Japan’s National Security Strategy & the Two Koreas

Views From the Next Generation
Japan must remain vigilant to North Korea’s activities and reinstate relations with South Korea

By  Yasuyo Sakata

On December 16, 2022, Japan revised its three key national security documents under the Kishida administration, ten years after the first national security strategy was issued in 2013 under the Abe administration. Under these revised documents, Japan has decided to revamp its defense posture and beef up its defense budget to two percent of GDP in the next five to ten years. What are the implications for the Korean peninsula? How does Japan see North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) and South Korea (the Republic of Korea, ROK), the former as a security threat and the latter as a security partner? What does this mean for Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation?

North Korea remains “an even more grave and imminent threat … than ever before” for Japan’s security, while the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) identifies China as a highest-priority matter of “serious concern” and “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge” for Japan and the international community.

North Korea has been designated as “a grave and imminent threat” in Japan’s defense policy since 2018, but recent developments have increased the level of threat perception. After Chairman Kim Jong-un laid out a five-year military development plan at the Eighth Korean Workers’ Party Congress in early 2021, North Korea has prioritized progress in its missile program as the “top priority” and accelerated the pace of its missile tests. In 2022, North Korea conducted 37 missile tests, including firing over 90 missiles total, of which 66 were ballistic missiles according to Nikkei. In particular, a Hwasong-12 IRBM-class ballistic missile test in early October triggered the J-ALERT missile alert system for the first time in five years, alarming the Japanese public.

In response to these developments, the 2022 NSS mostly emphasizes strengthening deterrence and defense with the United States and ROK, while also reiterating continued efforts toward “complete denuclearization” of North Korea which includes the pressure and dialogue approach, i.e., “fully implementing” economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts in “close coordination with the U.S. and the ROK.” At the Phnom Penh, Cambodia summit in November, President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio endorsed the Yoon administration’s “Audacious Initiative,” its diplomatic policy towards North Korea. Bilaterally, comprehensive resolution of the outstanding issues of concern, i.e., “abductions, nuclear, and missile issues” in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration (2002) was maintained. One issue that was not highlighted in the 2022 NSS was the North Korea cyber threat, though Japan does not take that lightly. “Active cyber defense” in cybersecurity is one of the features of the 2022 NSS. While not naming any particular entity, North Korea is one of the top priorities on Japan’s list of concerns.

Second, Japan has officially acknowledged South Korea as an Indo-Pacific security partner, though bilateral relations are not yet fully normalized. For Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the Japan-U.S.- Australia-India “Quad” partnership is the most featured framework, but reflecting South Korea’s Indo-Pacific shift and the Kishida-Yoon summitry, the 2022 NSS included South Korea as a “like-minded” partner in the FOIP. Since last May, Kishida and ROK President Yoon Suk-yeol have made efforts to fix badly damaged relations, working together to find a solution to the 2018 Korean Supreme Court ruling on Korean wartime laborers while pursuing strategic alignment on North Korea and broader Indo-Pacific security alongside the U.S., a common ally. Although hesitant at first, Kishida made a diplomatic shift and held an official bilateral summit with Yoon on November 13 on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh, when Yoon also announced South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy ahead of the summit at the ROK-ASEAN conference. The two leaders “welcomed each other’s vision for the Indo-Pacific and concurred on aligning their collective efforts in pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific, that is inclusive, resilient, and secure.” 

Lastly, the 2022 NSS reiterates Japan’s interest in enhancing Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral relations. Due to the Biden administration’s vigorous efforts to revitalize the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral with the Kishida and Yoon administrations, the three countries’ leaders committed to the first-ever summit level statement on November 13, 2022, right after the Japan-ROK summit. The Phnom Penh Statement on Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific is a very comprehensive document, covering a range of issues from North Korea, the broader Indo-Pacific security environment, Ukraine, military security, economic security (including the launch of a trilateral economic security dialogue), and global issues.

The 2022 NSS reflects the trilateral summit statement and mentions that Japan will enhance Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK strategic coordination “with response to North Korea and other issues in mind.” The NSS document highlights “Japan-U.S.-ROK and Japan-U.S.-Australia” as frameworks to build a multilayered framework based on the Japan-U.S. alliance, and to enhance security cooperation with “Australia, India, the ROK, European countries, Canada, NATO, EU, and others.” The main focus of Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation is North Korea and defense cooperation. In response to the heightened level of threat from North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, trilateral consultation and cooperation on extended deterrence, missile defense, and new counterstrike capabilities—to be acquired by Japan as stated in the 2022 NSS—will be absolutely necessary.

Yet, bilateral relations with South Korea are still complex. The 2022 NSS refers to South Korea as a “highly important neighboring country” both in “a geopolitical context” and to “Japan’s security,” and Japan will “enhance Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK strategic coordination.” This is the main stance and objective vis-à-vis South Korea in the 2022 NSS, but “issues of concern” were also addressed. Among these issues, the NSS explicitly mentioned the territorial dispute over the Takeshima (Dokdo in Korean) islets, to which the Yoon government quickly responded in protest. For trilateral defense cooperation to become more stable and to restore trust, Japan and the ROK will also have to reckon with the military incidents of 2018, including when a ROK Navy ship radar locked on to a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (SDF) patrol plane.

Japan’s 2022 NSS acknowledges the increased threat from the North and the need to fix relations with South Korea. Japan’s relations with the Korean peninsula have never been easy, but with the larger strategic context in mind, staying vigilant about North Korea’s activities and reinstating relations with South Korea is necessary. That should be done bilaterally with South Korea and trilaterally with Japan’s ally, the United States, through U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation.

Yasuyo Sakata is Professor of International Relations at Kanda University of International Studies (KUIS) in Japan.

Recent & Related

Commentary
Rachel Minyoung Lee
Commentary
Peter Makowsky • Iliana Ragnone • Jenny Town

Subscription Options

* indicates required

Research Areas

Pivotal Places

Publications & Project Lists

38 North: News and Analysis on North Korea