an even greater extent than in the U.S., Iranian foreign ministers have limited influence in shaping foreign policy. They must constantly deal with deep-state institutions, particularly the IRGC, that interfere in the decision-making process, as well as with the wishes of the Supreme Leader. Zarif, in 2021, referred to this as the struggle between “diplomacy and the battlefield.” When Zarif was chided by hardliners for the reference, Araghchi defended his former boss.
Araghchi outlined his priorities before the parliament on Aug. 12, promising a “comprehensive, active, and effective” diplomacy. He has called for a relationship based on “mutual respect” with the Europeans and “managing” hostilities with the U.S. He urges the “honorable” lifting of U.S. sanctions through “goal-oriented” and serious negotiations. Similar to many other Iranian officials, Araghchi’s agenda calls for “continuing strong relations with China and Russia, and expanding cooperation with emerging economies such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil.”
During the snap presidential campaign that followed the death of Raisi and Abdollahian in a helicopter crash, the new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, vowed to resolve Iran’s disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and engage with the West. However, Pezeshkian and Araghchi will ultimately need Khamenei’s blessing to negotiate over the nuclear program and restore Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. Zarif’s abrupt resignation as a top adviser to Pezeshkian is unlikely to impact Araghchi but could further undermine chances for a new nuclear deal.
The next 15 months will be pivotal for Iran’s foreign policy and the nuclear file. In October 2025, UN Security Council 2231, which enshrined the JCPOA, expires and the possibility of renewing previous UN sanctions will disappear. Given the substantial advances in Iran’s nuclear program and the lack of cooperation with the IAEA under the Raisi administration, France and the United Kingdom, as parties to the JCPOA and permanent members of the Security Council, could reimpose UN sanctions.
If, however, Khamenei gives Pezeshkian leeway to negotiate seriously over the nuclear program, Araghchi would be the right man for the job. His work as an advisor to the leader has earned Khamenei’s trust. His substantial experience in international diplomacy and in dealing with Western interlocutors means he has the requisite skills. The question remains whether he will be given the opportunity and whether the next U.S. administration will be receptive.
Sina Azodi is a Professorial Lecturer of International Affairs at the George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies, who specializes in Iran’s nuclear program and U.S.-Iranian relations. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of South Florida. Follow him on X: @Azodiac83
Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s Experienced and ‘Revolutionary’ Incoming Foreign Minister
By Sina Azodi
Middle East & North Africa
Editor’s Note: Sina Azodi is an expert on the history of Iran’s nuclear program and its nuclear diplomacy with the West. He is a frequent contributor to Stimson on that topic.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives
The man appointed to be Iran’s next foreign minister is well-known in the West as one of the top negotiators of the 2015 nuclear deal. Like his late predecessor, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Abbas Araghchi started his career as a political analyst in the foreign ministry but rose through the ranks with more distinction.
Araghchi’s appointment should be seen as a positive development at a time of high and rising tension in the region. In addition to his long experience in international affairs and nuclear talks, he enjoys robust “revolutionary” credentials that could partially shield him from domestic criticism should Iran make concessions on key issues.
“Araghchi is one of the most professional diplomats at the foreign ministry who has a very good reputation,” Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian ambassador to Germany and spokesman for nuclear talks in the early 2000s, told this analyst in an interview. “He has no affiliation with any political front and is respected by the majority of them.”
Araghchi was born in 1962 in Tehran to a conservative, religious family of merchants. Like many young Iranians, he volunteered to fight in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, an experience that shaped his worldview. Defending Iran’s ballistic missile program, for example, he asserted at a conference in 2018 that “We still remember the French Super Etendards (jets), British Chieftain tanks, German chemical weapons, U.S. AWACS planes & Saudi dollars [that fueled Iraq’s war against Iran.] Our missile program is defensive.”
The future nuclear negotiator joined the foreign ministry at the end of that war and earned a B.A. in international relations from the ministry’s School of International Relations. Araghchi also earned a master’s in political science in 1991 from the Islamic Azad University in central Tehran. Araghchi honed his fluent English in England, where he earned a PhD in politics and government from the University of Kent in 1996 under the supervision of Professor David McLellan, a British scholar of Marxism. Araghchi’s dissertation, “The Evolution of the Concept of Political Participation in Twentieth-Century Islamic Political Thought,” analyzes the compatibility of the Western concept of political participation with religion in Islamic societies. Araghchi concludes that modern Islamic political thought has sought to reconcile the absolute sovereignty of God with popular sovereignty, integrating elements of Western democracy with Islamic principles to create democratic institutions within the framework of Islamic law.
A career diplomat, Araghchi has held several significant roles, including Iran’s ambassador to Finland from 1999 to 2003 and head of the Foreign Ministry’s Western Europe department from 2003 to 2004, when Iran first negotiated with Britain, France and Germany about its advancing nuclear program. He was promoted to Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal Affairs in 2005. In 2008, he became ambassador to Japan, a position he held until becoming director for Asia and Pacific Affairs from 2011 to 2013.
Then Foreign Minister Javad Zarif recruited Araghchi to be his deputy in nuclear talks after the 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani. Described by his American counterpart, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, in a 2018 memoir as “steely, determined [and] calm” and an expert on the details of the nuclear fuel cycle, Araghchi played a key role in the negotiations that culminated in 2015 in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany.
The Trump administration quit the JCPOA in 2018 while Iran was in full compliance with the deal, which traded sanctions relief for verifiable curbs on the Iranian nuclear program. After the Biden administration came to office in 2021 and sought to revive the agreement, Araghchi led the Iranian negotiation team in Vienna. He reportedly had a draft ready for signing. However, as Rouhani complained in June 2021 after he left office, Araghchi was not given the “authority” to finalize the deal. Replaced by Abdollahian, a career Arabist with close ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), after the election of hardline President Ebrahim Raisi, Araghchijoined the Strategic Council for Foreign Relations, a body that advises the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Araghchi has remained a fierce defender of the JCPOA and the nuclear talks since leaving office. According to him, the agreement had three distinct benefits for Iran. First, it lifted sanctions. Second, it legitimized Iran’s nuclear program including enrichment of uranium. Third, it neutralized the “securitization project” of Iran’s adversaries who portray the Islamic Republic as a serious threat to international peace.
On relations with the U.S., Araghchi has adopted a pragmatic stance. In January 2024, he stated that as long as the Islamic Republic adheres to its revolutionary and anti-imperialistic discourse, resolving fundamental issues with the U.S. is not possible but differences can be managed. “Either you abandon the anti-imperialistic discourse, which means you are no longer the Islamic Republic, or you must confront the United States,” he said. “Therefore, resolving the problem is not feasible, but managing it is imaginable.”
Despite his expertise, Araghchi will likely face significant challenges at the foreign ministry. To an even greater extent than in the U.S., Iranian foreign ministers have limited influence in shaping foreign policy. They must constantly deal with deep-state institutions, particularly the IRGC, that interfere in the decision-making process, as well as with the wishes of the Supreme Leader. Zarif, in 2021, referred to this as the struggle between “diplomacy and the battlefield.” When Zarif was chided by hardliners for the reference, Araghchi defended his former boss.
Araghchi outlined his priorities before the parliament on Aug. 12, promising a “comprehensive, active, and effective” diplomacy. He has called for a relationship based on “mutual respect” with the Europeans and “managing” hostilities with the U.S. He urges the “honorable” lifting of U.S. sanctions through “goal-oriented” and serious negotiations. Similar to many other Iranian officials, Araghchi’s agenda calls for “continuing strong relations with China and Russia, and expanding cooperation with emerging economies such as India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil.”
During the snap presidential campaign that followed the death of Raisi and Abdollahian in a helicopter crash, the new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, vowed to resolve Iran’s disputes with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and engage with the West. However, Pezeshkian and Araghchi will ultimately need Khamenei’s blessing to negotiate over the nuclear program and restore Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. Zarif’s abrupt resignation as a top adviser to Pezeshkian is unlikely to impact Araghchi but could further undermine chances for a new nuclear deal.
The next 15 months will be pivotal for Iran’s foreign policy and the nuclear file. In October 2025, UN Security Council 2231, which enshrined the JCPOA, expires and the possibility of renewing previous UN sanctions will disappear. Given the substantial advances in Iran’s nuclear program and the lack of cooperation with the IAEA under the Raisi administration, France and the United Kingdom, as parties to the JCPOA and permanent members of the Security Council, could reimpose UN sanctions.
If, however, Khamenei gives Pezeshkian leeway to negotiate seriously over the nuclear program, Araghchi would be the right man for the job. His work as an advisor to the leader has earned Khamenei’s trust. His substantial experience in international diplomacy and in dealing with Western interlocutors means he has the requisite skills. The question remains whether he will be given the opportunity and whether the next U.S. administration will be receptive.
Sina Azodi is a Professorial Lecturer of International Affairs at the George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies, who specializes in Iran’s nuclear program and U.S.-Iranian relations. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of South Florida. Follow him on X: @Azodiac83
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