One year ago, China found itself in an unenviable spot: a mere twenty days after Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced a “no-limits partnership” between Russia and China on February 4, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Despite speculation on what and when China knew about the invasion, one thing is clear: the limits—or lack thereof—of China’s elevated relationship with Russia would be immediately tested. The United States has accused China of defending Putin’s war in Ukraine, and the U.S. and EU have both criticized China for spreading “disinformation” over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This begs the question: what has been the nature of Chinese support of Russia in the first year of the Ukraine war, if any?
China’s policy toward the Ukraine war has threaded the needle of avoiding outward criticism of Russia’s actions while chastising the U.S. as China’s strategic rival. Under the microscope of international criticism, China has walked a fine line: suspending business when threats to Chinese interests necessitated it, parroting Russian talking points when they aligned with China’s criticism of the U.S., and continuing trade when the environment was conducive. In doing so, China has used the opportunity to further its foreign policy interests at an incredibly uncertain time in the international environment.
Walking the Line
As fighting continues to rage and Western assistance is sent to Ukraine, Russia would be smart to seek all forms of external support still accessible to the country, including China. As the world’s largest economy, China has the means to change the course of the war in Ukraine. However, the United States and the EU have warned China against providing support to Russia in relation to its war in Ukraine. The question then is whether and in what ways China has crossed the West’s line of any support to Russia.
In relation to the Ukraine war, China has followed the spirit of Western pressure when Chinese interests were at risk of sanctions and when the business environment was prohibitively uncertain. In the weeks after the invasion, Chinese banks stopped financing purchases of Russian commodities, and Sinopec suspended talks for petrochemical investment and a gas marketing venture in Russia. Spooked by potential secondary sanctions, UnionPay, China’s state-owned payments network, refused to work with Western-sanctioned banks in Russia. And, in April, the Chinese drone manufacturer DJI Technology suspended all business activities in Russia and Ukraine to prevent use of its drones in combat.
Some Chinese entities, however, have fallen victim to speculation of sending Russia military aid. Recent reports assert that the Biden administration confronted the Chinese government about Chinese state-owned enterprises “knowingly assisting Russia in its war effort,” although supporting evidence was not made public. In November, speculation arose of military aid in transponder-less cargo shipments from Zhengzhou to Russia. And in June, the U.S. accused five Chinese firms of allegedly supplying Russia’s military and added them to the Entity List. In all these cases, Chinese support of Russia has remained speculative.
According to Chinese customs data, China exported no additional physical military support to Russia: Chinese exports of arms and ammunitions (HS code 93) continued throughout the war at 2019 and 2020 levels below $1 million per month. While continuing arms sales, however small, could be interpreted as assisting Russia, increased Chinese military exports to Russia, especially those of drones—a main concern of the West—have not transpired. One Chinese Wing Loong II military drone costs about $1-3 million.
To public knowledge, China has not overtly provided military support to Russia during the Ukraine war—although speculation is likely to continue.
Rhetorical Support of Russia
The same, however, cannot be said about China’s rhetorical support for Russia. China’s public position on the war has attempted to square the circle created by the timing of the elevation of the Sino-Russian relationship to “no-limits friendship” weeks before Russia’s invasion. The approach China has taken to the Ukraine war is a seemingly contradictory “pro-Russia neutrality,” not taking an active side in the fighting but being clear in its rhetoric of its pro-Russia bias.
Beijing has not publicly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has called for a negotiated end to the war. And while Xi Jinping has not met with Volodymyr Zelensky but has with Vladimir Putin—once in person in September and once virtually in December—China has sent some humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
On the other hand, China has held a pro-Russia bias, most evident in the four months after the invasion. In February and May, the Foreign Ministry parroted Russia’s euphemistic “special military operations” (特别军事行动) to describe the invasion. State media also defended Russian falsification attempts of atrocities. And at the United Nations, the Chinese blocked motions to censure Russia for its actions, voted against motions to investigate war crimes, and backed Russia’s March draft Security Council resolution that omitted mention of Russia’s role in the Ukraine crisis.
Such an endorsement of Russia’s position on the war while not adjudicating on the outcome of the conflict itself is informed by China’s most pervasive foreign policy priority: its strategic competition with the United States. In the context of great power competition, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Early into the war, statements by Chinese officials often aligned with Russian talking points criticizing the United States on the issue of Ukraine. The Chinese embassy in Washington’s list of “Falsehoods Spread by the U.S. on the Ukraine Issue” in May employed logic founded on long-standing Chinese grievances about U.S. policy. It accused the U.S. of benefiting economically from the war, criticized the U.S. sanctions regime as “never a fundamental or effective solution,” and agreed with the Russian attribution of NATO expansion as the casus belli. And as late as August, the Chinese ambassador to Moscow called the U.S. the “main instigator” of the war in Ukraine.
As the war has dragged on, China’s anti-U.S. rhetoric on the Ukraine war has softened, however. The Foreign Ministry has not referred to the war as a “special military operation” (特别军事行动) since May. From March to May, the Ministry spokesperson’s press conferences answered 22 questions on Ukraine with criticism directed toward NATO, with particular reference to NATO’s eastward expansion as a provocation of the Ukraine conflict (“北约连续东扩对俄罗斯安全环境造成的负面影响”). From October to December, only two press conferences had such criticisms, on December 2 and December 21. In October, China abstained on, rather than vetoed, a UN Security Council resolution condemning Russian actions in Ukraine, in contrast to its March vote for Russia’s draft resolution.
This shift toward less public criticism of the U.S. within the context does not negate China’s pro-Russia bias, as was seen in its early and vocal echoing of Russian talking points. Throughout the Ukraine war, the “common enemy” of Russia and China has not changed. What has occurred is a shift in the means, not a shift in the ends.
Continued and Increased Trade with Russia
Despite Western warning against “any support” to Russia, China has continued and even deepened trade with Russia. From 2021 to 2022, Chinese imports from Russia increased 43%, and Chinese exports to Russia grew by 13%. What is striking is China’s increased import of Russian crude oil despite high prices: China imported 8% more barrels of crude oil from Russia year on year, growing from 79.6 million tonnes to 86.2 million tonnes, nearly becoming China’s largest source of crude oil in 2022. The value of China’s imports of Russian crude grew 44% from $40.5 billion to $58.4 billion.
China’s overall imports of crude oil fell in 2022, yet China imported more from Russia. Considering globally high prices and China’s suppressed demand due to its zero-COVID policies, China’s increased imports of Russian oil are questionable. One could speculate that China’s imports of Russian crude qualify as Chinese support of the Russian economy during the Ukraine war. By purchasing Russia’s largest export, China effectively transferred $17.8 billion in added revenue from 2021 to 2022. In doing so, China has stood by its March 2022 determination for China and Russia to “continue to carry out normal trade cooperation.” China has been able to trade with Russia as well as to flout Western sanctions’ attempt to deprive Moscow of oil revenue.
Conclusion
One year since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s position on the Ukraine war can be characterized as pro-Russia neutrality. Beijing has been unwilling to provide Russia with military material support, but this has not prevented it from using the Ukraine opportunity to criticize its strategic competitor and purchase Russia’s top revenue source. In the current international environment, Chinese foreign policy is informed and filtered through the lens of great power competition. As the U.S. and its allies double down on support to Ukraine, it remains critical to observe how and if China must square away its dual interests of opposing U.S. principles and trading with Russia.
Ukraine at One Year: Has China Supported Russia?
By Jason Li
In China
One year ago, China found itself in an unenviable spot: a mere twenty days after Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced a “no-limits partnership” between Russia and China on February 4, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Despite speculation on what and when China knew about the invasion, one thing is clear: the limits—or lack thereof—of China’s elevated relationship with Russia would be immediately tested. The United States has accused China of defending Putin’s war in Ukraine, and the U.S. and EU have both criticized China for spreading “disinformation” over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This begs the question: what has been the nature of Chinese support of Russia in the first year of the Ukraine war, if any?
China’s policy toward the Ukraine war has threaded the needle of avoiding outward criticism of Russia’s actions while chastising the U.S. as China’s strategic rival. Under the microscope of international criticism, China has walked a fine line: suspending business when threats to Chinese interests necessitated it, parroting Russian talking points when they aligned with China’s criticism of the U.S., and continuing trade when the environment was conducive. In doing so, China has used the opportunity to further its foreign policy interests at an incredibly uncertain time in the international environment.
Walking the Line
As fighting continues to rage and Western assistance is sent to Ukraine, Russia would be smart to seek all forms of external support still accessible to the country, including China. As the world’s largest economy, China has the means to change the course of the war in Ukraine. However, the United States and the EU have warned China against providing support to Russia in relation to its war in Ukraine. The question then is whether and in what ways China has crossed the West’s line of any support to Russia.
In relation to the Ukraine war, China has followed the spirit of Western pressure when Chinese interests were at risk of sanctions and when the business environment was prohibitively uncertain. In the weeks after the invasion, Chinese banks stopped financing purchases of Russian commodities, and Sinopec suspended talks for petrochemical investment and a gas marketing venture in Russia. Spooked by potential secondary sanctions, UnionPay, China’s state-owned payments network, refused to work with Western-sanctioned banks in Russia. And, in April, the Chinese drone manufacturer DJI Technology suspended all business activities in Russia and Ukraine to prevent use of its drones in combat.
Some Chinese entities, however, have fallen victim to speculation of sending Russia military aid. Recent reports assert that the Biden administration confronted the Chinese government about Chinese state-owned enterprises “knowingly assisting Russia in its war effort,” although supporting evidence was not made public. In November, speculation arose of military aid in transponder-less cargo shipments from Zhengzhou to Russia. And in June, the U.S. accused five Chinese firms of allegedly supplying Russia’s military and added them to the Entity List. In all these cases, Chinese support of Russia has remained speculative.
According to Chinese customs data, China exported no additional physical military support to Russia: Chinese exports of arms and ammunitions (HS code 93) continued throughout the war at 2019 and 2020 levels below $1 million per month. While continuing arms sales, however small, could be interpreted as assisting Russia, increased Chinese military exports to Russia, especially those of drones—a main concern of the West—have not transpired. One Chinese Wing Loong II military drone costs about $1-3 million.
To public knowledge, China has not overtly provided military support to Russia during the Ukraine war—although speculation is likely to continue.
Rhetorical Support of Russia
The same, however, cannot be said about China’s rhetorical support for Russia. China’s public position on the war has attempted to square the circle created by the timing of the elevation of the Sino-Russian relationship to “no-limits friendship” weeks before Russia’s invasion. The approach China has taken to the Ukraine war is a seemingly contradictory “pro-Russia neutrality,” not taking an active side in the fighting but being clear in its rhetoric of its pro-Russia bias.
Beijing has not publicly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has called for a negotiated end to the war. And while Xi Jinping has not met with Volodymyr Zelensky but has with Vladimir Putin—once in person in September and once virtually in December—China has sent some humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
On the other hand, China has held a pro-Russia bias, most evident in the four months after the invasion. In February and May, the Foreign Ministry parroted Russia’s euphemistic “special military operations” (特别军事行动) to describe the invasion. State media also defended Russian falsification attempts of atrocities. And at the United Nations, the Chinese blocked motions to censure Russia for its actions, voted against motions to investigate war crimes, and backed Russia’s March draft Security Council resolution that omitted mention of Russia’s role in the Ukraine crisis.
Such an endorsement of Russia’s position on the war while not adjudicating on the outcome of the conflict itself is informed by China’s most pervasive foreign policy priority: its strategic competition with the United States. In the context of great power competition, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Early into the war, statements by Chinese officials often aligned with Russian talking points criticizing the United States on the issue of Ukraine. The Chinese embassy in Washington’s list of “Falsehoods Spread by the U.S. on the Ukraine Issue” in May employed logic founded on long-standing Chinese grievances about U.S. policy. It accused the U.S. of benefiting economically from the war, criticized the U.S. sanctions regime as “never a fundamental or effective solution,” and agreed with the Russian attribution of NATO expansion as the casus belli. And as late as August, the Chinese ambassador to Moscow called the U.S. the “main instigator” of the war in Ukraine.
As the war has dragged on, China’s anti-U.S. rhetoric on the Ukraine war has softened, however. The Foreign Ministry has not referred to the war as a “special military operation” (特别军事行动) since May. From March to May, the Ministry spokesperson’s press conferences answered 22 questions on Ukraine with criticism directed toward NATO, with particular reference to NATO’s eastward expansion as a provocation of the Ukraine conflict (“北约连续东扩对俄罗斯安全环境造成的负面影响”). From October to December, only two press conferences had such criticisms, on December 2 and December 21. In October, China abstained on, rather than vetoed, a UN Security Council resolution condemning Russian actions in Ukraine, in contrast to its March vote for Russia’s draft resolution.
This shift toward less public criticism of the U.S. within the context does not negate China’s pro-Russia bias, as was seen in its early and vocal echoing of Russian talking points. Throughout the Ukraine war, the “common enemy” of Russia and China has not changed. What has occurred is a shift in the means, not a shift in the ends.
Continued and Increased Trade with Russia
Despite Western warning against “any support” to Russia, China has continued and even deepened trade with Russia. From 2021 to 2022, Chinese imports from Russia increased 43%, and Chinese exports to Russia grew by 13%. What is striking is China’s increased import of Russian crude oil despite high prices: China imported 8% more barrels of crude oil from Russia year on year, growing from 79.6 million tonnes to 86.2 million tonnes, nearly becoming China’s largest source of crude oil in 2022. The value of China’s imports of Russian crude grew 44% from $40.5 billion to $58.4 billion.
China’s overall imports of crude oil fell in 2022, yet China imported more from Russia. Considering globally high prices and China’s suppressed demand due to its zero-COVID policies, China’s increased imports of Russian oil are questionable. One could speculate that China’s imports of Russian crude qualify as Chinese support of the Russian economy during the Ukraine war. By purchasing Russia’s largest export, China effectively transferred $17.8 billion in added revenue from 2021 to 2022. In doing so, China has stood by its March 2022 determination for China and Russia to “continue to carry out normal trade cooperation.” China has been able to trade with Russia as well as to flout Western sanctions’ attempt to deprive Moscow of oil revenue.
Conclusion
One year since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s position on the Ukraine war can be characterized as pro-Russia neutrality. Beijing has been unwilling to provide Russia with military material support, but this has not prevented it from using the Ukraine opportunity to criticize its strategic competitor and purchase Russia’s top revenue source. In the current international environment, Chinese foreign policy is informed and filtered through the lens of great power competition. As the U.S. and its allies double down on support to Ukraine, it remains critical to observe how and if China must square away its dual interests of opposing U.S. principles and trading with Russia.
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