The fall of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime 20 years ago gave Iran important strategic advantages that were not anticipated by U.S. invaders. Iran’s most significant regional enemy was removed from the scene and Shiites and Kurds aligned with Iran found more maneuvering room in the post-Saddam political structure.
The power of the Sunnis decreased and a new system based on federalism and ethnic and sectarian quotas emerged, which significantly increased Iran’s influence. These changes in Iraq allowed Iran to expand its strategic depth to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, forming what King Abdullah II of Jordan called a “Shia Crescent.”
But these gains for the Islamic Republic were counterbalanced by new threats that can be categorized on two levels: Concern about the U.S. military presence in Iraq and support for a regime change policy against Iran; and fear of the disintegration of the Iraqi state as a result of Kurdish independence and the rise of terrorism.
After a bloody eight-year war with Iraq started by Saddam Hussein in 1980, Iran’s main goal after the U.S. invasion was to prevent the establishment of a government in Baghdad that was hostile to Tehran. Iran also sought to expel American forces from Iraq and the region by bolstering proxies and other supporters in Iraq.
At the same time, the U.S. sought to establish a strong government in Baghdad that could resist threats to its sovereignty, including from Iran, and that had friendly relations with Washington.
Ironically, Saudi Arabia also found more maneuverability as a result of the end of Baathist rule. The fall of Saddam changed the balance of power in the region and boosted the influence of both Tehran and Riyadh.
One of Iran’s revolutionary slogans was “The path to Quds [Jerusalem] passes through Karbala,” a reference to a city in Iraq that is revered by Shiite Muslims. Iran sought to establish a new security order that would strengthen the role of Shiites throughout the region, with more serious support for Shiites in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait. Although Iran had used the Shiite factor in Iraq and the Levant even during the era of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the end of the Baathist regime gave Iran an exceptional opportunity to employ this factor in line with its geopolitical ambitions.
But the growth of Iranian cultural, political, and economic cooperation with the new government of Iraq also led to a backlash. Sunni Muslim countries in the region came to believe that their Shiite minorities were more loyal to Iran than to their own political systems.
Iran was also worried that the U.S. would follow up its invasion of Iraq by seeking regime change in Iran. This perceived threat caused Tehran to seek to create a balance against the U.S. and reduce its role and influence in Iraq by increasing Iranian presence and extensive influence in internal Iraqi politics and the creating proxies.
Iran sought to prevent the formation of a secular government with tendencies of Arab-Iraqi nationalism that could threaten Iran as the Baathist regime had in the past. In addition, Iran had concerns about the risk of separatism, which could have a significant impact on Iran’s national security and territorial integrity. A more independent Iraqi Kurdistan could boost Kurdish nationalism in Iran’s Kurdistan province and increase ethnic demands on Tehran in the future.
If Iraq collapsed into ethno-religious enclaves, the formation of a Sunni mini-state in the central regions of Iraq could potentially be a base for Arab nationalists and extreme Sunni Islamists, who have a hostile approach to Iran. Two events—the emergence of the Islamic State group in 2014 and establishment of a so-called caliphate in large parts of Iraq and Syria as well as a Kurdish independence referendum in 2017—show the extent of these threats.
The initial power vacuum in Iraq after 2003 increased competition between regional and extra-regional powers, and especially between Iran and the U.S. The U.S. pursued a wide range of goals, including state building, constitutional change, and culture building in Iraq, all of which it sought to export to other Middle Eastern countries. Some American neoconservatives considered Iraq as the gateway to democracy and transformation in the entire Middle East, including Iran.
Saudi Arabia focused on curbing Iranian influence in Iraq, and Iraq became an arena of competition between Riyadh and Tehran. Saudi concerns reflect the fact that about 70 percent of the population of the main oil-producing areas of the Persian Gulf are Shiites. Iran’s rising influence in the region also incentivized the Abraham Accords as nervous Sunni-ruled states sought closer ties with Israel and the U.S.
From Iran’s point of view, Shiite geopolitical components can comprise a resistance front in confrontation with the great powers and create suitable avenues for the export of the Islamic revolution. The fall of the Baathist regime gave Iran an opportunity to align Shiite ideology with Shiite geopolitics and strengthen an “axis of resistance” in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory.
Iran’s future influence depends on the stabilization in the respective political structures of groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi Shiite parties, Yemeni Houthis, and the Alawites of Syria and Turkey. On this basis, the pattern of Iran’s support for its proxies in the region is distinct, and includes a range of topics from ideological mobilization, networking, institution building, and monetary aid to operational doctrine, arms, and military training.
U.S. policy toward the Middle East has historically sought to prevent the rise of a regional superpower. The end of Saddam Hussein’s reign allowed Iran to challenge this order in line with its interests, but those challenges also sparked backlashes in the form of the Abraham Accords and resentment of Iranian influence within Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Given the recent announcement of a reconciliation deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran—brokered by Iraq and concluded by China—it remains to be seen whether and how the region’s Sunni and Shiite powers can stabilize the regional order.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Persian Gulf Security Orders. Follow him on Twitter at @J_Heirannia. Photo: U.S. Army/Spc. Kieran Cuddihy.
Retrospective: US Invasion of Iraq was a Mixed Blessing for Iran
By Javad Heiran-Nia
In Middle East & North Africa
The fall of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime 20 years ago gave Iran important strategic advantages that were not anticipated by U.S. invaders. Iran’s most significant regional enemy was removed from the scene and Shiites and Kurds aligned with Iran found more maneuvering room in the post-Saddam political structure.
The power of the Sunnis decreased and a new system based on federalism and ethnic and sectarian quotas emerged, which significantly increased Iran’s influence. These changes in Iraq allowed Iran to expand its strategic depth to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, forming what King Abdullah II of Jordan called a “Shia Crescent.”
But these gains for the Islamic Republic were counterbalanced by new threats that can be categorized on two levels: Concern about the U.S. military presence in Iraq and support for a regime change policy against Iran; and fear of the disintegration of the Iraqi state as a result of Kurdish independence and the rise of terrorism.
After a bloody eight-year war with Iraq started by Saddam Hussein in 1980, Iran’s main goal after the U.S. invasion was to prevent the establishment of a government in Baghdad that was hostile to Tehran. Iran also sought to expel American forces from Iraq and the region by bolstering proxies and other supporters in Iraq.
At the same time, the U.S. sought to establish a strong government in Baghdad that could resist threats to its sovereignty, including from Iran, and that had friendly relations with Washington.
Ironically, Saudi Arabia also found more maneuverability as a result of the end of Baathist rule. The fall of Saddam changed the balance of power in the region and boosted the influence of both Tehran and Riyadh.
One of Iran’s revolutionary slogans was “The path to Quds [Jerusalem] passes through Karbala,” a reference to a city in Iraq that is revered by Shiite Muslims. Iran sought to establish a new security order that would strengthen the role of Shiites throughout the region, with more serious support for Shiites in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait. Although Iran had used the Shiite factor in Iraq and the Levant even during the era of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the end of the Baathist regime gave Iran an exceptional opportunity to employ this factor in line with its geopolitical ambitions.
But the growth of Iranian cultural, political, and economic cooperation with the new government of Iraq also led to a backlash. Sunni Muslim countries in the region came to believe that their Shiite minorities were more loyal to Iran than to their own political systems.
Iran was also worried that the U.S. would follow up its invasion of Iraq by seeking regime change in Iran. This perceived threat caused Tehran to seek to create a balance against the U.S. and reduce its role and influence in Iraq by increasing Iranian presence and extensive influence in internal Iraqi politics and the creating proxies.
Iran sought to prevent the formation of a secular government with tendencies of Arab-Iraqi nationalism that could threaten Iran as the Baathist regime had in the past. In addition, Iran had concerns about the risk of separatism, which could have a significant impact on Iran’s national security and territorial integrity. A more independent Iraqi Kurdistan could boost Kurdish nationalism in Iran’s Kurdistan province and increase ethnic demands on Tehran in the future.
If Iraq collapsed into ethno-religious enclaves, the formation of a Sunni mini-state in the central regions of Iraq could potentially be a base for Arab nationalists and extreme Sunni Islamists, who have a hostile approach to Iran. Two events—the emergence of the Islamic State group in 2014 and establishment of a so-called caliphate in large parts of Iraq and Syria as well as a Kurdish independence referendum in 2017—show the extent of these threats.
The initial power vacuum in Iraq after 2003 increased competition between regional and extra-regional powers, and especially between Iran and the U.S. The U.S. pursued a wide range of goals, including state building, constitutional change, and culture building in Iraq, all of which it sought to export to other Middle Eastern countries. Some American neoconservatives considered Iraq as the gateway to democracy and transformation in the entire Middle East, including Iran.
Saudi Arabia focused on curbing Iranian influence in Iraq, and Iraq became an arena of competition between Riyadh and Tehran. Saudi concerns reflect the fact that about 70 percent of the population of the main oil-producing areas of the Persian Gulf are Shiites. Iran’s rising influence in the region also incentivized the Abraham Accords as nervous Sunni-ruled states sought closer ties with Israel and the U.S.
From Iran’s point of view, Shiite geopolitical components can comprise a resistance front in confrontation with the great powers and create suitable avenues for the export of the Islamic revolution. The fall of the Baathist regime gave Iran an opportunity to align Shiite ideology with Shiite geopolitics and strengthen an “axis of resistance” in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory.
Iran’s future influence depends on the stabilization in the respective political structures of groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi Shiite parties, Yemeni Houthis, and the Alawites of Syria and Turkey. On this basis, the pattern of Iran’s support for its proxies in the region is distinct, and includes a range of topics from ideological mobilization, networking, institution building, and monetary aid to operational doctrine, arms, and military training.
U.S. policy toward the Middle East has historically sought to prevent the rise of a regional superpower. The end of Saddam Hussein’s reign allowed Iran to challenge this order in line with its interests, but those challenges also sparked backlashes in the form of the Abraham Accords and resentment of Iranian influence within Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Given the recent announcement of a reconciliation deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran—brokered by Iraq and concluded by China—it remains to be seen whether and how the region’s Sunni and Shiite powers can stabilize the regional order.
Javad Heiran-Nia directs the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Persian Gulf Security Orders. Follow him on Twitter at @J_Heirannia. Photo: U.S. Army/Spc. Kieran Cuddihy.
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